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ABSTRACT 
Government statistics suggest that around one-third of children and young people do not 
make the expected progress in reading comprehension and text production during 
secondary school (Department for Education, 2015a; 2015b). Inference generation 
abilities are at the core of skilled models of comprehension (e.g. Kintsch, 1988; Zwaan, 
2003). However, previous research exploring the development of inference generation 
abilities typically compares a child group (9years or less) with an adult group (18years or 
over). To assess literal, coherence inference and elaborative inference processing in real-
world and counterfactual-world conditions in a wide age-range a new measure was 
created: the Image Selection Task (IST). The IST embeds a self-paced reading 
methodology and forced-choice picture-selection task into short stories to explore 
changes in inference generation skill (number of errors) and time-course (speed). The IST 
was found to be a valid measure of inference generation abilities and, due to reducing 
demands on translation and expressive language processes, potentially a purer measure 
than existing tasks which utilise verbal response methods. The IST was used to explore 
age-related changes in inference generation abilities in Year 5, Year 7, Year 9 and adults 
using a cross-sectional design. Findings suggest that inference generation skill plays a 
role in both reading comprehension and text production during adolescence, with skill 
increasing until Year 7. Error patterns suggest that coherence inferences were no more 
difficult than elaborative inferences for Years 5, 7 and adults. Year 9, however, found 
coherence inference generation more difficult than elaborative inference generation. 
Inference generation speed was found to improve until Year 9 for both real-world and 
counterfactual-world information, with time-course patterns comparable across all age 
groups, such that, in real-world and counterfactual-world conditions, coherence 
inferences were generated online and elaborative inferences offline. Real-world 
coherence inference generation skill was found to be underpinned by knowledge during 
adolescence. Both knowledge and inhibitory control appear to play a role in real-world 
elaborative inference generation skill during adolescence. Counterfactual-world 
inferences were both found to be underpinned by belief biases and inhibitory control. 
However, the direction of effect of inhibitory control reversed (from positive to negative) 
in Year 9. Further research is needed to explore whether this effect is specific to the 
current sample or more generalisable. Based on the findings, educational 
recommendations are provided, including suggestions for assessment and activities at 
specific points in the reading process. The recommended activities focus on promoting 
those skills underpinning inference generation. 
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OVERVIEW 
 
This thesis is split into three parts. Part 1 is concerned with reviewing the existing body 
of research exploring inference generation abilities. Therefore, a literature review is 
presented in Chapter 1. Part 2 of this thesis focuses on inference generation task selection, 
design, and evaluation. A review of current inference generation measures is presented in 
Chapter 2. This review revealed that no one measure is suitable for the assessment of both 
inference generation skill and time-course across a wide-range of age groups. Therefore, 
a new researcher-designed inference generation measure is introduced at the end of 
Chapter 2: The Image Selection Task (IST). The study reported in Chapter 3 evaluated 
the appropriateness of the inference-evoking texts and pictorial stimuli used in the IST. 
The study reported in Chapter 4 evaluated the utility of the IST by comparing patterns of 
results from the IST with those of an existing measure using the same methodology. The 
IST was found to be a valid measure of inference generation. Part 3 of this thesis presents 
the data and analysis of one large study conducted using the IST to assess inference 
generation abilities during adolescence. The methodology underpinning the large study 
is reported in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6 a relationship between inference generation and 
reading comprehension and text production is established. The reading comprehension 
ages of each age group were also explored, resulting in the construction of four new 
groups, split by reading comprehension age instead of chronological age. These reading 
comprehension age groups were used to conduct additional analysis in Chapters 7 and 8. 
The developmental trajectory of inferential skill (number of errors) and time-course 
(speed) was explored in Chapter 7 and the development of those cognitive skills 
underpinning inference generation during adolescence was explored in Chapter 8. A 
general discussion of findings is presented in Chapter 9.  
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Part 1: A Literature Review  
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CHAPTER 1 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The ability to successfully comprehend a text is one of the most important skills a child 
or young person (CYP) must develop, given the importance of reading comprehension to 
educational success and later professional success (Cain & Oakhill, 2006a; Meneghetti, 
Carretti, De Beni, 2006; National Center for Educational Statistics, 2009; 2011; Salahu-
Din, Persky, & Miller, 2008). However, between 2010 and 2015, around one third (31-
35%) of CYP finished Secondary School without achieving the literacy levels expected 
(Department for Education, 2015a). Government statistics suggest that some of these 
CYP did achieve age-related expectations (ARE) at the end of Primary School, such that 
only 11-17% of CYP completed Primary School without achieving literacy ARE between 
2005 and 2010. This suggests that for some CYP Secondary School presents challenges 
concerning the development of literacy skills. This is further evidenced by progress rates, 
such that between 2010 and 2015, less than one fifth (8-17%) of CYP failed to make the 
expected progress during Primary School, whereas around one third (27-31%) of CYP 
failed to make the expected progress during Secondary School (Department for Education, 
2015a). This suggests that some CYP have the literacy skills needed for success during 
Primary School but begin to struggle during Secondary School. The primary purpose of 
this thesis is to build upon the existing body of literature used to inform reading 
comprehension teaching and intervention during adolescence1.  
Reading comprehension is multi-faceted, resulting from the interaction of several skills, 
the exploration of all would be beyond the scope of this thesis (Kintsch 2012; Oakhill & 
Cain, 2011; Perfetti & Adlof, 2012; van den Broek, 2012). Therefore, for the reasons 
listed below, inference generation abilities are the focus of this thesis. Zwaan & Singer 
(2003) suggest that almost all aspects of comprehension are at least partially inferential, 
with inference generation at the heart of many skilled models of reading comprehension 
(Kintsch, 1988; van den Broek, Rapp, & Kendeou, 2005; Zwaan, 2003). Demands for 
inferential, as opposed to simply literal understanding, also increase as the CYP moves 
from Primary to Secondary School (AQA, 2013; Department of Education, 2013; Leach, 
Scarborough & Rescorla, 2003). Similarly, research exploring poor comprehenders, finds 
that whilst poor comprehenders are a heterogeneous group, many often have weak 
                                                 
 
1
 In this thesis adolescence refers to 9-10 years to adulthood (18 years and over). This range was selected 
as, as highlighted in Sections 1.1.2. and 1.2.2. this appears to be a potential period of qualitative change.  
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inference generation skills (Cain & Oakhill, 1999; Cain & Oakhill, 2006a; Cornoldi, de 
Beni, and Pazzaglia, 1996; Fletcher & Vaughn, 2009). Whilst teachers often identify 
weak inference generation skills as a need, in this researcher’s experience, teachers are 
often unable to go any further than this – i.e. state a specific class of inferences the CYP 
is struggling with, state which aspect of inference generation a CYP is struggling with, or 
provide a specific strategy to support the CYP. This suggests a lack of understanding of 
what inference generation is and what teachers should expect from a CYP at any given 
time. It is vital that a comprehensive understanding of the role of inference generation in 
the reading comprehension process during adolescence is held as this could support those 
CYP who are not making the progress expected during the Secondary School years. The 
typical development of inference generation abilities during adolescence is the focus of 
this thesis. See Figure 1.1 for an overview of this Chapter. 
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Figure 1.1. Summary of Chapter 1 
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1.1. Real-World Inference Generation 
 
Comprehension is more than the simple decoding of words. It is the ability to extract the 
relevant (and often implicit) meaning of a text. Van Dijk and Kintsch (1983) propose 
three levels of mental representation of a text: surface-level, propositional-level, and 
situational-level – see Figure 1.2. The surface-level is a verbatim representation of the 
words and phrases presented in the text. The propositional-level represents the explicit 
semantic meaning of the text but exact words and phrases are often lost. The situational-
level represents an integration of both the semantic meaning of the text and a reader’s 
relevant background knowledge.  Subsequently, the structure of the text is often lost, with 
information fitting into the reader’s pre-existing knowledge and beliefs. Unlike the 
preceding levels, the situational model is thought to contain both explicitly and implicitly 
stated information regarding the characters, objects, settings, events and actions (Graesser, 
Singer, & Trabasso, 1994; Schmalhofer, McDaniel & Keefe, 2002). The situational model 
is associated with true comprehension. The construction of a situational model of the text 
is thought to require more effort than the construction of either a surface- or propositional-
level model, however (e.g. Friese, Rutschmann, Raabe & Schmalhofer, 2008). The 
situational-level representation, though, is found to be more robust and long-lasting, being 
stored in long-term memory (Kintsch et al., 1990). For comprehension in the classroom, 
it is the information contained in the situational model that the CYP is likely to acquire 
and store (i.e. learn) and thus be able to retrieve at a later date (i.e. recall for use in an 
assessment). 
 
Figure 1.2. A Sample of a Schematic Representation of the Three Levels of Mental 
Representation 
Several theories have been proposed to explain the construction of a situational model 
(e.g. Kintsch, 1988; 1998; Kintsch & Van Dijk, 1978; van den Broek et al., 2005; van den 
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Broek, Young, Tzeng, & Linderholm, 1999; Zwaan, 2003). The fundamentals of most 
skilled models are the same, therefore, whilst discussion and evaluation of all of these 
models is beyond the scope of this thesis it is possible to briefly outline the general 
principles of mental model construction. Knowledge is thought to be activated via an 
associative mechanism whilst reading. The knowledge and text activated in the reader’s 
working memory are integrated into the reader’s mental model following several cycles 
of iteration, whereby strong connections become stronger and weaker connections are 
lost. Additionally, most models converge to suggest that for full comprehension – i.e. for 
an enriched situational model to be constructed – inferences are needed. For example, 
consider the passage below: 
“Lucy was in the woods. It was getting dark and she had not eaten all day. Lucy spotted 
a rabbit to her right. She crouched down low and then slowly began to sneak up on the 
rabbit, one paw at a time. When she was close enough, she pounced. Her tail wagged as 
she tucked into her meal.” 
To fully understand even this short passage several inferences must be made. The reader 
must infer that Lucy is a dog, it is early evening, Lucy is hungry, therefore she wanted to 
catch the rabbit and eat it, Lucy snuck up on the rabbit so it didn’t run away, Lucy caught 
the rabbit and ate it. The reader must also make a connection between ‘Lucy’ and ‘she’. 
The reader could also make additional inferences concerning the breed and colour of dog, 
the colour and size of rabbit, etc. Inferences are thus fundamental to successful mental 
model construction, with the number and range of possible inferences numerous. 
Whilst inference generation is positioned at the heart of situational model construction, 
inference generation appears to be a distinct process, above and beyond literal 
understanding. Neuroimaging research finds that when participants read a text that 
requires an inference, those brain areas associated with literal text comprehension are 
activated along with several other areas (typically the inferior prefrontal gyrus and 
superior temporal gyrus; e.g. Jin, Liu, Mo, Fang, Zhang & Lin, 2009; Jung-Beeman, 2005; 
Kim, Yoon, Kim, Lee & Kang, 2012; Mason & Just, 2004; Prat, Mason & Just, 2011; 
Virtue, Parish, & Jung-Beeman, 2008). Those additional areas of the brain activated when 
reading texts requiring an inference are related to skills and processes such as the selection 
of appropriate knowledge, semantic integration and detection of inconsistencies (Tyler & 
Marslen-Wilson, 2008; Zhang, Feng, Fox, Gao & Tan, 2004; Zhu, Zhang, Wang, Xiao, 
Huang & Chen, 2009). Given its unique and distinct nature, specific exploration of the 
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inference generation process during adolescence may prove fruitful in furthering 
understanding of reading comprehension during this time. Understanding which 
inferences CYP generate whilst reading and the processes underpinning this is vital if 
specific literacy needs are to be identified for those making slow progress during the 
Secondary School years. 
1.1.1. Categorisation of Inference Types 
 
Although different terminology may be used, two distinct types of inference are 
consistently identified: 1) coherence and 2) elaborative (e.g. Graesser et al., 1994; Singer 
& Ferreira, 1983). Coherence inferences refer to those inferences essential for the 
construction of a coherent mental representation of a text. They may link a referent to its 
owner or link explicitly stated information by drawing upon existing background 
knowledge to bridge a gap – see Table 1.1. for examples and Section 1.1.1.2.1. for further 
discussion. Elaborative inferences are not necessary for maintaining coherence, but do 
create a more enriched representation of the text – see Table 1.1. for examples and Section 
1.1.1.2.2. for further discussion. Several different types of inference fall into each 
category. Consequently, comprehensive categorisation systems have been developed. 
Table 1.1 provides an overview of the thirteen different classes of inference outlined by 
Graesser et al. (1994). 
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Table 1.1. Graesser, Singer, & Trabasso’s (1994) Inference Taxonomy 
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As can be seen from Table 1.1., the number of inferences that could be drawn whilst 
reading is numerous. However, a reader’s processing capacity is limited. Therefore, it is 
unlikely that all possible inferences are drawn whilst reading. One of the most prominent 
and controversial areas of investigation in inference generation is thus determining the 
time-course of different inference types. Specifically, which inferences are generated 
online and which inferences are generated offline. Online inferences are those inferences 
drawn whilst reading. The time-course of their generation is argued to be rapid, since they 
are drawn with no or little strategic effort (e.g. Bowyer-Crane & Snowling, 2010; Calvo, 
Castillo, & Schmalhofer, 2006; Ford & Milosky, 2008).  Offline inferences are those that 
require strategic effort and, as a result, are not drawn whilst reading. The time-course of 
offline inference generation is argued to be significantly longer than the inferential time-
course of online inferences (e.g. Campion, 2004; Calvo et al., 2006).  
Online inferences are those inferences generated whilst reading, with minimal strategic 
effort – i.e. automatically. However, this definition seems to conflict with the definition 
of reading comprehension being the result of a complex interaction between a variety of 
skills and processes (e.g. Kintsch 2012; Oakhill & Cain, 2011; Perfetti & Adlof, 2012; 
van den Broek, 2012). The nature of an online inference must be understood within the 
wider context of reading comprehension. Automaticity is not absolute but relative, such 
that automatic processing occurs faster and as the result of less conscious effort than 
strategic processing (Thurlow & van den Broek, 1997). Knowledge-based inferences 
depend on the activation and integration of the necessary knowledge from long-term 
memory (Graesser et al., 1994). Therefore, if the knowledge necessary for inference 
generation is not automatically activated the reader may have to engage in a conscious, 
strategic search of long-term memory (Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995). In this case, inference 
generation would be offline. When reading, knowledge related to the text is thought to be 
automatically activated via associative mechanisms (Kintsch, 1988; van den Broek et al., 
1999; 2004). The knowledge must then be integrated with text nodes and a link formed 
(Graesser et al., 1994; Kintsch, 1998). This process is more demanding than making no 
connection between knowledge and real-world information, such that texts evoking 
inferences result in longer reading speeds and higher levels of brain activity (e.g. Casteel, 
1993; Virtue, Haberman, Clancy, Parrish, & Jung-Beeman, 2006). However, when a 
strategic search of long-term memory is not required, this process is routinely found to 
occur within 400ms (Garrod, O'Brien, Morris, & Rayner, 1990). Skilled models of 
reading comprehension suggest that text is processed in cycles (occurring at the end of a 
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sentence, clause or phrase), with each cycle taking no more than 400ms (Kintsch, 1998). 
Therefore, within the bounds of reading comprehension, an online, automatic inference 
is one that is activated and fully integrated into the situational model within 400ms. 
Conversely, an offline, strategic inference can be defined as an inference that, whilst not 
integrated into the situational model within 400ms, can, with a strategic and conscious 
search of long-term memory, still be generated when the reader is given more time.  
1.1.1.1. Experimentally Determining the Online-Offline Nature of an Inference 
 
Inference generation measures assessing the online-offline nature of different inference 
types are underpinned by two assumptions. First, as discussed above, the generation of a 
link between two or more text-based ideas and the reader’s existing background 
knowledge is more demanding than literal processing (e.g. Casteel, 1993; Virtue et al., 
2006). Therefore, measures that tap the inferential time-course whilst reading (e.g. 
reading speeds, eye movements, brain-imaging) conclude that an inference has been 
drawn online if more cognitive effort is observed compared to the processing of explicit 
information (measured by slower reading speeds, increased regressions and longer 
fixations, and increased neuronal activity). Second, online inferences are integrated into 
the situational model within 400ms at which point they should be readily accessible in 
the reader’s working memory in the same way as explicitly stated information. Therefore, 
inference generation measures that tap the inferential time-course by recording responses 
after reading (e.g. lexical decision, naming, validation) conclude that an inference has 
been drawn online if the inferential item is responded to just as fast as explicitly stated 
information. This is known as a facilitation effect. See Chapter 2 for discussion of current 
inferential assessment tools. 
1.1.1.2. The Constructionist Theory 
 
The Constructionist Theory, proposed by Graesser et al. (1994) has three critical 
assumptions: 
1. The reader goal assumption – the reader will attempt to construct a situational 
model of the text that addresses their specific goals. 
2. The coherence assumption – the reader will attempt to construct a situational 
model that is both locally and globally coherent. 
3. The explanation assumption – the reader will attempt to construct a situational 
model that explains why particular events and actions have occurred. 
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As can be seen from Table 1.1., Graesser et al. (1994) propose three general classes of 
inferences: coherence inferences, elaborative inferences, and pragmatic communicative 
exchange inferences. Based on the three assumptions outlined above the Constructionist 
Theory predicts that coherence inferences are routinely drawn online whereas elaborative 
and pragmatic communicative exchange inferences are drawn offline. These predictions 
were supported by Graesser et al. (1994) using a three-pronged method, combining verbal 
protocols (think-aloud and question-answering, question-asking tasks), timed behavioural 
measures (reading speeds, response latencies on naming and lexical decision tasks) and 
theoretical predictions. The Constructionist Theory acknowledges that there will be 
exceptions to these predictions. For instance, if the reader’s goal is simply to proofread, 
as opposed to comprehend the text; they are unlikely to be seeking coherence or 
explanations. Moreover, whilst, for the sake of simplicity, Graesser et al. (1994) make a 
dichotomous distinction between online and offline inferences, they recognise that in 
reality the online-offline nature of inferences will run on a continuum. 
1.1.1.2.1. Coherence Inferences 
 
Coherence inferences are those that form a link between ideas both explicitly stated in the 
text and those that can be implied. Typically, this requires the activation and integration 
of background knowledge from long-term memory. As can be seen from Table 1.1., 
according to Graesser et al. (1994), a number of inferences fall into this category: 
Referential, Case Structure Role Assignment, Causal Antecedent, Superordinate Goal, 
Thematic, and Character Emotional Reaction. The most commonly researched coherence 
inference is the causal antecedent inference which bridges two ideas or concepts together. 
“Jack wanted a cup of tea, but there was no milk. Jack put on his coat and headed to the 
shop.” 
To understand why Jack headed to the shop it is necessary to link the second sentence 
with the first by inferring that Jack was going to the shop to buy some milk. To do this 
the reader must first activate the mediating idea that shops sell milk from their background 
knowledge. Without this link, the two sentences would appear unrelated and incoherent. 
Coherence inferences are consistently found to be drawn online (e.g. Bowyer-Crane & 
Snowling, 2010; Bloom, Fletcher, van den Broek, Reitz, & Shapiro, 1990; Casteel, 1993; 
Ford & Milosky, 2008; Kim et al., 2012; Long, Seely, & Oppy, 1996; Prat et al., 2011; 
Suh & Trabasso, 1993; Virtue et al., 2006; 2008). Specifically, the knowledge needed for 
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coherence inferences is thought to be automatically activated via associative mechanisms 
and have strong and numerous connections to other nodes within the model. In addition, 
the Constructionist Theory suggests that constructionist processes may heighten the 
strength of a connection if it provides coherence or an explanation. Therefore, when 
iteration occurs the coherence inference is strongly activated and quickly integrated into 
the situational model (within 400ms).  
1.1.1.2.2. Elaborative inferences  
 
As can be seen from Table 1.1., a number of inference types are classified as elaborative: 
Causal Consequence, Instantiation of Noun Category, Instrument, Subordinate Goal-
Action, and Static. Like coherence inferences, the generation of elaborative inferences is 
dependent on the activation and integration of background knowledge from long-term 
memory.  
“The young girl was dusting when a huge wolf crept up behind her. As the girl turned 
around the wolf snarled and let out a terrifying howl.” 
The reader could generate numerous elaborative inferences from the text above. For 
instance, it could be inferred that the wolf is going to eat the girl (causal consequence), 
the girl was dusting with a cloth (instrumental), or the wolf has big sharp teeth (static). 
Whilst these inferences serve to enrich the text, they are not necessary for coherence. 
Moreover, as is often the case, that due to limited contextual constraints these inferences 
are not certain – e.g. the girl could be dusting with a feather duster, old rag, or even teddy 
bear. Due to limited working memory capacity, it is unlikely that the reader could 
generate and maintain all possible elaborative inferences whilst reading without 
overloading working memory (Baddeley, 1986; Just & Carpenter, 1992). Even if they 
could, this would likely be an inefficient use of resources as, due to multiple possibilities, 
as the text unfolds the explanations are likely to be revealed as erroneous (e.g. Albrecht, 
O’Brien, Mason, & Myers, 1995; Calvo et al., 2006). This is supported by the 
Schmalhofer et al. (2002) model of discourse processing, which - developed within 
Kintsch’s Construction-Integration model (Kintsch, 1988; 1998) - suggests that 
coherence and elaborative inference generation result from the same construction 
processes, but differ at the point of integration. Specifically, whilst coherence inferences 
are confirmed by the text and thus integrated, due to multiple possibilities, elaborative 
inferences are not. The Constructionist Theory (Graesser et al., 1994) predicts that 
elaborative inferences will be drawn offline (coherence assumption). There is a large body 
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of research supporting this, such that, typically, a facilitation effect is only observed for 
elaborative inferences after a time interval of 800ms – 1250ms (e.g. Calvo & Castillo, 
2001a; 2001b; Calvo et al., 2006; Campion & Rossi, 2001; Long & Golding, 1993).  
The Constructionist Theory (Graesser et al., 1994) suggests that constraining the context 
and thus minimising the number of plausible predictive inferences allows for the online 
generation of predictive inferences, however, as there are significantly fewer alternatives 
to forecast and thus working memory is not overloaded. This is supported by a number 
of studies finding that elaborative inferences are generated online when the stimuli used 
results in possibilities that are highly constrained by the text and/or knowledge needed to 
generate the elaborate inference is readily accessible (Calvo, 2000; Calvo, Castillo & 
Estevez, 1999; Jin et al., 2009; Klin, Guzmán, & Levine, 1999; Cook et al., 2001; Till, 
Mross, & Kintsch, 1988; Van Berkum, Brown, Zwitserlood, Kooijman, & Hagoort, 2005; 
Weingartner, Guzman, Levine, & Klin, 2003). Similarly, Virtue et al. (2008) have shown 
that predictability underpins the neural processing engaged in, such that highly 
constrained text results in a qualitatively different process to less constrained text.  This 
led Virtue et al. (2008) to conclude that individuals only generate inferences when textual 
constraints are low when they are forced to do so. 
Some studies have found facilitation effects for elaborative inferences after time intervals 
of 500ms or less without a highly-constrained context (e.g. Cook et al., 2001; Peracchi & 
O'Brien, 2004). These studies typically employ a self-paced reading methodology - 
through a series of button presses, the participant moves through the text at their own 
speed. It is argued that when a self-paced methodology is used the reader is able to 
anticipate when the test item will appear and predict what the intended elaborative 
inference will be (Calvo et al., 2006; Keenan, Baillet, & Brown, 1984). Consequently, 
participants are able to engage in the strategic processing needed to generate this inference 
before moving onto the test item. Therefore, by the time the test item is presented the 
reader has already activated the information needed to respond correctly. Elaborative 
inference items may appear to be responded to just as fast as coherence and literal items, 
but the elaborative inferential processing may actually be occurring offline.  
Facilitation effects have been observed for elaborative inferences after time intervals of 
400ms or less, even when anticipation effects have been controlled for using a Rapid 
Serial Visual Presentation methodology – see Chapter 2 (e.g. Fincher-Kiefer, 1995; 1996; 
Keefe & McDaniel, 1993; McKoon & Ratcliff, 1986, 1989). Whilst at first this appears 
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contradictory, the level to which an inference is encoded must be considered. Skilled 
models of reading comprehension suggest that the knowledge activation process is dumb 
(e.g. Kintsch, 1998). Subsequently, initially, knowledge needed for the generation of a 
range of elaborative inferences may be activated, but only minimally – i.e. low activation 
levels, limited connections. After several cycles of spreading activation, these nodes are 
likely to be pruned and thus not be integrated into the final situational model. In this way, 
whilst reading, an elaborative inference can be activated but only minimally encoded into 
the situational model. Facilitation effects for elaborative inferences after a time interval 
of 400ms or less may thus reflect inferences that have been minimally activated, but 
during the process of integration have not been encoded into the situational model, such 
that when tested after longer time intervals, integration has begun and a facilitation effect 
is no longer observed.  
In sum, numerous inference types exist with most of these falling within either the 
coherence inference category or elaborative inference category. Coherence inferences are 
thought to be generated with minimal effort due to the automatic activation of the 
necessary knowledge and strong and multiple links to other ideas and knowledge. For the 
most part, elaborative inferences are thought to be generated offline, such that whilst the 
necessary knowledge may be activated initially, due to multiple possibilities that are not 
constrained by the text, this knowledge is quickly pruned from the model, meaning the 
target elaborative inference must be drawn with strategic effort after reading. If a highly 
constraining context is presented, meaning few possibilities are likely, and/or knowledge 
needed is readily accessible elaborative inferences may also be generated online. 
Similarly, it is possible that elaborative inferences are minimally activated when reading, 
but through the process of integration are lost due to weak activation levels. These factors 
must be key considerations when assessing the generation of elaborative inferences. 
1.1.2. The Development of Inference Generation Abilities 
 
When exploring age-related changes this thesis refers to two types of development, 
quantitative and qualitative. Quantitative development refers to changes in quantity – i.e. 
increases or decreases in a particular skill. For example, if adults read critical texts faster 
than CYP this would be described as a quantitative change. Qualitative development, on 
the other hand, refers to different patterns across groups. For example, if, regardless of 
differences in speed, CYP generated coherence and elaborative inferences offline, 
whereas adults generated coherence and elaborative inferences online this would be 
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described as a qualitative change. Research finds that inference generation skill 
quantitatively improves with age, with adults displaying superior inference generation 
abilities compared to CYP (e.g. Ackerman, 1986, 1988; Barnes, Dennis, & Haefele-
Kalvaitis, 1996; Kendeou, Bohn-Gettler, White & van den Broek, 2008; Oakhill, Cain, & 
Bryant, 2003). This may be due to qualitative changes in inference generation abilities. 
Research finds that whilst very young children have the ability to generate inferences 
from a narrative, they do not do this spontaneously (e.g. Omanson, Warren & Trabasso, 
1978; Paris, Lindauer & Cox, 1977), with the ability to spontaneously generate inferences 
whilst reading thought to emerge at approximately 9 years (Casteel, 1993; Casteel & 
Simpson, 1991; Paris & Lindauer, 1976; Paris et al., 1977). After 9-10 years, there are 
thought to be no qualitative developments in the inference generation time-course. 
Consistent with the Constructionist Theory, research utilising online methodologies to 
explore the inferential time-course of CYP suggests that, CYP engage in a qualitatively 
similar process to adults, such that coherence inferences are generated online and 
elaborative inferences offline (e.g. Bowyer-Crane & Snowling, 2010; Casteel, 1993; Ford 
& Milosky, 2003; 2008).  
For instance, Casteel (1993) asked participants to read short texts containing a target 
sentence that evoked either a coherence inference, elaborative inference, or no inference 
(explicit). Reading speeds of the target sentence were recorded to obtain an online 
measure of inference generation. Casteel found that 9 year olds, 11 year olds, 14 year olds, 
and adults read sentences requiring a coherence inference slower than sentences that did 
not require an inference for understanding – i.e. elaborative and explicit. The slower 
reading speed observed for coherence-inference evoking sentences compared to other 
sentence types is indicative of the additional cognitive demands needed to generate an 
inference. This suggests that CYP as young as 9 years are able to spontaneously generate 
coherence inferences whilst reading. However, as will be discussed shortly, the texts used 
by Casteel were not reflective of texts used in the classroom. Additionally, sample sizes 
were small comprising ‘average’ readers, only such that participants were reading at the 
level expected for their age. It is possible that those CYP who are not making the expected 
progress during the Secondary School years are engaging in a different process to those 
CYP achieving age-related expectations. Therefore, inclusion of all typical developers 
(where typical development refers to those CYP with no known learning difficulty, 
performing within 2 standard deviations of the mean) is key to the development of a 
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comprehensive understanding of age-related changes in the inference generation time-
course. 
Whilst research suggests no qualitative developments in the inference generation time-
course after 9-10 years, quantitative improvements have been observed (e.g. Barnes et al., 
1996; Casteel & Simpson, 1991; Casteel, 1993). However, the age at which adult-like 
performance is achieved is unclear. For instance, Casteel and colleagues found that adult-
like performance is achieved in early adolescence (between 10 and 14 years; Casteel, 
1993; Casteel & Simpson, 1991). Conversely, Barnes et al. (1996) suggest that the 
development of inference generation abilities continues to develop throughout 
adolescence. Differences could be due to the complexity of stimuli used, such that whilst 
Casteel and colleagues employed short texts (the texts used by Casteel (1993) are just 
four sentences long) Barnes et al. (1996) employed longer texts, more indicative of texts 
used in the classroom. Therefore, basic inference generation skills may reach adult-like 
levels at an early age, but other factors such as distance between information to be 
integrated and syntactic complexity may determine how successfully inference 
generation skills can be applied (Duffy & Rayner, 1990; Ehrlich & Rayner, 1983; German 
& Nichols, 2003). Moreover, whilst Casteel and colleagues used yes or no questions, 
Barnes et al. (1996) used open-ended questions. Cain and Oakhill (2006b) suggest that 
yes or no questions are easier than open-ended questions since when answering a yes or 
no question the inference is explicitly stated. In addition, Barnes et al. (1996) primed the 
knowledge needed to successfully generate the target inferences to control for knowledge. 
The results of Barnes et al. may reflect a different process to that employed when reading 
naturally.  
In sum, those studies that have explored inference generation at different points during 
adolescence, are inconsistent, with adult-like performance being achieved at different 
ages in different studies. This may be due to methodological differences. Research 
converges to suggest quantitative gains in inference generation abilities between 
childhood and adulthood, but no qualitative differences after 9-10 years. Current research 
is largely limited to ‘average’ readers, however. Therefore, those CYP who are making 
slower than expected progress during the Secondary School years are not currently 
represented. Further research exploring age-related changes in the inference generation 
abilities of an adolescent sample reflective of the current typical UK school-aged 
population is needed. 
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1.2. Learning from Fiction: Counterfactual-World Inference Generation 
A 
To be successful in the classroom, and beyond, CYP must be able to engage with not just 
non-fiction texts, but fictional resources too. Fictional texts are central to the enrichment 
and reinforcement of subject knowledge. For example, CYP may learn about historical 
events by reading texts such as ‘Goodnight Mr Tom’ (Magorian, 1981). CYP may learn 
about and reinforce their understanding of difficult scientific concepts that often require 
‘what if’ thinking by engaging with text-based materials such as ‘The Sarah Jane 
Adventures’ (bbc bitesize, 2014; Chandrasekharan & Nersessian, 2007), with teachers 
advocating the use of science fiction texts in the classroom to encourage scientific 
thinking (Dubeck, Bruce, Schmuckler, Moshier, & Boss, 1990). Fictional texts, 
particularly fantasy and science-fiction texts are often read for pleasure by CYP (Clark & 
Foster, 2005; Clark & Rumbold, 2006; Zirinksky & Rau, 2001). Reading for pleasure 
allows for the practice and development of sophisticated comprehension skills, with 
positive correlations observed between reading habits and ability to comprehend complex 
texts (Cain & Oakhill, 2011; Moje et al., 2008 Cipielewski & Stanovich, 1997).  
Fictional texts can present ideas, and thus require a level of understanding, that runs 
counter to actual events and/or an individual’s real-world knowledge. Subsequently, a 
counterfactual-world inference is needed. A counterfactual-world inference is an 
inference drawn from information that violates real-world knowledge. It has been argued 
that there are two types of counterfactual-world information: plausible and implausible 
(e.g. Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002; McMullen & Markman, 2002). Plausible 
counterfactual-world information includes “if only” statements (e.g. “if only I hadn’t 
missed the bus, I wouldn’t have been late for work”) and are also known as 
‘hypotheticals’. Implausible counterfactual-world information includes information that 
attempts to manipulate physical laws such as time – i.e. events that would be impossible 
in the real-world (Byrne, 2007; Zwaan, Langston, & Graesser, 1995). Implausible 
counterfactual-world information is thought to be more difficult to process than plausible 
counterfactual-world information (e.g. Kulakova, Aichhorn, Schurz, Kronbichler, & 
Perner, 2013; Zwaan et al., 1995). However, perhaps due to their commonality, fairy-tales 
and the events within them – i.e. talking animals – although impossible in the real-world 
are thought of as plausible counterfactual-world information (e.g. Zwaan et al., 1995). 
Counterfactual-world plausibility is thus best considered on a scale, with completely 
implausible information at one end, very plausible information at the other, and the 
information in most fairy-tales and fantasy texts falling somewhere in the middle.  
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Counterfactual-world inferences, particularly those generated from implausible 
information, may require the reader to integrate two ideas that would not normally be 
connected and may share a connection within the book that is impossible in the real-world. 
It is important to understand (a) how real-world inferences are generated when presented 
in a counterfactual-world context and (b) how counterfactual-world inferences are 
generated in fantasy and fiction texts. Exploration of (a) is important as information 
regarding cultural, political, and historical climates may be inferred from fantasy and 
fiction texts. Moreover, information regarding scientific processes may be inferred from 
science-fiction texts. Exploration of (b) is important as the counterfactual-world inference 
generation process may differ from the real-world inference generation process. 
Understanding how real-world and counterfactual-world inferential processes differ and 
the additional challenges counterfactual-world inferences present is essential to providing 
recommendations for the promotion of these inferences in the classroom. This section 
explores counterfactual-world inference generation by drawing upon not only research 
specifically exploring counterfactual-world inference generation, but also research 
exploring counterfactual-world text processing and counterfactual-world reasoning. 
 
1.2.1. Counterfactual-World Text Processing 
Research exploring counterfactual-world processing routinely finds that counterfactual-
world processing results from a different, more demanding process than real-world 
processing (e.g. Ferguson, 2012; Ferguson & Sanford, 2008; Ferguson, Sanford & 
Leuthold, 2008; Kulakova et al., 2013; Robinson & Beck, 2000). Specifically, 
counterfactual-world processing is thought to result in the representation of both the 
actual (real-world) and the alternate (counterfactual-world) state of events (Johnson-Laird 
& Byrne, 2002; Kulakova et al., 2013). To prevent confusion between what is real and 
what is not, it is argued that the individual dissociates real-world and counterfactual-
world information by constructing at least two mental models: real-world and 
counterfactual-world (Byrne, 2007). Some argue that the models are represented 
simultaneously (see the Mental Model Theory, Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). Others 
argue that the models are created and represented sequentially (see the Suppositional 
Theory; Evans, Over & Handley, 2002). Regardless of when the two models are 
represented, Roese, Sanna, & Galinsky, (2005) argue that if the counterfactual-world is 
to be fully comprehended, the two models must be compared at some point. The real-
world information, though, is likely to directly contrast with the counterfactual-world 
information, resulting in conflict, which must be resolved if the counterfactual-world is 
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to be processed successfully (e.g. Byrne, 2007; Ferguson, 2012). This effect will be 
referred to as real-world interference. 
When recalling a counterfactual-world text participants are found to exhibit real-world 
interference, such that they recall information consistent with real-world knowledge 
rather than the text (Ceci, Caves, & Howe, 1981; Dorfman, 1989; Dorfman & Brewer, 
1988). For instance, Ceci et al. (1981) found interference effects when participants 
recalled a counterfactual-world text a week after hearing. However, they did not find 
interference effects when texts were recalled after an immediate delay. This suggests 
interference may not be present whilst reading counterfactual-world texts, or at least not 
at the same level. As highlighted by Bartlett’s (1932) seminal study, the texts individuals 
read and hear are argued to be stored within existing real-world schemas, such that recall 
reflects participants’ beliefs and experiences more so than the original text. It may thus 
be the storage process that results in interference, not comprehension. Additionally, recall 
measures are subject to conscious construction processes that do not operate whilst 
reading (see Chapter 2 for a full discussion). The participant may thus consciously 
evaluate any real-world violations when recalling a text, although these violations may 
not have been considered when reading.   
Many choose to read fantasy and fiction texts for pleasure (e.g. Clark & Foster, 2005). If 
the processing of counterfactual-world text was cognitively taxing due to the need to 
continuously resolve conflict experienced due to real-world interference it is unlikely that 
these texts would be so popular, it is even less likely that readers would report an 
immersion into the fantasy world (Green & Brock, 2000). Those studies suggesting that 
readers experience disruption due to real-world interference may not reflect the natural 
online reading process. Some suggest that when reading naturally, counterfactual-world 
text comprehension does not require the comparison of real-world and counterfactual-
world models that counterfactual-world reasoning does (Gilbert, Krull, & Malone, 1990; 
Markman & McMullen, 2003; 2005; McMullen, 1997; McMullen & Markman, 2000; 
Rader & Sloutsky, 2002). This is supported by a growing body of research that employs 
online methods such as reading speeds, tracking of eye movements and brain-imaging to 
explore counterfactual-world text processing. 
Recent research suggests that when processing counterfactual-world texts, some initial 
real-world interference may be experienced, as the reader sets up a counterfactual-world 
model, however, once the counterfactual-world model is set up, the conflict experienced 
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is quickly accommodated (e.g. Ferguson, 2012; Hald, Stennbeek-Planting & Hagoort, 
2007; Warren, McConnell & Raynor, 2008). For instance, Ferguson (2012) employed 
measures of eye movements to explore the representation of the plausible counterfactual-
world mental model whilst reading. Participants read critical sentences that were preceded 
by either a sentence providing a counterfactual-world context or a sentence providing a 
real-world context. Within each critical text was a critical word that was either consistent 
or inconsistent with the preceding context. This created four conditions: 1) real-world 
consistent, 2) counterfactual-world consistent, 3) counterfactual-world inconsistent and 
4) real-world inconsistent. See Table 1.2. for example stimuli. Eye movements and 
reading speeds were recorded. Reading speeds of the critical word were found to be longer 
in the counterfactual-world consistent condition compared to all other conditions. This 
suggests some form of additional processing and possible disruption. However, regressive 
eye movements were significantly higher upon encountering the critical word in the 
counterfactual-world inconsistent condition compared to counterfactual-world consistent 
condition and real-world inconsistent condition. Ferguson suggests that participants did 
not regress back to the critical word in the counterfactual-world consistent condition as 
the additional reading time was used to set up a counterfactual-world model, upon which 
new counterfactual-world information can be directly mapped. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.2. Example Stimuli from Ferguson (2012), showing regions of analysis 
 
 
Research has found that the strength of preceding context mediates the level of 
interference faced, with stronger (i.e. longer or explicit) contexts resulting in less 
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interference – i.e. immediate accommodation - and weaker contexts resulting in 
accommodation after a delay (e.g. Nieuwland, 2013; Nieuwland & Martin, 2012; 
Niewland & van Berkum, 2006). For instance, Nieuwland and van Berkum (2006) 
explored the processing of implausible counterfactual-world information in 
counterfactual-world contexts and real-world contexts in two ERP experiments. They 
used stories in which inanimate objects experienced human emotions and engaged in 
human actions (e.g. falling in love, dancing). They found that anomaly effects (N400 
effects) were observed for implausible information in a real-world context, but not 
implausible information in a counterfactual-world context. The critical word in 
Nieuwland and van Berkum’s (2006) study was presented to participants alongside the 
predicate that made the inanimate object animate four times before it is presented as the 
critical text. It is likely, then, that this facilitated the set-up of a counterfactual-world 
model before the critical text was encountered, resulting in minimal interference effects.  
It appears that counterfactual-world models can also be stored and become part of the 
reader’s knowledge-base, supporting later counterfactual-world text processing. Filik and 
colleagues explored counterfactual-world text processing using fictional, but familiar 
scenarios (e.g. Harry Potter, Tom & Jerry) – see Table 1.3. for example stimuli. Whilst 
the nature of the scenarios used by Filik and colleagues was implausible (e.g. magic, 
talking animals), the characters were already known to participants, with most 
participants having expectations about characters’ behaviours and actions. Filik and 
colleagues found minimal real-world interference for counterfactual-world critical texts 
in counterfactual-world contexts, such that the fixation on the critical world, indicative of 
counterfactual-world mental model construction, was not observed (Filik, 2008; Filik & 
Leuthold, 2008; 2013). Interference was observed in counterfactual-world conditions 
when characters did not behave in the way expected, however. This suggests that 
additional set-up time was not needed initially as the participants already possessed the 
counterfactual-world model needed.  
Filik and colleagues also found that anomalies were more easily accommodated for 
fictional characters in the counterfactual-world inconsistent condition than real-world 
characters in the real-world inconsistent condition. This suggests that the counterfactual-
world models possessed by participants were more flexible than the real-world models, 
such that fewer constraints were placed on the characters observed (Filik, 2008; Filik & 
Leuthold, 2008; 2013).  
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Table 1.3. Example Stimuli for Filik & Leuthold (2013) 
 
In sum, it appears that when reading counterfactual-world texts some initial real-world 
interference may be experienced as the reader sets up a counterfactual-world model. 
However, the counterfactual-world model is then used to map incoming counterfactual-
world information onto, meaning disruption is minimal. Research suggests that 
counterfactual-world models can be stored in the reader’s knowledge-base allowing the 
reader to process new text, set within the counterfactual-world, without the additional set-
up costs. The research discussed above largely focused on literal understanding, however. 
Research exploring counterfactual-world inference generation appears inconsistent. 
However, as discussed next, the differences observed may reflect age-related changes in 
counterfactual-world inference generation processing. 
1.2.2. The Development of Counterfactual-World Inference Generation 
 
Research exploring the development of implausible counterfactual-world inference 
generation suggests that rather than developing with age, the ability to generate 
implausible counterfactual-world inferences declines with age (Ceci et al., 1981; 
Dorfman, 1989; Dorfman & Brewer, 1988). Dorfman and colleagues found that adults 
displayed more difficulty when generating counterfactual-world inferences than CYP. 
CYP aged 7-8 years, 9-10 years, 11-12 years, and adults were asked to read known and 
novel fables. Participants were then asked to explain the point or moral of the fable – i.e. 
generate a thematic inference. Adults struggled to generate the thematic inference when 
it was inconsistent with their real-world knowledge more so than CYP, with a negative 
relationship observed between the strength of the necessary knowledge-base and ability 
to draw thematic inferences from information that violated said knowledge-base. 
However, offline measures of inference generation were employed. As discussed above, 
measures of counterfactual-world processing taken after reading may overestimate the 
real-world interference faced whilst reading. 
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Bowyer-Crane and Snowling (2010) used a timed sentence verification task (SVT) to 
compare children’s ability to draw inferences from real-world stories with their ability to 
draw inferences from fairy stories. Thirty-nine 9-10 year olds were asked to read real-
world and fairy stories. Bowyer-Crane and Snowling (2010) found that accuracy of 
inference generation for both coherence and elaborative inferences did not differ in the 
real-world and fairy story conditions, suggesting CYP do not find it more difficult to 
generate inferences based on counterfactual information. However, response times were 
significantly faster in the real-world compared with the fairy stories condition, suggesting 
that whilst CYP are able to generate counterfactual-world and real-world inferences with 
equal ease, they find the process of counterfactual inference generation more taxing than 
the generation of real-world inferences. However, in both the real-wold and fairy story 
condition, coherence inference items were responded to as fast as literal items and faster 
than elaborative inference items. This suggests coherence inferences are generated online 
and elaborative inferences offline, regardless of plausibility of the information. 
Graesser, Kassler, Kreuz and McLain-Allen (1998) asked adults to read fantasy texts. 
After each text, participants completed an SVT with sentences reflecting four conditions: 
(1) real-world literal, (2) counterfactual-world literal, (3) real-world inference, (4) 
counterfactual-world inference. Response times were recorded. Reading speed of the 
whole passage was also recorded. Participants also completed a test battery assessing 
literacy expertise, reading skill, reading time and working memory. Whilst all adults 
struggled with counterfactual-world inference statements, those with higher levels of 
literacy expertise were able to successfully draw these counterfactual-world inferences, 
but only when they reduced their reading speed. All participants showed an advantage for 
real-world rather than counterfactual-world inference generation on the SVT. Moreover, 
all adults took much longer to make the true or false decision when confronted with 
counterfactual-world inferences. Taken together these results suggest that the 
counterfactual inferences may be generated offline, due to their more taxing nature.  
Despite both using a timed SVT the results of Bowyer-Crane and Snowling (2010) and 
Graesser et al. (1998) appear to directly conflict. Bowyer-Crane and Snowling suggest 
that CYP are able to generate counterfactual-world inferences with ease such that 
coherence inferences can be generated online, whereas Graesser et al. suggest that adults 
find counterfactual-world inference generation so difficult all inferences are generated 
offline. Counterfactual-world inference generation thus appears to be harder for adults 
than children. Moreover, the differing patterns of counterfactual-world inference 
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generation suggest that children and adults engage in qualitatively different processes 
when generating counterfactual-world inferences. Research exploring the processing 
underpinning the development of counterfactual-world reasoning may provide an 
explanation for the possible conceptual shift observed. 
Due to inconsistent findings regarding the development of counterfactual-world 
reasoning, Rafetseder and colleagues sought to explore the development of 
counterfactual-world reasoning and the processes underpinning this in CYP aged 6 years 
to adulthood (Rafetseder, Schwitalla, & Perner, 2013; Rafetseder, Cristi-Vargas, & 
Perner, 2010). Participants were presented with story worlds like the example below: 
Carol came home and did not take her dirty shoes off, and she made the floor dirty with 
her shoes. Max then followed Carol across the clean floor in his muddy shoes. 
Q: If Carol had taken her shoes off, would the floor be dirty or clean? 
If the second sentence is not included, the question can be answered correctly using basic 
conditional reasoning only – i.e. someone takes their shoes off, floors generally stay clean. 
If the second sentence is included, though, basic conditional reasoning results in the 
incorrect answer. Subsequently, counterfactual-world reasoning must be employed for 
the correct answer to be given. Stories were acted out using small props and read to 
participants. Participants were then asked questions about the story worlds that required 
either basic conditional reasoning or counterfactual-world reasoning. Results show all 
groups performed well on the questions requiring only basic conditional reasoning. 
However, for counterfactual-world reasoning adult-like performance was only observed 
in the 13-15 year olds. Performance did significantly improve between 5-6 years, 7-10 
years, 9-11 years, and 13-15 years, however. Taken together, it appears counterfactual-
world reasoning abilities develop throughout childhood and into adolescence, such that 
they are not fully developed (i.e. to an adult-like level) until around 13-15 years, when 
CYP shift from basic reasoning to counterfactual-world reasoning. 
Raefetseder et al. (2010; 2013) suggest that basic conditional reasoning requires the 
construction of just one representation – i.e. the real-state of events or imagined state of 
events. Van Reet, Pinkham, & Lillard, (2007) suggest that young children may create just 
one mental model when processing counterfactual-world information – i.e., engaging in 
pretend play. If children are only constructing one mental model, a counterfactual-world 
model, when reading they will face less real-world interference than those CYP and adults 
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who are constructing both a counterfactual-world model and a conflicting real-world 
model. The construction of only one mental model also explains the ease with which 
children are able to engage in other activities requiring counterfactual-world processing 
– e.g. pretend play (Currie, 1998; Harris & Kavanaugh, 1993; Jarrold, Carruthers, Smith, 
& Boucher, 1994; Riggs & Peterson, 2000). In addition to employing different processing 
strategies, Rafetseder et al. (2010) suggest the information contained within the 
counterfactual-world mental models constructed by CYP may differ to those constructed 
by adults. Specifically, Rafetseder et al. (2010) have shown that there is a lack of 
consistency between what adults and children believe should be changed. Less 
consistency was also observed between the children about what needs to be changed. This 
suggests children are more flexible and adults more rigid when manipulating real-world 
states. This may explain the conceptual shift observed in counterfactual-world inference 
generation. Whilst children create counterfactual-worlds where anything is possible, 
adults may change only one event at a time as the text necessitates. Therefore, adults may 
have to deal with conflict each time a counterfactual-world event is encountered. 
Research exploring counterfactual-world text processing suggests that adults may also be 
able to create flexible models, however. Filik (2013) found that anomalies were more 
easily accommodated for fictional characters than real-world characters. This suggests 
that counterfactual-world contexts are more flexible than real-world contexts – i.e. 
readers are more accepting of atypical information when processing fantasy information. 
This may be because when reading counterfactual-world texts some argue that readers 
actively suspend disbelief – i.e. ‘‘the impossible becomes possible’’ (Warren et al., 2008). 
This is supported by Huang and Gordon (2011) who suggest that readers are able to 
determine whether a text is fictional or non-fictional and then employ different processing 
strategies accordingly. If so, then adults would also be expected to engage with 
counterfactual-world inference generation with the same ease as children. This is 
supported by the growing body of research utilising online methods to explore 
counterfactual-world text processing in adults, such that, as discussed above, adults 
appear to be able to quickly accommodate disruption experienced due to real-world 
interference when processing counterfactual-world texts (e.g. Ferguson, 2012; Hald et al., 
2007; Warren et al., 2008).  
At present there is no one study exploring the developmental trajectory of implausible 
counterfactual-world inference generation, within a story context, in CYP and adults 
using the same methodology. As a result, the differences observed between adults and 
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CYP could be attributable to methodological discrepancies, as opposed to a conceptual 
shift. Bowyer-Crane and Snowling used short, simple texts suitable for 9 year olds (114-
144 words long, with readability ratings of seven years and four months or less) whereas 
Graesser et al. used longer, more complex texts (609-763 words long, with readability 
ratings ranging from approximately 20-40 years). It has been argued that complex texts 
are often processed at a surface-level, rather than a deep level (Baker, 1979; Glenberg, 
Wilkinson, & Epstein, 1982). Whilst this allows the individual to feel they have 
comprehended the text, it is argued that the representation created is ignorant to any 
discrepancies between the text and the reader’s real-world knowledge (Markman, 1979; 
Otero & Campanario, 1990; Vosniadou, Pearson, & Rogers, 1988). Therefore, the 
difficulty experienced by adults could be reflective of the complex texts they were asked 
to read as opposed to the processes underpinning counterfactual-world inference 
generation. However, this is unlikely given that real-world texts were of similar difficulty. 
It is possible, though, that the complexity of the text affected counterfactual-world 
inference generation abilities, more so than real-world inference generation abilities. 
Second, whilst Bowyer-Crane and Snowling (2010) employed an almost immediate time 
interval (500ms) between the presentation of the critical text and SVT, Graesser et al. 
(1998) did not present the SVT until the end of each chapter. Therefore, the time interval 
between critical text and test item was longer than that employed by Bowyer-Crane and 
Snowling and inconsistent across texts. Research suggests that as the time interval 
increases so does the probability of the inference being judged against real-world 
knowledge (Singer, 1994). Therefore, adults may have faced more real-world interference 
than CYP when validating counterfactual-world inferences.  
Third, research shows that for real-world information coherence inferences are generated 
online whereas elaborative inferences are not (Calvo & Castillo, 1996; 1998; 2001a; 
2001b; Calvo et al., 2006; Casteel, 1993; Casteel & Simpson, 1991; Long, Golding, & 
Graesser, 1992; Magliano, Baggett, Johnson, & Graesser, 1993; Millis & Grasser, 1994). 
This is the pattern of results observed by Bowyer-Crane and Snowling (2010) for 
counterfactual-world information. Whilst Bowyer-Crane and Snowling specify the types 
of inferences explored, Graesser et al. (1998) do not. It is possible that a) the inferences 
explored by Graesser et al. were predominantly elaborative inferences or b) the lack of 
discrimination between coherence and elaborative inferences resulted in skewed results. 
However, the timed-SVT is not a true measure of online inference generation (see Chapter 
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2). Therefore, further research using true online measures such as reading speeds and 
tracking of eye movements needed. 
Finally, Bowyer-Crane and Snowling (2010) used fairy tales in the counterfactual-world 
condition, conversely, Graesser et al. (1998) used texts that violated the laws of time and 
space. The processing of counterfactual-world information within fairy tales is thought to 
be less demanding than less familiar implausible information (Zwaan et al.,1995). The 
counterfactual-world information processed by adults may have been more difficult than 
that processed by children. It is unclear if adults would still display as much difficulty 
generating counterfactual-world inferences if given shorter, simpler texts comprising 
more plausible counterfactual-world information, with exploration and comparison of 
coherence and elaborative inferences using online methods. 
In sum, counterfactual-world processing appears to be qualitatively different for adults 
and children with a conceptual shift in processing occurring during adolescence. 
Specifically, whilst children may adopt a basic conditional reasoning strategy, such that 
they construct only one mental model, older CYP and adults may adopt a more complex 
counterfactual-world reasoning strategy, such that they construct and compare two 
models. However, at present, due to limited research utilising more than one age group, 
it is unclear if the differences in counterfactual-world inference generation abilities are 
due to methodological differences between those studies exploring adults and CYP or a 
conceptual shift in processing. Further research exploring the developmental trajectory of 
counterfactual-world inference generation in CYP and adults is, therefore, needed. 
1.3. Components of Inference Generation 
 
Inference generation is a multi-faceted skill resulting from the interaction of several 
processes. Exploration of the underlying process of inference generation is key to 
informing educational recommendations and the design of specific targeted interventions. 
This section outlines the neurological basis of inference generation and then discusses 
those skills central to real-world and counterfactual-world inference generation during 
adolescence. 
1.3.1. Neurological Basis of Inference Generation  
 
Inference generation appears to be a distinct skill, resulting from unique processing, 
above and beyond that associated with literal comprehension (e.g. Ferstl, Neumann, 
Bogler, & von Cramon, 2008; Ferstl, Rinck, & von Cramon, 2005; Ferstl, & von Cramon, 
 47   
 
2001; Kim et al., 2012; Kuperberg, Lakshmanan, Caplan, & Holcomb, 2006; Prat et al., 
2011; Prat & Just, 2010; Prat, Keller, & Just, 2007; Virtue et al., 2006; 2008). It is possible, 
then, that the developmental trajectory of inference generation differs to that of reading 
comprehension. Specific and additional teaching of inference generation skills may be 
needed. Distinct patterns of brain activations are also observed for coherence and 
elaborative inferences, suggesting that different strategies and interventions may be 
needed to support the different inference types (Beeman, Bowden, Gernsbacher, 2000; 
Chow, Kaup, Raabe, & Greenlee, 2008; Jin et al., 2009; Virtue & van den Broek, 2005). 
For coherence inferences, the left hemisphere is strongly activated, with the superior 
temporal gyrus initially activated, followed by the inferior frontal gyrus at the coherence 
break (e.g. Jung-Beeman, 2005; Mason & Just, 2004; Virtue et al., 2006). Activation of 
the superior temporal gyrus is associated with skills such as cognitive mapping and 
semantic retrieval (Robertson, Gernsbacher, Guidotti, Robertson, Irwin, Mock, & 
Campana, 2000; Wagner, Parâe-Blagoev, Clark, & Poldrack, 2001). Activation of the 
inferior frontal gyrus is routinely associated with skills such as inhibitory control – 
specifically information selection from competing alternatives – and language and 
semantic processing (Barch, Braver, Sabb, & Noll, 2000; Seger, Desmond, Glover, & 
Gabrieli, 2000). Consistent with behavioural research, neuroimaging research thus 
suggests that for coherence inferences, knowledge is activated whilst reading and then, at 
the point of a coherence break, selection processes operate to isolate the necessary 
knowledge and integrate this with the text and/or related knowledge (e.g. Schmalhofer et 
al., 2002).  
For elaborative inferences, the right hemisphere is strongly activated, with the superior 
temporal sulcus and the inferior frontal gyrus routinely activated (Chow et al., 2008; Jin 
et al., 2009). Chow et al. (2008) argue that knowledge activation during the elaborative 
inference generation process is controlled by top-down processes similar to those 
implicated in selected semantic retrieval, evidenced by the activation of the inferior 
frontal gyrus and superior temporal sulcus (Wagner et al., 2001; Barch et al., 2000; 
Thompson-Schill, D'Esposito, Aguirre, & Farah, 1997). Similar to coherence inference 
generation, relevant knowledge is then integrated with the text and other knowledge to 
generate an inference. Therefore, whilst the processes underpinning coherence and 
elaborative inference generation are the same or similar, their time-course may differ. The 
knowledge activation process may also differ, such that it is more of a conscious, guided 
process when generating elaborative inferences compared to coherence inferences. This 
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is supported by the hemispheric differences, such that Virtue and Joss (2012) suggest that 
the right hemisphere, heavily implicated in elaborative, but not coherence inference 
generation, is utilised when the language resources of the left hemisphere have been 
exhausted. Whilst inference generation is a multifaceted skill (e.g. Virtue et al., 2006), 
exploration of all of these skills is beyond the scope of this thesis. Therefore, given their 
importance and possible different roles in both coherence and elaborative inference 
generation, this thesis focuses on the role of knowledge activation and inhibitory control. 
1.3.2. Knowledge  
 
For both adults and CYP, those with high topic knowledge generate more inferences on 
texts relating to said topic than those with low topic knowledge, regardless of IQ (Birch 
& Bloom, 2004; Tarchi, 2010, 2012). The knowledge a reader possesses thus determines 
the inferences they can generate, such that if the necessary knowledge is not possessed 
by the reader, the target inference cannot be generated. Graesser et al. (1994) argue that 
background knowledge and the inferences this facilitates determine the meaning a reader 
can derive from a text. For instance, when reading ‘the girl picked up the bat’ with no 
supporting context, the reader could derive a meaning related to a piece of sports 
equipment or a small animal depending on the knowledge they possess. General 
knowledge has been found to improve with age, this may thus explain developments in 
inferential skill (Schroeders, Schipolowski, & Wilhelm, 2015; Thorsen, Gustafsson & 
Cliffordson, 2014). 
Inference generation, particularly whilst reading, is argued to be an automatic process 
(e.g. Graesser et al., 1994; Kintsch, 1993; McKoon & Ratcliffe, 1992). Knowledge 
accessibility refers to how fast knowledge can be activated (Glucksberg, Brown & 
McGlore, 1993). Difficulty rapidly accessing the necessary knowledge has been found to 
result in inference generation failure and may explain developments in inference 
generation skill during adolescence (Barnes et al., 1996; Cromley & Azevedo, 2007; 
Kintsch, 1994). Barnes et al. (1996) explored how accessibility of knowledge affects 
knowledge-based inference generation abilities in CYP aged 6-15years. To account for 
the effects of amount of knowledge Barnes et al. asked children to learn facts about a 
fictional planet. After controlling for age, Barnes et al. found, in all age groups, 
information that could be retrieved quickly was twice as likely to be used when drawing 
inferences as information that was more difficult to retrieve. Both inference generation 
skill and knowledge accessibility were found to improve with age, despite all groups 
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possessing the necessary knowledge. Improvements in inference generation between 6-
15 years thus appear to be underpinned by improvements in accessibility of knowledge. 
Barnes et al. (1996) found that the role of knowledge accessibility varied according to 
inference type. The importance of knowledge accessibility was found to increase for real-
world elaborative inferences, but decline for real-world coherence inferences. Barnes et 
al. suggests that this is due to improvements in accessibility of knowledge and 
comprehension monitoring. As the CYP develops, they are more likely to detect 
coherence breaks whilst reading (Singer & Flavell, 1981). The Constructionist Theory 
suggests that readers aim to maintain coherence whilst reading and may engage in a 
laborious search of long-term memory if the necessary knowledge is not readily 
accessible (Graesser et al., 1994). Therefore, accessibility of knowledge becomes less 
important. However, Barnes et al. primed the necessary knowledge to control for amount 
of knowledge. When generating coherence inferences in the Barnes et al. study, the 
necessary knowledge, even if not readily accessible, may have been weakly activated, 
thus requiring minimal effort to be fully activated. Participants may have thus freely, and 
potentially consciously, engaged in this additional processing, knowing that they would 
find the knowledge they would need. However, when reading naturally, the knowledge 
necessary for coherence inferences is thought to be activated through associative 
processing (Cook, Halleran, & O’Brien, 1998; Kintsch, 1988; 1998; van den Broek et al., 
2005). When not readily available, not wanting to disrupt the reading process and not sure 
how laborious of a search will be needed or if this search will be successful, older readers 
may not engage in this potentially time-consuming yet possibly fruitless task. 
Additionally, Barnes et al. used an offline measure of inference generation, meaning 
participants had time to engage in the strategic processing they may not have engaged in 
whilst reading. Subsequently, accessibility of knowledge would be essential to successful 
real-world coherence inference generation. Further research into the role of knowledge 
when reading naturally is warranted. 
Much of the difficulty associated with counterfactual-world inference generation is 
attributed to the activation of related but contradictory real-world knowledge (Alter, 
Oppenheimer Eply, & Eyre, 2007; Byrne, 2002; 2005; 2007; Evans, 2006; Evans et al., 
2005). When building a situational model of the text the reader is thought to activate 
related but contradictory real-world knowledge, however, this knowledge may have 
stronger and more numerous connections than those nodes associated with a 
counterfactual-world interpretation (McNamara & McDaniel, 2004; Zwaan & Truitt, 
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2000). This is supported by Alvermann, Smith and Readance (1985) who argue that when 
the information in the text is incompatible with real-world knowledge it is unlikely to be 
used to update the situational model being constructed. Alvermann et al. (1985) asked all 
participants to read a text. Prior to this, the required real-world knowledge was activated 
for one group – thus increasing the accessibility of that knowledge. They found when 
previous knowledge was easily accessible participants performed worse on those 
questions designed to assess understanding of text that was incompatible with real-world 
knowledge, with the representation being more reflective of real-world knowledge than 
the counterfactual-world text. Therefore, if knowledge is easily accessible more 
interference is likely to be experienced. The aforementioned research focuses on plausible 
counterfactual-world information or ambiguous real-world information. This type of 
information typically evokes participants to compare models (Markman & McMullen, 
2003; 2005; 2007). Implausible information, however, may not always evoke a 
comparison (Filik, 2008; Filik & Leuthold, 2008; Nieuwland & Van Berkum, 2006). 
Further exploration of the role of knowledge in implausible counterfactual-world 
information, in which real-world knowledge may not be strongly linked to the text, 
particularly if there is a preceding context would be useful. 
 
1.3.3. Inhibitory Control 
 
Knowledge is thought to be associative, resulting in the activation of both related and 
contradictory knowledge when reading (van den Broek et al., 2005; van den Broek, 
Risden, & Husebye-Hartman, 1995; van den Broek et al., 1999). Working memory 
capacity is limited, however (Baddeley, 1986; Just & Carpenter, 1992). Subsequently, the 
maintenance and integration of large amounts of knowledge would heavily tax working 
memory capacity, leaving little capacity for the execution of those other cognitive 
processes needed to successfully generate an inference and comprehend a text (Cain, 
2006; Oakhill & Cain, 2011; van den Broek, 2012). The amount of knowledge activated, 
maintained, and integrated into the situational model whilst reading must be constrained 
in some way. Inhibitory control has been implicated in the management of knowledge 
during the inferential process (e.g. Barnes, Faulkner, Wilkinson, & Dennis, 2004; Cain, 
2006; Gernsbacher, 1993; Harnishfeger, 1995).  
Research suggests that for comprehension to be successful, irrelevant and contradictory 
knowledge must be suppressed in the early stages of the inferential process (Cain, 2006; 
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Harnishfeger, 1995). This creates a more manageable workspace, such that processing 
costs are reduced as only the most relevant information is processed (e.g. Borella & de 
Ribaupierre, 2014; DeBeni & Palladino, 2000; Gernsbacher & Faust, 1991). The role of 
inhibitory control in the inference generation process is well-established. For instance, 
inhibitory control has been implicated in real-world inference generation across the 
lifespan (Cain, 2006; Barnes et al., 2004; DeBeni & Palladino, 2000; Gernsbacher, 1993). 
Similarly, poor comprehenders have been found to display difficulties inhibiting 
information, such that they displayed significantly more intrusion errors than good 
comprehenders (Caretti et al., 2004). However, to this researcher’s knowledge, not one 
study has explored age-related changes in the role of inhibitory control in real-world 
inference generation during the Secondary School years.  
Inhibitory control has been found to develop throughout adolescence, with development 
plateauing between around 14-17 years of age (see Romine and Reynolds, 2005 for a 
review). Developments in success in inhibiting irrelevant or contradictory information 
and developments in speed of inhibition have been observed (Bjorklund & Harnishfeger, 
1990; Romine & Reynolds, 2005; Tamm, Menon, & Reiss, 2002). As the CYP ages, the 
amount of knowledge they are able to readily access whilst reading has been found to 
increase (e.g. Barnes et al., 1996). Stronger and more efficient inhibitory mechanisms 
may thus be needed to maintain a clear workspace. Developments in inhibitory control 
may thus underpin developments in inference generation skill and inference generation 
efficiency during adolescence. Exploration of the potentially changing relationship 
between inhibitory control and knowledge may be fruitful in explaining the inference 
generation process during adolescence.  
The role of inhibitory control in counterfactual-world inference generation may be 
mediated by belief biases. A belief bias is a preference to process information in ways 
that match beliefs rather than logic – i.e. attend to, process and retrieve real-world 
information more readily than atypical information (e.g. Torrens, 1999). The process of 
initial suppression of knowledge when reading is thought to be guided by belief biases, 
as such, much of the contradictory and irrelevant knowledge, which is automatically 
activated due to associative knowledge activation mechanisms, is suppressed (e.g. 
Graesser et al., 1998). This frees up working memory capacity resulting in more efficient 
inference generation. However, when processing counterfactual-world information, 
belief biases have been found to hinder processing, resulting in errors and less efficient 
processing in both adults and children (Houde & Guichart, 2001; Markovits & Schroyens, 
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2007; Moutier, Plagner-Cayeux, Melot, & Houde, 2006; Richards & Sanderson, 1999). 
There is a growing body of research showing that counterfactual-world information 
processed in a counterfactual-world context is not treated as contradictory, however – i.e. 
belief biases are overcome (e.g. Nieuwland, 2012; 2013; 2015, Nieuwland & Berkum, 
2006; Nieuwland & Martin, 2012). This accommodation is only observed after an initial 
delay in which the counterfactual-world is set up, suggesting that belief biases may be 
operating in the initial stages of text processing.  
Whilst inhibitory control may at first be guided by belief biases, research suggests that in 
the later stages of processing inhibitory control may be essential to overcoming the effects 
of belief biases, such that, through correlations, training and brain imaging studies, 
Moutier and colleagues have highlighted a positive relationship between inhibitory 
control and ability to overcome belief biases (Houde, Zago, Crivello, Moutier, Pineau, 
Mazoyer, & Tzourio-Mazoyer, 2001; Houde & Moutier, 1996; 1999). Developments in 
inhibitory control during adolescence may thus support suppression of belief biases and 
ultimately successful counterfactual-world processing (Frank, 1996; 1997). The 
developing relationship between inhibitory control, belief biases and the processing of 
counterfactual-world information may not be as simple as the studies above suggest, 
however. Mitchell, Robinson, Isaacs and Nye (1996) suggest that there is a shift in the 
way belief biases are applied between 9 years and adulthood.  
Mitchell et al. (1996) explored the false belief abilities of a group of 5 year olds, 9 year 
olds and adults. Participants heard a story in which a character was given a true or a false 
message that was consistent or counter to the character’s existing experience. Mitchell et 
al. found that whereas children based character judgments on what the character had 
previously experienced, regardless of the truthfulness of the information in the message, 
adults based character judgements on the truthfulness of the information. Adults thought 
characters would believe the message if it was true even if this was not consistent with 
the character’s existing experiences. Mitchell et al. suggest that the difference is due to a 
qualitative shift in the way information violating real-world beliefs is processed, such that 
children rigidly apply a ‘seeing is believing rule’ – i.e. the character must see an event to 
believe it and any other form of contradictory evidence is not believed even if the reader 
knows the real state of events. Conversely, adults are argued to adopt a more complex 
processing strategy, drawing upon their existing previous knowledge to consider those 
factors that may lead one to accept another's message. This leaves adults more vulnerable 
to belief biases. This would explain the possible conceptual shift in counterfactual-world 
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inference generation discussed in Section 1.2.2. Further exploration of the developing 
relationship between inhibitory control, belief biases and counterfactual-world inference 
generation is warranted. 
1.4. Inference Generation and Literacy Skills 
In Secondary School classrooms information is presented in various ways, many of which 
require the CYP to read and understand text – e.g. textbooks, worksheets, websites. 
Similarly, even if a CYP has acquired the necessary knowledge, if they are unable to 
produce a coherent text they may struggle to achieve age-related expectations as typically, 
CYP are assessed via a written exam or written coursework. Learning and assessment 
across the curriculum are thus dependent on good reading comprehension and text 
production skills. Between 2010 and 2015, on average, just short of one third (27-31%) 
of CYP failed to make the expected progress between Key Stage 2 (Year 6) and Key 
Stage 4 (Year 11), despite only 11-17% of CYP not achieving age-related expectations 
by the end of Year 6 (Department for Education, 2015a; 2015b). This suggests that a) 
many of those who entered Secondary School with poor literacy skills did not close the 
attainment gap and thus continued to struggle throughout their school careers, and b) 
some CYP who were developing typically during Primary School failed to progress as 
expected during Secondary School. Without appropriate identification and intervention, 
literacy difficulties have been found to persist into adulthood (Rapp, van den Broek, 
McMaster, Kendeou & Espin, 2007). This next section outlines the role of inference 
generation in reading comprehension and text production. 
1.4.1. Inference Generation and Reading Comprehension 
 
Currently the National Curriculum for reading is based on the most prominent model of 
reading comprehension development, the Simple View of Reading (SVR; DFES, 2006; 
Gough, Hoover, & Peterson, 1996; Gough & Turner, 1986, Hoover & Gough, 1990; Rose, 
2006). The SVR suggests that reading comprehension is underpinned by two key 
components: decoding and linguistic comprehension. Decoding refers to the automatic 
recognition of a word and its semantic meaning. Linguistic comprehension refers to those 
language skills associated with the comprehension of oral sentences – i.e. inference 
generation, identification of text structure, meaning of propositions, and overall gist. 
Proficient reading comprehension occurs as decoding skills become fully automatized 
and fluent, meaning resources can be freed up to allow for the operation of linguistic 
comprehension skills (National Reading Panel, 2000; Perfetti, 1998; Samuels & Flor, 
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1997; Spear-Swerling & Sternberg, 1994). Consistent with this, the predictive utility of 
the two components is not equal and fluctuates with age (e.g. Storch & Whitehurst, 2002).  
The role of decoding is found to decline after 9-10years whereas the role of linguistic 
comprehension is found to increase (e.g. Adlof, Catts, & Lee, 2010; Catts, Hogan, & 
Adlof, 2005; Chen & Vellutino, 1997; Kershaw & Schatschneider, 2012). 
The SVR was originally proposed to explore individual differences in reading 
comprehension, not reading comprehension development. Whilst the two key 
components of the SVR has been found to explain variance in reading comprehension 
abilities in populations aged up to 18 years and over (Savage & Wolforth, 2007), Floyd 
Meisinger, Gregg, & Keith (2012) highlight a lack of research exploring the 
developmental trajectory of decoding and linguistic comprehension abilities across the 
lifespan.  Specifically, further research exploring the development of linguistic 
comprehension skills during the Secondary School years is needed as a) reading 
comprehension continues to improve even after decoding skills are automatic and b) 
Secondary School is the point when these higher-order skills appear to play a central role 
in reading comprehension. Researchers thus highlight the need for a comprehensive 
model of reading comprehension development that explores the role and development of 
those skills central to mental model construction (Cassidy, Valadez, Garrett, & Barrera, 
2010; Pike, Barnes, & Barron, 2010).  
Zwaan and Singer (2003) state that “almost every facet of comprehension is at least partly 
inferential” (Zwaan and Singer, 2003, pp. 100). Inference generation also lies at the heart 
of the most prominent skilled models of comprehension and has been implicated in 
reading comprehension success across the lifespan (e.g. Cain, Oakhill & Byrant, 2004; 
Dewitz, Carr & Patberg 1987; Kintsch, 1998; McGee & Johnson, 2003; Zwaan, 2003). 
Inferential abilities have also been found to play an indirect role in the text comprehension 
process, mediating the role of other skills. For instance, a relationship has been observed 
between vocabulary and inference skill (Cain, 2007; Cain, Oakhill, & Lemmon, 2004). 
Whilst vocabulary is initially a significant predictor of reading comprehension, with age, 
this relationship becomes reciprocal (Verhoeven & van Leeuwe, 2008). This is thought 
to be due to shifts in the mechanism of vocabulary acquisition, such that older readers are 
able to use the context surrounding an unknown word to infer meaning (e.g. Pretorius, 
2000). Subsequently, limited vocabulary does not always impair comprehension. 
(Freebody & Anderson, 1983; Wittrock, Marks, & Doctorow, 1975). This is supported 
by Nash and Snowling (2006) who found that vocabulary could be improved by teaching 
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CYP to infer meaning from the context. This led to greater gains in comprehension, 
compared to a control group who were only taught the meaning of target words.  
The importance of inference generation in classroom comprehension is also likely to 
increase as the CYP moves from Primary to Secondary School. As the CYP progresses 
through the school system, there is a shift from learning-to-read to reading-to-learn (Chall 
1996; Snow, Scarborough, & Burns, 1999) and from adult-led learning to pupil-led 
learning (Baker, Gertsen, & Scanlon, 2002). This increases the importance of good 
reading comprehension skills, and specifically inference generation abilities, for several 
reasons. The text-based materials CYP are presented with become longer and more 
challenging and complex with regards to vocabulary and syntactic structure, meaning the 
reader is expected to infer the meanings of new words using the surrounding context. 
(Shanahan & Shanahan, 2008, 2012). In addition, texts become less literal, with meaning 
more implicit (AQA, 2013; Department for Education, 2013). Subsequently, as a CYP 
progresses from Primary to Secondary School, the level of inferential processing required 
increases. This is mirrored by the reading comprehension assessment tools used. 
Whereas many reading comprehension assessments for Primary-School-aged CYP focus 
on explicit understanding and literal retrieval, many reading comprehension assessments 
for Secondary-School-aged CYP focus on implicit understanding and inference 
generation. For instance, Leach et al. (2003) found that poor comprehenders performed 
well on standardised measures of reading comprehension aged 9 years. However, by 11-
12 years the performance of poor comprehenders on the same standardised task had 
significantly decreased, dropping 53 percentile points, on average. Leach et al. used the 
Peabody Individual Achievement Test—Revised (PIAT-R; Dunn & Dunn, 1997). The 
items increase with difficulty, such that the early questions designed to assess the abilities 
of children aged under 9-10 years focus on basic reading skills such as sentence 
comprehension and literal thinking. However, the later questions designed to assess the 
abilities of CYP over 9-10 years focus on higher-order reading skills such as knowledge 
integration and inference generation. The same distinction also exists in the UK school 
system. 
To achieve a Level 4 (expected level) on the Key Stage 2 Reading Comprehension SATs 
paper (in 2013) 19 points must be achieved. 68% (13 points) of these points can be 
obtained using literal comprehension skills – i.e. identifying relevant information in the 
text. The remaining 6 points can come from the other four assessment focuses – see Figure 
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1.3. The GCSE English Language tests used at the end of Secondary School combine 
both exams and coursework, and reading and writing. Therefore, the exact number of 
comprehension marks needed for a GCSE grade C (expected level) cannot be determined. 
However, the assessment objectives on the 2013 AQA English Language foundation are 
presented in Figure 1.4. Taken together with the example marking scheme in Figure 1.4., 
it evident that for reading comprehension, the emphasis is on implicit understanding thus 
requiring inference generation. Taken together, there exists a clear shift from Primary to 
Secondary School in the assessment of reading comprehension proficiency, such that  the 
focus goes from literal comprehension and explicit identification to full and implicit 
understanding.  
 
Adapted from Key Stage 2 English 2013 Marking Scheme: Reading – Wolf Pack (Department of Education, 2013).  
Figure 1.3. – Key Stage 2 Reading Assessment Focuses 
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Adapted from AQA English Language June 2013 Marking Scheme (AQA, 2013).  
Figure 1.4. – GCSE (Key Stage 4) Assessment Objectives and Example Marking scheme 
It is unsurprising then that inference generation abilities have been found to account for 
unique variance in the reading comprehension abilities of Secondary School aged CYP. 
Barth, Barnes, Francis, Vaughn and York (2015) found that inferential skill was a 
predictor of reading comprehension in both adequate and struggling adolescents aged 11-
18 years, accounting for 2-5% of unique variance. Cromley, Snyder-Hogan, & Luciw-
Dubas, (2010) found that inference generation accounted for a much larger 19.1% unique 
variance in the reading comprehension skill of 14-15year olds. However, rather than 
exploring age-related changes in the role of inference generation, these studies controlled 
for age. As a result, it is unclear how the role of inference generation in the reading 
comprehension process changes with age. Exploration of the potentially changing role of 
inference generation abilities in the reading comprehension process during adolescence 
is thus warranted.  
1.4.2. Inference Generation and Text Production 
 
A literate individual is characterised by both the ability to understand and produce text 
(e.g. Bain, 2006; Hand, Wallace, & Yang, 2004). Proficient written text production is a 
complex task. First an idea is generated (e.g. Hayes & Flower, 1986). This idea is then 
elaborated on via the activation of real-world knowledge (e.g. Baker, Gersten, & Graham, 
2003; Harris, Graham, & Mason, 2006). The words to represent this idea must then be 
retrieved from the mental lexicon, ordered to create a syntactically correct sentence, the 
orthographic representation of the necessary words must be retrieved, and finally, the 
motor skills needed to produce these representations must be planned and executed 
(Torrance & Galbraith, 2006). To be coherent, the production of any one sentence must 
be easily associable to any previous sentence – i.e. ideas must be organised in a way that 
is both locally and globally coherent. Therefore, the writer must have in mind the 
sentences they have produced, the sentence they are producing, and their intended 
message and structure for the completed text – i.e. a mental model must be constructed 
and maintained (Torrance & Galbraith, 2006). As new ideas are added the coherence and 
structure of the text is continually updated and monitored as the writer pauses and revises 
(e.g. Chenoweth & Hayes, 2001; Hayes, 2012; Hayes & Chenoweth, 2006). Similar to 
reading comprehension, the construction of a mental model thus appears essential to 
successful text production. It is surprising, then, that the role of inference generation 
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abilities in the text production process is scarcely explored explicitly. Consequently, 
inference generation is not a prominent feature of the Simple View of Writing (SVW), 
the most influential and widely cited model of text production development (Juel, 1988).  
The SVW suggests that proficient writing results from the automatization of low-level 
transcription skills and increasing working memory capacity. This allows for the 
execution of higher-level oral language skills (McCutchen, Covill, Hoyne, & Mildes, 
1994). Although the SVW has received much support, it is primarily focused on the early 
stages of text production development (e.g. Connelly, Dockrell, & Barnett, 2005; Kellog, 
1999; McCutchen, 1996; Ransdell & Levy, 1996). Research exploring text production in 
adolescent and adult writers finds that even after the automatization of these skills, text 
quality continues to improve, with even proficient writers often finding the task of 
producing text very effortful (Scardamalia & Bereiter, 1991; Zimmerman & Martinez-
Pons, 1990). The predictive utility of the SVW has thus been found to decline with age 
(Babayigit & Stainthorp, 2010; 2011; Swanson & Berninger, 1996). Developments in text 
production quality during adolescence thus appear to be driven by skills and interactions 
not accounted for by the SVW.  
Building on Bereiter and Scardamalia’s (1987) model of children’s writing, Hayes (2012) 
proposes three distinct developmental stages of writing: 1) knowledge-telling (5-9 years), 
2) knowledge-structuring (10-13 years), and 3) knowledge-transforming (13 years and 
over). In the knowledge-telling stage, the writer produces a series of statements about a 
particular topic. This process relies on long-term memory and transcription skills. There 
is no consideration of the reader in this stage. During the knowledge-structuring stage 
writers not only produce a series of statements about a particular topic, they elaborate on 
these, such that a situational model is constructed. However, the reader is not thought to 
be considered. Finally, in the knowledge-transforming stage, writing is constructed to 
meet the readers’ needs meaning coherence is central. Stage 1 shows very little 
organisation or adaptation of knowledge, it is a random recall of ideas, by Stage 2 these 
ideas have been organised, and by Stage 3, these ideas have been elaborated on and 
integrated with other knowledge. The transition between the three stages reflects a 
growing need for coherence and integration of ideas. The development of these stages 
thus reflects the growing role of inference generation abilities. As with text 
comprehension, inference generation may not take a pivotal role in text production until 
those lower-level skills (transcription, spelling) are proficient. This model is supported 
by research exploring individual differences and developmental changes in text 
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production, such that with age, text production has been found to become more coherent 
with lower quality texts having less coherence (Berman & Slobin, 1994; Cain, 2003; 
Cragg & Nation, 2006; Fayol, 1991; Chanquoy, Foulin, & Fayol, 1990; Stein & Trabasso, 
1981) and contain more ideas (Keys, 1999; MacArthur, 2012; Wigglesworth, 1997). 
The role of inference generation in the development of text production appears key. 
However, what is not clear is what drives this development. Specifically, is text 
production initially constrained by limited inference generation skills or fewer available 
resources as resources are allocated to lower-level skills? Exploration of the role of 
inference generation in the text production and reading comprehension process, 
particularly during the Secondary School Years, may prove fruitful in furthering 
understanding of literacy development during what, for some, is a critical time. 
1.5. Summary of Research 
 
Government statistics suggest that around one third of CYP are not making the literacy 
progress expected during Secondary School. Whilst a variety of skills are implicated in 
mental model construction, inference generation appears to be at the core. Research 
exploring reading comprehension suggests that the importance of inference generation 
increases between Primary and Secondary School. Similarly, Hayes’ model of writing 
development suggests an increasing need for coherence and subsequent requirement for 
inference generation. Whilst inference generation has been found to be a predictor of 
literacy skills during the Secondary School years, a developmental approach has rarely 
been taken. Many studies explore only one or two age groups, typically an adult and/or 
child group. Moreover, the methodology used to explore CYP and adults can differ, 
meaning it is unclear if differences observed between the age groups are due to age-
related changes or methodological discrepancies. Consequently, age-related changes in 
the role of inference generation during adolescence have not been fully explored. 
Additionally, CYP are presented with a variety of different texts from multiple sources 
and genres. Therefore, to fully comprehend all of the texts they read, CYP must also be 
able to generate counterfactual-world inferences. However, existing research is 
conflicting - this could be due to the lack of consistency in the stimuli used to assess 
adults and CYP or a conceptual shift in counterfactual-world inference generation. At 
present a full and comprehensive model of inference generation, and underpinning skills, 
during adolescence does not exist. The studies reported in this thesis thus explore age-
related changes in real-world and counterfactual-world inference generation abilities 
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during adolescence to inform educational practice during this time. Part 2 of this thesis 
goes on to identify a measure suitable for the assessment of inference generation abilities 
throughout adolescence in order to investigate the following research questions: 
1. How does the role of inference generation in higher-order literacy skills change 
during adolescence? 
2. How do inference generation abilities change during adolescence? 
3. How do the cognitive underpinnings of successful inference generation change 
during adolescence?  
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Part 2: The Selection, Development and 
Evaluation of a New Inference Generation Task 
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CHAPTER 2 THE ASSESSMENT OF INFERENCE GENERATION:  
SELECTING AN APPROPRIATE TASK 
  
2.1. Introduction 
 
The study of inference generation has driven the development of a variety of research 
tools. However, researchers explore inference generation from different theoretical 
perspectives and with different aims. Since different theoretical assumptions often result 
in different assessment methods, the range of reading comprehension and inference 
generation tasks that exist are not interchangeable, such that they vary in their conceptual 
underpinnings, format, and related task demands (Carver, 1992; Cutting & Scarborough, 
2006; Keenan & Betjemann, 2006; Keenan, Betjemann, & Olson, 2008; Nation & 
Snowling, 1997; Sabatini, Albro, & O’Reilly, 2012). Subsequently, they do not 
necessarily assess the same underlying skills and processes and depending on the research 
aim, each task has both strengths and weaknesses. Selection of the most suitable task must 
be guided by consideration of these strengths and weaknesses and the specific research 
aims. For this thesis, a new task was developed by combining a self-paced reading 
methodology with a forced-choice picture-selection task. This Chapter begins by 
highlighting some key methodological considerations, the assumptions underpinning 
each task and rationale for selection are then discussed. 
2.2. The Assessment of Real-World and Counterfactual-World Inference 
Generation Abilities during Adolescence:  
Key methodological issues and considerations 
 
This research aims to explore the development of real-world and counterfactual-world 
inferential abilities during adolescence. It is essential that the task(s) selected is able to 
assess: 
 a range of age groups  both inferential skill and time-course  the real-world interference thought to be experienced when generating 
counterfactual-world inferences 
2.2.1. Assessment of a Range of Age Groups 
 
Research shows that, due to differences in tasks demands, even the same group of 
participants can perform differently on two tasks designed to assess the same skill (Boot, 
Becic, & Kramer, 2009; Burkart & Rueth, 2013; Hinze, Bunting & Pellegrino, 2009). 
Many of these additional task demands are associated with skills thought to improve with 
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age (e.g. working memory; Hulme & Tordoff, 19889). Subsequently, younger age groups 
may display weaker performance than older age groups; this may be reflective of 
differences in working memory, for example, though, and not the key skill being assessed. 
The tasks used in developmental studies need to be carefully considered to ensure they 
target the intended age group. However, Miller (1998) argues that the use of different 
tasks for each age group may result in a problem of measurement equivalence, such that 
the tasks used may not be comparable. Miller (1998) argues that to compare particular 
skills in different age groups, one task should be designed that can adequately tap into the 
intended behaviour of all of the age groups being studied. This thesis thus aims to use the 
same methodology (stimuli and task) for all age groups. 
2.2.2. Assessing Both Inferential Skill and Time-Course 
 
Inference generation failure is thought to be one of the main causes of poor 
comprehension (e.g. Cain, Oakhill, Barnes, & Bryant, 2001; Cain, Oakhill, & Elbro, 
2003; Perfetti, Marron, & Foltz, 1996). Therefore, the assessment of the inferential 
product (i.e. skill) is essential. Comprehension is also thought to be impaired if a reader 
is unable to generate the inferences needed to maintain coherence whilst reading 
(Graesser et al., 1994). Similarly, readers may be employing faulty inference generation 
strategies. Assessment of the unfolding inferential process (i.e. time-course) is also 
necessary. The assessment of both the inferential product and time-course not only allows 
for quantitative changes in inferential skill to be observed, but also any qualitative 
changes in the underlying process to be detected. This is particularly important when 
exploring counterfactual-world inference generation abilities given that research suggests 
that adults and CYP engage in a qualitatively different process (Bowyer-Crane & 
Snowling, 2010; Graesser et al., 1998).  
In addition to assessing both inferential skill and time-course, it is important that the 
measure used taps the natural reading process (as much as possible). Research shows that 
if the text is too difficult and/or presented rapidly, comprehension suffers as participants 
process the text at a surface- or propositional-level only, with inconsistencies not being 
detected (Royer, 2001). Given that most inferences are thought to be generated at the 
situational-level, this could lead to inaccurate conclusions regarding inference generation 
abilities being made. Research also shows that reading goal can influence comprehension, 
such that if the reader is not reading with a goal of comprehension, a situational-level 
representation is unlikely to be constructed (Kendeou, Bohn-Gettler, & Fulton, 2011; 
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Linderholm & van den Broek, 2002; Narvaez, van den Broek, & Ruiz, 1999; van den 
Broek, Lorch, Linderholm, & Gustafson, 2001). Gordon, Hendrick and Foster (2000) 
have shown that task demands can affect reading goals, such that participants adopt the 
simplest strategy available to them to complete a task – i.e. simply remembering the 
words in the critical text (creating a surface-level model) instead of comprehending the 
critical text (creating a situational-level model). Similarly, task instructions have been 
found to affect the level of comprehension. When reading naturally, elaborative 
inferences are not drawn whilst reading (Graesser et al., 1994). However, when 
participants are instructed to predict what will happen next, elaborative inferences are 
found to be drawn online (Calvo et al., 2006). In sum, it is fundamental that the text, task 
and instructions used promote a natural reading process, whereby construction of a 
situational-level representation of the text is promoted. 
2.2.3. Counterfactual-World Inference Generation: Assessing the Interference 
Experienced due to the Activation of Real-World Knowledge.  
 
When generating counterfactual-world inferences the activation of related but 
contradictory real-world information is thought to result in interference (e.g. Ferguson, 
2012). Resolving this interference is thought to be cognitively demanding, meaning 
counterfactual-world inference generation is often found to be more difficult than real-
world inference generation (e.g. Ferguson & Sanford, 2008). During adolescence there is 
thought to be a qualitative shift in the processing of counterfactual-world information 
(Bowyer-Crane & Snowling, 2010; Graesser et al., 1998; Rafetseder et al., 2010; 2013). 
This shift may be due to, at least in part, changes in the real-world interference 
experienced when generating counterfactual-world inferences. Therefore, exploring 
developmental differences in the interference faced is likely to aid understanding of the 
counterfactual-world inferential process and potential causes of inference generation 
failure.  
2.3. Selecting a Task 
 
Inference generation tools can be roughly split into two categories: 1) online measures - 
used to assess the unfolding inference generation process and 2) memory measures – used 
to assess the situational model created as a product of the inference generation process. 
This division means that whilst one task may be suitable for the assessment of the 
inferential time-course, this same task is unlikely to be suitable for the assessment of 
inferential skill, and vice versa. Therefore, to meet the task selection criteria set out in 
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this thesis, at least two tasks were needed. A self-paced reading task was selected to assess 
the inferential time-course of inference-evoking critical sentences and a forced-choice 
picture-selection task was selected to assess inferential skill.  
2.3.1. Using a Self-Paced Reading Tasks to Assess the Inferential Time-Course 
 
A self-paced reading task (SPRT) is a processing load measure. Other processing load 
measures include moving window tasks, measurements of eye movements and neuro-
imaging methods. Processing load measures provide information about the cognitive 
costs associated with processing a particular piece of text (Zwann & Singer, 2003). These 
tasks are underpinned by the assumption that information which is more cognitively 
taxing takes longer to process (Donders, 1969). The format of these tasks is very simple, 
with participants reading through a text at their own pace. Using computer software, the 
time taken to read and/or study the text is then recorded, along with additional 
measurements depending on specific methods. When exploring inference generation, 
research has shown that even if two sentences are equal with regards to syllable length 
(see Table 2.1.), if one sentence requires an inference for coherence to be maintained and 
the other does not, the sentence requiring an inference will result in greater processing 
costs – e.g. longer reading speeds, increased neuronal activation (Casteel, 1993; Poynor 
& Morris, 2003; Virtue et al., 2006; 2008). This effect is thought to be due to the increased 
cognitive effort needed to generate an inference and coherently integrate the text into a 
situational model.  
Table 2.1. Sample Stimuli used in Processing Load Measures 
 
In a SPRT, the researcher splits the passage into readable segments, using natural 
breaking points in the text. Segments are presented to the reader one at a time, with 
participants pressing a button to move through the text at their own speed. The SPRT is, 
therefore, able to provide a measure of processing costs associated with specific phrases 
and sentences. However, it is not as sensitive as the Moving Window Task (MWT) and 
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measurement of eye movements. The MWT works by presenting text on a computer 
screen, with only one word visible at any time. All other words are replaced with symbols 
or dashes. The reader is able to move through the passage by pressing a button, such that 
once the participant has read a word they press a button that then replaces the current 
word with symbols/dashes and reveals the next word. For example: 
 
Eye movement data show that words are rarely read in such a smooth one-by-one, left-
to-right manner (Reichle, Rayner, & Pollatsek, 2003). Therefore, Witzel, Witzel, and 
Forster (2012) argue that MWTs do not promote a natural reading process. Moreover, 
Zwaan and Singer (2003) suggest that participant's button presses can become rhythmic, 
failing to reflect underlying processing. Compared with a MWT, a SPRT more closely 
mirrors the natural reading process. Moreover, since the segments of text presented to the 
reader can vary in length, the likelihood of participants engaging in rhythmic button 
pressing is minimised.  
When eye-tracking is used, the text is presented on the screen, with small cameras used 
to monitor the participant’s eye movements as they read. This means that the participant 
is not required to press any buttons to read through the text. Consequently, the data 
obtained do not include any additional processing costs associated with the motor 
responses needed to press a button and/or the effort associated with switching between 
reading and pressing a button. Eye tracking methodologies are, therefore, thought to result 
in a purer measure of the processing costs associated with the natural reading process than 
the MWT and SPRT. Eye-tracking methodologies are also able to provide much more in-
depth detail, exploring fixations, saccades, and regressions. Given the time constraints of 
this PhD, it was thought that the use of an eye tracker would be too labour intensive in 
terms of the amount of data generated, however. Brain-imaging methods were not 
 67   
 
selected for the same reason2. Fortunately, Zwaan and Singer (2003) suggest that in many 
cases the SPRT produces data precise enough for the assessment of many skills and 
processes of interest when exploring inference generation. As such reading speeds have 
been used to assess the inferential time-course in previous research (e.g. Casteel, 1993). 
As discussed below, compared to other online measures, the SPRT is also able to better 
fulfil the task selection criteria outlined at the start of this Chapter. 
Other online measures include activation measures and information-content measures. 
Activation measures, such as the lexical decision task, naming task and probe recognition 
task, are used to assess the reader’s unfolding mental representations, specifically, the 
level of activation of a particular idea or concept (Zwaan & Singer, 2003). Typically, 
participants read a sentence followed by a critical word that participants must make some 
form of decision about. Information-content measures are used to provide detailed 
information about the skills and processes a participant is using when reading a text 
(Zwaan & Singer, 2003). Perhaps the most commonly used information-content measure 
is the think-aloud task. Think-aloud tasks require participants to verbalise their thought 
process and understanding as they read a text. When assessing a range of age groups, the 
SPRT is superior to information-content measures, such that SPRTs simply require 
participants to read a text (Zwaan & Singer, 2003). Therefore, as long as the texts used 
are age appropriate, SPRTs are suitable for the assessment of a range of age groups. 
Conversely, whilst training is given, performance on think-aloud tasks is heavily 
dependent on expressive language abilities. Since expressive language abilities typically 
improve with age (e.g. Berninger & Abbott, 2010), any differences observed between 
different age groups could be due to either differences in inference generation abilities or 
differences in expressive language skills.  
A SPRT is also likely to promote a more natural reading process than activation measures 
and information-content measures. Activation measures require participants to respond 
to a critical test item after reading the text. Therefore, it is unclear if the processing 
assessed reflects the processing taking place whilst reading or at the time of test. 
Moreover, Gordon et al., (2000) have shown that when probe recognition tasks are used 
participants simply remember possible probe words, processing the text at a surface-level 
                                                 
 
2
 Additionally, brain-imaging techniques require participants to remain still, given that the inference 
generation task designed for this thesis took around 30 minutes, it was felt that younger participants may 
struggle to remain still for this amount of time. 
 68   
 
only. Whilst information-content measures are categorised as an online measure, Zwaan 
and Singer (2003) suggest that many of the inferences participants report to be generating 
as part of the think-aloud task, may not be generated when reading normally. Instead, 
some of the inferences generated may be the result of strategic processing promoted by 
task instructions. The SPRT, however, does not require an explicit response from the 
participant and measures are taken whilst the participant is reading, not after. 
Consequently, the natural reading process is not disrupted. Since a SPRT causes minimal 
disruption to the natural reading process, unlike activation measures and information 
content measures, a valid measure of the level of real-world interference a participant 
faces whilst reading naturally can be obtained (e.g. Ferguson 2012; Ferguson & Sanford, 
2008; Ferguson et al., 2008). In sum, the SPRT is able to assess a range of age groups, 
with minimal disruption to the natural reading process. In addition, a measure of 
interference whilst reading can be obtained. 
2.3.2. Using a Forced-Choice Picture-Selection Task to Assess the Inferential Product 
 
Forced-choice picture-selection tasks (FCPST) present participants with a critical 
sentence followed by a grid displaying two or more pictures – one of which depicts the 
target (see Figure 2.1). Participants select the picture that best matches the preceding text.  
  
Figure 2.1. Schematic Representation of the Forced-Choice Picture-Selection Task 
A FCPST is a type of multiple-choice task, which is a forced-choice memory measure. 
Other commonly used forced-choice memory measures include the sentence recognition 
task (SRT) and sentence verification task (SVT). In the SRT participants have to decide 
if the test sentence appeared in the preceding text or not. In the SVT participants have to 
decide if, based on the preceding passage, the test sentence is true or false. If the correct 
target filler 
filler filler 
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inference has been drawn participants are predicted to falsely recognise the test sentence 
on the SRT, but correctly validate or select the test sentence on the SVT and multiple-
choice task (MCT), respectively. 
A FCPST is more suitable for the assessment of the inferential product than any other 
forced-choice memory measure for several reasons. First, research suggests that the SRT 
may encourage surface-level processing, such that participants can successfully complete 
the task without creating a situational level model (Gordon et al., 2000). Second, when 
using the SVT, interference is thought to be present if the participant fails to validate the 
counterfactual-world target and instead incorrectly validates the real-world alternative or 
if the participant’s responses to counterfactual-world items are correct, but significantly 
slower than responses to real-world items. However, the SVT requires participants to not 
only generate an inference but validate this inference too. Research suggests that 
inference validation may not be a part of the inferential process when reading 
counterfactual-world texts naturally, as this would interfere with their engagement of the 
text (e.g. Gillbert, 1991; Gillbert et al., 1990; Green & Brock, 2000; Rader & Sloutsky, 
2002). The need to validate inferences, then, may confound results and lead to the amount 
of interference experienced being over estimated.  
As discussed in Section 1.2.1, theories of counterfactual-world processing suggest that, 
at least initially, both counterfactual-world and real-world information is mentally 
represented (e.g. Ferguson, 2012). The real-world knowledge and the counterfactual-
world information are thus thought to be in direct competition when comprehending 
counterfactual-world texts. The SVT and SRT only allow for the assessment of one piece 
of information at a time. Therefore, if an error is made on the SVT or SRT or response 
times are slower in counterfactual-world conditions than real-world conditions, it can 
only be said, with confidence, that the correct inference has not been drawn or in the case 
of correct but slow response times, the inference has not been drawn online. This could 
be due to real-world interference, but also faulty inference generation processes. A major 
advantage of employing a MCT, therefore, is the ability to simultaneously present several 
ideas per test item – i.e. both the counterfactual-world target and real-world alternative 
can be placed in direct competition, just as they are in readers’ internal representations. 
If the participant routinely selects the real-world alternative instead of the counterfactual-
world target, or correctly selects the counterfactual-world target but significantly slower 
than they select the correct target in real-world conditions, it can be said, with much more 
confidence, that these patterns are due to the increased cognitive effort associated with 
 70   
 
resolving the conflict experienced due to real-world interference. However, as highlighted 
by Cain and Oakhill (2006b) even though verbal responses are not required, since 
multiple options have to be processed and compared, the processing demands associated 
with a MCT are much higher than those associated with other forced-choice memory 
measures. As discussed in the next section, the use of pictures minimises these demands, 
meaning a FCPST is superior to other verbal forced-choice memory measures as 
processing demands are reduced. As discussed below, compared to other offline measures, 
the FCPST is also better able to fulfil the task selection criteria outlined at the start of this 
Chapter. 
2.3.3. Assessing a Range of Age Groups: Reducing Output Demands Via the Use of 
Pictures 
 
Spooner, Baddeley and Gathercole (2004) found that children's comprehension 
performance was significantly better when measured using forced-choice responses as 
opposed to constructive memory measures, such as self-constructed answers to open-
ended questions. Spooner et al. (2004) suggest that when constructive memory measures 
are used, poor comprehension performance may not always be attributable to poor 
comprehension abilities. Poor performance may instead be due to the difficulties 
associated with constructing an answer. Spooner et al. concluded that since 
comprehension is an input process (i.e. construction of a mental model), the measure used 
to assess these processes should not make heavy output demands. The ability to deal with 
heavy output demands is likely to increase with age, due to improving working memory 
(e.g. Conklin, Luciana, Hooper, & Yarger, 2007) and expressive language skills (e.g. 
Berninger & Abbott, 2010). When completing tasks that place heavy output demands on 
participants, the comprehension performance of younger children is thus likely to be more 
confounded than the performance of older children and adults. Tasks that minimise output 
demands should thus be used to assess inference generation in a range of age groups. As 
discussed in this subsection, a pictorial response method places fewer output demands on 
participants than verbal response methods. 
A large body of research exists exploring the processing differences of words and pictures, 
with several theories being proposed. Typically, these theories fall into two camps. Some 
suggest that pictures and words are processed differently (e.g. Glaser & Glaser, 1989). 
Others argue that pictures and words are processed similarly, both having access to one 
unified semantic system (e.g. Kiefer & Pulvermuller, 2011). Despite these theoretical 
differences (a full discussion of which is beyond the scope of this thesis), research 
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consistently finds superior performance (e.g. faster response times, fewer errors) when 
pictorial, as opposed to verbal stimuli, are used – i.e. a picture superiority effect (Hinojosa, 
Carretie, Valcarel, Mendez-Bertolo & Pozo, 2009; Schacht & Sommer, 2009).  
Pictures are thought to be processed with more ease than words since additional 
translational processes are not needed. Text needs to be decoded – i.e. letters matched to 
their sounds and words deciphered (e.g. Samuels, 1988). Similarly, the words must be 
matched with their referent meanings (e.g. Coltheart, Curtis, Atkins, & Haller, 1993). 
Pictures, though, often allow for certain elements to be represented with relatively 
effortless maintenance, meaning working memory is freed up and can be used to complete 
other tasks (Glenberg & Langston, 1992). Since decoding ability, referent search ability, 
and working memory capacity are all found to improve with age (e.g. Conklin et al., 2007; 
Luciana, Conklin, Hooper, & Yarger, 2005) it follows that children show superior 
performance when processing pictures compared to words (e.g. Rafetseder et al., 2013; 
Wright & Berch, 1992). Developmental studies find that, regardless of task, the 
magnitude of the picture-superiority effect declines with age (Rosinksi, Pellegrino, & 
Siegel, 1977; McGonigle and Chalmers, 1984). This suggests that when words are used, 
any differences observed between different age groups could be due to developmental 
differences in processes associated with the additional skills needed to translate text to 
meaning and not real changes in the skill being assessed. It is unsurprising then that many 
have used pictorial stimuli, specifically FCPSTs, to assess adults and children (e.g. 
amount and accessibility of knowledge, Barnes et al., 1996; pronoun resolution, Sekerina, 
Stromswold, & Hestvik, 2004; vocabulary, Dunn & Dunn, 1997; counterfactual-world 
reasoning, Rafetseder et al., 2013; inference generation, Ford & Milosky, 2003).  
Wright and Berch (1992), however, noted some fundamental differences between the 
pictures and words commonly used in research. They found that pictures are often larger 
than the words used. Therefore, perceptually, pictures may be easier to interpret (Theios 
& Amrhein, 1989). Additionally, pictures of items from the same category are typically 
more visually similar than items from different categories, whereas words from one 
category are no more or less visually similar to words from a different category 
(Snodgrass & McCullough, 1986). Therefore, pictures are likely to aid categorisation 
more so than words. Similarly, Schlochtermeier, Kuchinke, Pehrs, Urton, Kappelhoff, & 
Jacobs (2013) found that whilst a word and picture can contain the same information they 
are not necessarily equivalent with regards to the level of detail conveyed. It is thought 
that pictures represent more detail regarding position, size, and relationships than words. 
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As such, when Schlochtermeier et al. (2013) adapted their text so it was just as detailed 
as a picture, they found that the picture superiority effect disappeared. 
It appears that pictures aid access to meaning since they provide more detail than words, 
which is more easily accessed since additional translational processes are not needed. 
Many of the additional skills associated with the processing of verbal information have 
been found to improve with age. The effect of some of these developmental confounds 
can be removed by using a literal control. However, unless the literal controls and test 
items are lexically identical, which could be potentially very repetitive, some differences 
may still exist. Similarly, the confounding effects of decoding could be removed by 
presenting test items orally, however, this could prove problematic when presenting more 
than one idea. The participant would need to remember all of the words or ideas presented 
to them, increasing the demands placed on short-term memory. In contrast, the use of 
pictures allows for the confounding effects of developmental differences in decoding, 
reading speed, associations between terms and referents, and short-term memory and 
working memory capacity to be minimised and in some cases completely eliminated, 
even when presenting multiple ideas. Subsequently, a FCPST is likely to provide a purer 
measure of abilities when assessing a range of age groups compared with other memory 
measures.  
2.3.4. Using a 2*2 Forced-Choice Picture Selection Task to Promote a Natural 
Reading Process 
 
When reading naturally a situational model of the text is thought to be created (e.g. Singer, 
1990). Many of the tasks reviewed above promoted the creation of a surface- or 
propositional-level representation due to simplistic response methods. In this thesis, the 
term picture refers to an image that depicts not only a single object, but an event, concept 
or relationship. Therefore, whilst the FCPST response method is simple, the correct 
picture cannot be selected by simply remembering the preceding words or phrases as there 
will be no direct match between the picture and preceding critical text. Instead, the critical 
text must be processed at the situational-level for the correct picture to be selected.  
The use of pictures has been found to aid CYP’s construction of mental models of the 
text, such that they serve as cues for information likely to be necessary to maintain 
coherence (Glenberg & Langston, 1992; Gyselinck & Tardieu, 1999), with this 
information influencing younger CYP more so than older CYP (Pike et al., 2010). As 
discussed above, pictures more directly depict relationships between various elements 
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(Gyselinck & Tardieu, 1999) and thus may facilitate the transformation of text to a mental 
model. Moreover, the direct and clear depiction of said relationships is thought to reduce 
the load placed on working memory (Marcus, Cooper, & Sweller, 1996) and thus allow 
resources to be allocated to higher-order skills such as inference generation if the picture 
is unambiguous. Subsequently, some may argue that the use of a pictorial task serves to 
facilitate younger children’s mental model construction, thus over estimating their skills 
for text-only comprehension and biasing the results. However, in the current research, the 
pictures are not presented simultaneously with the critical text. They are presented after 
reading the text. Thus whilst the pictures for coherence items, in particular, will depict 
the relationships between elements, this picture will not be able to serve as a cue for online 
mental model construction as it is presented after reading. The use of a pictorial response 
method may encourage participants to create more pictorial situational models than they 
may have done if a verbal response method was used. However, situational models are 
thought to contain information from a variety of sensory modalities, including vision (e.g. 
Zwaan, 2003).  
Overall, the use of a FCPST is likely to promote the creation of a situational model. Whilst 
the simultaneous presentation of text and pictures has been shown to facilitate situational 
model construction, this is unlikely to occur on the FCPST, since pictures are presented 
after situational model construction has begun. Subsequently, the FCPST is likely to 
provide a relatively valid assessment of those inferential abilities associated with the 
natural reading process. 
2.3.5. Using Pictures to Evaluate the Mental Representations Constructed From 
Verbal Stimuli 
 
Traditionally situational models were thought to contain only linguistic information (e.g. 
Fodor, 1975; Newell & Simon, 1972). Subsequently, the use of pictures, as opposed to 
text, to assess a verbal mental representation could be problematic since additional 
translational demands would be placed on participants. However, Zwaan (2003) proposed 
the Immersed Experiencer Framework, which suggests mental models contain 
information from a variety of sensory modalities. This idea has much support with 
research finding situational models contain information from a variety of sensory 
modalities (Zwaan, 1996; Zwaan & Taylor, 2006), including vision (Kaup, Yaxley, 
Madden, Zwann, & Ludke, 2007; Zwaan & Yaxley, 2003a; 2003b). The inclusion of 
visual information in the situational models created by readers is also supported by studies 
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which find that participants often report the use of imagery when reading (e.g. Richardson, 
1980).  
Schnotz and Bannert (2003) have created a multimedia model of situational model 
construction that focuses on the comprehension of textual and pictorial stimuli (see Figure 
2.2.). As can be seen from this model, there are two distinct branches, a textual 
(descriptive) branch and a pictorial (depictive) branch, with both branches cumulating in 
a depictive mental model which continually interacts with a propositional representation 
and is guided by the reader’s conceptual organisation. Therefore, whether the initial input 
is depictive or descriptive both a propositional representation and depictive mental model 
are created, with constant interactions occurring between descriptive and depictive 
information.  
 
Figure 2.2. Schnotz and Bannert’s (2003) Integrated Model of Text and Picture 
Comprehension 
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The branches and pathways in Schnotz and Bannert’s model are bi-directional, meaning 
that a picture can be used to create a situational model, and existing situational models 
(whether created from an initial text or pictorial input) can be evaluated using pictorial 
stimuli. Therefore, the use of a pictorial response method is likely to be suitable for 
assessing the situational models constructed whilst reading. This is supported by the 
numerous studies that have effectively used pictorial naming and categorisation tasks to 
assess the mental representations created from text (e.g. Ford & Milsoky, 2008; Kaup et 
al., 2007). Those using a FCPST to assess inference generation suggest that the FCPST 
is an effective measure of inference generation abilities (e.g. Ford & Milsoky 2003; 2008; 
Schmidt & Paris, 1978).  
For example, Ford and Milosky (2003) used a four-choice picture response method to 
explore inference generation abilities in CYP aged 5 to 6 years. CYP heard short scenarios 
evoking emotional inferences, with the last word missing (e.g. Twinky was bouncing a 
ball. A bully took the ball. Twinky was _______). Children were asked to select the facial 
expression that completed the scenario from a choice of four pictures (e.g. happy, sad, 
mad, and surprised), presented using a 2*2 grid format. Ford and Milosky found that all 
children, even those with a language impairment, understood the task and were able to 
effectively use the pictorial response method. This suggests that a 2*2 format picture 
selection method can be used to assess inference generation abilities, even in young 
children with weak linguistic abilities. This suggests the FCPST is suitable for the 
assessment of inference generation abilities. 
2.3.6. Using a 2*2 Forced-Choice Picture-Selection Task to Assess Real-World 
Interference 
 
When assessing counterfactual-world processing using constructive memory measures, if 
incorrect information is recalled or a participant answers a question incorrectly, errors 
can be analysed to determine the underlying cause of inference generation failure, 
specifically, the presence of real-world interference (e.g. Cain et al., 2001; Cain et al., 
2003; Carlson, Seipel, & McMaster, 2014; Norbury & Bishop, 2002). However, the level 
of real-world interference present in participants’ reconstructions may not be an accurate 
reflection of the interference present whilst engaging with the text. When reading fantasy 
and fiction texts, some argue that readers actively suspend beliefs and use the 
counterfactual-world context as a base for all comparisons (e.g. Filik, 2008; Filik & 
Leuthold, 2008; Nieuwland & Van Berkum, 2006). Subsequently, real-world interference 
is minimal. However, when asked a question or asked to recall the text, the reader may 
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more consciously consider real-world violations. Subsequently, when constructing an 
answer, the real-world interference experienced may be stronger than when reading a 
fantasy or fiction text. A FCPST may be a useful tool when assessing real-world 
interference, such that assessment is made immediately after reading the critical text and 
processes associated with constructing an answer are not needed. Specifically, both the 
counterfactual-world target and real-world alternative can be presented. Given that 
processing costs are reduced by the use of pictures instead of words, several possibilities 
can be presented, allowing even firmer conclusions to be made regarding the cause of 
inference generation failure – i.e. in addition to the counterfactual-world target and real-
world alternative, fillers indicative of, for example, integration failure or literal 
processing, are also included. Error analysis could then be conducted allowing much 
firmer conclusions regarding the cause of inference failure to be made. 
2.4. Conclusion 
 
A review of existing inference generation tasks revealed that no single task was able to 
meet the following task selection criteria: 
 Assess a range of age groups  Assess both the inferential skill and time-course associated with the natural 
reading process  Assess the real-world interference thought to be experienced when generating 
counterfactual-world inferences 
Many previous measures place high output demands on participants, despite 
comprehension and thus inference generation being primarily input processes. When 
assessing a range of age groups this is problematic as ability to overcome output demands 
improves with age, meaning differences in performance between older and younger age 
groups could be due to either genuine differences in inference generation abilities or 
differences related to task demands. Whilst some existing tasks use simple verbal 
response methods with few output demands (e.g. lexical decision task), it has been argued 
that successful completion of these tasks is possible by creating a surface-level model of 
the text only. The use of forced-choice picture-selection task (FCPST) which utilises a 
pictorial, as opposed to verbal, response method reduces task demands, such that 
translational demands (e.g. decoding) are minimised. However, a complete idea is still 
depicted meaning participants cannot respond correctly by simply remembering the text 
verbatim. A pictorial response method, unlike some of the simple verbal response 
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methods, thus promotes a natural reading process. Typically, existing inference 
generation tasks assess either inferential skill or time-course. Simultaneous assessment of 
the inferential process and product was desired, however, to minimise the time CYP spent 
out of their learning environments. Unlike offline assessment tools which measure the 
inferential process after reading and require an explicit response, the self-paced reading 
task assess the inferential process whilst reading and does not require an explicit response. 
The natural reading process is thus uninterrupted and by measuring reading speed of 
critical texts that precede the FCPST a measure of the inferential process can be obtained 
without increasing participant assessment time. Finally, due to minimal output demands, 
several ideas can be presented simultaneously in the FCPST without exhausting 
participants’ resources. Both the target and real-world alternative can be presented in 
counterfactual-world conditions. Additional diagnostic errors, reflecting typical reasons 
for inference generation failure can also be included. Error analysis can be conducted to 
explore real-world interference when processing counterfactual-world information in 
addition to other faulty inference generation strategies. This new task, which combines a 
self-paced reading methodology and forced-choice picture selection task will be known 
as the Image Selection Task. 
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CHAPTER 3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE IMAGE SELECTION 
TASK - A NEW INFERENCE GENERATION PARADIGM 
3.1. Introduction 
 
This thesis is concerned with the exploration of age-related changes in real-world and 
counterfactual-world inference generation abilities during adolescence. To obtain a 
comprehensive picture of inference generation abilities during this time, it is essential that 
the task(s) used is able to assess a range of age groups, both inferential skill and time-
course, and the real-world interference experienced when generating counterfactual-
world inferences. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, many of the most commonly used 
inference generation tasks are unable to fulfil all of the above task selection criteria. 
Consequently, the creation of a new task – the Image Selection Task (IST) - was necessary. 
This Chapter outlines the development of the IST. 
3.1.1. Outline of the Image Selection Task 
 
The IST combines a self-paced reading methodology with a forced-choice picture-
selection task (FCPST), embedding them both into a story (see Figure 3.1 for a schematic 
representation). Participants move through the story at their own speed until a 2*2 grid 
with four pictures is presented. Although not explicitly highlighted to participants, each 
2*2 grid is preceded by a screen displaying a critical text. When the 2*2 grid is presented, 
participants select the picture they feel best matches the text they have just read. The time 
taken to read each critical text provides a measure of the inferential time-course whereas 
inferential skill was assessed via number of errors made on FCPST. An analysis of errors 
was also conducted to determine the potential cause of inference generation failure and 
levels of real-world interference in the counterfactual-world conditions.  
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Figure 3.1. Schematic Representation of the Image Selection Task 
3.1.1.1. Story Development  
 
Many studies do not provide context before or after the critical text. Instead, they simply 
present the critical text followed by the test stimuli, this is then immediately followed by 
another item (e.g. Calvo et al., 2006; Ferguson, 2012; Gernsbacher & Faust, 1991). 
However, this is very different to reading in real-life, where typically a chunk of text is 
read to extract information. The standard coherence framework suggests that reading 
goals determine the level of coherence a reader seeks to gain from a text (van den Broek 
et al., 1995; 2001). Subsequently, reading a list of sentences with no real purpose is 
unlikely to lead to a reading goal of comprehension, and thus experimental stimuli are 
unlikely to be processed to the same level as natural texts. Embedding the critical texts 
and FCPST into stories provides a context and increases engagement, creating reading 
goals similar to those associated with the natural reading process.  
This thesis is primarily concerned with those inferences drawn when engaging with the 
science-fiction texts commonly read for pleasure by CYP and used in the classroom. 
Originally, the researcher sought to use ‘real texts.’ However, due to their complexity and 
variability this was not possible. Subsequently, story plots were developed based on the 
ideas depicted in the BBC Bitesize Key Stages 2 (7-11years) and 3 (11-14years) Science 
Story Text 
Critical Text 
Forced-Choice 
Picture-Selection 
Task 
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resources and in books in the ‘young readers’ fantasy’ section of the researcher’s local 
library. A predominate theme in this literature was space travel. Consequently, stories 
were designed to focus on the space adventures of two characters – Holly and Ben - with 
each story relating to the characters’ adventures on a new planet.  
All stories were written to be 190-210 words long to prevent fatigue and boredom, but at 
the same time allow a full plot to develop and engage participants. Royer (2001) suggests 
if a text is too difficult participants' comprehension suffers. Subsequently, stories were 
designed to be readable by the youngest participants assessed in this thesis – 9 year olds. 
Hatcher’s (2000) book grading formula was used to assess the readability of stories3. All 
stories received a readability level of 9 years or less (see Appendix 3.1 for a full list of 
story ratings). 
Six stories were written to assess real-world inference generation abilities (real-world 
stories), six stories were written to assess counterfactual-world inference generation 
abilities (counterfactual-world stories), and six stories were written to assess memory for 
information explicitly stated in the text (literal stories). Each story was split into three 
sections. The first two sections ended with a critical text. The final section provided a 
conclusion to the story. See Table 3.1. for an example story. Therefore, each story 
contained two critical texts. Each real-world and counterfactual-world story contained 
one critical text designed to evoke a coherence inference and one critical text designed to 
evoke an elaborative inference. In the literal condition, one critical text assessed memory 
for real-world information and the other, memory for counterfactual-world information. 
Two versions of each story were written, such that the second version of stories had the 
converse arrangement of critical texts. This was to ensure any differences between 
different conditions could not be attributed to the position of critical sentence. This meant 
that the story content had to be changed slightly. The number of words in Version 1 and 
2 of the story always remained exactly the same. The general gist of the story also 
remained consistent, as did the readability rating (mean rating Version 1 = 8.79, SD = 
0.19; mean rating Version 2 = 8.83, SD = 0.18; t (17) = 0.72, p = 0.48). There was also 
no difference in readability ratings across the three story conditions (mean rating real-
world stories = 8.78, SD = 0.23; mean rating counterfactual-world stories = 8.74, SD = 
                                                 
 
3
 This formula is based on five key variables: number of words in story, number of pages in story, number 
of words with 6 or more letters, number of words in the longest sentence, and number of syntactic 
features. Syntactic features refer to contractions, use of negatives, change of verb tense, and so on. 
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0.14; mean rating literal stories = 8.89, SD = 0.13; F (2, 35) = 2.60, p = .09). The 
administration of programs 1 and 2 was also counterbalanced across participants, see table 
3.2 for a summary of the counterbalancing and randomisation of critical texts and stories. 
Table 3.1. Example Story Text with Critical Sentences Embedded 
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Table 3.2. Counterbalancing and Randomisation of materials
 
CFW =  counterfactual-world, RW =  real-world 
3.1.1.2. Development of Critical Texts 
 
Critical text refers to the sentence(s) which evokes a target inference, or in the literal 
conditions, explicitly states the information needed to respond correctly. By assessing 
responses to the different types of critical texts, the patterns of inferential skill (number 
of errors) and time-course (reading speed) can be obtained. To explore these patterns six 
types of critical text were created: 
1. Real-world Coherence 
2. Real-world Elaborative 
3. Counterfactual-world Coherence 
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4. Counterfactual-world Elaborative 
5. Literal Real-world 
6. Literal Counterfactual-world 
3.1.1.2.1. Selection of Coherence and Elaborative Inferences Types 
 
There are several types of coherence and elaborative inferences (e.g. Graesser et al., 1994). 
Exploration of all of these inferences is beyond the scope of this thesis. The coherence 
and elaborative inferences selected for exploration were those deemed most important 
during adolescence. 
During Key Stages 2 – 4, CYP are expected to not just read a text, but to understand it 
and thus extract relevant information from it (Department of Education, 2013). 
Consequently, it is essential that CYP are able to create coherent situational models of 
the texts they are presented with. Graesser et al., (1994) define global coherence as 
localised chunks of information which have been hierarchically organised and connected 
into higher-order chunks. Thus, global coherence is essential for summarising a text. 
However, research suggests that global coherence is unlikely to be achieved without local 
coherence (see Graesser et al., 1994 coherence assumption). Graesser et al. (1994) define 
local coherence as “structures and processes that organise elements, constituents, and 
references of adjacent clauses or short sequences of clauses" (Graesser et al., 1994, pg. 
371). Graesser et al. (1994) describe three types of local coherence inferences: referential, 
case structure role assignment, and causal antecedent. Referential and case structure role 
assignment inferences, although thought of as essential for local coherence (e.g. Kintsch 
& van Dijk, 1978), are fairly basic and as such are thought to be developed to an almost 
adult-like level by children aged 9-10 years (Ackerman, 1986). Causal antecedent 
inferences, on the other hand, refer to those inferences which link or bridge together 
current actions/events/states with previous ones (Graesser et al., 1994). Research suggests 
that causal antecedent inference-making ability continues to develop throughout 
childhood and into adulthood (e.g. Ackerman, 1986; Casteel, 1993). Since these 
inferences are necessary for establishing explanations for events occurring in a text (e.g. 
a character’s behaviour or the cause of an element changing state), they are essential for 
both narrative and expository texts, making them particularly important for success across 
the curriculum.  
CYP must also be able to elaborate on a text during Key Stages 2-4, adding information 
which, whilst not necessary for coherence, aids understanding by creating a more detailed 
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picture (Department of Education, 2013). Graesser et al. (1994) describe five types of 
elaborative inference: causal consequence inferences (more commonly known as 
predictive inferences), instantiation of noun category inferences, instrumental inferences, 
subordinate goal-action inferences, and static inferences. Static inferences are likely to be 
particularly useful during Key Stages 2-4 since they refer to inferences made about a 
character’s or object’s, traits, knowledge, beliefs and/or properties (Graesser et al., 1994). 
When drawing opinions and conclusions about why a character may react in a certain way 
it is necessary to infer what the agents in the text may have known or believed. In science 
it is necessary to infer static properties of materials to understand and predict potential 
uses (e.g. which material will be the best insulator), changes in state (e.g. solid to liquid), 
and outcomes. Consequently, causal (coherence) and static (elaborative) inferences were 
explored in this thesis. 
3.1.1.2.2. Criteria for Critical Texts 
 
All critical texts were designed to meet the following criteria: 
1. All critical texts must read naturally 
Typically, previous research uses the same critical text in all conditions, varying only one 
target word (e.g. Cook et al., 2001; Ferguson, 2012). This allows for strong experimental 
control. However, in opposition to previous research, the critical texts in the IST were 
embedded into stories to provide the critical text with a context and encourage a natural 
reading process. The use of identical critical texts was likely to result in the creation of 
contrived and repetitive stories. This issue could have been overcome by creating two 
additional stories for each critical text and counterbalancing these across participants. Due 
to time constraints this was not possible4. Subsequently, 36 unique critical texts were 
created. 
With regards to interference, two identical sentences are usually employed to explore 
differences in responses to the real-world alternative compared to the counterfactual-
world target. However, since the IST presents both the counterfactual-world target and 
real-world alternative, real-world alternative control sentences were not needed.  
 
                                                 
 
4
 54 as opposed to just 18 stories would have had to be created. 
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2. All critical texts must have the same syllable length, syntactic structure, tone, 
and readability level 
To ensure response patterns reflect differences in inferential processing and not linguistic 
processing features (e.g. text length, grammatical structures, reading difficulty) critical 
texts were designed to be as similar as possible. Firstly, all critical text were designed to 
be exactly 21 syllables in length. Critical texts were matched on syllable length, as 
opposed to word length, as syllables are thought to provide a more robust measure of 
reading speed than words (e.g. Just & Carpenter, 1980). Critical texts were written using 
the same syntactic structures and tone and rated using Hatcher's (2000) book grading 
formula 5 . All critical texts received readability ratings of 9 years or less, with no 
significant differences between the six conditions (real-world coherence mean = 7.60, SD 
= 0.48; real-world elaborative mean = 7.51, SD = 0.33; counterfactual-world coherence 
mean = 7.77, SD = 0.81; counterfactual-world elaborative mean = 7.75, SD = 0.68; literal 
real-world mean = 7.78, SD = 0.57; literal counterfactual-world mean =7.68, SD = 0.69; 
F (5, 35) = 0.19, p = 0.97). Subsequently, all critical texts should be readable by even the 
youngest children in the study.  
3. Elaborative critical texts should not promote online processing. 
Research finds that elaborative inferences can be drawn online under certain conditions, 
such as high contextual constraints resulting in few alternate possibilities, easily 
accessible knowledge due to preceding activation or strong semantic constraints, or when 
given enough processing time (e.g. Calvo, Castillo, & Schmalhofer, 2006). To ensure 
elaborative inferences were not primed by individual words in the critical text, the 
semantic associations between the words in the critical text and intended inference were 
checked using the Edinburgh Associative Thesaurus database (EAT, 2013). If a word was 
found to have a high semantic association with the target the word was changed. Research 
shows that when tasks are repetitive and consistently require a similar elaborative 
inference, participants are able to anticipate this and engage in the strategic processing 
needed to complete the task when reading the critical sentences (e.g. Calvo et al., 2006; 
Keenan et al., 1984). Consequently, results could suggest that an elaborative inference 
                                                 
 
5
 Words in a story was set to 101 when calculating readability grades for critical texts since critical texts 
were embedded into a story. All other factors (e.g. words in longest sentence and syntactic features) were 
calculated based solely on critical text. 
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has been drawn whilst reading, when in fact, if reading naturally, this may not have been 
the case. For this reason, critical texts were embedded into a story as opposed to appearing 
at the end of a story. The need to draw inferences based on several topics of knowledge 
should also minimise this anticipatory effect as participants cannot predict the type of 
static property they should be making an inference about. Some participants may still 
anticipate the generation of an inference related to the properties of the object being 
described. However, there are so many potential possibilities the reader is unlikely to try 
and generate them all.  
Science-fiction texts are often used during Key Stages 2 and 3 to teach and reinforce 
scientific principles (BBC Bitesize, 2014 – see science section). Subsequently, all critical 
texts were designed to reflect information on one of six key scientific topics (reproduction, 
transport and movement, communication, animal attacks, plant and human anatomy, 
physical properties) currently taught during Key Stages 2 and 3, identified through 
consultation with Key Stage 2 and 3 Science National Curriculums and the BBC Bitesize 
Science website (see Appendix 3.2). 
3.1.1.3. Development of the Forced-Choice Picture-Selection Task 
 
Several picture databases exist. However, it was not possible to use these as implausible, 
and in many cases novel, ideas needed to be depicted – e.g. a bear hatching from an egg. 
Subsequently, it was necessary to create new pictures. The researcher read the critical 
texts and then drew pictures based on her mental representation. The process of picture 
creation is summarised in Figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.2. The Process of Picture Creation 
As discussed in Section 2.3.5., pictorial test stimuli are likely to be particularly 
advantageous when assessing the real-world and counterfactual-world inference 
generation abilities of a range of age groups as meaning can be extracted with more ease 
from pictures than words. This is only the case if the picture adequately depicts the idea 
intended. Consequently, all pictures were designed to meet the following criteria: 
1. All pictures contain two to four key components 
Research suggests that busy pictures (i.e. those containing a large number of elements) 
can be difficult to interpret and can be more ambiguous than simpler pictures (e.g. Székely, 
D’amico, Devescovi, Federmeier, Herron, Iyer, Jacobsen, & Bates, 2003; Snodgrass & 
Vanderwart, 1980; Snodgrass & Yuditsky, 1996). Typically, the more detailed the picture, 
the more difficult it is to interpret. Subsequently, simple drawings were used, with the 
number of elements in each picture kept as consistent as possible, such that each picture 
comprised only 2-4 elements – in the picture above there are three elements: the shark, 
Holly and the sea. 
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2. All pictures are simple line drawings 
Research shows that line drawings are easier to comprehend than real photographs (Ryan 
& Schwartz, 1956). Hochberg (1972) argues that this is because line drawings create a 
prototype – i.e. they convey only the key distinctive features of the object making object 
identification easier. To ensure pictures were easy to interpret simple line drawings were 
used. 
3. Whenever possible, all pictures are black and white 
Research shows that visually salient features such as colour can affect picture processing, 
with visually distinctive elements attracting more attention than less distinctive elements 
(e.g. Itti & Koch, 2000; Parkhurst, Law, & Niebur, 2002). Unless colour was one of the 
static properties being assessed, all pictures were presented in black and white. 
3.1.1.3.1. Design of Fillers 
 
Three filler pictures were created for each item, with one filler in the counterfactual-world 
conditions always depicting the real-world alternative. In both real-world and 
counterfactual-world conditions, one filler also depicted the literal state of events in the 
inference conditions. Research shows that processing of a visual scene can be affected by 
both visually salient features (Itti & Koch, 2000) and those features likely to be interesting 
or meaningful to the participant (Wright, 2005). Therefore, all fillers were designed to be 
as similar as possible to target pictures, comprising the same composition and 
components – see Table 3.3. for examples. The positioning of the target item was pseudo-
randomised so that the target item appeared in each quadrant nine times (see Table 3.3.). 
To do this a random 36 item number sequence containing the numbers 1 to 4 was created 
using a random number generator. 
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Table 3.3. Examples of Target pictures and related fillers  
 
3.1.1.4. Additional considerations 
 
3.1.1.4.1. Comprehension Questions 
 
In addition to embedding the critical sentences into story text, two comprehension 
questions were created to follow each story. Consistent with previous research, this was 
to encourage participants to engage with the stories and read carefully with the goal of 
understanding the text (e.g. Calvo et al., 2006; Long, Oppy, & Seely, 1994). One of the 
comprehension questions required knowledge explicitly stated in the text. The other 
comprehension question required an emotional inference; emotional inference questions 
were used as these inferences had not been assessed in any other part of the task. 
Emotional inferences refer to an emotional response of the character – e.g. when reading 
‘Billy is being bullied’ a reader may infer that Billy is feeling sad. Emotional inferences 
fall into the coherence inference category and thus should be drawn whilst reading. 
However, emotional inferences are often linked to global coherence and thus often relate 
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to comprehension of the whole story. In addition, emotional inferences were selected 
since this inference was applicable to all stories and unlike many of the other coherence 
inferences did not overlap with the causal coherence inferences being assessed.  The 
location in the passage to which the question pertained was varied to encourage deep level 
processing of the whole text.  
The comprehension questions were presented one at a time using a true or false format, 
similar to that used by Long et al. (1994) and Till et al., (1988). Participants were 
instructed to press the key ('k') with a     sticker on it if they thought the answer was 
true and the key ('s') with a  sticker on it if they thought the answer was false. 
Examples of the comprehension questions used can be found in Table 4.3. The answer to 
the comprehension questions was true half of the time. True or false response methods, 
as opposed to free recall comprehension questions, are particularly beneficial in the IST 
as it means all elements of the task can be presented and responded to on the laptop. The 
physical act of task switching is reduced, meaning the task can run more efficiently.  
3.1.1.4.2. Instructions 
 
Research suggests that reading aloud disrupts the natural reading process, leading to the 
text being processed at a surface-level only (e.g. Keefe & McDaniel, 199). To promote a 
natural reading process participants were asked to read silently. Full instructions can be 
found in Section 4.2.1.4. 
3.1.1.4.3. Practice Trials 
 
Participants were presented with 20 practice trials to allow them to become familiar with 
the coloured button response method. In these practice trials a shape appeared in one of 
the coloured quadrants; participants had to indicate, using the coloured buttons, where the 
shape had appeared as fast as possible -  see section 4.1.1 for further details on response 
method. Ford and Milosky (2008) used a similar practice procedure when using a FCPST. 
If the researcher felt participants were struggling with the response method during 
practice trials, further instruction was given. 
The task was presented on a HP ProBook Laptop using E-Prime software (Psychology 
Software Tools, Pittsburugh, PA) to present stimuli and record number of errors and 
reading speed (recorded in milliseconds). 
3.1.2. Current Study 
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To evaluate the validity of the newly designed test stimuli, Stage 1 of this study explored 
the critical text’s ability to elicit the type of processing expected. Stage 2 explored 
whether pictorial stimuli depicted the idea intended, ease of interpretation of pictures, and 
plausibility of ideas depicted. Since this study is concerned with the evaluation of test 
stimuli, as opposed to comparing different age groups, it was only necessary to use a child 
and an adult group. 
 
3.2. Stage 1: Evaluation of Inferences Evoked by the Critical Text 
 
Research shows that inferential skill and time-course vary depending on the type of 
inferential processing required (e.g. Bowyer-Crane & Snowling, 2010; Calvo et al., 2006; 
Virtue et al., 2008). To explore these patterns, the critical texts were carefully designed 
to evoke coherence-inference, elaborative-inference, or literal processing. Participants 
were asked to indicate the type of processing they engaged in when presented with the 
critical sentences intended for use in the IST. This was assessed using a difficulty scale. 
In accordance with Graesser et al.'s (1994) definitions of different inference types, a 
difficulty score of 1 (very easy) referred to literal processing, a difficulty score of 2 (easy) 
referred to coherence inferential processing, and a difficulty score of 3 (medium) referred 
to elaborative inferential processing. A difficulty score of 4 (hard) was also used, which 
reflected no or a limited connection between the critical sentences and test sentence. If 
critical sentences evoke the type of processing intended, then they should consistently 
receive the associated rating. It was predicted that all critical sentences would receive the 
expected rating at least 80% of the time (this cut off is in line with Calvo & colleagues' 
criteria for judging the validity of inference-inducing sentences; Calvo, 2000; Calvo et 
al., 1999; Calvo, Castillo & Schmalhofer, 2006).  
 
 
 
3.2.1. Method 
 
3.2.1.1. Participants 
 
10 adults (mean age = 24.90 years, SD = 7.06, range = 18 – 40 years, 5 females) and 10 
CYP (mean age = 9.60 years, SD = 0.84, range = 9-11 years, 6 females) were recruited. 
Adults were recruited from Sheffield Hallam University undergraduate and postgraduate 
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courses and the researcher's local area. All undergraduate students received research 
credits for their participation. CYP were recruited from sports groups at a local leisure 
centre. All participants were native speakers of English and did not have a known learning 
difficulty. All participants had normal or corrected to normal vision (e.g. contact lenses 
or glasses) and none were colour blind. 
3.2.1.2. Design and Materials 
 
3.2.1.2.1. Critical Text Booklet 
 
A 36 item paper-based booklet was created to assess the type of inference evoked by each 
critical text. Each item consisted of the critical text followed by the expected inference 
(test sentence). 12 items reflected those critical sentences designed to evoke coherence 
inferences, 12 items reflected those critical sentences designed to evoke elaborative 
inferences, and 12 items reflected those critical sentences used in the literal stories. See 
Table 3.4. for examples and Appendix 3.3 for a full list of critical texts and test sentences. 
The order in which sentences were presented in the questionnaire was randomised using 
a random number generator. All participants received the sentences in the same order. 
Table 3.4. Example Critical Text and Test Sentences for Literal, Coherence and 
Elaborative Conditions 
 
For each item participants rated how easy it was to make the connection between the 
critical sentence and the test sentence (a processing rating) on a 4-point likert scale, where 
1 = very easy and 4 = hard. Definitions for each point on the scale were given at the start 
– see Table 3.5. 
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Table 3.5. Inference Ratings and Definitions 
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The first three definitions were adapted from those given by Graesser et al. (1994) and 
correspond to literal, coherence, and elaborative inferential processing, respectively. 
The definitions were read aloud and then explained in simpler terms for the CYP. Before 
starting the questionnaire all participants were asked to explain to the researcher what 
each rating meant. Participants did not complete the task until the researcher was happy 
that they fully understood each definition. Answers were scored as correct if the 
participant selected the rating thought to be elicited by the critical text. A high accuracy 
rating indicates a critical sentence which reliably evoked the intended inferential (or 
literal) processing. A low accuracy rating indicates that a critical sentence did not evoke 
the intended processing. 
3.2.1.3. Procedure 
 
Written consent was also gained from all adults. The three-tiered method of consent 
detailed in Section 5.3.3. was used to obtain consent from all CYP – this includes written 
organisational, parental 6 , and child consent. All participants completed the booklet 
individually in a quiet area (e.g. a lab room or break out space in the CYP's leisure 
centre/sports club). All participants were given the following instructions: 
‘In this booklet there are 36 short passages about some fictitious 
planets. I would like you to read these passages very carefully. The 
passages will be in italics. A short sentence in bold font will follow 
every passage. I would like you to tell me how easy or difficult it was 
to make the connection between the passage and sentence using the 
following scale.’ 
The rating scale and associated definitions were then explained to participants. Once the 
researcher was sure the participant understood the rating scale and definitions, an example 
was given. Participants then completed the booklet. The researcher was always close by 
in case the CYP needed any help reading the sentences. Adults took approximately 15-
20 minutes and CYP took approximately 20-25 minutes to complete the questionnaire. 
Once participants had completed the questionnaire they were thanked and debriefed, CYP 
were also given a goody bag and letter of thanks for their parents. 
 
                                                 
 
6
 The term parental/parent is used in this thesis to refer to the wide range of individuals who care for 
CYP. 
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3.2.2. Results 
 
If a critical text received the rating representing the inferential processing intended, it was 
scored as correct. A mean accuracy percentage was then calculated for each item. When 
looking at the ratings given by the children, 34 out of 36 items received the inference 
rating expected at least 80% of the time (see Appendix 3.4 for critical sentence accuracy 
ratings).  
Items 13b (furry fish) and 15b (running fish) were designed to evoke literal processing, 
however, item 13b was only rated as requiring literal processing 50% of the time, and 
item 15b, 40% of the time. It was thought that this was due to the wording of the test 
sentence as opposed to the wording of the critical text. Both items 13b and 15b are 
counterfactual-world items, but the test sentence refers to 'this planet' (e.g. 'The fish on 
this planet are covered in fur'). This phrase was meant to refer to the planet upon which 
the 'furry fish/running fish' lived. However, CYP may have thought the sentence was 
referring to Earth, causing confusion and a more difficult decision-making process. The 
wording of the test sentences in these items was changed to remove the ambiguity caused 
by the use of 'this planet' before the booklet was given to adults, all other items remained 
the same in the booklet given to adults and children. The newly modified item 13b and 
15b were given a rating of 1 (the expected rating associated with literal processing) at 
least 80% of the time by adults. Inspection of individual item ratings given by adults 
found that all items received the processing rating expected at least 80% of the time (see 
Appendix 3.4 for a full list of percentage ratings).  
After removing responses to items 13b and 15b (5.56% of the child data) from the 
children's data set a participant mean accuracy percentage was calculated for both adults 
and children for each condition. As can be seen from Table 3.6. the mean accuracy 
percentage was 80% or over for all conditions. This suggests that for all conditions the 
critical texts were consistently rated as evoking the inferential processing intended. 
Therefore, the critical sentences appear suitable for use in the IST. 
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Table 3.6. Mean Critical Text Accuracy Percentages (and Standard Deviations) across 
All Conditions for Both Adults and Children 
 
3.3. Stage 2: Evaluation of the Interpretation, Processing Difficulty, and 
Plausibility of Pictorial Stimuli 
 
As discussed in Section 2.3.3., research suggests pictures, as opposed to text, allow direct 
access to meaning and may be more suitable for the assessment of a range of age groups. 
However, this is only the case if the pictures adequately depict what they are supposed to 
and are easy to interpret. Stage 2 of the study evaluated whether the pictures: 
 depicted the idea intended,   were easy to interpret,  in the case of real-world target items (and real-world alternative filler items in 
counterfactual-world conditions), depicted plausible ideas,   in the case of counterfactual-world target items, depicted implausible ideas. 
To determine if the pictures depicted the ideas intended participants were asked to 
describe the picture. Participants then rated how difficult it was to make this decision and 
finally participants rated the plausibility of the idea depicted by each picture. If a picture 
reliably depicted the idea intended, then the picture should consistently be identified 
correctly. It was predicted that all of the pictures intended for use on the IST would be 
identified correctly at least 80% of the time, in accordance with cut off rates used by 
Calvo and colleagues (Calvo, 2000; Calvo et al., 1999; 2006). Since each picture was 
only rated by five adults and five children, 80% is the equivalent of just one adult or one 
child identifying the picture incorrectly, creating a very stringent criterion.  
A difficulty rating scale ranging from 1 = extremely easy to 5 = extremely hard was used 
to obtain a measure of picture difficulty. It was predicted that all pictures intended for use 
in the IST would receive a mean difficulty rating of 2 or less. A plausibility rating scale 
ranging from 1 = impossible to 4 = very likely was used to obtain a measure of picture 
plausibility. It was predicted that all real-world target pictures would receive a mean 
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plausibility rating of 3 or more and all counterfactual-world target pictures would receive 
a mean plausibility rating of 2 or less. It was predicted that the real-world alternatives to 
the counterfactual-world target pictures would also receive a mean rating of 3 or more.  
3.3.1. Method 
 
3.3.1.1. Participants 
 
20 adults (mean age = 33.55 years, SD = 13.88, range = 18-65 years; 11 females) and 20 
CYP (mean age = 9.90 years, SD = 1.07, range = 9-12 years; females) were recruited. 
Adults were recruited from Sheffield Hallam University undergraduate and postgraduate 
courses and the surrounding area. All undergraduate students received research credits 
for their participation. CYP were recruited from sports groups at a local leisure centre. 
All participants were native speakers of English and did not have a known learning 
difficulty. All participants had normal or corrected to normal vision and none were colour 
blind. None of the participants recruited for Stage 2 had taken part in Stage 1 of this study. 
3.3.1.2. Materials and Design 
 
3.3.1.2.1. Picture Validation Booklet 
 
Four 36-item booklets were created to evaluate the 144 pictures designed by the 
researcher for use in the IST. The 144 pictures were randomly divided across the four 
booklets to prevent fatigue. The distribution of the four booklets was counterbalanced 
across participants. 
The picture validation booklet was designed to assess whether or not the pictures depicted 
what they were supposed to, picture difficulty, and picture plausibility, thus each item 
consisted of three parts. First, using an open-answer method, participants stated what they 
thought the picture was. Participants then rated picture difficulty on a 5 point likert scale, 
where 1 = very easy and 5 = very difficult7 - see Table 3.7. for definitions of each rating. 
 
                                                 
 
7
 Participants were not told what the picture was supposed to be before making their difficulty rating as if 
the participant did not identify the picture correctly this data was removed from analysis. 
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Table 3.7. Picture Difficulty Ratings and Definitions 
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Finally, participants were asked to rate picture plausibility on a 4 point likert scale where 
1 = impossible and 4 = very likely – see Table 3.8. for definitions for each rating. 
Table 3.8. Picture Plausibility Ratings and Definitions 
 
3.3.1.3. Procedure 
 
Written organisational, parental, and child consent were gained for all CYP. Written 
consent was also gained from all adults. All participants completed the picture validation 
booklet individually in a quiet area. All participants were given the following instructions: 
You’re going to see some pictures. Next to each picture is a dotted 
line. I would like you to write down what you think each picture is on 
this line. I would then like you to tell me how easy it was to decide 
what each picture was using the scale below. After you’ve done this, I 
would then like you to tell me how likely you think it is that you would 
see the idea in the picture in real-life using the scale below. 
The rating scales and associated definitions were then explained to participants, with each 
being followed by an example. Once the participant had confirmed that they understood 
what to do, they completed the booklet. In most cases, adults and children completed the 
booklet themselves. However, some children who were conscious of their handwriting or 
spelling asked to dictate and let the researcher fill the booklet in for them. Upon 
completion of the booklet, the researcher quickly scanned the booklet, if any pictures had 
been incorrectly identified the researcher explained what the picture was meant to be and 
asked the participant how they thought the picture could be improved. No changes were 
made at this point. The booklet took adults 15-20 minutes to complete and children 20-
30minutes to complete. Once participants had completed the booklet they were thanked 
and debriefed, children were also given a goody bag and letter of thanks and debrief to 
take home to their parents. 
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3.3.2. Results 
3.3.2.1. Accuracy of Picture Depiction 
 
All answers given by participants were scored as correct/incorrect by the researcher and 
a second scorer (psychology graduate) using a set of strict criteria. Table 3.9. provides 
examples of the criteria used and some examples of both correct and incorrect answers 
given by participants. Inter-rater reliability between the researcher and the second scorer 
was found to be very high, with 97.08% agreement between the two scorers for children 
and 98.75% agreement for adults.  
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Table 3.9. Examples of criteria used to score picture identification answers and the 
types of answers marked as correct/incorrect 
 
To explore whether or not the pictures created adequately depicted the idea intended, a 
mean correct response percentage was calculated for each picture8. Inspection of these 
percentages shows that for children, 136 of the 144 pictures received a mean correct 
response percentage of 80% or above. The target picture for item 4a (Holly and Ben 
walking on water/across the lake), all four pictures for item 10b (Red poppies, Blue 
                                                 
 
8
 the researcher’s own marks were used not the seconder marker’s 
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poppies, Orange poppies, Yellow poppies) and the target and two fillers for item 14a 
(Hard rock, Bendy rock, Cracked rock) did not receive a mean correct response 
percentage of 80% or above. For adults, 138 of the 144 pictures received a mean correct 
response percentage of 80% of above. The fillers for item 10b (Blue poppies, Orange 
poppies, Yellow poppies) and the target and two fillers for item 14a (Hard rock, Bendy 
rock, Cracked rock) did not receive a mean correct response percentage of 80% or above 
(see Appendix 3.5 for accuracy percentages for every picture). Several changes, all listed 
below, were made to rectify these issues. 
The target picture for item 4a was edited so that the waves in the lake were blue - more 
clearly representing water. This picture was rated again by five children who had not 
previously participated in the study (mean age = 9.20 years, SD = 0.45, 3 females; these 
new participants were also asked to provide a difficulty and plausibility rating for the new 
picture). This edited picture received a 100% identification ratimg from the five new 
participants. Water was represented in this way (i.e. blue) in all relevant pictures to 
improve clarity and consistency across items. 
Item 10b was changed from ‘The enormous field ahead of them was filled to the brim with 
beautiful poppies.’ to ‘The Blib did not use a pencil to draw Ben. He used a small stick 
covered in honey.9’ Consequently, the intended inference went from ‘poppies are red’ to 
‘honey is golden yellow.’ Four new pictures were created for this new item. These four 
pictures were then rated again by five children (mean age = 9.60 years, SD = 0.89, 3 
females) and five adults (mean age = 25.80 years, SD = 11.71, 1 female), none of which 
had previously participated in the study (these new participants were also asked to provide 
a difficulty and plausibility rating for the new pictures). The new children identified the 
target correctly 80% of the time, filler 1 correctly 100% of the time, filler 2 correctly 
100% of the time, and filler 3 correctly 80% of the time. The new adults correctly 
identified the target 100% of the time, filler 1 was correctly identified 80% of the time, 
filler 2 100% of the time, and filler 3 was correctly identified 100% of the time. 
Item 14a was changed from ‘However, they were trapped. There was no way out. The 
thick walls of rock were completely solid.’ to ‘The people in this place wore tops made 
                                                 
 
9
 These item was also evaluated to ensure they evoked the target inference using the methodology 
outlined in Stage 1. 
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from elastic. Elastic is quite stretchy10.’ Consequently, the intended inference went from 
'rocks are hard and inflexible' to 'elastic is flexible and stretchy.' Four new pictures were 
created for this new item. These four pictures were then rated again by five children (mean 
age = 9.40 years, SD = 0.55, 2 females) and five adults (mean age = 22.40 years, SD = 
3.58, 3 females), none of which had previously participated in the study (these new 
participants were also asked to provide a difficulty and plausibility rating for the new 
pictures). The new children identified the target correctly 100% of the time, filler 1 was 
identified correctly 100% of the time, filler 2 80% of the time, and filler 3 was also 
identified correctly 80% of the time. The new adults correctly identified the target 100% 
of the time, filler 1 80% of the time, filler 2 80% of the time, and correctly identified filler 
3 100% of the time.  
Using the new stimuli, mean correct response percentages were calculated for adults and 
children for each condition. These mean correct response percentages can be found in 
Table 3.10.  
Table 3.10. Mean correct response percentages (and Standard Deviations) across All 
Conditions for Adults and Children 
 
As can be seen from Table 3.10. in all conditions, the mean percentage accuracy rating is 
very high (above 90%) for both adults and children. This suggests that the pictures 
intended for use in the IST reliably convey the ideas intended. Overall, it appears that 
after some modifications, all pictures adequately depicted the intended ideas and are 
suitable for use in the IST.  
 
 
                                                 
 
10
 These items were also evaluated to ensure they evoked the target inference using the methodology 
outlined in Stage 1. 
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3.3.2.2. Picture Difficulty and Plausibility Ratings  
3.3.2.2.1. Preliminary Analysis 
 
The data were inspected prior to analysis and those pictures identified incorrectly were 
removed (this resulted in 2.92% of child data and 3.89% of adult data being removed 
from analysis), meaning only difficulty and plausibility ratings of those pictures correctly 
identified were used to calculate means. To ensure that pictures in all conditions were of 
equal difficulty, mean difficulty ratings for each condition were calculated. Mean 
difficulty ratings comprised all pictures a participant rated within that condition - i.e. both 
targets and fillers – and can be found in Table 3.11. To ensure real-world target pictures 
depicted plausible ideas and counterfactual-world target pictures depicted implausible 
ideas mean plausibility ratings were calculated for each condition. Mean plausibility 
ratings comprised the plausibility ratings for target items only and can be found in Table 
3.12. 
There were no outliers in the data and homogeneity of variance was not violated, such 
that the largest standard deviation was less than four times larger than the smallest 
standard deviation (Howell, 1987). However, for difficulty ratings, the distribution for all 
conditions was positively skewed - this was expected since it was hoped that most pictures 
would receive fairly low ratings. For plausibility ratings, the distribution was positively 
skewed for counterfactual-world conditions and negatively skewed for real-world 
conditions. Again, this was expected since it was hoped that counterfactual-world items 
would receive low scores, indicative of implausibility, and that real-world alternative 
filler pictures would receive high scores, indicative of plausibility. ANOVA is believed 
to be robust enough to deal with skewed distributions of data, even when small samples 
are used (Field, 2013). Even though Likert scales produce ordinal data, it is argued that 
once items are summed or averaged across the scale the data becomes interval (Carifio & 
Perla, 2008). Parametric ANOVAs were conducted on all difficulty and plausibility data 
obtained in Stage 2 of the study. 
3.3.2.2.2. Picture Difficulty Ratings 
 
First, mean difficulty ratings were calculated for each picture. Inspection of these means 
showed that mean ratings for all pictures were less than 2 for the children. Since a score 
of 1 equals very easy and 2 = easy this suggests children found all pictures easy to 
interpret. However, the target picture of item 3a (man flying over cliff) received a mean 
rating of 2.33 from the adults (see Appendix 3.6 for mean difficulty ratings for each item). 
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Consequently, lines to indicate movement were added to this picture. It was then rated 
again by five adults (mean age = 21.20 years, SD = 3.35, 4 females) who had not 
previously taken part in the study. The new adult participants gave the edited picture a 
mean rating of 1.6. Ratings for the amended stimuli were used when calculating a mean 
difficulty rating for each condition. As can be seen from Table 3.11. the mean difficulty 
ratings in all conditions, for both adults and children, are less than 2. Therefore, it seems 
all pictures, regardless of condition, are easy to interpret. 
 Table 3.11. Mean Difficulty Ratings (and Standard Deviations) across All Conditions for 
Both Children and Adults 
 
A 2 (Age: adults, children) * 2 (plausibility: real-world, counterfactual-world) * 3 
(inference type: literal, causal, elaborative) mixed ANOVA was conducted. No 
significant effects of age (F  (1,38) = 0.53, p = 0.47, ηp² = 0.01), plausibility (F  (1, 38) = 
0.003, p = 0.96, ηp² < 0.001), or inference type (F (2,76) =  2.167, p =  0.12, ηp² =  0.05) 
were found. There were also no significant interactions (p > 0.05 for all interactions). This 
suggests that there is no difference in picture difficulty across conditions. Overall, it 
appears that all pictures are easy to interpret with no differences in picture difficulty 
between conditions or between adults and children observed. 
3.3.2.2.3. Picture Plausibility Ratings 
 
First, mean plausibility ratings were calculated for each target picture. The definitions 
assigned to the ratings mean that a score of 3 or more reflects a plausible idea, whereas a 
score of 2 or less reflects an implausible idea. Inspection of the plausibility ratings given 
to individual pictures shows that all real-world target items received a mean plausibility 
rating of 3 or more and all counterfactual-world target items received a mean plausibility 
rating of 2 or less from adults (see Appendix 3. for individual plausibility ratings for each 
picture). However, this is not the case for children. Whilst all counterfactual-world target 
items received a mean plausibility rating of 2 or less, three real-world items received a 
mean plausibility rating of less than 3: item 8a (shark biting Holly), item 16a (Holly and 
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Ben walking on the road) and item 18a (shark biting Holly's foot). This suggests that 
children view the ideas depicted in these pictures as implausible, however, exploration of 
the explanations given by children who gave these pictures a score of 2 or less suggests 
this may not be the case. 
Items 8a and 18a were rated as unlikely by some children as they felt that they personally 
were unlikely to see a shark or snake biting someone in England. However, the children 
did acknowledge that being bitten by a shark or snake was plausible, they just felt that 
they were unlikely to see it. Item 16a was also rated as unlikely by some children as they 
felt that they would be unlikely to see people walking/running in the middle of the road 
as ‘this is dangerous’. The answers given may be due to the wording of the question - 
'how likely would you be to see…'.  When answering, some children appear to have taken 
an idiosyncratic approach - i.e. 'how likely is it that I would see this?' Since all three items 
were acknowledged as plausible, even if unlikely to be witnessed by the children, these 
items were not changed. Overall, it appears that all real-world target pictures and all real-
world alternative filler pictures depict plausible ideas whereas all counterfactual-world 
target pictures depict implausible ideas. 
Mean plausibility ratings were then calculated for each condition. As can be seen from 
Table 3.12. mean plausibility ratings for the real-world conditions are above 3 and 
plausibility ratings for counterfactual-world conditions are below 2, for both adults and 
children. This suggests that the real-world pictures depict plausible ideas, whereas the 
counterfactual-world pictures depict implausible ideas. 
Table 3.12. Mean Plausibility Ratings (and Standard Deviations) across All Conditions 
for Children and Adults 
 
A 2 (Age: adults, children) * 2 (plausibility: real-world, counterfactual-world) * 3 
(inference type: literal, causal, elaborative) mixed ANOVA was conducted to explore any 
differences in the plausibility of ideas depicted by real-world and counterfactual-world 
targets. A main effect of plausibility was found (F  (1,38) = 621.01, p < 0.001, ηp² = 0.94) 
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with real-world items (mean = 3.35, SD = 0.22) receiving significantly higher plausibility 
ratings than counterfactual-world items (mean = 1.41, SD = 0.20). No significant effect 
of inference type (F (2,76) = 0.18, p = 0.84, ηp² = 0.005) or age (F (1,38) = 0.08, p = 0.79, 
ηp² < 0.01) was found. There were no significant interactions observed (p > 0.05 for all 
interactions). It appears that real-world target items are more plausible than 
counterfactual-world items for both adults and children. 
Finally, counterfactual-world items were designed to include the counterfactual-world 
target and three fillers, with one filler depicting the real-world alternative to the 
counterfactual-world target. To ensure these real-world alternatives depict plausible ideas 
subsidiary analysis was conducted to explore their plausibility. Mean plausibility ratings 
were calculated for each real-world alternative picture. Inspection of these means found 
that all pictures received mean plausibility ratings above 3 from adults and children. An 
overall mean was then calculated for real-world alternative pictures, real-world target 
items, and counterfactual-world target items. A 2 (Age: Adults, Children) * 3 (Picture 
Type: Real-world Target, Counterfactual-world Target, Real-world Alternative) mixed 
ANOVA was conducted to explore any differences in the plausibility of ideas depicted 
by real-world targets, counterfactual-world targets, and real-world alternatives. A main 
effect of picture type was observed (F (2,76) = 519.02. p < .001, ηp² = 0.93). Post-hoc 
pairwise comparisons (conducted using a Bonferroni adjustment (0.05/3)) revealed that 
there was no significant difference between the plausibility ratings for real-world 
alternative (mean = 3.50, SD = 0.31) and real-world target items (mean = 3.35, SD = 0.43; 
t (39) = 1.95, p = .058). Counterfactual-world target pictures (mean = 1.41, SD = 0.32) 
were found to receive significantly lower plausibility ratings than both real-world target 
(t (39) = 34.46, p < .001) and real-world alternative pictures (t (39) = 24.21, p < .001). 
There was no main effect of age (F (1,38) = 0.64, p = .43, ηp² = 0.02). There was found 
to be no significant interaction between picture type and age (F (2,76) = 2.27, p = .11, ηp² 
= .056). This suggests that real-world alternative pictures, like real-world target pictures, 
depict plausible ideas. Overall, real-world target pictures and real-world alternatives 
appear to depict plausible ideas whereas counterfactual-world target pictures appear to 
depict implausible ideas.  
3.4. Discussion 
 
All critical sentences and pictures appear to be suitable for use in the IST. Critical texts 
were found to elicit the type of processing intended. Pictures were found to depict the 
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ideas intended, be easy to interpret, and in the case of real-world targets, depict plausible 
ideas but in the case of counterfactual-world targets depict implausible ideas. Whilst, all 
critical texts were found to elicit the type of processing intended, some minor 
modifications had to be made to the critical text booklet. Moreover, it was after some 
modifications that all pictures were also found to adequately depict the idea intended. In 
most cases, the modifications made were minor, for example, adding blue lines to more 
clearly depict water. However, two items had to be replaced with new critical texts being 
created.  
 All pictures were found to be easy to interpret, with no differences found between 
conditions or adults and children. All real-world target pictures (and real-world 
alternatives, a special filler used in the counterfactual-world conditions) were found to 
depict plausible ideas. Conversely, all counterfactual-world pictures were found to depict 
implausible ideas. Some children approached the task in a very idiosyncratic manner, 
such that three real-world target pictures were rated as implausible by some children, 
since they felt that they personally would never see, for instance, a shark attack. Overall, 
it seems the newly designed stimuli is fit for purpose and should allow for a valid 
assessment of real-world and counterfactual-world inference generation abilities. 
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CHAPTER 4 AN EVALUATION OF THE IMAGE SELECTION 
TASK 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
This Chapter presents initial findings from a new inference generation assessment tool, 
the Image Selection Task (IST), which was developed to assess real-world and 
counterfactual-world inference generation abilities in a range of age groups. To determine 
the validity of the IST, as a measure of inference generation, patterns of data from the IST 
are compared with patterns observed on an already widely used measure of inference 
generation, the Sentence Verification Task (SVT) to determine if the IST results in similar 
time-course and skill patterns to the SVT. 
 
4.1.1. Designing the Image Selection Task 
 
The Image Selection Task (IST) combines a self-paced reading (SPR) methodology and 
forced-choice picture-selection task (FCPST). The IST is a computer-based assessment 
that comprises 18 short stories (195-205 words long). Each story was split into three 
sections, with the first two sections of each story ending with a critical text (inference-
evoking/explicit). Reading speeds of the critical text were recorded to provide a measure 
of the inferential time-course. Each critical text was followed by a 2*2 FCPST, in which 
the target and three related fillers were presented. One of the fillers depicted explicitly 
stated information, to tap a common reason for inferential failure – literal processing. In 
the counterfactual-world conditions, one of the fillers also depicted the real-world 
alternative, to provide a measure of the real-world interference experienced when 
processing counterfactual-world information. Number of errors was recorded to provide 
a measure of inference skill. Figure 4.1. provides a schematic representation of the IST.  
The IST was designed to capitalise on the strengths of existing measures. To allow for 
the assessment of a range of age groups, additional demands were kept to a minimum by 
using a simple pictorial response method to assess the inferential product. Additionally, 
all text was created to be readable by CYP aged 9 years or less. Two tasks were combined 
to allow for the efficient assessment of both inferential skill and time-course. To promote 
a natural reading process, critical texts were embedded into stories and a SPR 
methodology was employed to assess the inferential time-course whilst reading, with 
minimal disruption. Finally, the use of diagnostic, as opposed to random, filler pictures 
allowed for an error analysis to be conducted, providing insight into the real-world 
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interference experienced when generating counterfactual-world inferences and possible 
causes of inference generation failure when generating real-world inferences. 
4.1.2. Evaluating the IST 
 
The IST is based on similar tasks used by Ford and Milosky (2003; 2008) and Schmidt 
and Paris (1978). The IST, with the addition of reading speeds and more complex stimuli, 
is, a novel paradigm, however, and has not previously been used to assess inference 
generation abilities. The validity of the IST as an inference generation measure needed to 
be ascertained. Typically, the validity of a comprehension measure is determined by: 
 exploring whether the measure taping those skills underpinning comprehension 
correlates with and/or predicts variance in a standardised reading comprehension 
measure (predictive/concurrent validity; Marcotte and Hintze, 2009; Shapiro, 
Fritschmann, Thomas, Hughes, & McDougal, 2014), or   comparing performance on the target measure with an already standardised 
measure (construct validity; e.g. Carlson et al., 2014; Reed & Vaughn, 2012). 
The primary aim of this Chapter was to ascertain whether the IST is able to measure 
inference generation (construct validity). Therefore, the patterns obtained from the IST 
were compared with patterns obtained on a Sentence Verification Task (SVT). The SVT 
was used as it has previously been employed to assess real-world and counterfactual-
world inference generation skill and time-course in adults and children (Bowyer-Crane & 
Snowling, 2010; Graesser et al., 1998). 
To be suitable for the assessment of real-world and counterfactual-world inference 
generation abilities during adolescence the IST must also meet the following criteria: 
1. Assess the inference generation skills of CYP aged 9-10 years to adults 
a. The IST should not result in ceiling or floor effects 
b. The IST must be simple to use and all instructions clear 
2. Assess the real-world interference thought to be experienced when processing 
counterfactual-world information. 
 
 
4.1.3. The Current Study 
 
The primary aim of the current study was to evaluate the newly designed IST to determine 
if the IST is a valid measure of inference generation abilities. Patterns of time-course 
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(reading speed) and skill (number of errors) data obtained from the IST were compared 
with patterns of time-course (response time) and skill (number of errors) data obtained on 
the SVT. The IST was designed to be suitable for the assessment of a wide range of age 
groups, specifically CYP aged 9-10 years to adults. For efficiency, two age groups were 
assessed in the current study 9-10 year olds and adults, such that if the IST is suitable for 
these two groups, it should also be suitable for those intermediate age groups. Table 4.1. 
presents predictions made for each task.11 
  
                                                 
 
11
 The list of predictions in Table 4.1 is exhaustive. However, this is due to the complexity of the two 
tasks used, such that faster response speeds on the SVT would be indicative of an online inference 
whereas slower reading speeds on the IST would be indicative of an online inference. 
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Table 4.1. Predictions for Time-Course and Skill 
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4.2. Stage 1 – Comparing Time-Course and Skill Patterns on the Sentence 
Verification Task and Image Selection Task 
4.2.1. Method 
4.2.1.1. Participants 
 
Thirty adults (mean age = 20.22 years, SD = 3.26, range = 18-33 years; 21 females) and 
thirty children (mean age = 9.95 years, SD = 1.03, range = 9-10 years; 17 females) were 
recruited. Adults were recruited from Sheffield Hallam University undergraduate and 
postgraduate courses, Sheffield and surrounding areas, and Nottinghamshire. All 
undergraduate students received research credits for their participation. Children were 
recruited from local schools and a sports group at a local leisure centre. All participants 
were native speakers of English and did not have a known learning difficulty. All 
participants had normal or corrected to normal vision and none were colour blind. None 
of the participants recruited had taken part in Study 1 (Chapter 3). 
4.2.1.2. Design 
 
An experimental mixed factorial design was employed. The between-participant 
independent variables were age (Children, Adults) and task (SVT, IST) – see Table 4.2. 
for distribution of participants. The within-participant independent variables were 
plausibility (Real-world, Counterfactual-world) and inference type (Literal, Coherence, 
Elaborative). The dependent variables were number of errors made on SVT and IST, time 
taken to respond to the test item (measured in milliseconds) on SVT, and time taken to 
read critical text (measured in milliseconds) on IST.  
Table 4.2. Number of Participants Completing Each Task  
 Adults Children 
Image Selection Task 15 15 
Sentence Verification 
Task 
15 15 
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4.2.1.3. Materials 
 
4.2.1.3.1. Image Selection Task 
 
A detailed description of the stimuli used in the Image Selection Task (IST) can be found 
in Chapter 3. 
The IST comprises three parts: 1) story text, 2) critical text, and 3) 2*2 forced-choice 
picture-selection grid. The participant moves through the task at their own pace, selecting 
the picture that they feel best matches the critical text. A schematic representation of the 
IST can be found in Figure 4.1. 
Eighteen stories (all 195-210 words long; mean = 203.44, S.D = 1.98) deemed suitable in 
terms of content and readability were created by the researcher (see Appendix 4.1 for 
readability and word length scores for all stories). All 18 stories designed for the IST 
received a readability rating of 9 years or less (mean = 8.81, S.D = 0.18). Six stories were 
created to assess real-world inferential processing abilities and six stories were created to 
assess counterfactual-world inferential processing abilities. Six additional stories were 
created to assess participant's short-term memory of information explicitly stated in the 
text (literal stories), examples of each story type can be found in Table 4.3. All stories 
were designed in three sections, such that the first two sections ended with a critical text 
and the final section provided a story ending. All critical texts were 21 syllables in length 
and either evoked an inference or, in the literal stories, explicitly stated the information 
needed to respond to the test items correctly. 
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Figure 4.1. Schematic Representation of the Image Selection Task  
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Table 4.3. Sample Text - Real-World, Counterfactual-World and Literal Conditions 
 
Real-world and counterfactual-world stories were designed to assess coherence and 
elaborative inferential abilities. Subsequently, each story contained one coherence-
inference-evoking critical text and one elaborative-inference-evoking critical text. Literal 
stories contained one critical text based on real-world information and one critical text 
based on counterfactual-world information. Inferential abilities were indexed by number 
of errors and speed at which critical text was read. The order of critical sentences within 
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each story was pseudo-randomised (see Table 3.2.), so that any differences in inferential 
performance could not be attributed to the position of the critical sentence. Additionally, 
two versions of the stories were written, such that the second version of stories had the 
converse arrangement of critical sentences. This meant that the story content had to be 
changed slightly. The number of words in version 1 and 2 of the story always remained 
the same. The general gist of the story also remained consistent, as did the readability 
rating (mean rating version 1 = 8.79, SD = 0.19; mean rating version 2 = 8.83, SD = 0.18; 
t (17) = 0.72, p = 0.48).  
The stories were sorted into two programs due to two versions of each story being created 
to ensure any differences between different conditions could not be attributed to the 
position of critical sentence. Each program comprised 18 stories. Each program 
comprised only one version of each story, with programs organised such that each was 
made up of: 
 6 stories presenting the coherence-inference-evoking critical text first (3 real-
world and 3 counterfactual-world),   6 stories presenting the elaborative-inference-evoking critical texts first (3 real-
world and 3 counterfactual-world),   3 stories presenting the real-world literal critical texts first, and   3 stories presenting the counterfactual-world critical texts first  
Whilst all participants received stories in the same order, the order of real-world, 
counterfactual-world and literal stories was randomised. The administration of programs 
1 and 2 was also counterbalanced across participants, see Table 3.2. for a summary of the 
counterbalancing and randomisation of critical texts and stories. 
A FCPST followed each critical sentence. Participants were required to select the picture 
that they felt best matched the preceding text as quickly and as accurately as possible. 
Figure 4.2. shows the format of the FCPST, as can be seen the task is comprised of four 
quadrants, each containing a picture. The top left quadrant has a yellow border, the top 
right quadrant has a red border, the bottom left quadrant has a blue border, and the bottom 
right quadrant has a green border. On the number pad, blue, green, yellow and red stickers 
were placed on keys 1, 2, 4, and 5, respectively, to mirror the quadrants on the screen. 
Participants used these keys to make their selection. 
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Figure 4.2. The Format of the Image Selection Task Test Items 
As can be seen from Figure 4.2, the FCPST comprised four pictures: the target (the correct 
item which reflects the inference which could have been drawn or the information 
explicitly stated in the critical sentence, in the case of literal items), and three fillers. 
The task was presented on a HP ProBook Laptop using E-Prime software to present 
stimuli and record number of errors and response time (recorded in milliseconds). 
4.2.1.3.2. Sentence Verification Task 
 
A schematic representation of the sentence verification task (SVT) can be found in Figure 
4.3. The stories, critical sentences and comprehension questions used in the SVT were 
identical to those used in the IST. Where relevant, all of those design considerations that 
aimed to minimise order effects in the IST were also applied to the SVT. However, the 
critical text was followed by a test sentence that participants had to judge as true or false, 
examples of these sentences can be found in Table 4.3. The test sentences appeared in 
bold and two font sizes larger than the story text. If participants thought the sentence was 
true they were instructed to press the key ('k') with a  sticker on, if they thought the 
sentence was false participants were instructed to press the key ('s') with a  sticker on. 
Inference generation abilities were measured by the time taken to make this true/false 
judgment, response times were measured from the presentation of test stimuli to the onset 
of tick or cross button press by the participant. Number of errors was also recorded. The 
correct response in all of the inference items was always true. Thus, a TRUE/TRUE 
response pattern was always correct for the inference items. Therefore, in half of the 
literal items the correct answer was false, such that correct response pattern was 
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TRUE/FALSE for half of the literal trials. This is the same design used by Bowyer-Crane 
and Snowling (2010) and has been used to minimise the number of stories a participant 
has to read. 
  
Figure 4.3. A Schematic Representation of the Sentence Verification Task 
4.2.1.4. Procedure 
 
Written consent was gained from all adults. The three-tiered method of consent, detailed 
in Section 5.3.3., was used to obtain consent from all children. All participants were tested 
individually in a quiet area. First, the researcher engaged participants in small talk to make 
them feel comfortable. Participants were then asked to move the laptop around on the 
desk so that it was in a comfortable position for them. Participants were informed that 
they would be helping the researcher to make sure that all of instructions were clear and 
made sense. Participants were encouraged to let the researcher know if anything was 
unclear or needed further explanation, or if they had any suggestions that would make the 
instructions clearer. 
Once the laptop was in place all participants were given the following instructions 
(instructions were read aloud and appeared on the screen): 
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Today I would like you to read some stories about Holly and 
Ben. Holly and Ben are space adventurers that travel to planets 
all over the universe.  
At the end of each story, you'll be asked two questions so you 
need to make sure that you're reading the stories carefully. You 
answer these questions using the tick and the cross keys. If you 
think the answer is true you press the tick and if you think the 
answer is false, you press the cross. Does that sound OK?  
The whole story won't appear on the screen at once, instead just 
one or two sentences will appear on the screen. Once you have 
finished reading and understood the sentences on the screen just 
press the spacebar and you will then see the next set of 
sentences. Does that make sense? Please just read through these 
sentences at your normal reading speed. Try and read the 
stories in your head. 
Participants completing the SVT then received the following instructions: 
Every now and then you will see a sentence in bold. So this 
sentence will be a bit bigger than the text before it. You need to 
tell me if you think the sentence in bold is true or false based on 
the story you have just been reading. If you think the sentence is 
true based on the text you've just read you need to press the tick. 
If you think the sentence in bold is false based on the text you've 
just read you need to press the cross. You need to try and make 
this true or false decision as quickly and as accurately as 
possible. Does all of that make sense? 
OK, please put a finger on the cross and a finger on the tick. 
Conversely, participants completing the IST received the following instructions: 
Every now and then, the screen will be split into four sections, 
with a picture appearing here, here, here, and here. You need to 
tell me which picture you feel best matches the story you have 
been reading. You need to try and make this decision as quickly 
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and as accurately as possible. To do this you will use these 
coloured buttons. If you think the picture that best matches the 
text you've just read is in this yellow box you press the yellow 
button, if you think it's in this red box you press the red button, 
the blue box you press the blue button, and if you think the 
picture that best matches the text you've just read is in the green 
box you press the green button. Does all of that make sense? 
OK good, so put one hand over the coloured buttons and your 
other hand over the space bar. Press the spacebar for a little 
practice 
Participants were then given 20 practice trials to allow them to become familiar with the 
coloured button response method – see Section 3.1.1.4.3. The researcher monitored 
participants' performance during these practice trials and gave further instruction if 
necessary. The researcher was confident that all participants had mastered the response 
method by the end of the practice trials. 
The researcher ensured that all participants had understood the instructions and had a 
clear idea of what they had to do before starting the experiment proper. Participants 
worked through the story text and critical text at their own pace. Once participants had 
finished reading the critical text a screen with a fixation point in the centre was presented 
for 500ms, the test item then immediately followed this. Participants controlled the 
presentation of the text using the spacebar. Each press of the spacebar caused the current 
text to be erased and replaced with the next set of sentences. 
A screen with the text 'PLEASE GET READY FOR YOUR NEXT STORY' appeared 
for 1000ms before each story began. After every third story, a screen would appear 
advising participants to take a break and have a stretch. Adults completed the IST/SVT 
in around 20minutes, whereas children took on average 30minutes to complete the 
IST/SVT. Response accuracy was not signalled to ensure the tasks provided a measure of 
current as opposed to learning ability. Positive encouragement was given to all 
participants, regardless of performance (e.g. you're doing well). Participants were thanked 
and debriefed. Each child was also given a goody bag, letter of thanks, and debrief letter 
to take home to their parents. 
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4.2.2. Results 
4.2.2.1. Preliminary Analysis 
Two versions of each story were created to ensure any differences between different 
conditions could not be attributed to the position of critical sentence. Therefore, story 
effects were investigated12. On the SVT, no difference in response times was found 
between Set 1 and Set 2 for adults (t (17) = 0.87, p = 0.40) or children (t (17) = 0.64, p = 
0.53). On the IST, there was found to be no significant difference between reading speeds 
on Set 1 and Set 2 for adults (t (17) = .14, p =.89) or children (t (17) = .41, p = .69). For 
both the SVT and IST, there was found to be no difference between the number of errors 
made on Set 1 and Set 2 for adults (t (17) = 0.53, p = 0.59) or children (t (17) = 0.44, p = 
0.67). The data from both sets of stories was, therefore, collapsed. 
4.2.2.2. Assessing the Inferential Time-Course: IST Reading Speed and SVT 
Response Time Measures 
 
First, the data were inspected prior to analysis and all incorrect responses were removed. 
Second, a data trim was conducted, with all scores 2 standard deviations above or below 
the participant’s grand reading speed (IST) or response time (SVT) mean removed and 
all scores 2 standard deviations above or below each items grand reading speed (IST) or 
response time (SVT) mean removed. Whilst most outliers were evenly distributed across 
all items and participants, some items resulted in more than 50% of errors/outliers. For 
children, item 5b was removed from the SVT, and items 5b, 6a, and 11a were removed 
from the IST. For adults, items 4b, 6a, and 10b were removed from the SVT, and item 6a 
was removed from the IST. Overall, for children, 26.48% of data were removed from the 
SVT, and 29.06% of data were removed from the IST. For adults, 19.20% of data were 
removed from the SVT, and 18.51% of data were removed from the IST – a breakdown 
of the percentage of data removed at each stage can be found in Table 4.4. The error rates 
in this study are higher than those found in similar inference generation studies with adults 
(e.g. Calvo & Castillo, 2001a; 2001b; Casteel, 1993) and children (e.g. Bowyer-Crane & 
Snowling, 2010; Casteel, 1993). However, since this was the first time these tasks were 
administered, it was expected that some modifications would be necessary. 
                                                 
 
12
 analysis was conducted using the trimmed data set (see Section 4.2.2.2.) 
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Table 4.4. Percentage of Data Removed 
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Using the trimmed data set, a participant mean response time was calculated for each 
condition for the SVT and a participant mean reading speed was calculated for each 
condition for the IST. Participant means were then used to calculate mean response times 
and reading speeds for each condition, see Table 4.5. for SVT data and Table 4.6. for IST 
data. 
Table 4.5. Mean Responses Times (and Standard Deviations) in Milliseconds by Age, 
Plausibility and Inference Type 
 
Table 4.6. Mean Reading Speed (and Standard Deviations) in Milliseconds by Age, 
Plausibility and Inference Type 
 
For the SVT, inspection of skewness and kurtosis statistics revealed that for most of the 
conditions the data were normally distributed13. However, for the IST, a leptokurtic skew 
was observed for literal counterfactual-world, real-world coherence, real-world 
elaborative and counterfactual-world elaborative conditions for children and a leptokurtic 
skew was observed for literal real-world, literal counterfactual-world, real-world 
coherence, and real-world elaborative conditions for adults.  ANOVA is argued to be 
                                                 
 
13
 z scores for skewness and kurtosis were less than 1.96, the level suggested by Field (2005) for sample 
sizes less than 200 
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robust enough to deal with skewed data (Field, 2013). The assumption of sphericity was 
met for the SVT, such that Mauchly’s test of sphericity was not significant. For reading 
speeds, Mauchly's was violated for plausibility * inference type. Therefore, Huynh-Feldt 
statistics are reported for this analysis14. Homogeneity of variance was not violated. Two 
parametric ANOVAs were conducted to explore the effects of age, plausibility and 
inference type on response times on the SVT and reading speeds on the IST.  
For the SVT, a 2 (Age: Children, Adults) * 2 (Plausibility: Real-World, Counterfactual-
World) * 3 (Inference Type: Literal, Causal, Elaborative) mixed ANOVA was conducted. 
A main effect of plausibility was observed, such that real-world items were responded to 
significantly faster than counterfactual-world items (F  (1,28) = 104.88, p < .001, ηp² 
= .79). A main effect of inference type was observed (F  (2,56) = 79.61, p < .001, ηp² 
= .74). Three post-hoc pairwise comparisons were conducted to explore further. To 
control for a Type I error, a conservative alpha level of .01 was set in line with previous 
research (e.g. Cain et al., 2004; Calvo & Castillo, 2001a; 2001b). This alpha level was 
used for all post-hoc analyses in this thesis. There was found to be no significant 
difference between the response time to coherence items and literal items (t (29) = 3.08, 
p = .01). Elaborative items were found to be responded to significantly slower than literal 
items (t (29) = 11.63, p < .001) and coherence items (t (29) = 9.48, p <.001). A main effect 
of age was also found, with adults responding significantly faster than children (F (1, 28) 
= 151.64, p < .001, ηp² = .84).  
A significant interaction was observed between plausibility and age (F (1, 28) = 11.94, p 
= .002, ηp² = .30). Four t-tests were conducted to explore further. Children were found to 
respond to real-world items (t (28) = 7.38, p < .001) and counterfactual-world items (t 
(28) = 16.62, p < .001) significantly slower than adults. Both adults and children were 
found to respond to counterfactual-world items significantly slower than real-world items 
(children: t (14) = 4.23, p = .001; adults: t (14) = 11.47, p < .001). An interaction between 
inference type and age was observed (F (2, 56) = 13.86, p < .001, ηp² = .33). Nine t-tests 
                                                 
 
14
 Girden (1992) suggest that Huynh-Feldt, not the Greenhouse-Geisser correction, should be used when 
the estimates of sphericity are greater than 0.75, as in these cases the Greenhouse-Geisser correction is 
likely to be too conservative. 
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were conducted to explore further15. Compared to adults, children were found to respond 
significantly slower to literal items (t (23.32) = 9.37, p < .001), coherence items (t (28) = 
7.25, p < .001) and elaborative items (t (28) = 11.64, p < .001). Adults were found to 
respond to coherence items just as fast as literal items (t (14) = 2.31, p = .04), whereas 
elaborative items were responded to significantly slower than coherence (t (14) = 3.88, p 
= .002) and literal items (t (14) = 5.94, p < .001). The same pattern was observed for 
children (literal vs coherence: t (14) = 2.15, p = .05; literal vs elaborative: t (14) = 10.61, 
p < .001; coherence vs elaborative t (14) = 9.10, p < .001). An interaction between 
plausibility and inference type was also observed16. Six post-hoc t-tests were conducted 
to explore further. Real-world coherence items were found to be responded to just as fast 
as real-world literal items (t (29) = 2.95, p = .01). Real-world elaborative items were 
found to be responded to significantly slower than real-world coherence items (t (29) = 
5.56, p <.001) and literal items (t (29) = 4.30, p < .001). The same pattern was observed 
for counterfactual-world items (coherence vs literal: t (29) = 2.01, p = .05; elaborative vs 
coherence: t (29) = 6.34, p < .001; elaborative vs literal: t (29) = 7.67, p < .001). The 
interaction between plausibility, inference type and age was not significant (F (2, 56) = 
0.54, p = .58, ηp² = .02). 
For the IST, a 2 (Age: Children, Adults) * 2 (Plausibility: Real-World, Counterfactual-
World) * 3 (Inference Type: Literal, Causal, Elaborative) mixed ANOVA was conducted. 
Although means suggest a trend for counterfactual-world critical texts (mean = 6011.71, 
SD = 1744.68) to be read slower than real-world critical texts (mean = 5620.23, SD = 
1790.50), a significant main effect of plausibility was not observed (F (1, 28) = .96, p 
= .34, ηp² = .04). A main effect of inference type was observed (F (2, 56) = 3.71, p = .04, 
ηp² = .13). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons revealed that there was no difference between 
literal and elaborative reading speeds (t (29) = 0.69, p = .50). Coherence items were read 
slower than literal and elaborative critical texts. However, due to the correction applied 
this did not reach significance (p >.03 for both comparisons). A main effect of age was 
observed (F (1, 28) = 7.06, p =.01, ηp² = .23), with adults reading significantly faster than 
                                                 
 
15
 To explore change quantitatively, differences between adults and children for each inference type were 
explored. To explore change qualitatively, differences between coherence, elaborative and literal 
inference types were explored for adults and children separately. 
16
 Since this thesis is concerned with changes in time-course, coherence, literal and elaborative items were 
compared for real-world conditions and counterfactual-world conditions. 
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children. None of the remaining interactions were significant (p > .30 for all remaining 
interactions – see Appendix 4.2). 
In sum, patterns on the SVT suggest that coherence inferences are generated whilst 
reading whereas elaborative inferences are not, such that response times for coherence 
items were just as fast as response times to literal items, whereas response times for 
elaborative items were significantly slower than response times to both coherence and 
elaborative items. Visual inspection of means on the IST also supports this assumption, 
such that reading speeds were slower for coherence items compared to literal and 
elaborative items, with no difference between literal and elaborative items. However, 
these comparisons did not reach significance. Counterfactual-world items were found to 
be responded to significantly slower than real-world items on the SVT, however, this 
effect was not observed on the IST. Whilst an interaction was observed between 
plausibility and age on the SVT, when explored further results revealed that both adults 
and children responded to counterfactual-world items slower than real-world items, 
although children responded slower than adults. An interaction between inference type 
and age was also observed on the SVT, however, again the same patterns were observed 
for adults and children, such that both groups responded slower to elaborative items 
compared to coherence and literal items, with no difference in response times to 
coherence and elaborative items. Children responded slower to adults in all conditions. 
These results suggest that coherence inferences are generated online whereas elaborative 
inferences are not by adults and children, although this process may be more taxing for 
children compared to adults. An interaction was observed between plausibility and 
inference type on the SVT but not the IST. However, similar to above, when the data was 
explored the patterns suggested were the same as those suggested by the main effects on 
the IST – coherence inferences are generated online and elaborative inferences offline, 
regardless of the plausibility of the information being processed. Therefore, whilst 
interactions were observed on the SVT but not the IST, suggested inferential time-course 
patterns were similar across tasks. Overall, the IST appears to be a valid measure of the 
inferential time-course, such that similar patterns were observed on the IST and SVT. 
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4.2.2.3. Assessing Inferential Skill 
 
For both the SVT and IST, the number of errors made by each participant was calculated 
for each condition. From this, the mean number of errors for each condition was 
calculated, as can be seen in Table 4.7. 
Inspection of the skewness and kurtosis statistics revealed that for many of the conditions 
the data were normally distributed. However, the adult real-world and counterfactual-
world literal IST data were positively skewed with a leptokurtic distribution. This is due 
to very low error rates, with many adults often making no errors at all in these conditions. 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericity was not significant. However, homogeneity of variance was 
violated such that the largest standard deviation was more than four times larger than the 
smallest standard deviation. Due to the skewed data and violation of homogeneity of 
variance both parametric and non-parametric ANOVAs were conducted17. 
                                                 
 
17
 Both parametric and non-parametric tests resulted in the same patterns. Therefore, only parametric 
results are reported. 
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Table 4.7. Mean Number of Errors (and Standard Deviations) by Age, Plausibility, Inference Type and Task 
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To explore the effects of age and task on the patterns of real-world and counterfactual-
world inference generation a 2 (Age: children, adults) * 2 (Task: SVT, IST) * 2 
(Plausibility: real-world, counterfactual-world) * 3 (Inference Type: literal, causal, 
elaborative) mixed factorial ANOVA was conducted. A main effect of plausibility was 
found (F (1, 56) = 11.16, p = .001, ηp² = .17), with more counterfactual-world than real-
world errors being made. A main effect of inference type was observed (F (2, 112) = 5.38, 
p = .02, ηp² = .07). Three t-tests were conducted to explore further. There was found to 
be no difference between the number of literal and coherence errors made (t (59) = 2.31, 
p = .03), literal and elaborative errors made (t (59) = 2.44, p = .02), or coherence and 
elaborative errors made (t (59) < .001, p = 1.00). A main effect of age was observed (F 
(1, 56) = 26.80, p < .001, ηp² = .32), with children making significantly more errors than 
adults. There was no main effect of task (F (1,56) = 0.41, p = .53, ηp² = .01). None of the 
interactions were significant (p > .09 for all interactions – see Appendix 4.3.). 
4.2.2.4. Error Analysis 
 
To explore the interference experienced due to the activation of real-world knowledge 
when generating counterfactual-world inferences an error analysis was conducted. Given 
the high error rates across both the IST and SVT, an error analysis was also conducted on 
the real-world and literal items to see if there were any improvements that could be made 
to the stimuli. 
4.2.2.4.1. Children’s Data 
 
80% of the errors made in the counterfactual-world inferential conditions were real-world 
interference errors - i.e. the selection of the real-world alternative instead of the 
counterfactual-world target. For instance, for item 4b, which evokes the inference 'the 
leaves are red,' three children chose the green tree (real-world alternative) instead of the 
red tree (counterfactual-world target). The high percentage of real-world errors suggests 
that when drawing counterfactual-world inferences, real-world interference may occur.  
The remaining 20% of counterfactual-world errors made by children are likely to be due 
to ambiguous stimuli, lack of understanding, or no inference/an erroneous inference 
generation process. For instance, in item 2a (see Figure 4.4.), the critical sentence stated 
that the river was filled with coffee, with participants expected to infer that the river would 
be hot. However, two children chose the warm river (Quad 1) instead of the hot river 
(Quad 2) – see Figure 4.4. This may be because coffee can be served both hot and warm, 
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or it could be that to the children both of the temperatures represented on the 
thermometers in Quad 1 and Quad 2 reflected 'hot coffee.' To remove this ambiguity, the 
critical sentence was changed and instead of simply referring to the liquid in the river, the 
critical sentence was modified to refer to 'the steaming liquid'. The picture with a warm 
thermometer was also edited so that thermometer reflected a cooler temperature. Since 
some of the errors thought to reflect real-world interference could also reflect ambiguity 
in the stimuli or a lack of understanding, several of these items were also edited to ensure 
that counterfactual-world errors are actually reflective of real-world interference (final 
stories can be found in Appendix 4.4). 
 
Figure 4.4. Test Item 2a  
Real-world errors were split into three categories: (1) picture ambiguity, (2) text 
ambiguity, and (3) no inference drawn. An error was assigned to one of the ambiguity 
categories if there was a consistent error pattern - i.e. selection of the same (incorrect) 
picture. By analysing the critical text and picture selected, a decision was made as to 
where the ambiguity laid. For instance, item 9b states that the hippo crossed the thin ice 
(the intended inference was 'hippos are heavy') with many selecting the ‘light hippo’ 
picture. This suggests that the issue was text ambiguity. Therefore, this item was changed 
so the hippo was just standing on firm ground. If there was no consistent pattern of errors 
made, errors were assigned to the no inference category. 29% of errors were attributed to 
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picture ambiguity, 36% of errors were attributed to text ambiguity, and 29% of errors 
were attributed to no inference being drawn.  
In the literal conditions, 100% of the errors made were likely to reflect the need for 
pronoun resolution. Only one of these errors was in the real-world literal condition (item 
13a). For item 13a (for which the intended target is: 'Holly speaks to Ben') one child chose 
a dog saying hello instead of Holly saying hello. This may be because the critical sentence 
only said 'quietly she spoke…' This sentence was edited so that it was clear that Holly 
was the one speaking. The remaining errors were in the counterfactual-world literal 
conditions and the children consistently chose the real-world alternative. This suggests 
that when working memory is taxed (i.e. when the child needs to expend resources 
engaging in pronoun resolution) children may revert to a real-world baseline. 
4.2.2.4.2. Adult’s Data 
 
91% of the counterfactual-world errors made reflected real-world interference. The 
remaining 9% of the counterfactual-world errors made could reflect guessing and thus 
may be indicative of either a response error or no inference being drawn. As with the 
child data, real-world errors were split into three categories: (1) picture ambiguity, (2) 
text ambiguity, and (3) no inference drawn. The same process of category assignment 
was used. 30% of the real-world errors made by adults were attributed to picture 
ambiguity, 40% to text ambiguity, and 30% to no inference being drawn. 100% of the 
literal errors made by adults could be response errors, since, typically, only one 
participant made the error. 
The error analysis conducted shows that many of the errors made may reflect issues with 
the stimuli as opposed to the participants’ inferential abilities. Subsequently, it was 
necessary to amend some of the ambiguous stimuli. Stage 2 presents the findings of the 
evaluation of the IST using the amended stimuli. 
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4.3. Stage 2 – Comparing Time-Course and Skill Patterns on the Sentence 
Verification Task and Image Selection Task Using Amended Stimuli 
 
4.3.1. Method 
 
4.3.1.1. Participants 
 
30 adults (mean age = 25.63 years, SD = 8.05, range = 18-47 years; 18 females) and 30 
children (mean age = 9.97 years, SD = 1.33, range = 9-10 years; 16 females) were 
recruited. Adults were recruited from Sheffield Hallam University undergraduate and 
postgraduate courses, Sheffield and the surrounding area. All undergraduates received 
research credits for their participation. Children were recruited from local schools and a 
sports group at a local leisure centre. All participants were native speakers of English and 
did not have a known learning difficulty. All participants had normal or corrected to 
normal vision and none were colour blind. None of the participants recruited for Stage 2 
had taken part in Stage 1 of this study or Study 1 (Chapter 3). 
4.3.1.2. Design 
 
The design was the same as that employed in Stage 1. 
4.3.1.3. Materials 
 
4.3.1.3.1. Modified Image Selection Task 
 
Whilst the general design of the IST remained the same as in Stage 1 the main character's 
names were changed from Holly and Ben to Lily and Joe, as the researcher was made 
aware of a children's TV show called Holly and Ben's Magic Kingdom. Several other 
changes, regarding pronoun resolution and stimuli ambiguity, were also made following 
the results of Stage 1. The changes that were made did not affect content with all stories 
maintaining their original plot. All 18 stories remained between 190 and 210 words long, 
with all stories in Version 1 having the same number of words as Version 2 (mean = 
207.00, SD = 2.06). All 18 stories received a readability rating of grade 3 (8-9years) or 
less using Fry's readability formula (Version 1: mean = grade 1.96, SD = 0.52; Version 
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2: mean = grade 1.93, SD = 0.50)18, thus, after modifications, stories were still suitable 
for the youngest participants (See Appendix 4.5). 
The original IST was designed with 20 practice trials to familiarise participants with the 
response method. To ensure participants were not just comfortable with the response 
method but also the general design of the task a practice story was created. This story 
followed the same format as all of the experimental stories, such that it was 202 words in 
length and received a readability rating of less than grade 3 (see Appendix 4.6). Real-
world literal and counterfactual-world literal critical sentences were used in the story. If, 
during the practice story, participants selected the incorrect picture, participants were 
asked to explain their decision. The researcher then explained why this was not the correct 
picture and which picture was correct. Very few participants selected the incorrect picture 
on this practice block. 
Finally, it was decided that the comprehension questions should appear in blue text to 
allow participants to easily differentiate between the story text and the comprehension 
questions. No other changes were made. 
4.3.1.3.2. Modified Sentence Verification Task 
 
The stories, critical sentences and comprehension questions used in the modified SVT are 
the same as those used in the modified IST. The design and format of the modified SVT 
was the same as the SVT used in Stage 1. 
4.3.1.4. Procedure 
 
Consent was gained from adults and children in the same way as in Stage 1. 
Administration of the modified IST and modified SVT followed the same procedure as 
the administration of the original IST and SVT in Stage 1. However, the two main 
characters were introduced as Lily and Joe not Holly and Ben, participants were informed 
that the comprehension questions at the end of each story would appear in blue text, and 
participants were asked to complete a practice story before reading the first proper story. 
                                                 
 
18
 Readability of stories was measured using Fry's readability formula (Fry, 1968) instead of Hatcher's 
book grading formula. Fry's readability formula was used as it took into account not just length of word, 
but number of syllables which has been found to be more closely related to readability (e.g. Just & 
Carpenter, 1980). Therefore, Fry's formula is likely to provide a more subtle, accurate measure of 
readability. 
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The modified IST/SVT took adults on average 20 minutes and children 30 minutes to 
complete. 
4.3.2. Results 
4.3.2.1. Preliminary Analysis 
 
Story effects were investigated since two versions of each story were created. Analysis 
was conducted to determine if one version of the stories was any more difficult than the 
other. No difference in response times was found between Set 1 and Set 2 for adults (t 
(17) = 0.39, p = 0.71) or children (t (17) = 0.58, p = 0.57). There was also no difference 
in reading speeds between Set 1 and Set 2 for adults (t (17) = 0.92, p = 0.37) or children 
(t (18) = 0.16, p = 0.88). Nor was there found to be any difference between the number 
of errors made on Set 1 and Set 2 for adults (t (17) = 0.41, p = 0.69) or children (t (17) = 
0.25, p = 0.81). The data from both sets of stories were, therefore, collapsed. 
4.3.2.2. Assessing Inferential Time-Course 
The data were inspected prior to analysis and all incorrect responses were removed. A 
data trim was also conducted with all scores 2 standard deviations above or below the 
participant’s grand mean removed and all scores 2 standard deviations above or below 
each items grand mean removed. Overall, for children, 17.46% of data were removed 
from the modified SVT, and 12.22% of data were removed from the modified IST. For 
adults, overall 7.78% of data were removed from the modified SVT, and 9.26% of data 
were removed from the modified IST – see Table 4.8. for a full breakdown of data 
removed. The exclusion rates observed are comparable to those found in similar inference 
generation studies with adults (e.g. Calvo & Castillo, 2001a; 2001b; Casteel, 1993) and 
children (e.g. Bowyer-Crane & Snowling, 2010; Casteel, 1993). 
Table 4.8. Percentage of Data Removed 
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Using the trimmed data set, a participant mean response time was calculated for each 
condition for the SVT and a participant mean reading speed was calculated for each 
condition for the IST. Participant means were then used to calculate a mean response time 
or reading speed for each condition, see Table 4.9. for SVT data and Table 4.10. for IST 
data.  
Table 4.9. Mean Response Times (and Standard Deviations) in Milliseconds by Age, 
Plausibility and Inference Type 
 
Table 4.10. Mean Reading Speeds (and Standard Deviations) by Age, Plausibility, 
Inference Type, and Task 
 
Inspection of the skewness and kurtosis statistics revealed that for most of the conditions 
the data were normally distributed. However, the distribution of real-world literal scores 
on the SVT for children was found to have a slight leptokurtic skew, however, this was 
not severe. Mauchly’s test of sphericity was not significant for all conditions. 
Homogeneity of variance was not violated for reading speed data, but was violated, for 
response time data such that the largest standard deviation was more than four times 
higher than the smallest standard deviation. Since the sample sizes are equal it is argued 
that ANOVA is robust enough to deal with this violation (Field, 2013). Therefore, two 
parametric ANOVAs were conducted.  
A 2 (Age: Children, Adults) * 2 (Plausibility: Real-World, Counterfactual-World) * 3 
(Inference Type: Literal, Causal, Elaborative) mixed ANOVA was conducted on SVT 
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response times. A main effect of plausibility was observed (F (1,28) = 17.17, p < .001, 
ηp² = .38), with real-world items (mean = 3068.22, SD = 988.40) found to be responded 
to significantly faster than counterfactual-world items (mean = 3989.43, SD = 1174.91). 
A main effect of inference type was observed (F (1, 56) = 16.10, p < 001, ηp² = .37). 
Three post-hoc t-tests were conducted to explore further. Coherence items (mean = 
3308.14, SD = 1007.48) were found to be responded to just as fast as literal items (mean 
= 2942.11, SD = 868.75; t (28) = .09, p = .927). Elaborative items (mean = 4336.22, SD 
= 1443.57) were found to be responded to significantly slower than coherence items (t 
(28) = 4.69, p < .001) and literal items (t (28) = 4.79, p < .001). A main effect of age was 
observed (F (1,28) = 116.93, p < .001, ηp² = .81), with children responding significantly 
slower than adults. None of the interactions were significant (p > .31 for all interactions 
– see Appendix 4.7). Taken together, results suggest that coherence inferences are read 
whilst reading, whereas elaborative inferences are not, regardless of age group and 
plausibility of information. Counterfactual-world information does appear to be more 
taxing than real-world information, however, evidenced by the longer response times in 
the counterfactual-world condition compared to the real-world condition. 
A 2 (Age: Children, Adults) * 2 (Plausibility: Real-World, Counterfactual-World) * 3 
(Inference Type: Literal, Causal, Elaborative) mixed ANOVA was conducted on IST 
reading speeds. A main effect of age was found (F (1,28) = 21.22, p < .001, ηp² = 0.43), 
with adults reading critical texts faster than children. A main effect of plausibility was 
found (F (1,28) = 12.15, p = 0.002, ηp² = 0.30), with participants reading counterfactual-
world items significantly slower than real-world items. A main effect of inference type 
was also found (F (2,56) = 12.70, p < 0.001, ηp² = 0.31). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons 
found that coherence items were read significantly slower than both literal (t (29) = 4.64, 
p < .001) and elaborative items (t (29) = 3.73, p = .001). There was no difference between 
reading times of literal and elaborative items (t (29) = 1.24, p = .23). None of the 
interactions were significant (p > .10 for all interactions – see Appendix 4.8). Taken 
together, results suggest that coherence inferences are read whilst reading, whereas 
elaborative inferences are not, regardless of age group and plausibility of information. 
Counterfactual-world information does appear to be more taxing than real-world 
information, however, as evidenced by the longer reading speeds for all inference types 
in the counterfactual-world condition compared to the real-world condition. 
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4.3.2.3. Assessing Inferential Skill 
 
For both versions of the task, the number of errors made by each participant was 
calculated for each condition. From this the mean number of errors for each condition 
was calculated, as can be seen in Table 4.11. 
Inspection of the skewness and kurtosis statistics revealed that for many of the conditions 
the data were not normally distributed, such that the data were positively skewed with a 
leptokurtic distribution. This is due to the low error rates observed in some conditions. 
Mauchly's Test of Sphericity was significant for plausibility * inference type. Therefore, 
the Huynh-Feldt statistic is reported. Homogeneity of variance was also violated, with the 
highest standard deviation more than four times larger than the smallest standard 
deviation for both sets of data. Due to the skewed data and violation of homogeneity of 
variance both parametric and non-parametric ANOVAs were conducted19.  
  
                                                 
 
19
 Parametric and nonparametric tests resulted in the same patterns. Therefore, only parametric results are 
reported below. 
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Table 4.11. Mean Number of Errors (and Standard Deviations) by Age, Plausibility, Inference Type, and Task 
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To explore the effects of age, task, plausibility and inference type a 2 (Age: adults, 
children) * 2 (Task: SVT, IST) * 2 (Plausibility: real-world, counterfactual-world) * 3 
(Inference Type: literal, causal, elaborative) mixed ANOVA was conducted on errors 
made on SVT and IST. A main effect of plausibility was found (F  (1,56) = 23.51, p < .001, 
ηp² = .30), with more counterfactual-world errors than real-world errors being made. A 
main effect of inference type was found (F (2,112) = 28.88, p < .001, ηp² = .34). Post-hoc 
pairwise comparisons found that more coherence errors (t (29) = 6.27, p < .001) and 
elaborative errors (t (29) = 7.18, p <.001) than literal errors were made. There was found 
to be no significant difference between the number of coherence and elaborative errors 
made (t (29) = 1.58, p = .06). A main effect of age was observed (F (1,56) = 34.27, p 
< .001, ηp² = .38), with children making more errors than adults. A main effect of task 
was also observed (F (1,56) = 7.84, p = .007, ηp² = .12), with more errors made on the 
SVT than the IST.  
A significant interaction between inference type and age was observed (F (2,112) = 10.45, 
p < .001, ηp² = .16). Nine post-hoc t-tests were conducted to explore this interaction 
further20. Children were found to make significantly more coherence errors (t (58) = 4.00, 
p < .001) and elaborative errors (t (58) = 4.44, p < .001) than adults. However, there was 
found to be no significant difference between the number of literal errors made by adults 
and children (t (58) = 0.63, p = .53). Adults were found to make a similar number of literal, 
coherence and elaborative errors (p > .01 for all comparisons). Children were found to 
make significantly fewer literal errors than coherence errors (t (29) = 5.43, p < .001) and 
elaborative errors (t (29) = 5.65, p < .001). There was no difference in the number of 
coherence and elaborative errors made by children (t (29) = 1.79, p = .08). This suggests 
children find inferential, but not literal processing more difficult than adults. Similarly, 
whilst adults find inferential processing no more difficult than literal processing, children 
appear to find inferential processing more difficult than literal processing. 
A significant interaction was observed between plausibility and inference type (F (1.96, 
109.58) = 3.88, p = .024, ηp² = .07). Nine post-hoc t-tests were conducted to explore this 
                                                 
 
20
 To explore change quantitatively, differences between adults and children for each inference type were 
explored. To explore change qualitatively, differences between coherence, elaborative and literal 
inference types were explored for adults and children separately. 
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interaction further 21 . Significantly fewer real-world literal errors than real-world 
coherence errors (t (59) = 2.82, p = .006) and real-world elaborative errors (t (59) = 3.83, 
p < .001) were made. Similarly, significantly fewer counterfactual-world literal errors 
than counterfactual-world coherence errors (t (59) = 5.44, p < .001) and counterfactual-
world elaborative errors (t (59) = 5.48, p < .001) were made. Participants were found to 
make significantly more counterfactual-world coherence errors than real-world coherence 
errors (t (59) = 2.91, p = .005) and significantly more counterfactual-world elaborative 
errors than real-world elaborative errors (t (59) = 4.13, p < .001). There was no significant 
difference between the number of literal errors made in either the real-world or 
counterfactual-world conditions (p > .10 for all comparisons). This suggests, regardless 
of plausibility, adults and children find inferential processing more difficult than literal 
processing. Similarly, whilst counterfactual-world inferential processing appears to be 
more difficult than real-world inferential processing, literal processing appears to be just 
as easy when processing both real-world and counterfactual-world information. 
A significant interaction was observed between inference type and task (F (2,112) = 7.66, 
p = .001, ηp² = .12). Nine post-hoc t-tests were conducted to explore further. Significantly 
fewer literal errors than coherence errors (SVT: t (29) = 4.75, p < .001; IST: t (29) = 2.83, 
p = .008) and elaborative errors (SVT: t (29) = 5.43, p <. 001; IST: t (29) = 2.79, p = .009) 
were made on the SVT and the IST. Significantly more elaborative errors were made on 
the SVT compared to the IST (t (58) = 2.83, p = .006). No other comparisons were 
significant (p > .03 for all comparisons). Taken together, results suggest that elaborative 
inference generation appears to be more difficult on the SVT than the IST, whereas there 
is no difference for coherence and literal processing. 
A significant interaction was observed between age and task (F (1,56) = 10.95, p = .002, 
ηp² = .16). Four post-hoc t-tests were conducted to explore further. Children were found 
to make significantly more errors than adults on the SVT (t (28) = 6.20, p < .001), whereas 
there was no significant difference between the number of errors made by adults and 
children on the IST (t (28) = 1.90, p = .07). Adults were found to make a similar number 
of errors on the IST and SVT (t (28) = 0.43, p = .67), whereas children were found to 
                                                 
 
21
 Since this thesis is concerned with changes in time-course, coherence, literal and elaborative items were 
compared for real-world conditions and counterfactual-world conditions. 
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make significantly more errors on the SVT compared to the IST (t (28) = 3.70, p = .001). 
Taken together, results suggest that children find inferential processing easier on the IST 
compared to the SVT, such that they perform at adult-like levels on the IST. 
A significant interaction was observed between inference type, age and task (F  (2,112) = 
3.42, p = .036, ηp² = .06). Twelve post-hoc t-tests were conducted to explore further. 
Children were found to make significantly more elaborative errors on the SVT than the 
IST (t (28) = 3.57, p = .001). Compared to adults, children were found to make 
significantly more coherence errors (t (28) = 4.63, p < .001) and elaborative errors (t (28) 
= 4.71, p < .001) on the SVT. Children were found to make significantly fewer literal than 
coherence errors (t (14) = 5.41, p < .001) and elaborative errors (t (14) = 6.07, p < .001) 
on the SVT. The difference between literal errors and coherence errors (t (14) = 2.86, p 
= .01) and elaborative errors (t (14) = 2.96, p = .01) also approached significance on the 
IST. No other comparisons were significant (p > .01 for all comparisons). None of the 
remaining interactions were significant (p > .01 for all interactions – see Appendix 4.9). 
Taken together results suggest that children, compared to adults, display difficulty on the 
SVT more so than the IST when processing inferential items. Children appear to find the 
generation of elaborative items particularly difficult on the SVT. 
The processing of literal information appears to be no different for real-world and 
counterfactual-world information. However, counterfactual-world inferential processing 
appears to be more difficult than real-world inferential processing. It appears that children 
perform at adult-like levels on the IST, such that there is no difference in performance for 
coherence, elaborative or literal items, regardless of age, when assessed using the IST. 
Importantly, children appear to find inferential processing more difficult on the SVT 
compared to IST, such that they display particular difficulty with inferential processing 
and specifically elaborative processing when assessed using the SVT. This appears to be 
the case for both real-world and counterfactual-world information. 
 
 
4.3.2.4. Error Analysis 
 
4.3.2.4.1. Children’s Error Patterns 
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Errors made in the counterfactual-world condition were categorised into three conditions: 
(1) real-world interference, (2) literal processing, and (3) random guessing. 64% of 
counterfactual-world errors fell into the real-world interference category, such that the 
participant chose the real-world alternative instead of the correct counterfactual-world 
target. 18% of counterfactual-world errors fell into the literal processing condition. The 
remaining 18% of errors fell into the random guess condition.  
The real-world errors were categorised into four categories22: (1) literal processing, (2) 
lack of knowledge, (3) picture ambiguity, and (4) no inference/response error. An error 
was categorised as indicative of literal processing if the picture depicting information 
explicitly stated in the critical was selected. 43% of the errors made in the real-world 
condition reflected literal processing. When completing the IST some participants would 
make comments suggesting a lack of knowledge – e.g. ‘What colour is clay?’ An error 
was categorised as indicative of a lack of knowledge if such a comment had been made. 
28.57% of errors made could potentially reflect a lack of knowledge. 14% of the real-
world errors made were categorised as picture ambiguity. For instance, for item 7a, one 
child chose the picture of Joe saying hello to the whale, instead of the picture of the whale 
calling. The image used lines to represent sonar, however, this may have been too 
complex for the children. This item was modified; such that this item was changed to 
'Suddenly Joe heard a loud Moo! Joe turned around to see a cow walking towards him.' 
with the target picture depicting a cow mooing. Finally, 29% of the real-world errors were 
categorised as response errors - i.e. accidentally choosing the button next to the correct 
one – or no inference being drawn resulting in a guess, due to no consistent error pattern 
being observed. 
60% of the literal errors made are likely to reflect misinterpretation of the picture. 
However, this was widely spread across items suggesting there is no issue with any 
particular picture. 20% of the literal errors made reflected a real-world error. As suggested 
in Stage 1, this may be indicative of children reverting to a real-world baseline when their 
working memory is taxed and/or they are unable to make a decision. Finally, 20% of the 
errors made could be indicative of response errors. 
                                                 
 
22
 These categories are different to those in Stage 1 as clearer patterns were revealed. 
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4.3.2.4.2. Adults’ Error Patterns 
 
75% of the errors made in the counterfactual-world condition were categorised as real-
world interference errors. The remaining 25% of errors demonstrated no clear pattern, 
thus are likely to reflect guessing or response errors. Errors made in the real-world and 
literal conditions, were rare and widely spread meaning error analysis could not be 
conducted on these data. 
Overall, the error analysis conducted suggests that a) the modified stimuli are more 
suitable than the original stimuli, such that ambiguity and the need for pronoun resolution 
appears to have been reduced; and b) real-world interference is likely to be a major cause 
of difficulty, for both adults and children, when generating counterfactual-world 
inferences. 
4.4. Discussion 
The Image Selection Task (IST) is a novel paradigm specially created for this thesis to 
assess inference generation abilities during adolescence. This study sought to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the IST as a measure of inference generation by comparing the results of 
the IST with the results of a timed Sentence Verification Task (SVT) comprising the same 
stimuli. In Stage 1, patterns on the IST largely mirrored those on the SVT. However, 
counterfactual-world items appeared to be more cognitively demanding than real-world 
items on the SVT but not the IST. The high error rates and error analysis conducted 
suggested that amendments to the stimuli were necessary. In Stage 2, consistent with the 
predictions made, time-course patterns on the IST largely mirrored those on the SVT. 
However, in conflict with the predictions made, there were some differences when 
exploring the skill (number of errors) data. Specifically, children appeared to find the 
SVT more difficult than the IST, experiencing particular difficulty when processing 
elaborative inferences. These differences may be due to the pictorial versus textual 
presentation of test items. As discussed below, this does not minimise the validity of the 
IST as a measure of inference generation. 
 
4.4.1. The Image Selection Task as a Measure of the Inferential Time-Course 
 
The Constructionist Theory suggests that those real-world inferences needed for 
coherence are generated whilst
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generated with strategic effort after reading (offline; Graesser et al., 1994). Research 
exploring counterfactual-world inference generation, suggests that children generate 
counterfactual-world coherence inferences online, whereas adults generate all 
counterfactual-world inferences offline (Bowyer-Crane & Snowling, 2010; Graesser et 
al., 1998). Real-world patterns on both the IST and SVT were consistent with the 
Constructionist Theory. However, patterns on both the IST and SVT, suggest that both 
children and adults generate those counterfactual-world inferences needed for coherence 
whilst reading. As will be discussed further in Chapter 7, the difference between the 
findings of the current research and previous research may be due methodological 
differences in stimuli used.  
In line with previous research, it was predicted that adults and children would respond to 
counterfactual-world items significantly slower than real-world items on the SVT and 
read counterfactual-world items significantly slower than real-world items on the IST, 
indicating that the processing of counterfactual-world information is more demanding 
than the processing of real-world information (e.g. Ferguson, 2012). This was not the 
pattern of results found in Stage 1, such that whilst means suggested counterfactual-world 
items were read slower, there was no significant difference between real-world and 
counterfactual-world reading speeds on the IST. However, in Stage 2, after amendments 
to the stimuli, counterfactual-world items were responded to significantly slower than 
real-world items on both tasks. This suggests that coherence inferences are generated 
whilst reading, regardless of plausibility, however this process appears to be more 
cognitively demanding for counterfactual-world, compared to real-world information. In 
sum, inferential time-course patterns were the same on both the IST and SVT. This 
suggests the IST is a valid measure of the inferential time-course in adults and children, 
for real-world and counterfactual-world information. 
4.4.2. The Image Selection Task as a Measure of Inference Generation Skill 
 
Previous research suggests that the generation of elaborative inferences is more difficult 
than the generation of coherence inferences (e.g. Bowyer-Crane & Snowling, 2010; Cain 
& Oakhill, 1999; Cain et al., 2001). The interaction between inference type and age, 
revealed that this was not the case in the current study, however, such that on both tasks 
a similar number of coherence and elaborative errors were made. Whilst there was no 
difference within the tasks, significantly more elaborative errors were made on the SVT 
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than IST. The first possible interpretation of these results is the stimuli used in the current 
research did not evoke the necessary inference types. However, stimuli were carefully 
designed to evoke target inference types, with the results of Chapter 3 suggesting that 
coherence inference-evoking sentences evoke coherence inferences and elaborative 
inference-evoking sentences evoke elaborative inference generation. The second 
interpretation is that the difference in difficulty observed in previous research is due to 
differences in the demands of coherence and elaborate inference-evoking stimuli not 
present in the current research. As discussed in more detail in Chapter 7, previous research 
typically explores knowledge-based elaborative inferences, but text-based coherence 
inferences. Third, it is possible that the use of pictures encouraged participants completing 
the IST to create a pictorial mental model. Given that the static properties assessed in the 
elaborative condition were largely visual, elaborative inference generation, particularly, 
on the IST may have been aided by the construction of a multi-modal mental 
representation. In sum, it appears that the generation of knowledge-based elaborative 
inferences is no more difficult than the generation of knowledge-based coherence 
inferences, particularly when elaborative static properties are assessed using pictorial 
stimuli. 
Previous research shows that inference generation skill increases with age (e.g. Barnes et 
al., 1996; Casteel, 1993; Oakhill et al., 2003). However, whilst children were found to 
make more errors than adults on the SVT, adults and children were found to make a 
similar number of errors on the IST. This was due to children making significantly fewer 
errors on the IST compared to the SVT, whereas adults made a similar number of errors 
on both tasks. Previous research finding that inference generation skill increases with age, 
converges to suggest the ability to generate inferences unprompted, improves with age, 
as opposed to basic inference generation skill – i.e. young children are capable of 
generating the same inferences as adults, but do not do so unless prompted (Omanson et 
al., 1978; Paris, et al., 1977). Since demands are likely reduced in the IST compared to 
the SVT, children may have had more resources available to focus on inference 
generation – specifically elaborative inference generation - explaining the superior 
performance observed. The current study thus highlights the necessity of non-verbal 
methods of assessment. 
Consistent with previous research, the error analysis conducted suggested that real-world 
interference was the primary cause of inference generation failure when generating 
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counterfactual-world inferences. Research suggests that counterfactual-world text 
processing becomes more difficult with age (Ceci et al., 1981; Dorfman, 1988). It was, 
therefore, predicted that counterfactual inferential skill would be significantly worse for 
adults compared to children on both the IST and SVT. However, this was not the case, 
such that both groups made more counterfactual-world errors than real-world errors on 
the IST and SVT. As discussed in more detail in Chapter 7, this may be due to 
methodological differences in the stimuli used to assess the counterfactual-world 
inference generation abilities of adults and CYP in previous research.  
4.4.3. Conclusion 
 
The current study was conducted to explore the validity of the IST, a novel paradigm 
designed to assess inference generation abilities. After some modifications, the IST 
resulted in the same inferential time-course patterns as the SVT. Whilst some differences 
in number of errors were observed between patterns on the IST and SVT, these 
differences may reflect differences in task demands, such that the IST promotes the 
construction of a more enriched mental model more so than the SVT. Similarly, the IST 
reduces task demands allowing for a purer measure of inference generation skill, resulting 
in children performing significantly better on the IST than the SVT. The IST, then, also 
appears to be a valid measure of inference generation skill. Subsequently, the IST was 
used to assess inference generation abilities in this thesis. 
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Part 3:  Using the IST to Explore Inference 
Generation during Adolescence – A Series of 
Cross-Sectional Studies 
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CHAPTER 5 METHODOLOGY FOR STUDIES 3-5 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
The aim of this research is to explore real-world and counterfactual-world inference 
generation abilities during adolescence. Part 1 of this thesis reviewed current literature in 
the area. Part 2 focused on the design and evaluation of an inference generation task 
suitable for the assessment of both real-world and counterfactual-world inference 
generation abilities during adolescence. This resulted in the creation of the Image 
Selection Task (IST). Part 3 of this thesis utilises the IST to explore how inference 
generation abilities develop during adolescence and the skills and processes underpinning 
this development. The purpose of this Chapter is to describe, evaluate, and justify the 
research methods used in Studies 3, 4 and 5 (Chapters 6, 7 and 8, respectively). 
5.2. Design 
 
When studying age-related changes three designs can be employed: 1) cross-sectional 2) 
longitudinal, and 3) sequential. A longitudinal or sequential design would have been 
preferable since repeated assessment of the same participants allows for the assessment 
of changes over time. However, typically, research exploring reading comprehension and 
related skills employ time intervals of no less than one year (e.g. Kim, Wagner, & Lopez, 
2012; Seigneuric & Ehrlich, 2005; Verhoeven & van Leeuwe, 2008). Due to the time 
constraints of this PhD, neither approach was feasible. A cross-sectional design was thus 
employed in this research. Cross-sectional designs assess and compare several age groups. 
Cross-sectional studies are popular as all of the necessary data can be collected relatively 
quickly. However, since each child is only tested once, firm conclusions regarding 
individual development over time cannot be made. Although, attempts should be made to 
control for confounding variables, differences between age groups could be due to 
discrepancies in the educational, economical, or socio-cultural experiences as opposed to 
age-related experiences (e.g. Salthouse, 2010). For instance, 11 year olds could show 
superior performance compared to 9 year olds, however, this could be due to the 11 year 
olds receiving a higher quality education than the 9 year olds rather than an improvement 
in said skill between the ages of 9 and 11 years. Every attempt was made to control for 
these variables in the current study as discussed in Section 5.3. 
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5.3. Participant Recruitment 
 
5.3.1. Selection of Age Groups 
 
Four age groups were selected to take part in this research: (1) 9-10 year olds, (2) 11-12 
year olds, (3) 13-14 year olds, and (4) 18 years and over.  When exploring development 
and possible stages of change it is essential that the age-range chosen reflects the point in 
development where the change is expected to occur (Harris, 2008). Whilst many Primary 
School CYP appear to have typical literacy abilities, government statistics suggest that 
some of these CYP begin to struggle in Secondary School (Department for Education, 
2015a; 2015b). Additionally, research shows that whilst adults struggle to generate 
counterfactual-world coherence inferences online, CYP aged 9-10years do not (e.g. 
Bowyer-Crane & Snowling, 2010; Graesser et al., 1998). This finding suggests a 
conceptual shift in the processing of counterfactual-world inferential abilities, with this 
period of change occurring between 9-10 years and adulthood. This thus set the upper and 
lower age-range of participants for the research. 14-16 years is the age at which CYP are 
preparing for their GCSEs and other equivalent exams. As such, schools can be reluctant 
to release CYP from their studies during this time. Fortunately, research suggests little 
development in those key skills explored in this thesis during 14-16 years (e.g. Romine 
& Reynolds, 2005). Therefore, it was decided to assess 9-10 year olds, 11-12 year olds 
13-14 year olds and adults (18 years and over). 
5.3.2. Sample Selection 
 
Sample size (50 participants per group) was determined by Harris’ (1985) rule of thumb 
such that for every predictor variable ten participants are needed23. Sample size in this 
study is thus higher than that used in similar developmental studies (e.g. Bowyer-Crane 
& Snowling, 2010).  
 
This thesis is concerned with the development of inferential abilities in typical 
developers; therefore, recruiting a sample reflective of the typical UK school-age 
population was important. Research suggests that socioeconomic status is predictive of 
                                                 
 
23
 Originally working memory was a predictor variable not control variable. 
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literacy abilities, such that those from a lower socioeconomic background may be 
disadvantaged (Jefferson, Gibbons, Rentz, Carvalho, Manly, Bennet & Jones, 2011; 
Rowe & Goldin-Meadow, 2009; Zhang, Tardif, Hong Li, Liu, McBride-Chang, Liang & 
Zhang, 2013). There is also a strong link between teaching practices and literacy abilities 
(Bui & Fagan, 2013). To gain a representative sample it was important to recruit 
participants from a range of socioeconomic backgrounds and educational institutions, 
which, despite all following the National Curriculum, may implement different teaching 
strategies. Therefore, every mainstream Secondary School in the South Yorkshire area 
(84; and one school in Derbyshire24) was invited to take part in the research. There was a 
response rate of 11.76%, with ten Secondary Schools agreeing to take part. Five Year 7s 
and five Year 9s were selected from each school. Every mainstream Primary School in 
Barnsley was also invited to take part in the research (80). There was a response rate of 
10%, with eight Primary Schools agreeing to take part. 5 Year 5s were recruited from the 
majority of Primary Schools, ten Year 5s were recruited from one Primary School and 
eleven Year 5s were recruited from another Primary School. Table 5.1 presents a 
summary of characteristics for each school. Participants were recruited from a range of 
areas, thus it is likely that a diverse sample, with regards to socioeconomic backgrounds 
and teaching strategies, was obtained. Variation in teaching strategy, in particular may 
not have been achieved if all participants were recruited from the same school. Teachers 
or year heads (for secondary schools) were all given criteria to help guide their selection 
of children and young people. The researcher was not involved in pupil selection after 
this point, with selecting participants in line with this criteria the responsibility of the 
school. The criteria given to schools along with a rationale is outlined below. 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.1. Summary of School Information 
                                                 
 
24
 This was due to researcher error such that a school in Derby was confused with a school in Sheffield 
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 School Area No. and Age of 
participants 
recruited 
Percentage of 
Pupils Eligible 
for Pupil 
Premium 
Primary 
Schools 
1 Barnsley 11 Year 5s 70.1% 
 
2 Sheffield 10 Year 5s 10% 
 
3 Barnsley 5 Year 5s 5.8% 
 
4 Sheffield 5 Year 5s 55.9% 
 
5 Sheffield 5 Year 5s 34.5% 
 
6 Sheffield 5 Year 5s 16.4% 
 
7 Sheffield 5 Year 5s 37.2% 
 
8 Sheffield 5 Year 5s 49.7% 
Secondary 
Schools 
1 Sheffield 5 Year 7s 
5 Year 9s 
27.6% 
 
2 Sheffield 5 Year 7s 
5 Year 9s 
52.0% 
 
3 Rotherham 5 Year 7s 
5 Year 9s 
31.5% 
 
4 Rotherham 5 Year 7s 
5 Year 9s 
23.4% 
 
5 Rotherham 5 Year 7s 
5 Year 9s 
23.8% 
 
6 Rotherham 5 Year 7s 
5 Year 9s 
38.8% 
 
7 Doncaster 5 Year 7s 
5 Year 9s 
18.3% 
 
8 Doncaster 5 Year 7s 
5 Year 9s 
45.4% 
 
9 Barnsley 5 Year 7s 
5 Year 9s 
33.9% 
 
10 Derby 5 Year 7s 
5 Year 9s 
34.7% 
 
A variety of other factors have been found to impact upon literacy development, which 
have guided selection criteria. Criteria 1: Children must be typical developers, such that 
they do not have a known learning difficulty and/or exceptional reading abilities. Those 
with known learning difficulties may fall within the typical range for literacy abilities, 
but may be employing qualitatively different strategies to those without learning 
difficulties (Graham & Bellert, 2009; Ricketts, Jones, Happe, & Charman, 2013). Criteria 
2: Children should be selected from a range of family backgrounds, ethnicities and both 
genders. Research has found correlations between literacy abilities and family 
background, ethnicity and gender (Denton, Wolters, York, Swanson, Kulesz, & Francis, 
R2014; Lindo, 2014). Criteria 3: Children should be native speakers of English. research 
shows that children with English as an additional language (EAL) display atypical literacy 
development (e.g. Burgoyne, Whiteley, & Hutchinson, 2011; 2013). Criteria 4: Children 
should not be colour blind or have any other (non-corrected) visual impairments. The IST 
requires participants to use coloured buttons to make their selection. To sum, schools 
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were asked to select a sample of children who varied in regards to literacy abilities (but 
did not have a known learning difficulty or exceptional literacy abilities), family 
background, ethnicity, and gender, were native English speakers, and were not colour 
blind.  
Adults were recruited from Sheffield Hallam University. Research suggests that 
university students are not representative of the adult population, such that compared to 
the general population, this group have higher literacy skills (e.g. Kuczera, Field & 
Windisch, 2016). Whilst a representative adult sample would have been desirable, with 
regards to availability a student sample was most convenient to recruit. All adults were 
native English speakers, did not have a known learning difficulty and were not colour 
blind. 
To conclude, to ensure a representative sample of typical developers was obtained 
multiple schools from different socio-economic backgrounds utilising different teaching 
methods were recruited. Within each school, CYP with a range of literacy abilities, 
ethnicities and genders were selected. All participants spoke English as a first language, 
had no known learning difficulties and none were colour-blind. 
5.3.3. Ethical Considerations 
 
Ethical approval for this project was gained from the SHU ethics committee, with these 
and the BPS ethical guidelines being adhered to throughout (see Appendix 5.1). A three-
tiered method of obtaining CYP consent was employed: initially consent was obtained 
from the school, then the CYP’s parent, and finally the CYP (see Appendix 5.2 for 
information sheets, consent forms, and debrief forms for all age groups). All schools were 
approached in the same way. An email was sent to all schools, briefly explaining the study 
and asking if they would be interested in participating. If schools responded a meeting 
was set-up (typically with the head teacher or head of year) to discuss the research. If the 
school was happy to participate at the end of the meeting, they were given an information 
pack containing details of the research and tasks to be undertaken, a school consent form 
to be signed by the head teacher, and parental consent forms. Schools sent out and 
collected the parental consent forms for the researcher. Once informed, written consent 
from the school and parents was obtained a date for data collection was confirmed with 
all school staff who would be affected. During the first data collection session written, 
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informed consent was gained from each CYP. In every session following, verbal consent 
was obtained. See Figure 5.1. for a summary of the CYP recruitment process. 
 
Figure 5.1. Flow diagram of the CYP recruitment procedure 
Adults were recruited through an advert on the Sheffield Hallam University psychology 
research participation scheme. Adults were invited to discuss the research further and, if 
happy to take part, a time and date was arranged. Before the initial data collection session 
adults were given an information sheet followed by a consent form. Informed, written 
consent was gained from all adults.  
Regardless of age, the information sheet and consent form was read aloud to all 
participants. Each task was also explained to all participants before being undertaken, 
participants then had to confirm that they were happy to complete the task. Whilst positive 
encouragement was given to all participants (e.g. “you’re doing well” “keep trying your 
best”), participants (nor, in the case of CYP, parents or schools) were not advised of their 
individual performance on any task.  
5.4. Cognitive Assessment of Inference Generation, Underpinning Skills and 
Processes, and Higher-Order Literacy Skills 
 
5.4.1. Introduction 
 
Part 3 of the thesis is concerned with the exploration of inference generation abilities 
during adolescence. Three research studies were conducted: 1) exploration of the role of 
inference generation in reading comprehension and text production during adolescence, 
2) the development of inference generation abilities during adolescence, 3) the 
development and role of those cognitive skills underpinning inference generation during 
adolescence. The data for all studies were collected at the same time point (although this 
comprised two sessions). The following sections address issues concerning the 
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administration of a large battery of cognitive tasks, in addition to describing, evaluating, 
and justifying the cognitive test battery used. 
5.4.2. Administration of the Test Battery 
 
The tasks were presented in the same order to all participants so as not to advantage or 
disadvantage any participant. The order of task administration was designed to minimise 
fatigue and boredom, such that similar tasks were not presented one after another and 
participants were assessed over two sessions. The first session was an individual session 
and the second a small group session (for some adults, two individual sessions were held). 
In addition to reducing boredom, the splitting of tasks across two sessions was also 
undertaken to reduce carry-over effects between tasks utilising the same information – 
e.g. inference generation and knowledge tasks. See Appendix 5.3 for order of tasks. 
5.4.3. Measures 
 
Each participant completed all assessments discussed in this section. Table 5.1. provides 
a summary of the measures used. 
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Table 5.1. Summary of Measures 
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5.4.3.1. Inference Generation 
 
As detailed in Chapters 3 and 4, a new task was developed to assess inference generation 
abilities in this study: Image Selection Task (IST).  Participants were presented with a 
series of stories, in which critical texts followed by 2*2 picture selection tasks, were 
embedded. Participants select the picture that best matches the text they have just read. 
Critical texts evoke either real-world coherence inferential processing, real-world 
elaborative inferential processing, real-world literal processing, counterfactual-world 
coherence inferential processing, counterfactual-world elaborative inferential processing, 
or counterfactual-world literal processing. Number of errors and reading speed (in 
milliseconds) were recorded. 
5.4.3.2. Control Measures 
 
5.4.3.2.1. Non-Verbal and Verbal Reasoning 
 
Consistent with previous developmental research, this study sought to control for 
intelligence (e.g., Cain & Oakhill, 1999; 2006a; 2011). The Matrix Reasoning Subscale 
of the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999) was used to 
assess non-verbal reasoning. In this task, participants were presented with a pattern with 
a piece missing. Participants must select the missing piece from a choice of five pictures. 
The Vocabulary Definitions Subscale of the WASI was used to assess verbal reasoning. 
Participants hear a word. They then define it. These subscales were selected since the 
WASI was designed for easy and efficient assessment of an individual’s intellectual 
functioning. Subsequently, when combined, these two subscales are able to provide a 
measure of full scale IQ, vital given the relatively large test battery and time constraints. 
The WASI is also suitable for the assessment of 6 – 89 year olds. Specifically, the matrix 
reasoning subscale was chosen over the block design subscale since it is untimed and does 
not disadvantage any of the younger participants. Combined, the matrix reasoning and 
vocabulary definitions subscales can be easily and efficiently administered to a wide 
range of age groups to provide a full-scale measure of IQ. 
5.4.3.2.2. Working Memory 
 
Working memory has been implicated in the reading comprehension process and is 
highlighted as central to the inference generation process throughout Chapter 1 (Dixon, 
Lefevre, & Twilley, 1988; Engle, Cantor, & Carullo, 1992; Goff, Pratt, Ong, 2005;  
158 
 
 
Masson & Miller, 1983; Stothard & Hulme, 1992; Singer, Andrusiak, Reisdorf, & Black, 
1992; Singer & Richot, 1996; Whitney, Ritchie, & Clark, 1991). Baddley and Hitch 
developed the Working Memory Model in 1974 which suggests that working memory 
comprises several components: (1) Central Executive, (2) Visuo-Spatial Sketchpad, (3) 
Phonological Loop, (4) Phonological Store, and (5) Articulatory Control Process. Three 
types of working memory are commonly discussed: general, verbal and visual (spatial). 
The importance of working memory in the inferential and comprehension processes has 
been found to vary as a function of the specific aspect of working memory being assessed 
(e.g. Cain & Oakhill, 2006a; De Beni, Palladino, Pazzaglia, & Cornoldi, 1998; Kershaw 
& Schatschneider, 2012; Yuill, Oakhill, & Parkin 1989). Verbal working memory has 
been most strongly linked with inference generation and reading comprehension (e.g. 
Baddeley, Logie, Nimmo-Smith, & Brereton, 1985). This is unsurprising given that 
successful completion of verbal working memory tasks is often dependent on sentence 
comprehension skills (e.g. Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Siegel & Ryan, 1989). 
Establishing the relationship between verbal working memory and inference generation 
and comprehension is, therefore, difficult with results likely to be biased and 
multicollinearity high. The role of general working memory has been implicated in 
reading comprehension and text production, such that whilst the reader may rely on 
several skills to integrate information and create a coherent mental representation, when 
working memory capacity is limited all of these skills cannot be utilised (Kintsch & van 
Dijk, 1978; Oakhill & Cain, 2011; van den Broek, 2012). Subsequently, working memory 
constraints exert a general restriction across the comprehension and inference generation 
processes that is not limited to verbal processing only. A measure of general working 
memory capacity, specifically one distinct from comprehension skill, was thus required.  
The Backwards Digit Span Task from the British Ability Scales II was chosen to assess 
working memory in the current research (Elliott, Smith, & McCulloch, 1996). In this task, 
participants hear a series of digits, which increase in length on each trial. Participants 
must recall the digits in reverse order. Accuracy is recorded. The backwards digit span 
task is argued to provide a general measure of working memory capacity, such that the 
need to maintain and manipulate information places high demands on the attentional 
element of working memory (Gathercole, 2008). Moreover, it is not dependent on 
sentence comprehension skills (Case, Kurland & Goldberg, 1982) and is quick and easy 
to administer.  
159 
 
 
5.4.3.2.3. Single-Word-Reading  
 
In the current research, the York Assessment of Reading for Comprehension (YARC) 
Primary and Secondary was used to assess single-word reading (Snowling, Stothard, 
Clarke, Bowyer-Crane, Harrington, Nation, Truelove, & Hulme, 2009; 2010). See 
Section 5.4.3.3.1. for justification and description. 
5.4.3.3. Higher-Order Literacy Measures 
 
5.4.3.3.1. Reading Comprehension 
 
A range of standardised measures exist to assess reading comprehension ability in CYP. 
In the current research, the York Assessment of Reading for Comprehension (YARC) 
Primary and Secondary was used to assess reading ability (Snowling et al., 2009; 2010). 
Participants are presented with a page of words and read the words they know. Accuracy 
is recorded, providing a measure of single-word-reading ability. Passage readability is 
then selected based on the CYP’s single-word-reading ability. The child reads the passage 
aloud (silently in secondary version). Time taken to read the text is recorded providing a 
measure of reading fluency. Participants are then asked a series of literal and inferential 
questions. Participants respond verbally. Accuracy is recorded providing a measure of 
reading comprehension. The YARC employs an open-ended question format, allowing 
for the qualitative analysis of answers. Possible causes of comprehension failure can thus 
be explored. The YARC also has other advantages.  
First, many other tools used to assess reading place heavy demands on decoding skills 
(Sponner et al., 2004). For instance, in the Neale Analysis of Reading Ability (NARA; 
Neale, 1999; Neale, Christophers, & Whetton, 1989) participants begin reading the same 
passage. Additional passages are then read until a certain number of reading errors are 
made. Assessment of reading comprehension can thus be a time-consuming process. 
Conversely, for those with weak decoding abilities the testing will stop very quickly.  
However, the YARC only requires two short passages to be read and these are determined 
by the participant’s performance on the single-word-reading task. Moreover, for those 
with particularly weak word-reading abilities supplementary passages are provided. 
These passages are read aloud and errors corrected. Therefore, weak decoding ability does 
not impair comprehension performance. Second, by combining the Primary and 
Secondary YARC sets a relatively wide age-range can be assessed (4-16 years). Although 
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the YARC Secondary is not designed for the assessment of adult reading comprehension 
abilities, it was decided that this task would also be used to assess adults in the current 
study to ensure consistency and thus comparability. The YARC Secondary was piloted 
on adults (n=5) and ceiling effects were not observed on either the single-word-reading 
or passage reading tasks.  
5.4.3.3.2. Text Production 
 
A narrative production task from picture prompts was used to assess text production skills. 
Participants were given 10 minutes to write a story based on six black and white line 
drawings, using the same characters as those in the IST. Picture prompts were used since 
these have been successfully used with different age groups in oral narrative production 
tasks (e.g. Shapiro & Hudson, 1991) and written language tasks (e.g. Cain, 2003). Asking 
participants to write without such prompts can disadvantage those with limited experience 
or story exposure. To assess the quality of the text productions the Wechsler Objective 
Language Dimensions analytic scoring system was used (Wechsler, 1996). This system 
comprises subscales assessing ideas and development, organisation, unity and coherence, 
vocabulary, sentence structure and variety, grammar and usage, and capitalisation and 
punctuation. 
5.4.3.4. Predictor Variables 
5.4.3.4.1. Amount and Accessibility of Knowledge 
 
Amount of general knowledge has been found to correlate with inference generation skill, 
however, even those with the highest levels of general knowledge cannot generate the 
target inference if they cannot readily access the specific target knowledge (e.g. Cromley 
& Azevedo, 2007; Barnes et al., 1996; Tarchi, 2010; 2012). Subsequently, a common 
cause of inference generation failure is insufficient knowledge and/or insufficient access 
to this knowledge (Barnes et al., 1996; Kintsch, 1994). It also follows that participants 
will not experience real-world interference when generating a counterfactual-world 
inference if they do not possess and/or cannot readily access said real-world knowledge. 
Previous research exploring the relationship between amount of knowledge and 
inferential abilities has employed general topic knowledge tests, multiple-choice 
questionnaires, and free recall tasks to assess amount of knowledge (e.g. Barnes et al., 
1996; Cain, et al., 2001). Timed responses on free recall tasks have been used to assess 
accessibility of knowledge (e.g. Barnes et al., 1996; Cain et al., 2001). In this thesis, a 
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timed sentence verification task was used to assess both amount and accessibility of 
knowledge for several reasons. 
It was essential that the knowledge-base assessed was directly associated with each item 
in the Image Selection Task. The administration of three tasks (to assess inference 
generation, amount of knowledge, accessibility of knowledge) tapping the exact same 
knowledge-base could, however, cause problems if administered in the same session, 
such that one task could prime responses on another. It was approximated that, for most 
participants, data collection would take place over two sessions. Consequently, one task 
suitable for the assessment of both amount of knowledge and accessibility of knowledge 
was needed so that inference generation could be assessed in Session 1 and then 
knowledge in Session 2.  
Both multiple-choice and free recall tasks can be designed to tap a specific knowledge-
base, with response times being recorded, making them suitable for the simultaneous 
assessment of both amount and accessibility of the target knowledge. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, text-based multiple-choice tasks place additional processing demands on 
participants that tax children’s limited resources more so than adults’. In the researcher’s 
experience, CYP, even when asked a very specific question can go off topic, thus 
assessment of the target knowledge may not have been obtained if a free recall task was 
used. Some have minimised this problem by first teaching a knowledge-base (e.g. Cain 
et al., 2001). However, for counterfactual-world items, this would mean that the 
counterfactual-world information was added to the knowledge-base calling into question 
its ‘counterfactual nature.’ Therefore, neither a multiple-choice or free recall task was 
suitable for the current research.  
A timed sentence verification task can be designed to assess a specific knowledge-base. 
Since sentences are presented one at a time processing costs are reduced compared to a 
multiple-choice task, making this task suitable for the assessment of a range of age groups. 
A 72-item timed sentence verification task was created to assess amount and accessibility 
of knowledge. 36 items required a true response and were directly associated with the 
knowledge-base used in the IST. The remaining 36 items were lexically and syntactically 
similar fillers, which required a false response. These items were not related to the 
knowledge-base used to develop the IST. The task was piloted on adults (n=5) and 
children aged 9-11 years (n=5). The instructions were found to be clear and 
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understandable. Floor effects were not observed, however, some adults did perform at 
ceiling on amount of knowledge. However, given that the IST was designed based on 
knowledge learnt during Key Stages 2 and 3 this was expected. 
5.4.3.4.2. Inhibition 
 
Due to associative mechanisms of knowledge activation and thus the presence of related, 
but irrelevant information, successful real-world inference generation has been found to 
be underpinned by inhibitory control, such that the reader must create a clear workspace, 
if inferences are to be generated efficiently (Barnes et al., 2004; Cain, 2006; Harnishfeger, 
1995). Successful counterfactual-world inference generation is also argued to be, at least 
in part, dependent on an individual’s ability to inhibit a familiar response (i.e. real-world 
information) and respond in a new way (i.e. counterfactual-world inference; Graesser et 
al., 1998). The Rule-Shift-Cards task, Go/No-Go task and the Stroop task assess the 
ability to suppress an unwanted response or information (Gomez, Ratcliff, & Perea, 2007; 
Salthouse & Meinz, 1995). However, the Go/No-Go task is dependent on motor skills, 
and is thus a measure of response inhibition rather than interference suppression. 
Conversely, in the Rule-Shift-Cards task the conflict between the familiar response and 
the new rule must be resolved before responding. There is not merely a simple motor 
response, but a decision between which rule to attend to and which rule to ignore. 
Moreover, unlike the Stroop task the Rule-Shift-Cards task is not dependent on reading 
abilities. As such, the Rule-Shift-Cards task is best suited to tap the inhibitory processing 
associated with successful counterfactual-world inference generation. Therefore, the 
Rule-Shift-Cards task from the Behavioural Assessment of the Dysexecutive Syndrome 
(BADS; Wilson, Alderman, Burgess, Emslie & Evans, 2003) was used to assess 
inhibition abilities. In this task, participants see a series of cards. As each card is presented 
participants must respond ‘true’ or ‘false’ depending on the rule given. Participants see 
the cards again, but must respond according to a new rule. Errors are recorded. The Rule-
Shift-Cards task was chosen because it assesses ability to inhibit a familiar pattern of 
responding and respond in a new way. Specifically, the rule-shift-cards task provides a 
measure of intrusion errors, such that information that was once relevant is no longer 
relevant, but continues to ‘intrude’ on processing. This is similar the role of real-world 
knowledge when processing counterfactual-world information. 
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Whilst the Rule-Shift-Cards Task is designed for the assessment of adults (16 years and 
over), the Play Card test in the Behavioural Assessment of the Dysexecutive Syndrome 
in Children (BADS-C) has the same format and same rules. Therefore, since raw scores 
as opposed to standard scores or profile scores were used, the Rule-Shift-Cards Task from 
the BADS was used with all participants to allow for comparability. The Rule-Shift-Cards 
task was piloted on children aged 9-11 years (n=5). All participants understood the task 
and did not display ceiling or floor effects.  Finally, the Rule-Shift-Cards Task is easily 
and efficiently administered. 
5.4.3.4.3. Belief Bias 
 
As discussed in Section 1.3.3. belief biases may guide suppression during the inference 
generation process. In line with previous research exploring belief biases, a reasoning 
from false premises task was used to assess belief biases in the current research (e.g. 
Markovits & Schroyens, 2007; Moutier, et al., 2006). Five items presented a true premise 
and true conclusion (control), five items presented a true premise and false conclusion 
(filler a), five items presented a false premise and true conclusion (experimental), and 
five items presented a false premise and false conclusion (filler b), see Table 5.2. for 
example stimuli. Stimuli were acquired through personal communication with Claudine 
Bowyer-Crane. Participants must decide if the conclusion is true or false based on the 
preceding premise. Typically, measures of probability ratings and accuracy are obtained. 
It is assumed that a belief bias is present if either (a) conclusions in the experimental 
condition are rated has having lower probabilities than conclusions in the control 
condition or (b) more errors are made in the experimental condition than the control 
condition. It is argued that errors made on reasoning from false premises tasks can be 
attributed to weak inhibitory processes rather than poor logic (Houdé, 2000; Moutier, 
Angeard & Houdé, 2002). Consequently, a belief bias may be held, but not result in an 
error if inhibitory skills are strong. A measure of response time was also recorded in the 
current research. In accordance with the commonly accepted assumption that information 
which is more cognitively taxing takes longer to process (Donders, 1968;1969) it stands 
that stronger belief biases that cause more interference and thus require stronger 
inhibitory processes will result in longer response times. By calculating a difference score 
(control – experimental), strength of belief bias was gained whilst controlling for 
differences in reading speed and general processing speed. The task was piloted on adults 
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(n=5) and children aged 9-11 years (n=5), with all participants finding the instructions 
clear, the task easy to complete, and no ceiling or floor effects being observed.  
Table 5.2. Example Reasoning from False Premises Stimuli 
 
5.4.4. Test Scores 
 
When standardised measures are employed three types of score are available: (1) age-
equivalent score, (2) standardised score, and (3) raw score. This research was concerned 
with assessing change, as such, neither age-equivalent or standard scores were 
appropriate. Age equivalent scores are not on an interval scale and thus the difference 
between 9:2 and 10:2 is rarely the same as the difference between 11:2 and 12:2 since 
rates of development differ. Similarly, standardised scores cannot determine change as 
they are linked to age-related expectations - whilst an 11-year-old may demonstrate 
significantly superior performance on a task compared to a 9-year-old, if both are 
performing as expected for their age group they will receive the same score. Therefore, 
on all tasks (except reading comprehension, for which reading comprehension age was 
used), raw scores were used as they provide detail of actual level of attainment and thus 
changes with age can be observed. 
5.5. Summary 
 
This thesis is concerned with exploration of real-world and counterfactual-world 
inferential abilities during adolescence, the cognitive skills and mechanisms underpinning 
this development, and the role of these skills in reading comprehension and text 
production. Before running the studies, careful consideration was given to the 
methodology used. A cross-sectional design was employed to capture the age-range at 
which development is occurring. A representative CYP sample was recruited by inviting 
a large number of schools to take part in the research and providing specific selection 
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criteria. Ethical considerations were made to ensure all participants were able to provide 
informed consent. The test battery was also carefully compiled, with age and capabilities 
of participants considered. Furthermore, tasks were ordered to reduce fatigue and tasks 
were selected to result in efficient data collection. Table 5.3. provides a summary of the 
test battery. Finally, raw scores were used to assess changes with age. 
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Table 5.3. Summary of Test Battery 
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CHAPTER 6 THE ROLE OF INFERENTIAL ABILITIES IN 
HIGHER-ORDER LITERACY SKILLS DURING ADOLESCENCE  
6.1. Introduction 
 
A literate individual is characterised by not only the ability to read and spell words, but 
the ability to extract the intended meaning from a text and produce a coherent piece of 
writing (e.g. Bain, 2006). Therefore, this study explores the role of inferential skill in 
reading comprehension and text production in 9-10 year olds, 11-12 year olds, 13-14 year 
olds, and adults. 
6.1.1. Inference Generation and Reading Comprehension 
 
Successful reading comprehension is characterised by the construction of an integrated 
and coherent mental model in which two or more textual propositions are connected using 
the reader’s background knowledge (e.g. Kintsch, 1988; van den Broek et al., 2005; van 
den Broek et al., 1999). Background knowledge may also be used to elaborate on textual 
propositions, with information regarding possible outcomes, instruments used, and 
physical attributes of characters and objects also being integrated into the model (Graesser 
et al., 1994; Kaup et al., 2007). Inference generation is thus central to many models of 
proficient reading comprehension (Kintsch, 1988; van den Broek et al., 2005; Zwaan, 
2003). Inference generation has also been implicated in the development of reading 
comprehension in CYP (e.g. Cain & Oakhill, 2012; Cain et al., 2004; Verhoeven & van 
Leeuwe, 2008). For instance, Cain and Oakhill (2012) found that inference generation 
skill at age 8-9years was a longitudinal predictor of reading comprehension skill age 10-
11 years. Similarly, many CYP identified as poor comprehenders are characterised by 
weak inferential skills (e.g. Cain & Oakhill, 2006a), with interventions designed to 
develop inference generation skills improving both inference generation and 
comprehension skills (e.g. Dewitz, Carr & Patberg 1987; McGee & Johnson, 2003). 
Inference generation abilities thus appear to underpin reading comprehension in CYP, 
rather than being a consequence of reading comprehension or an incidental correlate.  
UK government statistics suggest that some CYP, who were developing typically during 
Primary School (i.e. achieving age-related expectations), begin to struggle to comprehend 
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the texts they are presented with in Secondary School (Department for Education, 2015a; 
2015b). This is worrying given that the importance of comprehension skills to academic 
success increases with age as the focus moves from ‘learning-to-read’ to ‘reading-to-learn’ 
(Chall 1996; Snow et al., 1999). In recent years, researchers have identified the need to 
improve adolescent comprehension (see Cassidy et al., 2010). This has sparked research 
into the exploration of the relationships between reading comprehension and inference 
generation during adolescence. Specifically, Barth et al. (2015) found that inferential skill 
was a predictor of reading comprehension in both adequate and struggling adolescents 
aged 11-18 years, accounting for 2-5% of unique variance. Similarly, Cromley and 
Azevedo (2007) found that inference generation made a significant contribution of 19.1% 
to the reading comprehension abilities of adolescents aged 14 years, after controlling for 
word-reading, background knowledge, strategy, and vocabulary. Previous research thus 
implicates inference generation in the comprehension process of adolescents, however, 
several questions remain unanswered.  
First, the predictive utility of inference generation in the comprehension process of 
adolescents appears to be inconsistent. Cromley and Azevedo (2007) found that inference 
generation accounted for around four times more variance in reading comprehension skill 
than Barth et al. (2015). This discrepancy may be due to the tools used to assess inference 
generation. Barth et al. (2015) used inference generation measures in which the 
knowledge needed to successfully generate the target inference was presented in the text. 
Conversely, Cromley and Azevedo (2007) used an inference generation measure which 
was dependent on the reader activating their own background knowledge – more typical 
of the natural reading process (Barnes et al., 1996; Kintsch, 1993). As such, Barth et al. 
(2015) may have underestimated the role of inference generation in reading 
comprehension skill due to the use of an inference generation measure that did not fully 
assess all aspects of the inference generation process.  
Second, the potentially fluctuating role of inference generation in the reading 
comprehension process during adolescence has not yet been explored. Cromley and 
Azevedo (2007) only explored the relationship between inference generation and reading 
comprehension in one age group. Whilst Barth et al. used a wide age-range (11-18years), 
instead of creating separate models for each age group, age was controlled for, meaning 
the developmental trajectory of the role of inference generation abilities is unclear. Third, 
there are several types of inference (see Section 1.1.1.). The research discussed above has 
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focused on coherence inferences. However, elaborative inferences result in the 
construction of a more enriched mental model and thus deeper comprehension (e.g. 
Graesser et al., 1994; Kintsch, 1994). It is possible then that elaborative inferences play a 
key role in adolescent comprehension, given the shift in importance from explicit to 
implicit understanding (e.g. Leach et al., 2003). Fourth, inferences can be generated from 
information that violates real-world beliefs, these are known as counterfactual-world 
inferences. The generation of counterfactual-world inferences is thought to be more 
cognitively demanding than the generation of real-world inferences (e.g. Dorfman, 1989; 
Dorfman & Brewer, 1988; Graesser et al., 1998). However, the specific role of 
counterfactual-world inference generation abilities in the reading comprehension process 
has not been explored. In sum, further research is needed to explore the nature of the 
relationship between reading comprehension and inference generation during 
adolescence, specifically, the individual and potentially unique role of different inference 
types needs to be explored. 
6.1.2. Inference Generation and Text Production 
 
Text production is a multi-faceted process, resulting from the dynamic interaction of 
several skills, with proficient mental model construction and thus inference generation 
central to the text production process (Hayes, 1996; 2012). However, the role of inference 
generation in text production quality has not been explicitly explored in CYP. The 
knowledge-telling model, originally proposed by Bereiter and Scardamalia (1987) and 
updated by Hayes (2012), conceptualises developments in textual coherence, organisation 
and elaboration. Three distinct stages of writing are proposed: knowledge-telling, 
knowledge-structuring, and knowledge-transforming. The knowledge-telling stage 
reflects the writing of CYP aged 5-9 years, who are typically found to produce a series of 
unconnected statements about a particular topic. The writing process relies primarily on 
long-term memory and transcription skills. The knowledge-structuring stage was added 
by Hayes (2012) based on research conducted with CYP aged 10-13 years. Hayes found 
that during this time, CYP produced more ideas than younger writers, such that initial 
ideas were elaborated on. Some ideas were linked using the writer’s background 
knowledge. This is supported by research showing that at around 9 years of age, 
connectives such as ‘because’ can be seen in CYP’s writing (Fayol, 1991). At this age, 
and into adulthood, the use of a connective has been found to be determined by the 
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strength of relationship between the actions, events or states in two adjoining phrases or 
sentences (Fayol & Lete, 1987). Both coherence and elaborative inference generation 
skills may thus become important to text production during this stage as the writer begins 
to link, build relationships and elaborate on their ideas using their background knowledge. 
In the knowledge-transforming stage, ideas are selected, elaborated on, and then 
organised to meet the audience’s needs. The construction of more organised and coherent 
texts appears to stem from prolonged periods of planning and revising. Chanquoy, Foulin, 
and Fayol (1990) found that adults paused for significantly longer periods than CYP 
before beginning writing, suggesting that adults spend longer planning and revising than 
CYP. Inferential processes are thought to be essential to both planning and revision. 
Specifically, planning requires the integration and elaboration of ideas, as such, in many 
cases inferences must be generated (Keys, 1999). Similarly, the process of revision 
requires the writer to read back the text they have written to determine coherence, 
MacArthur (2012) thus suggests that those skills essential for reading comprehension are 
also essential to the revision process. The transition between the three stages reflects a 
growing need for coherence, integration, organisation and elaboration of ideas. Inference 
generation may thus play a potentially increasing role in text production quality during 
the adolescent years. However, the explicit role of inference generation in text production 
during adolescence is yet to be established. 
6.1.3. The Current Study 
 
Inference generation is implicated in the process of both reading comprehension and text 
production during adolescence. However, potential age-related changes in the role of 
inference generation abilities in reading comprehension and text production during 
adolescence have not been fully explored. The unique contribution of different inference 
types has also been overlooked, with research either failing to specify the type of 
inference explored or focusing on real-world coherence inferences. The current study thus 
sought to establish the role of inference generation skill in reading comprehension skill 
and text production quality in Year 5 (9-10 year olds), Year 7 (11-12 year olds), Year 9 
(13-14 year olds) and adults (18 years and over). It was predicted that inference generation 
skill would make a unique and significant contribution to reading comprehension skill 
and text production quality in all age groups, even after controlling for IQ, word-reading 
skill and working memory capacity. 
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The study also sought to explore the unique role of real-world coherence, real-world 
elaborative, counterfactual-world coherence, and counterfactual-world elaborative 
inference generation skill. Coherence inferences are essential for basic understanding, 
whereas elaborative inferences result in a deeper understanding (Graesser et al., 1994). It 
was thus predicted that the role of coherence inference generation abilities in reading 
comprehension would decrease with age, regardless of plausibility. Conversely, the role 
of elaborative inference generation abilities was predicted to increase with age. For text 
production, research suggests that both textual coherence and content (number of ideas) 
improve with age (Berman & Slobin, 1994; Stein & Trabasso, 1981; Wigglesworth, 1997). 
Subsequently, the predictive utility of both coherence and elaborative inference 
generation abilities was predicted to increase with age.  
6.2. Method 
6.1.1. Participants 
51 CYP from Year 5 (9-10yers), 50 CYP from Year 7 (11-12years), 50 CYP from Year 
9 (13-14years), and 56 adults (18years and over) were recruited. Table 6.1. provides a 
summary of demographics for all age groups. All participants met the selection criteria – 
see Chapter 5. None of these participants had participated in any previous research. 
Table 6.1. Number of females and mean age (in years) for Year 5, Year 7, Year 9 and 
Adults 
 
6.1.2. Design 
A cross-sectional design with four age groups: Year 5, Year 7, Year 9, and adults (18 
years and over) was employed to explore the predictive utility of real-world coherence, 
real-world elaborative, counterfactual-world coherence and counterfactual-world 
elaborative inference skill (number of errors) in reading comprehension skill and text 
production quality. The control variables were intelligence (non-verbal and verbal), single 
word reading ability, and working memory capacity. The predictor variables were real-
world coherence skill, real-world elaborative skill, counterfactual-world coherence skill 
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and counterfactual-world elaborative inference skill 25 . The outcome variables were 
reading comprehension age and text production quality. 
6.1.3. Materials 
6.1.3.1. Inference Generation 
 
The Image Selection Task (IST) was used to assess inference generation – see Section 
4.3.1.3.1. for a description of the task used. Real-world coherence inference generation 
skill, real-world elaborative inference generation skill, counterfactual-world coherence 
inference generation skill and counterfactual-world elaborative inference generation skill 
were explored. The mean number of errors score for each condition was used in analysis. 
6.1.3.2. Reading Comprehension 
 
The York Assessment of Reading for Comprehension (YARC; Snowling et al., 2009; 
2010). Primary and Secondary was used to assess reading ability. Participants were 
presented with a page of words and asked to read the words they knew. Passage 
readability was then selected based on the participant’s single-word-reading ability. 
Participants read the passages aloud, without any help from the researcher. Participants 
were then asked a series of literal and inferential questions to provide a measure of 
comprehension abilities. Participants responded verbally. Correct answers received a 
score of one and incorrect answers a score of zero. A total comprehension score was 
calculated by summing all correct responses. Since participants read texts of different 
levels, a reading comprehension age score was calculated to explore age-related changes. 
 
 
6.2.3.1.Text Production 
 
A narrative production task from picture prompts was used to assess text production skills. 
Participants were given 10 minutes to write a story based on six black and white line 
drawings. To assess the quality of the text productions the Wechsler Objective Language 
                                                 
 
25
 Time-Course (speed) data was also used as predictor variables in this study and study 5 reported in 
Chapter 8. However, this analysis did not result in significant findings and/or clear patterns. Therefore, it 
is not included in this thesis. 
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Dimensions analytic scoring system was used (Wechsler, 1996). This system comprised 
six subscales assessing ideas and development, organisation, unity and coherence, 
vocabulary, sentence structure and variety, grammar and usage, and capitalisation and 
punctuation. Each subscale received a score of between one and four, with one indicating 
poor quality and four excellent quality. A total quality score was calculated by summing 
scores on all subscales.  
6.2.3.2.Control Measures 
 
IQ, word-reading skill and working memory capacity were controlled for in the current 
study as these skills have been implicated in reading comprehension and text production 
skill (Carver, 1990; Dixon, Lefevre, & Twilley, 1988; Goff et al., 2005; Masson & Miller, 
1983; Nation, Clarke, & Snowling, 2002; Seigneuric, Ehrlich, Oakhill, & Yuill, 2000; 
Singer, Andrusiak, Reisdorf, & Black, 1992; Singer & Richot, 1996; Stanovich, 1993; 
Stanovich, Cunningham, & Freeman, 1984; Whitney, Ritchie, & Clark, 1991). 
6.2.3.2.1. Intelligence Measures 
 
The Matrix Reasoning Subscale of the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence 
(WASI; Wechsler, 1999) was used to assess non-verbal reasoning. Participants were 
presented with patterns with one piece missing and asked to select the picture that 
completed the pattern. Participants scored one for a correct answer. The Vocabulary 
Definitions Subscale of the WASI was used to assess verbal reasoning. Participants heard 
a word and were then asked to define it. Participants scored two for a full answer and one 
for a partially correct answer. Raw scores are reported. 
6.2.3.2.2. Working Memory Measure 
 
The Backwards Digit Span Task from the British Ability Scales II (Elliot et al., 1996) 
was used to assess working memory capacity. Participants heard a series of digits, which 
increased in length. Participants were asked to recall the digits in reverse order. Working 
memory capacity was indexed by the number of digit strings recalled correctly – see 
Section 5.4.3.2.2. for more detail. An accuracy score was used in this study. 
6.2.3.2.3. Word-Reading Measure 
 
The York Assessment of Reading Comprehension (Primary and Secondary) was used to 
assess single-word-reading ability. Participants were presented with a page of 60 
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(Primary) or 70 (Secondary) words and asked to read as many as possible. Word-reading 
skill was indexed by the number of words read correctly. An accuracy score was used in 
this study. 
6.2.4. Procedure 
 
All tasks were administered as part of a larger test battery used to obtain data for Studies 
3, 4, and 5. Written consent was gained from all CYP using a three-tiered approach as 
described in Section 5.3.3. Written consent was gained from adults. Participants were 
assessed individually in a quiet area of their school or university. Before the test battery 
was administered the researcher spent 10-15minutes talking to the participant to make 
them feel comfortable. Tests were administered across two sessions – see Appendix 5.3 
for order of tasks. The first session lasted approximately 30-40 minutes for adults and 40-
60 minutes for CYP. The second session lasted approximately 30-40 minutes for adults 
and 40-60 minutes for CYP. Participants were briefed on each task before starting it and 
reminded of their right to withdraw from the study or task. At the end of the final session 
participants were thanked and debriefed, with a debrief letter being sent out to the parents 
of all CYP. 
6.3. Results 
6.3.3. Age-Related Changes in Reading Comprehension, Text Production, IQ, Single 
Word Reading Skill and Working Memory Capacity 
 
Age-related changes in reading comprehension skill, text production quality, IQ, word-
reading skill and working memory were explored using ANOVAs. Descriptives for 
inference generation skill can be found in Table 6.2., for completeness. However, a full 
exploration of age-related changes in inference generation skill is not presented until 
Chapter 7.  
 
6.3.3.1.Preliminary Analysis 
 
Inspection of the data revealed that the assumption of homogeneity of variance was met 
for all variables, however, the data were skewed for matrix reasoning, vocabulary, and 
word-reading skill. Outliers were left in for all measures as they were thought to reflect 
true scores. Across all age groups, this led to one outlier being included for matrix 
reasoning and vocabulary and two outliers being included for word-reading skill. Non-
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parametric tests were conducted for matrix reasoning, vocabulary, and word-reading skill. 
Means and standard deviations for word-reading skill, matrix reasoning, vocabulary, 
working memory capacity, reading comprehension skill, and text quality are presented in 
Table 6.2. for each year group. Table 6.2. shows that most skills appear to improve with 
age. A series of one-way independent ANOVAs were conducted to explore age-related 
changes in reading comprehension, text production, matrix reasoning, vocabulary, word-
reading, and working memory capacity further. 
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Table 6.2. Descriptive Statistics (Means and Standard Deviations) for Single-Word-Reading, Vocabulary, Matrix Reasoning, IQ, 
Decoding, Working Memory Capacity, Real-World Coherence Inference Errors, Real-World Elaborative Inference Errors, Counterfactual-
World Inference Errors, Counterfactual-World Elaborative Inference Errors, Reading Age and Text Production Quality for All Age 
Groups. 
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6.3.3.2.The Development of Reading Comprehension 
 
A significant main effect of age was found for reading comprehension age (F (3,196) = 
53.87, p < .001, ηp² = .06). Six independent t-tests were conducted to explore further. 
Year 5 were found to have a significantly lower reading comprehension age than all other 
age groups (Y5 vs Y7: t (99) = 8.38, p < .001; Y5 vs Y9: t (99) = 6.67, p < .001; Y5 vs 
adults: t (105) = 12.48, p < .001). Year 7 were found to have a lower reading 
comprehension age than adults, although due to the correction applied this was not 
significant (t (104) = 2.48, p = .02). Year 7 were found to have a higher reading 
comprehension age than Year 9, due to the correction applied this difference was not 
significant (t (98) = 2.41, p = .02). Year 9 were found to have a significantly lower reading 
comprehension age than adults (t (104) = 5.74, p < .001). Due to the limited progress 
between Year 7 and Year 9, the number of weak comprehenders in Year 5, Year 7 and 
Year 9 was determined. In this thesis, a weak comprehender is defined as an individual 
with a reading comprehension age more than a year less than their chronological age. The 
percentage of weak comprehenders in each group can be found in Table 6.3. As can be 
seen from this table, Year 9 is comprised of a higher percentage of weak comprehenders 
than all other groups. This may explain the limited progress observed between Year 7 and 
Year 9. 
Table 6.3. Percentage of Weak Comprehenders in Year 5, Year 7 and Year 9 
 Year 5 Year 7 Year 9 
Percentage of Weak Comprehenders 27 14 57 
 
6.3.3.3.The Development of Text Production Quality 
 
A significant main effect of age was observed for text production quality (F (3,196) = 
27.75, p < .001, ηp² = .36). Six independent t-tests were conducted to explore further. 
Year 5 were found to have significantly lower text production quality scores than all other 
age groups (Y5 vs Y7: t (99) = 2.85, p = .005; Y5 vs Y9: t (99) = 3.05, p = .003, Y5 vs 
Adults: t (105) = 8.86, p < .001). Year 7 and Year 9 were both found to have significantly 
lower text production quality scores than adults (Y7 vs adults: t (104) = 6.25, p < .001; 
Y9 vs adults: t (104) = 5.22, p <.001). However, there was found to be no significant 
178 
 
 
difference between the quality of text produced by Year 7 and by Year 9 (t (98) = .047, p 
= .64).  
6.3.3.4. The Development of IQ 
 
An independent measures non-parametric ANOVA was conducted to explore the effect 
of age group on overall IQ – see Appendix 6.1 for individual analysis for vocabulary and 
matrix reasoning. A main effect of age was found for overall IQ score (χ2 (3, N = 207) = 
105.11, p < .001). Six non-parametric independent t-tests were conducted to explore 
further. Year 5 were found to have lower composite IQ scores than Year 7 (U = 345.00, 
p < .001, N = 101), Year 9 (U = 167.50, p < .001, N = 101), and adults (U = 91.50, p < 
.001, N = 106). Whilst Year 7 were found to have a lower composite IQ score than Year 
9, due to the correction applied this difference did not reach significance (U = 499.50, p 
= .01, N = 100). Adults were found to have higher composite IQ scores than Year 7s (U 
= 301.50, p < .001, N = 106) and Year 9s (U = 456.00, p < .001, N = 106).  
6.3.3.5. The Development of Single-Word-Reading Skill 
 
A non-parametric independent measures ANOVA was conducted to explore the effect of 
age on single-word-reading ability. A main effect of age was found (χ2 (3, N = 207) = 
115.51, p < .001). Six non-parametric post-hoc independent t-tests were conducted to 
explore further. Year 5 were found to read fewer words correctly than Year 7 (U = 331.50, 
p < .001, N = 101), Year 9 (U = 141.50, p < .001, N = 101), and adults (U = 43.50, p < 
.001, N = 106). Year 7 were found to read fewer words correctly than Year 9, however, 
due to the correction applied this failed to reach significance (U = 490.50, p = .011, N = 
100). Year 7s (U = 250.50, p < .001, N = 106) and Year 9s (U = 354.50, p < .001, N = 
106) were found to read fewer words correctly than adults.  
6.3.1.6. The Development of Working Memory Capacity 
An independent measures ANOVA was conducted to explore the effect of age on working 
memory capacity. A significant main effect of age was found (F (3,196) = 12.96, p < 
.001, ηp² = 0.18). Six independent t-tests were conducted to explore further. Year 5 were 
found to have a smaller working memory capacity than Year 7 (t (99) = 2.69, p = .008), 
Year 9 (t (99) = 3.83, p < .001) and adults (t (105) = 6.08, p <.001). There was found to 
be no significant difference between the working memory capacity of Year 7 and Year 9 
(t (98) = 1.33, p = .18). However, Year 7 were found to have a smaller working memory 
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capacity than adults (t (204) = 3.13, p = .002). There was found to be no significant 
difference between the working memory capacity of Year 9 and adults (t (204) = 1.46, p 
= .15).  
In sum, reading comprehension skill, text production quality, overall IQ score, single 
word reading skill appear to improve throughout adolescence, despite a period of limited 
progress between Year 7 and Year 9. Conversely, for working memory capacity, 
developments are observed between Year 5 and Year 7, with adult-like levels being 
achieved between Year 7 and Year 9. Taken together, for most variables, limited progress 
is observed between Year 7 and Year 9. 
6.3.4. The Relationships between Reading Comprehension, Text Production and 
Inference Generation Abilities during Adolescence 
 
This analysis seeks to explore the role of inference generation skill (number of errors) in 
reading comprehension and text production. The role of inference generation skill in 
reading comprehension and text production skill was analysed using multiple hierarchical 
regression analyses. The order of variables was selected a priori. Composite IQ scores, 
single-word-reading scores and working memory capacity scores were entered in Step 1 
to account for relationships between reading comprehension, text production, IQ, word-
reading skill and working memory capacity. Individual contributions made by each 
control component are not reported as this was not the aim of the study, however, they 
can be found in Appendix 6.2. Overall IST performance, real-world coherence inferential 
skill, real-world elaborative inferential skill, counterfactual-world coherence inferential 
skill, and counterfactual-world elaborative inferential skill were each entered, in turn, in 
Step 2. 
To explore patterns of development and potential age-related changes in the contribution 
of inference generation abilities to text production and reading comprehension, separate 
regression analyses were conducted for each age group, as opposed to controlling for age. 
 
 
 
180 
 
 
6.3.4.1.Preliminary Analysis 
 
Data screening revealed that all correlations were below .8, all VIF values were below 10 
and all tolerance values were greater than .1. For most analyses the Durbin-Watson 
statistic was between 1 and 3, suggesting the assumption of independence was met. 
However, for the regression model exploring the role of real-world elaborative inference 
generation skill in text production quality of adults, the Durbin-Watson statistic was 0.97. 
Consequently, the conclusions made from this model must be made with caution. For all 
analyses, assumptions of homoscedasticity and linearity were met. Residual statistics 
were examined for extreme cases26. For most analyses, there were never more than three 
cases (out of 50) with standardised residual statistics higher than +/- 2 or more than one 
standardised residual greater than +/-2.5. However, the model exploring the independent 
contribution of counterfactual-world coherence inference generation in the reading 
comprehension skill of adults resulted in four participants with standardised residuals 
above two. The accuracy of this model must be viewed with caution. For most analyses, 
residual errors in the model were fairly normally distributed. For some models there was 
slight skew, however, this was never severe. Means were calculated for each group for 
performance on each task. As can be seen from Table 6.2. there were no ceiling or floor 
effects. 
6.3.4.2. The Relationship between Inference Generation Abilities and Reading 
Comprehension Skill 
 
To explore the relationship between inference generation abilities and reading 
comprehension skill, a hierarchical regression analysis was conducted for each group with 
reading comprehension skill as the outcome variable. Control variables were entered in 
Step 1 and total Inference Generation Score in Step 2. Total inference generation score 
was calculated by summing errors across all four inference conditions. Results can be 
found in Table 6.4. 
 
                                                 
 
26
 Field (2005) suggests that 95% of cases should have standardised residuals within +/-2 and 99% of 
cases should have standardised residuals within +/-2.5. 
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Table 6.4. Summary of Fixed-Order Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses (∆R2) 
With Reading Comprehension Age as the Dependent Variable and Image Selection Task 
Score as Predictor, Controlling for IQ, Word-Reading Ability and Working Memory 
Capacity 
*p ≤ .05 ** p ≤ .01 *** p ≤ .001 
Inference generation abilities were found to make a unique contribution to reading 
comprehension age in all age groups, even after controlling for IQ, word-reading skill and 
working memory capacity. A positive relationship was observed, such that stronger 
inference generation skill was related to superior reading comprehension skill. The 
predictive utility of inference generation in reading comprehension skill appears to 
decrease with age, such that inference generation abilities account for 45.7%, 33.4%, 
27.0%, and 22.6% of unique variance in Year 5, Year 7, Year 9, and adults, respectively. 
Fisher’s r-to-z transformation found that none of the comparisons of coefficients were 
significant, however (p >  .20 for all comparisons). Therefore, whilst visual inspection of 
the predictive utility of inference generation skill in reading comprehension suggests a 
decline, this is not significant. 
This study aimed to explore the potentially differing contributions of four inference types 
in reading comprehension skill: real-world coherence, real-world elaborative, 
counterfactual-world coherence and counterfactual-world elaborative. Therefore, for 
each age group, four hierarchical regression analyses were conducted with reading 
comprehension as the outcome variable. To explore the independent contribution of the 
four inference types, inference skill for each type was entered in Step 2 sequentially. 
These analyses are summarised in Table 6.5. 
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Table 6.5. Summary of Fixed-Order Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses (∆R2) 
With Reading Comprehension Skill as the Dependent Variable and All Inference 
Conditions as Predictor Variables, Controlling for Word-Reading, IQ, and working 
memory capacity 
 
*p ≤ .05 ** p ≤ .01 *** p ≤ .001 
A positive relationship was observed between real-world coherence inference skill and 
reading comprehension, such that stronger real-world coherence inference generation 
skill was related to superior reading comprehension skill. The predictive utility of real-
world coherence inference skill in reading comprehension skill appears to decrease with 
age, accounting for 37.3%, 23.5%, 16.6%, and 9.4% unique variance in Year 5, Year 7, 
Year 9s and adults, respectively, after controlling for IQ, word-reading skill and working 
memory capacity. Elaborative inference generation skill explains a significant amount of 
unique variance in reading comprehension skill in Year 9 (13.7%) and adults (10.9%), 
after controlling for IQ, word-reading skill and working memory capacity. A positive 
relationship was observed, such that stronger real-world elaborative inference generation 
skill was related to superior reading comprehension skill. The amount of unique variance 
in reading comprehension skill accounted for by counterfactual-world coherence 
inference skill approaches significance for Year 7 (p = .051). Neither counterfactual-
world coherence nor counterfactual-world elaborative skill made a unique contribution to 
reading skill for any other age groups. Fisher’s r-to-z transformation was used to explore 
differences in the unique contribution made by the different inference types further. None 
of the comparisons of coefficients were significant (p >  .15 for all comparisons). This 
suggests that whilst the pattern of results may suggest the predictive utility of real-world 
coherence inference skill declines throughout adolescence, whereas real-world 
elaborative inference skill increases until Year 9, this is not significant. 
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6.3.4.3. The Relationship between Inference Generation Abilities and Text 
Production Quality 
 
To explore the relationship between inference generation and text production quality a 
hierarchical regression analysis was conducted for each group with text production 
quality as the outcome variable. Control variables were entered in Step 1 and total 
Inference Generation Score in Step 2. Results can be found in Table 6.6. 
Table 6.6. Summary of Fixed-Order Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses (∆R2) 
With Text Production Quality Score as the Dependent Variable and Image Selection 
Task Score as Predictor, Controlling for IQ, Word-Reading Ability and Working 
Memory Capacity 
 
*p ≤ .05 ** p ≤ .01 *** p ≤ .001 
Inference generation skill did not account for a significant amount of variance in the text 
production quality of Year 5. However, results suggest that the predictive utility of 
inference generation skill in text production quality increases with age, with inference 
generation skill accounting for 18.5%, 21.5%, and 24.0% unique variance in text 
production quality in Year 7, Year 9, and adults, respectively, after controlling for IQ, 
word-reading skill and working memory capacity. Conversely, the predictive utility of 
the control variables appears to decline with age, with word-reading skill, IQ and working 
memory capacity collectively accounting for 45.9%, 29.1%, 16.5% and 5.6% unique 
variance in text production quality of Year 5, Year 7, Year 9 and adults, respectively. 
Fisher’s r-to-z transformation was used to explore these patterns further. None of the 
comparisons of coefficients were significant (p >  .03 for all comparisons). This suggests 
that whilst the predictive utility of inference skill in text production quality appears to 
increase throughout adolescence, whereas the predictive utility of the control variables 
declines, this is not significant. 
This study aimed to explore the potentially differing contributions of four inference types 
in text production quality: real-world coherence, real-world elaborative, counterfactual-
world coherence and counterfactual-world elaborative. For each age group, four 
hierarchical regression analyses were conducted with text production quality as the 
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outcome variable. To explore the independent contribution of the four inference types, 
inference skill scores for each inference type were entered in Step 2 sequentially. These 
analyses are summarised in Table 6.7. 
Table 6.7. Summary of Fixed-Order Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses (∆R2) 
With Text Production Quality as the Dependent Variable and All Inference Conditions 
as Predictor Variables, Controlling for Word-Reading, IQ, and working memory 
capacity 
 
*p ≤ .05 ** p ≤ .01 *** p ≤ .001 
The predictive utility of real-world coherence inference skill in text production quality 
was found to increase with age, after controlling for word-reading skill, IQ and working 
memory capacity. A positive relationship was observed, such that stronger real-world 
coherence inference generation skill was related to superior text production quality. 
Specifically, inference generation explained 4.8% unique variance in text production in 
Year 7. However, this was not significant. Inference generation accounted for 8.4% 
unique variance in Year 9, however this contribution only approached significance (p 
= .059). Finally, inference generation accounted for a significant 22.5% significant unique 
variance in adults. Real-world elaborative inference skill was found to make a unique 
contribution to text production quality in Year 7 (12.9), Year 9 (12.1%), and adults (6.9%), 
respectively. A positive relationship was observed, such that stronger real-world 
elaborative inference generation skill was related to superior text production quality. For 
the most part, counterfactual-world inferential skill did not make a unique contribution to 
text production quality. However, counterfactual-world coherence skill was a unique 
predictor of text production quality in Year 5, accounting for 7.1% unique variance, after 
controlling for word-reading skill, IQ and working memory capacity. A positive 
relationship was observed, such that stronger counterfactual-world coherence inference 
generation skill was related to superior text production quality. Fisher’s r-to-z 
transformation was used to explore these differences further. None of the comparisons of 
coefficients were significant (p >  .14 for all comparisons). 
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6.4 Discussion 
 
This study sought to establish the role of inference generation in reading comprehension 
skill and text production quality in Year 5, Year 7, Year 9 and adults. The results of this 
study extend previous knowledge in several ways. First, whilst reading comprehension 
skill and text production quality were found to improve from Year 5 to adulthood, 
progress between Year 7 and Year 9 was limited. Second, inference generation skill 
explained unique variance in text production quality from Year 7 onwards, after 
controlling for IQ, word-reading skill, and working memory capacity. Finally, the role of 
inference generation in reading comprehension skill and text production quality during 
adolescence varied as a function of inference type.  
6.4.1. Age-Related Changes in Reading Comprehension Skill and Text Production 
Quality 
 
Reading comprehension skill and text production quality were both found to improve 
from Year 5 to adulthood. However, there was no improvement in text production quality 
between Year 7 and Year 9 and reading comprehension skill decreased during this time 
(due to the correction applied this difference did not reach significance). Taken together, 
results suggest that Year 7 to Year 9 is a period of limited literacy progress for some CYP. 
This is consistent with UK government statistics which suggest around one third of CYP 
do not make the progress expected during the Secondary School years (Department for 
Education, 2015a).  
6.4.2. The Developing Role of Inference Generation Skill in Reading Comprehension 
Skill 
Inference generation was found to make a significant unique contribution to reading 
comprehension skill throughout adolescence, accounting for 45.7%, 33.4%, 27.0%, and 
22.6% unique variance in Year 5, Year 7, Year 9 and adults, respectively, after controlling 
for IQ, word-reading skill, and working memory capacity. There is a discrepancy in 
previous research regarding the predictive utility of inference generation during the 
Secondary School years. Barth et al. (2015) found that inference generation accounted for 
only 2-5% unique variance in reading comprehension skill. Conversely, Cromley and 
Azevedo (2007) found that inference generation accounted for a much larger 19.1% 
unique variance in the reading comprehension skill of 14-15year olds. The findings of the 
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current study support Cromley and Azevedo (2007), such that inference generation at all 
ages was found to account for substantial variance in reading comprehension skill 
(22.6%-45.7%). Like Cromley and Azevedo (2007), the current study used an inference 
generation measure which was dependent on the reader activating their own background 
knowledge, as opposed to a measure that presented the necessary knowledge in the text. 
Subsequently, it appears that when an inference generation measure is used that does not 
minimise the contribution of those processes central to successful inference generation 
(e.g. knowledge activation), inference generation makes a considerable contribution to 
reading comprehension skill during adolescence.  
The amount of variance in reading comprehension skill accounted for by inference 
generation in the Cromley and Azevedo (2007) study appears to be less than the amount 
of variance explained in the current study, however. This discrepancy may be due to the 
wide range of age groups assessed in the current study. Cromley and Azevedo used a 
sample of 14-15 year olds only. This group would fall between Year 9 and adults in the 
current study. When the results of Cromley and Azevedo are considered against just Year 
9 (27.0%) and adults (22.6%), predictive utility explained is more comparable. 
The current study extends previous research in a second way, such that visual inspection 
of regression coefficients, suggests the role of inference generation skill in reading 
comprehension declines with age between 9-10 years and adulthood. However, these 
differences did not reach significance. This effect had not previously been observed and 
is surprising given the prominent role of inference generation in skilled models of reading 
comprehension (e.g. Kintsch in 1988; van den Broek et al., 2005; Zwaan. 2003). Given 
that this decline was not statistically significant, further research is needed to establish 
the changing role of inference generation in the reading comprehension process during 
adolescence.  
The current study was also unique in nature, such that the independent contribution of 
four different inference types was investigated. Visual inspection of regression 
coefficients suggests that the predictive utility of real-world coherence inference 
generation in reading comprehension declines with age. However, this was not significant. 
The converse was observed for real-world elaborative inferential skill, such that it did not 
make a significant unique contribution to reading comprehension skill until Year 9. 
However, again, changes were not significant. Despite not being significant the increases 
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and declines in predictive utility do fit with existing research. Real-world coherence 
inferences are essential to basic understanding and the maintenance of coherence, with 
real-world coherence skill found to improve with age (Barnes et al., 1996; Kendeou et al., 
2008; Oakhill et al., 2003). The decline in importance may thus be due to real-world 
coherence inferential skill becoming sufficient for basic understanding. Since the 
cognitive demand incurred when generating coherence inferences has been found to 
decrease with age, with adult-like performance achieved around 12-14 years, Year 9 and 
adults may have more resources available for the generation of the more cognitively 
demanding elaborative inferences (e.g. Casteel, 1993). This would explain why 
elaborative inferences do not make a significant unique contribution to comprehension 
skill until Year 9. It was found that counterfactual-world inferences did not make a unique 
contribution to reading comprehension skill at any age. However, given that fantasy texts 
were not used to assess comprehension this is not surprising. In sum, inference generation 
appears central to reading comprehension during the Secondary School years, particularly 
when the text requires knowledge activation, with coherence and elaborative inference 
skill sharing unique relationships with reading comprehension. 
6.4.3. The Developing Role of Inference Generation in Text Production Quality 
 
Previous research had not explicitly explored the role of inference generation in text 
production quality. The current study thus extends previous research by showing that 
inference generation makes a unique contribution to text production quality between 11-
12 years and adulthood. In contrast to the role of inference generation skill in reading 
comprehension process, the predictive utility of inference generation skill in text 
production quality was found to increase with age. Whilst a significant contribution was 
not made in Year 5, inference generation skill accounted for 18.5%, 21.5%, and 24.0% 
unique variance in Years 7, 9 and adults respectively, after controlling for IQ, word-
reading skill, and working memory capacity. However, whilst a visual inspection of 
regression coefficients suggests an increase in predictive utility of inference generation 
skill, this was not significant, thus further research exploring the potentially changing role 
of inference generation in text production is needed. 
Real-world coherence inferences did not make a unique contribution to text production 
quality until Year 9. Conversely, real-world elaborative inferences only made a unique 
contribution to text production quality in Years 7 and 9. The knowledge-telling model 
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suggests that writing moves through three distinct stages: 1) knowledge-telling, 2) 
knowledge-structuring, 3) knowledge-transforming (Bereiter and Scardamalia, 1987; 
Hayes 2012). The knowledge-telling stage occurs before 10 years of age and is 
characterised by the activation of ideas, although these may not be linked or well 
developed. It follows, then, that in Year 5 neither elaborative or coherence inference 
generation skill would make a unique contribution to text production quality since ideas 
are neither elaborated on nor linked together. The knowledge-structuring stage is 
characterised by the elaboration of ideas, with some links being made. CYP are thought 
to go through this stage between 10-13 years. During this period, the results of the current 
study suggest that elaborative inference generation skill makes a larger unique 
contribution to text production quality than coherence inference generation skill. This fits 
with CYP’s growing ability to elaborate on ideas during this stage. Conversely, whilst 
some links may be made, which may require coherence inference skills, these links have 
been found to be relatively limited during this stage. The knowledge-transforming stage, 
typical of CYP aged 13 years and over, is characterised by a coherent representation, with 
the reader in mind, created through extended periods of planning and revision. It thus 
follows that real-world coherence inferences, central for linking ideas and maintaining 
coherence, do not make a significant unique contribution until Year 9 (13-14 years). 
Progression through the stages of the knowledge-telling model thus appears to coincide 
with changes in the role of the different inference types in text production quality. This 
highlights the possible pivotal role of inference generation skill in the text production 
process throughout adolescence. 
Whilst real-world inferences did not make a significant unique contribution to text 
production quality in Year 5, counterfactual-world coherence inference generation skill 
did, accounting for 7.1% unique variance, after controlling for IQ, word-reading skill, and 
working memory capacity. This is an interesting finding that requires further exploration 
to be fully understood. For instance, real-world and counterfactual-world inference 
generation may be underpinned by different processes. Belief biases for example may 
underpin counterfactual-world inference generation whereas the activation of real-world 
knowledge may be central to real-world inference generation. If so, it is important to 
understand how those skills underpinning counterfactual-world inference generation 
operate during text production in Year 5 and how this differs to the older age groups. 
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Answering these questions would provide a deeper insight into the knowledge-telling 
stage of writing development.  
6.4.4. Conclusions 
 
This study has identified a continued role of inference generation skill in both reading 
comprehension and text production between the ages of 9-10 years and adulthood. Real-
world coherence and elaborative inferences were found to share unique relationships with 
reading comprehension and text production. Specifically, the results of this study 
highlight the growing role of elaborative inference generation skills in the reading process 
as coherence inference generation skills become proficient. Although non-significant, the 
results of this study also support Hayes (2012) model of text production development, 
highlighting the growing role of coherence inference generation skill.   
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CHAPTER 7 A CROSS-SECTIONAL STUDY EXPLORING THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF INFERENCE GENERATION SKILL AND 
INFERENTIAL TIME-COURSE IN YEAR 5s, YEAR 7s, YEAR 9s 
AND ADULTS  
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
Research has implicated a role for inference generation skill in reading comprehension 
across the lifespan (Cain & Oakhill, 2012; Kintsch, 1988; Verhoeven & van Leeuwe, 
2008). Exploring the development of inference generation abilities during adolescence 
may thus inform effective educational practice. The cross-sectional study reported here 
was designed to investigate age-related changes in real-world and counterfactual-world 
inference generation skill and changes in the inferential time-course in Year 5 (9-10years), 
Year 7 (11-12years), Year 9 (13-14years) and adults. 
7.1.1. Real-World Inference Generation across the Lifespan 
 
Research finds that whilst very young children have the ability to generate inferences 
from a narrative, they do not do this spontaneously (e.g. Omanson et al., 1978; Paris et 
al., 1977). With age, however, the ability to generate inferences whilst reading without 
prompting appears to improve, leading to increases in inferential skill (Ackerman, 1986, 
1988; Barnes et al., 1996; Kendeou et al., 2008). Understanding the development of those 
processes underpinning whether an inference is drawn spontaneously whilst reading or 
not is thus important. Research exploring the inferential time-course in adults converges 
to support the Constructionist Theory (Graesser et al., 1994) which suggests that 
coherence inferences are generated whilst reading (i.e. online), whereas elaborative 
inferences are drawn after reading (i.e. offline). Research utilising online methodologies 
to explore the inferential processes of CYP suggests that, despite generating fewer 
inferences than adults do, children and adolescents engage in a qualitatively similar 
process to adults, such that they, too, generate coherence inferences online and elaborative 
inferences offline (Bowyer-Crane & Snowling, 2010; Casteel, 1993; Casteel & Simpson, 
1991). Similarly, typically, all age groups find the generation of elaborative inferences 
more difficult than the generation of coherence inferences (e.g. Bowyer-Crane & 
Snowling, 2010; Cain & Oakhill, 1999; Cain et al., 2001). Therefore, whilst inference 
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generation skill improves from childhood to adulthood, the processes underpinning 
inference generation appear to remain the same. 
The research discussed above may not reflect the current UK picture, however. Many of 
the studies above have relatively small sample sizes, with participants recruited from 
predominantly white suburban schools. Often, participants are described as ‘average’ 
readers, such that they are reading at the level expected for their age. Research and UK 
government statistics suggest that a number of CYP, who do not have special educational 
needs nor have been identified as poor comprehenders, are still struggling to comprehend 
the texts presented to them and produce coherent texts (Department for Education, 2015a; 
2015b). These CYP may be processing text in a different way to their peers who are 
achieving or exceeding age-related expectations. However, they are unlikely to have been 
represented in the studies above. Whilst some have explored inference generation abilities 
at several ages, many of the studies discussed above compare just two groups, typically 
an adult and child group (9-10 years or younger), thus little is known about the 
developmental trajectory of inferential abilities during adolescence. Of the research that 
does exist, results appear inconsistent, with some suggesting that inference generation 
abilities develop throughout adolescence (e.g. Barnes et al., 1996) whereas others find 
that inference generation abilities reach adult-like levels by 13-14 years of age (e.g. 
Casteel, 1993). Further research is needed to advance understanding of age-related 
changes in inference generation abilities during adolescence in a sample reflective of the 
current UK school-aged population. 
7.1.2. Counterfactual-World Inference Generation across the Lifespan 
 
Research exploring counterfactual-world processing suggests that counterfactual-world 
information is more difficult to process than real-world information, due to the need to 
resolve conflict experienced due to the activation of related, but contradictory real-world 
knowledge – i.e. real-world interference (e.g. Alter et al., 2007; Byrne, 2002; 2007; Evans, 
2006; Evans et al., 2005). However, Ceci et al. (1981) suggest that this is not always the 
case for CYP. Ceci et al. explored the real-world and counterfactual-world recall ability 
of CYP aged 7 years and 10 years. For both groups, Ceci et al. found no difference 
between the recall accuracy of real-world and counterfactual-world information after 
immediately hearing a story. However, when stories were recalled after a three-week 
delay, Ceci et al. found that significantly more errors were made when recalling 
192 
 
 
counterfactual-world information compared to real-world information, particularly for 
the 10 year olds. Specifically, the CYP failed to correctly recall counterfactual-world 
information about well-known characters, such that participants recalled the real, rather 
than counterfactual, traits of the characters. This suggests that errors were due to real-
world interference.  
Given that 10 year olds displayed more real-world interference when recalling 
counterfactual-world stories than 7 year olds, Ceci et al. concluded that when processing 
counterfactual-world texts, the amount of real-world interference faced increases with 
age. This is supported by Dorfman and colleagues (Dorfman, 1989; Dorfman & Brewer, 
1988). They presented participants with fables, in which key information ran counter to 
existing beliefs (e.g. the hare wins the race instead of the tortoise), then asked participants 
to generate a thematic inference regarding the point of the fable, thus requiring 
participants to put aside existing beliefs. Superior performance was observed by 7-8 year 
olds, compared to 9-10 year olds, 12-13 year olds and adults. Dorfman and colleagues 
asked participants to do this immediately after hearing the story, however. The difficulty 
associated with generating counterfactual-world inferences is thus surprising given that 
Ceci et al. found that real-world interference was not present in immediate recall for any 
age group. The difference observed may be due to the methodological variations below.  
Text can be processed at three levels, increasing in difficulty: surface, propositional and 
situational (Van Dijk and Kintsch, 1983). Gordon et al. (2000) suggest that participants 
will adopt the easiest strategy possible when completing tasks. Therefore, participants in 
Ceci et al.’s immediate recall condition may have only created a surface-level 
representation. A surface-level representation of the text is a verbatim record stored in 
short-term memory, retention is limited. Consequently, participants in the three-week 
delay condition would not be able to maintain a surface-level representation for this 
period. If a text is to be stored for later retrieval, a more robust situational model is needed. 
Unlike surface-level representations, situational-level representations are thought to be 
structured according to the reader’s real-world knowledge (e.g. Kintsch, 1988). The 
construction of a surface-level representation, compared to a situational-level 
representation, may thus explain why significantly less real-world interference was 
observed in the immediate recall condition compared to the delayed recall condition in 
Ceci et al.’s (1981) study. Inferences are also thought to be generated primarily at the 
situational-level (Graesser et al., 1994; Schmalhofer et al., 2002). The task used by 
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Dorfman and colleagues requires a thematic inference to be generated meaning successful 
completion is dependent on the reader constructing a situational-level representation of 
the text. Taken together, it appears that real-world interference is present when 
completing tasks requiring the construction of situational-level representations, but not 
surface-level representations.  
The recall task and thematic inference task employed by Ceci et al. (1981) and Dorfman 
and colleagues (Dorfman, 1989; Dorfman & Brewer, 1988) are offline measures of 
reading comprehension and inference generation. Bowyer-Crane and Snowling (2010) 
used a timed sentence verification task (SVT) to explore real-world and counterfactual-
world inferential abilities in children aged 9-10 years. They found that accuracy of 
inference generation for both coherence and elaborative inferences did not differ in the 
real-world and a fairy story conditions. Consistent with Ceci et al. (1981), this suggests 
that, compared to real-world inference generation, children do not find it more difficult 
to generate inferences based on counterfactual information. Moreover, Bowyer-Crane 
and Snowling found that in both the real-world and fairy story condition, participants 
responded to coherence items significantly faster than elaborative items, suggesting 
coherence inferences are drawn online, regardless of the plausibility of the information. 
However, responses in the real-world condition were significantly faster than in the fairy 
story condition, suggesting children may find the process of counterfactual inference 
generation slightly more taxing than real-world inference generation.  
Despite also employing a SVT, Graesser et al. (1998) found that adults displayed an 
accuracy advantage for real-world rather than counterfactual-world inference generation. 
Moreover, all adults took much longer to make the true or false decision when confronted 
with counterfactual-world inference items compared to real-world inference items. 
Graesser et al. thus concluded that, due to the presence of real-world interference, adults 
find the generation of all counterfactual inferences cognitively taxing and thus generate 
them offline. The discrepancy in online-offline patterns between Graesser et al. (1998) 
and Bowyer-Crane and Snowling (2010) suggests a qualitative shift in the processing of 
counterfactual-world information between 9-10 years and adulthood. The differences 
between adults and children could also be due to methodological differences between the 
two studies, however. 
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The texts used by Bowyer-Crane and Snowling (2010) were 114-144 words long, with 
readability ratings of 7:4years or less, whereas the texts used by Graesser et al. (1998) 
were 609-763 words long, with readability ratings ranging from approximately 20-40 
years. Whereas Bowyer-Crane and Snowling used fairy tales in the counterfactual-world 
condition, Graesser et al. used texts that violated the laws of time and space – information 
that is far more implausible (Byrne, 2007; Zwaan et al., 1995). Additionally, the SVT 
followed the critical text after an almost immediate time interval (500ms) in the Bowyer-
Crane and Snowling study. Conversely, the SVT was presented at the end of the text in 
the Graesser et al. study, meaning that the time interval between critical text and test item 
was longer than that employed by Bowyer-Crane and Snowling and inconsistent across 
texts. Difficulty associated with processing counterfactual-world information has been 
found to increase as length of text, complexity of text, implausibility of information, and 
time interval increase (Byrne, 2007; Markman, 1979; Otero & Campanario, 1990; Singer, 
1994; Vosniadou et al., 1988). This may thus explain the difficulty faced by adults 
compared to CYP. Similarly, research shows that for real-world information, coherence 
inferences are generated online whereas elaborative inferences are not (e.g. Calvo & 
Castillo, 1996; 1998; 2001a; 2001b). This is also the pattern of results observed by 
Bowyer-Crane and Snowling (2010) for counterfactual-world information. However, 
whilst Bowyer-Crane and Snowling (2010) specify the types of inferences explored, 
Graesser et al. (1998) do not. It is thus possible that a) the inferences explored by Graesser 
et al. were predominantly elaborative inferences, b) the lack of discrimination between 
coherence and elaborative inferences resulted in skewed results, c) due to the differing 
time intervals, the task may not be sensitive to differences between coherence and 
elaborative inferences, since there is adequate time for both types of inference to be 
generated before the test item is presented. In sum, it is unclear if adults would display as 
much difficulty generating counterfactual-world inferences if given shorter, simpler texts 
comprising more plausible counterfactual-world information, with exploration and 
comparison of coherence and elaborative inferences. Due to limited research, it is thus 
unclear if the differences observed between adults and children are due to a conceptual 
shift in the processing of counterfactual-world information or methodological 
discrepancies.  
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7.1.3. The Current Study 
 
The current study sought to establish age-related changes in real-world and 
counterfactual-world inferential abilities in Year 5, Year 7, Year 9, and adults. There was 
a specific focus on exploring whether the differences observed between the 
counterfactual-world inference generation processing difficulties of adults and children 
were due to a conceptual shift or methodological differences. Research suggests that real-
world coherence inferences are drawn online, regardless of age whereas real-world 
elaborative inferences are drawn offline, regardless of age (Casteel, 1993; Poynor & 
Morris, 2003). The same pattern of results has been found for counterfactual-world 
inferences for children (Bowyer-Crane & Snowling, 2010). However, research suggests 
that adults draw all counterfactual-world inferences offline (e.g. Graesser et al., 1998). 
Therefore, two critical texts were embedded into one of eighteen stories, reflecting one 
of six conditions (1) real-world coherence, (2) real-world elaborative, (3) real-world 
literal, (4) counterfactual-world coherence, (5) counterfactual-world elaborative, and (6) 
counterfactual-world literal. Critical texts were then followed by a forced-choice picture-
selection task, with one picture depicting the target inference (or target information in 
literal conditions). In the coherence condition, causal inferences were explored and in the 
elaborative condition, static inferences were explored. - see Chapter 3. Reading speeds of 
critical texts and number of errors on the forced-choice picture selection task were 
recorded to provide measures of the inferential time-course and inference generation skill, 
respectively.  
7.1.3.1. Predictions 
 
The current study predicts quantitative, but not qualitative changes in both real-world and 
counterfactual-world inference generation abilities during adolescence, proposing that 
qualitative changes in counterfactual-world processing are due to methodological 
discrepancies as opposed to a conceptual shift in processing. Inference generation skill 
and speed is predicted to improve, across all conditions, during adolescence for real-world 
inferences but decline for counterfactual-world inferences. Adult-like performance is 
predicted to be achieved for both skill and speed by Year 9. Qualitative changes during 
adolescence are not predicted, such that regardless of age and plausibility of information, 
coherence inferences are predicted to be generated with more success than elaborative 
inferences and coherences inferences are predicted to be generated online and elaborative 
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inferences offline. Due to the need to resolve the conflict experienced due to the activation 
of related, but contradictory real-world knowledge, the counterfactual-world process is 
predicted to differ to the real-world inference generation process for all age groups, such 
that additional processing costs are predicted when generating counterfactual-world 
inferences compared to real-world inferences. Therefore, it is predicted that all groups 
will read counterfactual-world critical texts slower than real-world critical texts. 
7.2. Method 
7.2.1. Participants 
 
Those who participated in Study 3 were also included in this study.     
7.2.2. Design 
 
A 4 (Age: Year 5, Year 7, Year 9, adults) * 3 (Inference Type: Coherence, Elaborative, 
Literal) * 2 (Plausibility: Real-World, Counterfactual-world) cross-sectional design was 
employed to explore age-related changes in real-world and counterfactual-world 
inferential abilities during adolescence. The dependent variables were reading speed of 
critical texts resulting in a correct response (milliseconds) and number of errors made on 
forced-choice picture-selection task. 
7.2.3. Materials 
7.2.3.1. Inference Generation Measure 
 
The Image Selection Task (IST) from Study 3 was used to explore inference generation 
skill (number of errors) and the inferential time-course (reading speeds) – See Chapters 3 
and 4. 
7.2.4. Procedure 
 
The IST was administered as part of a large test battery used to obtain data for Studies 
3, 4, and 5 – see Section 6.2.4 for the procedure. 
 
7.3. Results 
7.3.1. Assessing Inferential Skill 
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The data were inspected prior to analysis. Since two versions of each story were created, 
analysis was conducted to determine if one version of the stories was more difficult than 
the other. There was found to be no difference between the number of errors made on 
Version 1 and Version 2 for Year 5 (t (50) = 0.76, p = .45), Year 7 (t (49) = 0.13, p = .90), 
Year 9 (t (49) = 1.01, p = .33) or adults (t (55) = 0.29, p = .78). The data were collapsed 
across both versions.  
Age-related changes in inference generation abilities were established using a mixed 
factorial ANOVA with number of errors as the dependent variable. The independent 
variables were inference type, plausibility and age. To calculate the mean number of 
errors for each condition, the number of errors for each participant in each condition was 
first calculated. These totals were then used to create a group mean for each condition - 
see Table 7.1. A visual summary of means can also be found in Figure 7.1.  
Inspection of the skewness and kurtosis statistics revealed that for all six conditions the 
data were normally distributed. Homogeneity of variance was not violated. Mauchly’s 
Test of Sphericity was significant for inference type. A parametric ANOVA was 
conducted to explore the effects of age, plausibility and inference type on skill (number 
of errors), with Huynh-Feldt statistics27 reported for all analyses involving inference. 
Table 7.1. Mean number of errors (and Standard Deviations) all conditions for all age 
groups (max number of errors =  6) 
 
                                                 
 
27
 Girden (1992) suggests that Huynh-Feldt, not the Greenhouse-Geisser correction, should be used when 
the estimates of sphericity are greater than 0.75, as in these cases the Greenhouse-Geisser correction is 
likely to be too conservative. 
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Figure 7.1. Mean number of errors (and Standard Deviations) for all six inference 
conditions for all age groups 
A 4 (Age: Year 5, Year 7, Year 9, adults) * 3 (Inference Type: Literal, Coherence, 
Elaborative) * 2 (Plausibility: Real-World, Counterfactual-World) mixed factorial 
ANOVA was conducted. There was a main effect of age (F (3, 203) = 8.37, p < .001, ηp² 
= 0.14).  Post-hoc comparisons were conducted to explore this main effect further. As 
illustrated in Figure 7.2. Year 5 were found to make more errors than Year 7, however, 
due to the correction applied this did not reach significance (t (99) = 2.44, p = .02). Year 
5 were found to make significantly more errors than Year 9 (t (99) = 2.95, p = .004), and 
adults (t (105) = 4.94, p < .001). Whilst means suggest a steady increase in inference 
generation skill, none of the remaining comparisons were significant (p > .043 for all 
remaining comparisons - see Appendix 7.1).  
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Figure 7.2. Bar Chart to show Main effect of age Across All Six Inference Conditions  
There was a main effect of inference type (F  (1.71, 362.08) = 123.89, p <.001, ηp² = 0.45). 
Post-hoc comparisons show that significantly fewer literal errors than coherence (t (206) 
= 16.16, p < .001) or elaborative errors were made (t (206) = 13.89, p < .001). Error rates 
were found to be higher for coherence items compared to elaborative items, however, due 
to the correction applied this difference did not reach significance (t (206) = 2.52, p 
= .013).  There was no main effect of plausibility (F (1, 203) = .78, p = .38, ηp² = 0.01). 
There was a significant interaction between inference type and age (F (5.14, 362.08) = 
3.01, p = .011, ηp² = 0.06) – see Table 7.2. for post-hoc analyses and Figure 7.3. for visual 
depiction. Year 5 and Year 9 were found to make significantly more coherence errors 
than adults. This suggests that coherence inference generation skill develops between 
Year 5 and adulthood. However, this progress may be steady, with a period of limited 
development between Year 7 and Year 9. Year 5 were found to make significantly more 
elaborative errors than Year 9 and adults. This suggests elaborative inference generation 
skill develops during adolescence, with adult-like levels achieved around Year 9. All age 
groups made fewer literal errors than coherence or elaborative errors. There was no 
significant difference between the number of coherence and elaborative errors made for 
Year 5, Year 7 and adults. However, Year 9 were found to make significantly more 
coherence than elaborative errors.  
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Figure 7.3. Line Graph showing the interaction between age and inference type 
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Table 7.2. Summary of comparisons conducted to explore the interaction between 
inference type and age group 
 
*significant at .01 level ** significant at .001 level 
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There was a significant interaction between plausibility and inference type (F (1.85, 
383.70) = 8.63, p < .001, ηp² = 0.05). Post-hoc contrasts show that significantly fewer 
literal than coherence or elaborative errors were made in the real-world condition (t (206) 
= 10.38, p < .001; t (206) = 10.14, p < .001, respectively) and counterfactual-world 
condition (t (206) = 12.13, p < .001; t (206) = 9.20, p < .001). There was no significant 
difference in the number of coherence and elaborative errors made in the real-world 
condition (t (205) = 1.20, p = .23). Conversely, significantly more coherence than 
elaborative errors were made in the counterfactual-world condition (t (205) = 3.76, p 
< .001). No other interactions were significant (p > .70 for all interactions - see Appendix 
7.2.). This suggests that throughout adolescence coherence errors are no more difficult 
than elaborative errors when processing real-world information. However, when 
processing counterfactual-world information, the generation of coherence inferences 
appear to be more difficult than the generation of elaborative inferences. 
7.3.1.1. Additional Analysis 
 
In the above analyses, Year 9 displayed a qualitatively different pattern of inferential skill 
to the other three age groups. The Year 9 sample comprises a high number of CYP with 
reading comprehension levels below age-related expectations – see Chapter 6.3.3.2. It is 
possible then that the qualitatively different pattern observed in Year 9 is due to a sample 
which comprise predominantly weak comprehenders. To explore this further four new 
groups were created based on reading comprehension age: 7-9:11 years (n = 49), 10-13:11 
years (n = 51), 14-15:11 years (n = 48), and 16 years+ (n=59). See Table 7.3. for a 
summary of means. To determine if the unique pattern observed in Year 9 is due to the 
number of weak comprehenders in that group, a mixed factorial ANOVA, with number 
of errors as the dependent variable was conducted to explore changes in plausibility and 
inference type as a function of reading comprehension age.  
As with the analysis above, all assumptions for parametric testing were met, therefore, a 
3*2*2 parametric ANOVA was conducted to explore the effects of age, plausibility and 
inference type on skill (number of errors), with Huynh-Feldt statistics reported due to 
Mauchly’s test of Sphericity being violated for all inference conditions. 
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Table 7.3. Mean number of errors (and Standard Deviations) all six inference 
conditions for all Reading-Age groups 
 
There was a main effect of inference type (F (1.65, 352.56) = 66.54, p < .001, ηp² = 0.39). 
Post-hoc tests revealed that significantly fewer literal than coherence (t (206) = 11.99, p 
< .001) or elaborative errors (t (206) = 11.11, p < .001) were made. There was no 
difference in the number of coherence and elaborative errors made (t (206) = 0.78, p = .44). 
There was a main effect of age (F (3, 203) = 3.58, p = .016, ηp² = 0.09). Post-hoc pairwise 
comparisons revealed that the 7-9:11 years group made significantly more errors than 10-
13:11 years group (t (98) = 2.82, p = .006), 14-15:11 years group (t (95) = 2.72, p = .008), 
and 16 years+ group (t (106) = 2.78, p = .006). None of the remaining comparisons were 
significant (p > .71 for all remaining comparisons – see Appendix 7.3). There was no 
main effect of plausibility (F (1,206) = 1.13, p = .26, ηp² = 0.01). There was, however, a 
significant interaction between plausibility and inference type (F (1.86, 396.65) = 6.38, p 
= .003, ηp² = 0.06). There was no difference between the number of literal and elaborative 
errors made in real-world and counterfactual-world conditions (F (1, 205) < .001, p = 
1.00, ηp² < .001). However, significantly more coherence than elaborative errors were 
made in the counterfactual-world condition compared to the real-world condition (F 
(1,205) = 47.38, p = .009, ηp² = 0.06). None of the remaining interactions were significant 
(p > .20 for all interactions – See Appendix 7.4). The interaction between age and 
inference type present in the original analysis was not present in this additional analysis. 
This suggests that the difficulty generating coherence inferences displayed by Year 9 was 
not due to the high proportion of poor comprehenders in this group. The possible reasons 
for Year 9 to display a qualitatively different error pattern to all other are groups are 
discussed in Section 8.4.3. 
7.3.2. Error Analysis 
Analysis was conducted on the errors made by all age groups to explore the role of real-
world interference when processing counterfactual-world information. Real-world 
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interference is argued to be present if the participant selects the real-world alternative 
instead of the counterfactual-world alternative. The forced-choice picture-selection task 
was designed so that errors caused by literal processing could also be identified, such that 
one of the pictures depicted the literal state of events. Remaining errors were categorised 
as unexplained errors, such that the cause of inferential failure could not be determined 
by the IST. Tables 7.4. and 7.5. summarise the types of errors made when processing real-
world inferences and counterfactual-world inferences, respectively. 
Table 7.4. Mean Percentage of Error Types made in Real-World Conditions 
 
Table 7.5. Mean Percentage of Error Types made in Counterfactual-World Conditions 
The general trends, presented in Table 7.4, suggest that for all age groups real-world 
coherence errors are largely attributed to literal processing, such that of the total errors 
made, between 64%-82% of these errors could be attributed to literal processing. 
Conversely, for all groups real-world elaborative errors are predominantly categorised as 
unexplained errors. For counterfactual-world processing, the means presented in Table 
7.5. suggest that both coherence and elaborative errors are predominantly attributable to 
real-world interference.28  In sum, when processing counterfactual-world information, 
real-world interference appears to be the primary cause of errors. However, when 
generating real-world inferences, the primary cause of inference generation failure varies 
as a function of inference type, such that the primary cause of coherence inference failure 
                                                 
 
28
 Statistical analysis was not conducted due to limited data. 
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appears to be literal errors, whereas the majority of elaborative errors appear to be 
response errors. 
 
7.3.3. Reading Speed 
 
The analysis of reading speeds is concerned with the inferential time-course of successful 
inference generation, therefore, all errors were removed. This resulted in five participants 
from Year 5, two participants from Year 7, and one participant from Year 9 losing more 
than 50% of their data. These participants were excluded from all subsequent analyses. 
Consistent with previous research, a data trim was also conducted, with all scores +/-2 
standard deviations the participant’s grand mean being removed and all scores +/-2 
standard deviations each item’s grand mean being removed (e.g. Calvo & Castillo, 
2001a). If a participant had one or less available answer in any one condition, this was 
treated as a missing value and replaced with the said condition’s mean. This data trim 
resulted in one Year 5 losing more than 50% of their reading speed data. This participant 
was removed. Whilst most outliers were evenly distributed across all items and 
participants, some items resulted in more than 50% of errors or outliers. For Year 5 and 
Year 7 items 2a, 8b, and 11a were excluded from all analyses. For Year 9, items 2a and 
8b were excluded from all analyses. For adults, items 2a, 5b and 8b were excluded from 
all analyses. In total, 4.47% of Year 5 data, 5.06% of Year 7 data, 3.97% of Year 9 data, 
and 6.30% of adult data were lost due to the data trim conducted. Due to both errors and 
the data trim, for Year 5, 22.22% of reading speed data were removed. For Year 7, 19.66% 
of reading speed data were removed. For Year 9, 18.577% of reading speed data were 
removed. For adults, 19.49% of reading speed data were removed. Whilst the level of 
data lost due to errors appears quite high, it is consistent with data loss rates in similar 
studies recruiting child and adolescent samples (Bowyer-Crane & Snowling, 2010; 
Casteel, 1993). 
Since two versions of each story were created, analysis was conducted to determine if one 
version of the stories was more taxing than the other. There was found to be no difference 
between the reading speeds of critical texts on Version 1 and Version 2 for Year 5 (t (18) 
= 0.91, p = .37), Year 7 (t (18) = 1.67, p = .10), Year 9 (t (18) = 1.66, p = .10) or adults (t 
(18) = .22, p = .83). The data were collapsed across both versions. For all groups a 
participant mean reading speed was calculated for each condition. These means were then 
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used to calculate group means, which can be seen in Table 7.6. A visual summary of 
means can also be found in Figure 7.4. Means suggest that, for all age groups, coherence-
inference-evoking critical texts are read slower than elaborative-inference-evoking 
critical texts and literal texts. For all age groups, there appears to be no difference between 
reading speeds for elaborative-inference-evoking critical texts and literal critical texts. 
Inspection of the skewness and kurtosis statistics revealed that for all conditions the data 
were normally distributed. Homogenity of variance was not violated. However, 
Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity was violated for inference type. A parametric ANOVA was 
conducted to explore the effects of age, plausibility and inference type on skill (number 
of errors), with Huynh-Feldt statistics reported for all analyses involving inference29. 
Table 7.6. Mean Reading Speed of Critical Texts (and Standard Deviations 
(milliseconds)) for all conditions for all age groups 
 
                                                 
 
29
 Girden (1992) suggest that Huynh-Feldt, not the Greenhouse-Geisser correction, should be used when 
the estimates of sphericity are greater than 0.75, as in these cases the Greenhouse-Geisser correction is 
likely to be too conservative. 
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A 4 (Age: Year 5, Year 7, Year 9, adults) * 3 (Inference Type: Literal, Coherence, 
Elaborative) * 2 (Plausibility: Real-World, Counterfactual-World) mixed factorial 
ANOVA was conducted. There was found to be a main effect of plausibility (F (1,180) = 
12.45, p = .001, ηp² = 0.07), such that counterfactual-world items (mean = 5734.70, SD 
= 1342.78) were found to be read significantly slower than real-world items (mean = 
5512.95, SD = 1256.24). This suggests that the processing of counterfactual-world 
information is more taxing than real-world information. 
A main effect of inference type was observed (F (1.92, 346.25) = 6.93, p = .001, ηp² = 
0.04). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons revealed that there was no significant difference 
between the reading speeds of literal (mean = 5529.81, SD = 1300.04) and elaborative 
items (mean = 5551.08, SD = 1257.82; t (180) = 0.32, p = .75). Coherence items (mean 
= 5790.58, SD = 1527.65) were found to be read significantly slower than literal items (t 
(180) = 3.12, p = .002) and elaborative items, however (t (180) = 2.92, p = .004). This 
suggests that coherence inferences are generated online, whereas elaborative inferences 
are generated offline. A main effect of age was observed (F (1,180) = 44.73, p < .001, ηp² 
= 0.44). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons found that the reading speeds of all groups 
significantly differed (p < .001 - see Appendix 7.5) except for Year 9 and adults (t (93) = 
1.31, p = .19). Adults (mean = 4469.95, SD = 1125.55) and Year 9 (mean = 4806.35, SD 
= 1440.91) had the fastest reading speeds, followed by Year 7 (mean = 6025.74, SD = 
0
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1451.45), and then Year 5 (mean = 7193.25, SD = 2012.99) who displayed the slowest 
reading speeds.  This suggests inferential efficiency is achieved by Year 9. There were 
no significant interactions (p > .01 for all interactions - see Appendix 7.6) suggesting the 
inferential patterns were the same for both real-world and counterfactual-world 
information and across age groups30. 
7.4. Discussion 
 
This study sought to establish age-related changes in real-world and counterfactual-world 
inference generation skill (number of errors) and speed (reading speed) in Year 5 (9-10 
years), Year 7 (11-12 years), Year 9 (13-14 years) and adults (18 years and over). Unlike 
previous research, the current study used the same methodology with all age groups. The 
results of this study extend previous knowledge in several ways. First, quantitative 
changes in both real-world and counterfactual-world inference generation skill and speed 
were observed during adolescence. Both skill and speed improved during adolescence for 
real-world and counterfactual-world information, with adult-like performance observed 
for inference skill by Year 7 and inference speed by Year 9. This both conflicts with and 
supports predictions made, such that counterfactual-world skill and speed were predicted 
to decline during adolescence whereas real-world skill and speed were predicted to 
improve. Second, consistent with predictions, despite quantitative improvements during 
adolescence, qualitative changes in online-offline inferential time-course patterns were 
not observed. Regardless of the plausibility of information, all age groups read coherence-
inference-evoking critical texts significantly slower than literal and elaborative evoking 
critical texts. This suggests coherence inferences are generated whilst reading whereas 
elaborative inferences are not, throughout adolescence. Previous differences, then, may 
thus be due to methodological discrepancies, as predicted. Third, qualitatively different 
error patterns were observed for Year 9 compared to all other groups. Years 5 and 7 and 
adults found the generation of coherence inferences no more difficult than the generation 
of elaborative inferences. Conversely, Year 9 made significantly more coherence errors 
than elaborative errors. This effect disappeared when groups were split by reading 
                                                 
 
30
 Additional analysis was conducted with groups split by reading comprehension age instead of 
chronological age. Patterns were the same when groups were split by reading age and chronological age – 
see Appendix 7.7. 
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comprehension age as opposed to chronological age. This suggests that Year 9 may be a 
special time in the development of inferential abilities and conflicts with predictions made, 
such that no qualitative changes were predicted. Fourth, consistent with predictions, for 
all age groups, the process of real-world and counterfactual-world inference generation 
does appear to differ. Counterfactual-world inference generation appears to have 
additional processing costs, compared to real-world inference generation, evidenced by 
slower reading speeds in all age groups. However, these costs appear to be effectively 
managed for counterfactual-world elaborative inference generation but not 
counterfactual-world coherence inference generation. Whilst not statistically significant, 
means suggest this effect is most prominent in Year 9. Analysis of errors suggests that 
difficulties faced when processing counterfactual-world information can be attributed to 
real-world interference. This suggests that throughout adolescence real-world 
interference is harder to inhibit whilst reading than when generating inferences with 
strategic effort. These findings are discussed in relation to previous research below. 
7.4.1. The Developmental Trajectory of Real-World Inference Generation  
 
Real-world inference generation skill and real-world inference generation speed both 
improved in all conditions during adolescence, with adult-like performance in skill 
achieved by Year 7 and speed by Year 9. For inference generation skill, different 
trajectories were observed for coherence and elaborative inferences. For coherence 
inference generation, adult-like levels are observed in Year 7 but not Years 5 and 9, with 
Years 5 and 9 making significantly more errors than adults. It is possible then, that 
coherence inference generation skill develops throughout adolescence, with some 
achieving adult-like levels in Year 7, but some not achieving proficiency until later. 
Alternatively, whilst not significant, visual inspection of mean number of errors made 
suggest a decline in performance between Year 7 and Year 9. This is consistent with the 
decline in reading comprehension observed between Year 7 and 9 in Chapter 6. It is 
possible, then, that for some, coherence inference generation skill declines between Year 
7 and Year 9. However, this is a cross-sectional study, therefore, it is unclear if these 
results reflect true age-related changes. For elaborative inference generation skill, steady 
improvements were observed, with adult-like levels achieved between Year 7 and Year 
9. Whilst quantitative gains in inference generation skill during adolescence are consistent 
with previous research, differing developmental trajectories for the two inference types 
had not been noted (Ackerman, 1986, 1988; Barnes et al., 1996).  This is likely due to 
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previous research not distinguishing between the two inference types. This study thus 
highlights the importance of exploring the development of both inference types during 
adolescence. Current results also highlight slow progress after Year 7. There are several 
possible interpretations. First, significant improvements in inference generation skill may 
occur between Year 7 and adulthood. However, the Image Selection Task (IST) may not 
be sensitive enough to detect them. Whilst error rates were low, particularly in Year 9 and 
adulthood, ceiling effects were only observed for literal conditions, it is likely then that 
the task provided enough breadth to tap the inference generation skills of all age groups. 
Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 3, the stimuli and format in the IST were designed to 
be suitable for the assessment of inferential abilities in a range of age groups. It is thus 
unlikely that the limited development observed is due to the sensitivity of the IST. Second, 
it is possible that basic inference generation skills are achieved by Year 7. Research shows 
that even young CYP are able to generate the same inferences as adults when prompted 
(Omanson et al., 1978; Paris et al., 1977). It is possible then that basic inference 
generation skills are achieved early on, but successful application of inferences is 
constrained by decoding skills, text demands and/or ability to express the inference. This 
may explain why adult-like inference generation skills were observed at a younger age 
than in previous research – texts in the IST were designed to be readable by the youngest 
participants and expressive output demands were minimised by the use of a pictorial 
response method.  
In addition to the main effect of age, an interaction between inference type and age was 
observed for skill (number of errors), such that whilst Years 5 and 7 and adults found 
elaborative inference generation no more difficult than coherence inference generation, 
Year 9 made significantly more coherence than elaborative errors. An interaction was 
also observed between plausibility and inference type for skill (number of errors). 
However, a three-way interaction between inference type, plausibility and age was not 
significant. Visual inspection of means suggests that, whilst not significant, coherence 
inferences are more difficult than elaborative inferences for Year 9 in the counterfactual-
world condition only. Therefore, means suggest that for real-world information, despite 
quantitative gains in inference generation skill during adolescence, qualitative changes 
do not occur, such that for all age groups there was no difference in the number of 
coherence and elaborative errors made. This refutes previous research, which suggests 
that elaborative inferences are more difficult than coherence inferences for both children 
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and adults (e.g. Bowyer-Crane & Snowling, 2010; Cain & Oakhill, 1999; Cain et al., 
2001). The difference between the findings of the current study and previous research 
may be due to the measure used. Some studies have assessed inferential skill using online 
measures only (e.g. Calvo & Castillo, 1996; 1998; 2001a). Whilst these measures provide 
information regarding those inferences that can be generated successfully whilst reading, 
research shows that participants, particularly CYP, are able to generate more inferences 
when prompted than spontaneously whilst reading (Omanson et al., 1978; Paris et al., 
1977). Moreover, those inferences generated whilst reading are typically found to be 
coherence inferences, with elaborative inferences tending to be generated offline (e.g. 
Calvo & Castillo, 1996; 1998; 2001a; 2001b; Casteel, 1993; Casteel & Simpson, 1991). 
This thus explains the superiority of coherence inferential skill compared to elaborative 
inferential skill when online measures are used.  
Some studies finding that elaborative inference generation is more difficult than 
coherence inference generation have used offline measures and prompts, however (Cain 
& Oakhill, 1999; Cain et al., 2001; Casteel & Simpson, 1991). Typically, in this previous 
research, whereas elaborative inferences require the integration of the text and the 
reader’s background knowledge (i.e. knowledge-based inferences), coherence inferences 
can be generated successfully by integrating two premises in the text (i.e. text-based 
inferences). In the current study, both coherence and elaborative inferences were 
knowledge-based inferences. This suggests that the discrepancy between the two 
inference types in previous research may be due to differences in processing costs 
associated with the knowledge-based versus text-based inferences. This is supported by 
Cain et al., (2001) who used knowledge-based inference-evoking stimuli to assess both 
coherence and elaborative inferences and also found no significant difference between 
coherence and elaborative inferential skill.  
Alternatively, differences between the current findings and previous research may be 
reflective of the pictorial response method used in the current study. Static inferences 
were explored in the elaborative condition, with a focus on properties that could be 
depicted pictorially e.g. colour and texture. The Immersed Experiencer Framework (IEF) 
suggests that mental representations are multi-modal, including not just verbal 
information, but other sensory information (Zwaan, 2003 – see Chapter 2.3.5). The use 
of pictorial test stimuli may thus have encouraged participants to create a pictorial 
situational mental model. Moreover, the IEF suggests that information is depicted in the 
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mental model using the modality it was experienced in, since static properties are more 
often experienced visually than verbally, these properties may thus be more easily and/or 
strongly represented pictorially than verbally (Zwaan, 2003). Compared to participants in 
previous research using text-based response methods, participants in the current study 
may have found the generation of elaborative inferences no more difficult than the 
generation of coherence inferences due to the nature of the pictorial situational model, 
such that both coherence and elaborative inferences were readily depicted. 
For inference generation speed, as measured by reading speed, quantitative developments 
were observed until Year 9. Year 5 read critical texts significantly slower than all groups, 
Year 7 read critical texts significantly slower than Year 9 and adults, however, there was 
no difference between the reading speeds of Year 9 and adults. This suggests adult-like 
inference generation speeds are achieved by Year 9. This is consistent with previous 
research (e.g. Casteel, 1993). It is notable, though, that speed continues to improve after 
skill has reached adult-like levels. It is possible that whilst CYP may have the basic 
inference generation skills needed for success on the IST by Year 7, they are still unable 
to execute these skills as quickly as Year 9s and adults, such that they are constrained by 
slower access to the necessary knowledge, for example. In line with previous research, 
qualitative changes in inference speed were not observed, such that all age groups were 
found to read coherence-inference-evoking critical texts significantly slower than 
elaborative-inference-evoking and literal critical texts. There are two possible 
interpretations. First, it may be that coherence-inference-evoking critical texts were 
simply more taxing than elaborative-inference-evoking critical texts and literal critical 
texts. This is unlikely given the measures taken to ensure similar levels of complexity and 
readability across conditions – see Chapter 3. When exploring inference generation, 
research has shown that even if two sentences are equal in syllable length, if one sentence 
requires an inference for coherence to be maintained and the other does not, the sentence 
requiring an inference will take longer to read (e.g. Poynor & Morris, 2003). Therefore, 
an alternative interpretation is that the additional processing costs associated with 
coherence-inference-evoking critical texts are attributable to the generation of the 
coherence inference whilst reading the text. This interpretation is consistent with previous 
research, which finds that CYP and adults generate coherence inferences, but not 
elaborative inferences, whilst reading (e.g. Barnes et al., 1996; Calvo & Castillo, 1996; 
1998; 2001a; 2001b; Casteel, 1993; Graesser et al., 1994).  
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In sum, quantitative changes in both inference generation skill, as measured by number 
of errors, and inference generation speed, as measured by reading speed, were observed 
during adolescence, with adult-like levels being achieved in Year 7 and Year 9, 
respectively. Different trajectories were observed for coherence and elaborative 
inferences, highlighting the distinctiveness of these inference types. Specifically, all age 
groups appear to generate coherence inferences whilst reading and elaborative inferences 
after reading. All age groups appear to find the generation of elaborative inferences no 
more difficult than the generation of coherence inferences, though. Therefore, the 
processes underpinning coherence and elaborative inferences, whilst distinct, do not 
appear to qualitatively change during adolescence. The speed at which inference 
generation skills can be executed may be constrained during adolescence, however. 
 
7.4.2. The Developmental Trajectory of Counterfactual-World Inference Generation  
 
Counterfactual inference generation skill and real-world inference generation speed both 
improved in all conditions during adolescence, with adult-like performance in skill 
achieved by Year 7 and speed by Year 9. For inference generation skill, possible 
qualitative changes were observed. There was no difference in number of coherence and 
elaborative errors made in Year 5, Year 7, or adults, however, Year 9 made more 
coherence than elaborative errors. For inference generation speed, patterns were 
consistent across all age groups, such that coherence inferences were generated whilst 
reading whereas elaborative inferences were not. The findings of this study thus conflict 
with previous research in several ways. First, previous research suggests that 
counterfactual-world inference generation abilities decline with age (Ceci et al., 1981; 
Dorfman, 1989; Dorfman & Brewer, 1988). However, in the current study, 
counterfactual-world patterns largely mirrored real-world patterns, such that quantitative 
gains in inference generation skill and speed were observed during adolescence, with 
adult-like performance being achieved by Year 7 and Year 9, respectively. Second, 
previous research suggests a conceptual shift in counterfactual-world processing during 
adolescence, such that whilst CYP may generate counterfactual-world coherence 
inferences online, adults generate all inferences offline (Bowyer-Crane & Snowling, 
2010; Graesser et al., 1998). However, in the current study, reading speed patterns were 
consistent across all age groups, with coherence-inference-evoking critical texts read 
significantly slower than both literal and elaborative-inference-evoking critical texts by 
214 
 
 
all age groups, regardless of the plausibility of the information. This suggests, throughout 
adolescence, counterfactual-world coherence inferences are generated whilst reading, 
whereas elaborative inferences are generated after reading. In previous research there 
were methodological discrepancies regarding text length, complexity, plausibility, and 
time interval when exploring the counterfactual-world inference generation abilities of 
CYP and adults. The current study was unique, such that the same methodology was 
employed with all age groups. Discrepancies between the results of the current study and 
previous research thus suggest that the differences observed between CYP and adults in 
previous research are due to inconsistencies in stimuli and method as opposed to age-
related changes and conceptual shifts in processing. The stimuli used in the current study 
were similar to those used by Bowyer-Crane and Snowling (2010) - short texts comprising 
fairy-tale-like implausible counterfactual-world information, with readability ages of 9 
years or less. It is possible, then, that difficulty generating counterfactual-world coherence 
inferences whilst reading may arise for adults or all age groups, with longer, more 
complex texts, comprising implausible natural-law-violating information (e.g. Graesser 
et al., 1998).  
Whilst the changes in the inferential time-course suggested by previous research were not 
observed in the current study, Year 9 did display a qualitatively different error pattern to 
all other age groups. Unlike the other groups, Year 9 found counterfactual-world 
coherence inference generation more difficult than counterfactual-world elaborative 
inference generation. One possible interpretation of these results is that Year 9 are 
struggling to generate inferences whilst reading. Previous research suggests that 
coherence inferences are generated with minimal effort whilst reading and result from 
largely unconscious processing. Conversely, elaborative inferences are thought to require 
strategic effort, with the reader more aware of their processing (Graesser et al., 1994; 
Long & Golding, 1993; Magliano et al., 1993; McKoon & Ratcliffe, 1992). Year 9 may 
thus be able to more actively suppress real-world interference when generating 
counterfactual-world elaborative inferences compared to counterfactual-world coherence 
inferences. However, this was a cross-sectional study, meaning the differences observed 
across groups may be due to individual differences within each sample and not age. 
Specifically, the Year 7 cohort was found to comprise stronger readers than the Year 9 
cohort – See Section 6.3.3.2. Therefore, the unique inference generation pattern observed 
in Year 9 may be attributable to the sample used. This is supported by the additional 
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analysis reported. When groups were split according to reading comprehension age rather 
than chronological age, for all age groups, there was found to be no significant difference 
in the number of coherence and elaborative errors made. Further research exploring 
inference generation during Year 9 is needed, specifically exploring those skills and 
processes that may underpin the suppression of real-world interference whilst generating 
inferences. 
It was predicted that for all age groups the process of real-world and counterfactual-world 
inference generation would differ. Despite similar online-offline patterns being observed 
for both real-world and counterfactual-world inference generation, counterfactual-world 
critical texts were found to be read significantly slower than real-world critical texts by 
all age groups. This suggests that counterfactual-world texts are more demanding than 
real-world texts. This is consistent with previous research (e.g. Byrne, 2002; 2007). 
Previous research suggests that this additional processing cost is due to the construction 
of two mental models, a real-world and counterfactual-world mental model, with the 
resolution of conflict experienced due to the activation of related, but contradictory real-
world information, cognitively demanding (e.g. Ferguson, 2012). This is supported by the 
error analysis conducted, such that 54-87% of the counterfactual-world inference errors 
made could be attributed to real-world interference. Importantly, the extra time spent 
processing counterfactual-world inferences appears to be effective for Years 5 and 7 and 
adults, such that these groups made no more errors in the counterfactual-world conditions 
compared to real-world conditions. However, as discussed above, means suggest that 
Year 9 made more coherence than elaborative inference errors in the counterfactual-world 
condition but not the real-world condition. This suggests, despite additional processing 
time, Year 9s still appear to be displaying difficulty when generating counterfactual-
world coherence inferences. Further research exploring why this is the case for Year 9 
but no other age group is warranted. 
In sum, whilst quantitative improvements in counterfactual-world inference generation 
skill and speed were observed during adolescence, developmental patterns of 
counterfactual-world inference generation whilst reading were found to be relatively 
consistent across age groups, such that coherence inferences appear to be generated online, 
whereas elaborative inferences appear to be generated offline. The finding that all groups 
were able to generate coherence inferences whilst reading, regardless of the plausibility 
of the information, directly conflicts with previous research. This may be due to 
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methodological discrepancies in previous research. Regardless of inference type, 
counterfactual-world critical texts were read significantly slower than real-world critical 
texts by all age groups. Consistent with previous research, this suggests that the 
processing of counterfactual-world information is more taxing than the processing of real-
world information, with this difficulty being attributed to the resolution of real-world 
interference. For Years 5 and 7 and adults, the additional time spent processing 
counterfactual-world information appears to be effective, such that there is no significant 
difference in real-world and counterfactual-world skill levels. However, Year 9 may be 
experiencing difficulty generating counterfactual-world coherence inferences, despite the 
extra processing time. Future research is needed to explore why this is the case in Year 9 
but at no other point during adolescence. 
7.4.3. Conclusions 
Inference generation skill, as measured by number of errors, and speed, as measured by 
reading speed, improved during adolescence, with adult-like levels achieved around Year 
7 and Year 9, respectively. Whilst inference generation skill appears to reach adult-like 
levels early in adolescence it is possible that the successful application of these skills is 
constrained in some way – e.g. speed at which knowledge can be accessed. These factors 
(e.g. knowledge accessibility) may thus limit inference generation speed between Year 7 
and Year 9, explaining why adult-like performance is achieved earlier for inferential skill 
than inferential speed. When explored separately, coherence and elaborative inference 
skills had unique trajectories. Coherence inference skill appears to develop throughout 
adolescence, with a period of limited progress between Year 7 and Year 9. Elaborative 
inference skill appears to develop steadily during adolescence, with adult-like levels 
achieved between Year 7 and Year 9. For real-world inference generation, despite 
quantitative gains in inference generation skill and speed, patterns tended to remain the 
same throughout adolescence, such that the generation of elaborative inferences was 
found to be no more difficult than the generation of coherence inferences and whilst 
coherence inferences were found to be generated online, elaborative inferences were 
found to be generated offline. For counterfactual-world inference generation, patterns of 
inferential time-course were consistent throughout adolescence, such that coherence 
inferences were generated online and elaborative inferences offline. However, throughout 
adolescence, the resolution of conflict experienced due to real-world interference, appears 
to result in the generation of counterfactual-world inferences being more cognitively 
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taxing than the generation of real-world inferences. For the most part, the extra processing 
time attributed to counterfactual-world information appears to be effective, however, this 
may not be the case for Year 9s when generating coherence inferences. Further research 
is needed to explore those factors constraining inference generation throughout 
adolescence and, in particular, in Year 9.  
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CHAPTER 8 PREDICTORS OF REAL-WORLD AND 
COUNTERFACTUAL-WOLRD INFERENTIAL ABILITIES 
DURING ADOLESCENCE 
 
8.1. Introduction 
 
Inference generation is a multi-faceted skill, with areas such as the superior frontal gyrus 
and dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex routinely activated when reading a text requiring an 
inference for comprehension (e.g. Ferstl et al., 2005; 2008 Jung-Beeman, 2005; Mason 
& Just, 2004; Virtue et al., 2006). Activation of these brain areas is related to skills and 
processes such as the selection of appropriate knowledge, semantic integration and 
detection of inconsistencies. It is essential to understand how those skills underpinning 
inference generation operate during adolescence as this may further illuminate the role of 
inference generation in higher-order literacy skills during adolescence. The cross-
sectional study reported here investigates the potentially varying independent 
contributions of four key predictors: 1) amount of knowledge, 2) accessibility of 
knowledge, 3) inhibitory control, and 4) strength of belief bias in real-world and 
counterfactual-world inferential skill in Year 5 (9-10 years), Year 7 (11-12 years), Year 
9 (13-14years) and adults (18years and over).  
8.1.1. The Role of Knowledge in the Inference Generation Process 
 
This thesis is primarily concerned with knowledge-based inferences due to their centrality 
in situational model construction (e.g. Graesser et al., 1994; Kintsch, 1993; 1994). 
Kintsch (1993) defines knowledge-based inferences as those that result from the 
activation and subsequent integration of a reader’s background knowledge with the text 
they are reading. When generating knowledge-based inferences, research finds that, for 
both adults and CYP, those with high topic knowledge generate more inferences than 
those with low topic knowledge, regardless of IQ (Birch & Bloom, 2004). In this way, 
the specific background knowledge a reader possesses determines the meaning they can 
derive from a text (Graesser et al., 1994). For instance, if the reader does not know what 
a rod is used for they cannot infer that the girl is going fishing when reading sentence A. 
Furthermore, if a reader is an expert in finances and banking but naïve in the area of 
agriculture and fishing, when reading sentence A, the reader may infer that the girl is 
going to a monetary bank, rather than a riverbank. Coherence would be lost. 
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Sentence A: The girl picked up her rod and headed to the bank. 
Whilst specific topic knowledge does not necessarily vary as a function of age – i.e. a 
CYP can be an expert in an area an adult knows little about – the amount of general 
knowledge possessed has been found to increase with age (Schroeders et al., 2015; 
Thorsen et al., 2014). Subsequently, the likelihood of an individual possessing the 
relevant knowledge needed to generate an inference on any given topic increases with 
age. Simply increasing the knowledge-base does not always result in associated 
improvements in inference generation skill, however. Barnes et al. (1996) found that, 
even after teaching the necessary knowledge, age-related differences in inference 
generation skill were still observed. This may be because inference generation is 
dependent upon not only possession of the necessary knowledge, but also ready access to 
said knowledge (Barnes et al., 1996).  
Accessibility of knowledge refers to how quickly information can be retrieved 
(Glucksberg et al., 1993). It has been shown that certain brain areas become more active 
when individuals read sentences that require an inference (e.g. Chow et al., 2008; 
Kuperberg et al., 2006). This suggests that these areas are involved in inference 
generation. Skilled-comprehenders have been found to display less neuronal activation 
than less-skilled comprehenders when generating an inference, however (Prat & Just, 
2010; Prat et al., 2007; 2011). This suggests that skilled-comprehenders engage in more 
efficient processing – one possible reason for more efficient processing could be that 
skilled-comprehenders are able to access knowledge more readily than less skilled-
comprehenders.  
Barnes et al. (1996) explored the relationship between accessibility of knowledge and 
inference generation in CYP aged 6 - 16 years. They found that the role of knowledge 
accessibility varied according to inference type. The importance of knowledge 
accessibility was found to increase for real-world elaborative inferences, but decline for 
real-world coherence inferences. Barnes et al. suggests that this is due to improvements 
in accessibility of knowledge, such that, with age, more information is readily available 
for elaborative inference generation. Barnes et al. argue that as comprehension 
monitoring improves with age, older participants are more likely to detect coherence 
breaks whilst reading. To maintain coherence, older participants are thus more likely to 
engage in a search for the necessary knowledge, regardless of the accessibility of this 
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knowledge. Therefore, for older participants, accessibility of knowledge becomes less 
important as participants identify more coherence gaps and actively strive to fill these 
gaps with the necessary knowledge. For younger participants, on the other hand, 
coherence breaks may not be detected, thus a conscious search of long-term memory may 
not be undertaken. As a result, the only inferences generated without prompting will be 
those for which knowledge is easily accessible. 
When processing counterfactual-world information the automatic activation of large 
amounts of related, but contradictory, real-world knowledge is argued to result in real-
world interference (Alter et al., 2007; Byrne, 2002; 2007; Evans, 2006). The resolution 
of the conflict experienced due to real-world interference is argued to be one of the 
primary difficulties faced when generating counterfactual-world inferences (Byrne, 2012; 
Ferguson & Sandford, 2008). It follows, then, that the more related real-world knowledge 
an individual possesses and the more easily accessible this knowledge is, the more real-
world interference they will face when processing counterfactual-world information. 
Since both amount and accessibility of knowledge are found to increase with age, this 
would fit with previous research which finds that cognitive demands and difficulty 
associated with counterfactual-world inferential processing increase with age (Ceci et al., 
1981; Dorfman, 1989; Dorfman & Brewer, 1988). In sum, both amount and accessibility 
of knowledge are implicated in the inference generation process, with improvements 
observed in both as CYP age. The role and importance of knowledge may vary as a 
function of both age and inference type, however. Developments in said skills may thus 
affect the inference generation process during adolescence. 
8.1.2. The Role of Inhibitory Control in Inference Generation 
 
The representation of semantic knowledge is thought to be associative, resulting in the 
activation of both related and contradictory knowledge when reading (e.g. van den Broek 
et al., 2005; van den Broek et al., 1996; van den Broek et al., 1999). Language processing 
takes place in working memory, with several skills and processes interacting (Cain & 
Oakhill, 2006a; De Beni et al., 1998; Kershaw & Schatschneider, 2012; Yuill et al., 1989). 
Working memory capacity, however, is limited (Baddeley, 1986; Just & Carpenter, 1992). 
Subsequently, the maintenance and integration of large amounts of knowledge would 
leave little processing capacity for the execution of those other cognitive processes, such 
as comprehension monitoring, needed to successfully generate an inference and 
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comprehend a text (Cain, 2006; Oakhill & Cain, 2011; van den Broek, 2012). The amount 
of knowledge activated, maintained, and integrated into the situational model whilst 
reading must be constrained in some way.  
Inhibitory control has been implicated in the management of knowledge during the 
inferential process (e.g. Barnes et al., 2004; Cain, 2006; De Beni & Palladino, 2000). 
Research suggests that for comprehension to be successful, irrelevant and contradictory 
knowledge must be suppressed in the early stages of the inferential process (e.g. Cain, 
2006; Harnishfeger, 1995). This creates a more manageable workspace, such that 
processing costs are reduced as only the most relevant information is processed (Barnes 
et al., 2004; Cain, 2006). Good inhibitory control thus appears central to efficient and 
accurate inference generation. This is supported by research showing that, compared to 
those with strong inhibitory skills, those with weak inhibitory control struggle to generate 
inferences and ultimately comprehend a text (Cain, 2006; Gernsbacher & Faust, 1991). 
Inhibitory control has also been implicated in counterfactual-world processing, such that 
it is essential to the suppression of conflicting real-world knowledge (Houde & Moutier, 
1996; 1999; Houde et al., 2001). Inhibitory control has been found to develop throughout 
adolescence and into adulthood (Bjorklund & Harnishfeger, 1990; Romine & Reynolds, 
2005). Developmental improvements in counterfactual-world inference generation ability 
during adolescence would be expected. However, previous research suggests that 
compared to real-world inferential processing, difficulty associated with counterfactual-
world inferential processing increases with age (e.g. Ceci et al., 1981; Dorfman, 1989; 
Dorfman & Brewer, 1988). The increasing processing difficulties associated with 
counterfactual-world information may be due to when and how in the inferential time-
course inhibitory control is executed. The filtering model suggests that readers have a 
bias for typical information, such that they will attend to, process and retrieve this 
information more readily than atypical information (Graesser et al., 1998). Typical 
information is that which fits with pre-existing schemas and real-world knowledge. The 
filtering model suggests that in the early stages of text processing, much of the 
contradictory and irrelevant knowledge, that is automatically activated due to associative 
knowledge activation mechanisms, is suppressed.  
Counterfactual-world information is, by nature, contradictory, as such, this information 
may be suppressed early in the inferential process. Subsequently, counterfactual-world 
222 
 
 
information would need to be reactivated if the counterfactual-world inference is to be 
successfully generated. Research suggests that in many cases the reader may not 
recognise that they need to reprocess the text since filtering information may also provide 
‘an illusion of comprehension’ (Glenberg et al., 1982; Otero & Campanario, 1990; 
Vosniadou et al., 1988). An illusion of comprehension refers to a basic representation of 
the text in which inconsistent or difficult information is excluded, to create a version of 
the text the reader is able to understand. Strong inhibitory control in the early stages of 
text processing may thus hinder counterfactual-world inference generation, such that the 
necessary inference is not generated or the information needed is not readily activated, 
resulting in a more time-consuming process. This may thus explain the increasing 
difficulty associated with counterfactual-world processing from childhood to adulthood 
(e.g. Dorfman, 1989). However, the filtering model is based on the processing of 
counterfactual-world information in real-world contexts. There is a growing body of 
research showing that counterfactual-world information processed in a counterfactual-
world context is not treated as contradictory and, therefore, is not suppressed (Nieuwland, 
2012; 2013; 2015, Nieuwland & Berkum, 2006; Nieuwland & Martin, 2012). These 
studies have explored literal, rather than inferential text processing, however. It is thus 
unclear if, when presented in a counterfactual-world context, counterfactual-world 
inferences could be generated with minimal real-world interference. The role of inhibitory 
control in the processing of counterfactual-world information in counterfactual-world 
contexts requires further exploration.  
8.1.3. The Role of Belief Biases in the Inferential Process 
 
A belief bias is a cognitive preference to process information depending on real-world 
beliefs, rather than logic. The mental model theory proposes a three stage model of 
comprehension, with belief biases playing a central role in the final stage of inference 
validation (Johnson-Laird & Byrne 1991; 2002). For the inference to be fully encoded 
into the reader’s mental model of the text, Johnson-Laird and Byrne (1991) suggest that 
a conscious, cognitively demanding search or construction of a model in which the 
inference is compatible takes place. To reduce processing costs, inferences consistent 
with real-world beliefs are thought to be automatically accepted. For real-world 
inferential processing, belief biases thus serve to reduce processing costs whilst reading.  
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Counterfactual-world inferences are inconsistent with real-world beliefs, however, 
meaning the mental model theory would predict that they are not automatically accepted. 
A conscious and cognitively demanding search and/or construction process must be 
executed to resolve this conflict. Since real-world knowledge is automatically activated, 
in addition to a counterfactual-world inference, an inconsistent and inaccurate real-world 
inference may also be generated (Kintsch, 1988; 1998; van den Broek et al., 1995; 1999; 
2005). This effect is evident in the literature, such that errors, when processing 
counterfactual information, typically reflect conflicting real-world information (e.g. Ceci 
et al., 1981). The effects of belief biases when processing counterfactual-world 
information have been observed for adults and CYP such that, compared to real-world 
consistent information, reading speeds and response times for counterfactual-world 
information are longer and error rates are higher (Houde & Guichart, 2001; Moutier, et 
al., 2006; Bjorklund and Harnishfeger, 1990;).  
If the counterfactual-world information is to be processed successfully, the interference 
caused by belief biases must be inhibited (Houde & Moutier, 1996; 1999; Houde et al., 
2001). Since inhibitory control has been found to increase with age (Bjorklund and 
Harnishfeger, 1990; Romine & Reynolds, 2005), it is unsurprising that some have found 
that an individual’s ability to inhibit belief biases also increases with age (e.g. Frank, 
1996; 1997). However, it has also been found that children are able to overcome the 
effects of a belief bias with more ease than adolescents and adults (Mitchell et al., 1996). 
Mitchell et al. (1996) argue that CYP apply a ‘seeing is believing rule’ – i.e. the character 
must see an event to believe it and any other form of contradictory evidence is not 
believed even if the reader knows the real state of events. Conversely, adults are argued 
to adopt a more complex processing strategy, drawing upon their existing previous 
knowledge to consider those factors that may lead one to accept another's message. This 
leaves adults more vulnerable to belief biases. This may explain the possible conceptual 
shift in counterfactual-world inference generation processing observed between 9-10 
years and adulthood (Bowyer-Crane & Snowling, 2010; Graesser et al., 1998). 
When generating counterfactual-world inferences during the comprehension of fantasy 
and fictional texts the necessary counterfactual-world model is already provided. Recent 
research suggests that counterfactual-world information is compared to a counterfactual-
world model rather than real-world model, when presented within a counterfactual-world 
context (Nieuwland, 2012; 2013; 2015, Nieuwland & Berkum, 2006; Nieuwland & 
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Martin, 2012). This suggests that readers may be able to put aside belief biases when a 
counterfactual-world context is provided. Moreover, it has been argued that when reading 
naturally readers do not validate their inferences whilst reading, as the cognitive effort 
needed to do this would disrupt the natural reading process (Markman & McCullen, 2003; 
2005; 2007; McMullen, 1997; McMullen & Markman, 2000). Instead, to avoid 
comprehension disruption, all inferences are argued to be automatically accepted. At 
present, research predominantly explores the role of belief biases in counterfactual-world 
reasoning, rather than counterfactual-world inference generation. Subsequently, belief 
biases may not play such an influential role in the generation of counterfactual-world 
inferences when reading fantasy and fictional texts. Further research exploring the 
potentially changing role of belief biases in the inferential process during adolescence is 
needed. 
8.1.4. The Current Study 
 
Amount of knowledge, accessibility of knowledge, inhibitory control, and strength of 
belief bias appear to be some of the skills implicated in the inferential process during 
adolescence. Not only are these skills central to real-world and counterfactual-world 
inference generation, developments in these skills are thought to be advantageous for real-
world inference generation, but detrimental to counterfactual-world inference generation, 
thus explaining the possible conceptual shift in processing suggested by the literature (e.g. 
Bowyer-Crane & Snowling, 2010; Graesser et al., 1998). However, previous research 
typically explores the role of these cognitive skills in isolation. Furthermore, the 
predictive utility of the cognitive components of inference generation is rarely explored 
developmentally. Little is known about which skill(s) is most important at a particular 
time, how importance and role changes with age, or how the role of these skills may 
change according to inference type. In addition, extant literature focuses on 
counterfactual-world reasoning, and/or counterfactual-world inference generation with 
no context. Therefore, little is known about how the four key cognitive skills operate 
when generating counterfactual-world inferences from fantasy or fiction texts. The 
current study sought to explore the role of amount of knowledge, accessibility of 
knowledge, strength of belief bias, and inhibitory control in real-world and 
counterfactual-world inference generation skill for four age groups: Year 5, Year 7, Year 
9, and adults. This study aimed to (a) investigate the independent predictive utility of 
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amount of knowledge, accessibility of knowledge, strength of belief bias, and inhibitory 
control in real-world and counterfactual-world coherence and elaborative inference 
generation; and (b) establish age-related changes in the predictive utility of the four key 
predictors in real-world and counterfactual-world inferential processing in Year 5, Year 
7, Year 9, and adults. Since this study is primarily exploratory, no predictions were made, 
other than all skills would be unique predictors of inference generation skill between Year 
5 and adulthood. 
8.2. Method 
8.2.1. Participants 
The same participants recruited for Study 3 were also included in this study – see Chapter 
6. 
8.2.2. Design 
A cross-sectional design was employed with four age groups: Year 5 (9-10 years), Year 
7 (11-12 years), Year 9 (13-14 years), and adults (18 years and over) to explore age-
related differences in the predictive utility of four predictor variables: accessibility of 
knowledge, amount of knowledge, strength of belief bias, and inhibitory control. Working 
memory capacity, IQ score, and single-word-reading ability were controlled for due to 
the relationship these variables have been found to share with inference generation skill 
(Carver, 1990; Dixon et al., 1988; Goff et al., 2005; Masson & Miller, 1983; Singer et al., 
1992; Singer & Richot, 1996; Whitney et al., 1991). The outcome variables were:  
 Real-world Coherence Skill (number of errors)  Real-World Elaborative Skill (number of errors)  Counterfactual-World Coherence Skill (number of errors)  Counterfactual-World Elaborative Skill (number of errors)31 
 
                                                 
 
31
 The IST provides measures of both the inferential time-course (reading speed) and inference generation 
skill (number of errors). Number of errors was used in the current study as the dependent variable instead 
of reading speed. Reading speed may be affected by decoding skill and other aspects of reading 
comprehension, which are not directly related to inference generation skill. To control for these factors a 
difference score (inference reading speed – literal reading speed) would have been needed. However, 
when calculated this resulted in some negative scores. Due to the regressional nature of this study these 
scores could not be used. Consequently, only skill was explored. 
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8.2.3. Materials 
8.2.3.1. Intelligence, Working Memory, and Word-Reading Measures 
 
IQ score (a composite of the vocabulary subscale and matrix reasoning subscale) 
measured using the WASI, working memory capacity measured using the BAS II 
backwards digit span task, and single-word-reading ability measured using the York 
Assessment of Reading Comprehension (Primary and Secondary) were used as control 
variables (Elliott et al., 1996; Snowling et al., 2009; 2010; Wechsler, 1999). Full details 
of these measures can be found in Chapters 5 and 6. 
8.2.3.2. Inference Generation Measure 
The Image Selection task used in Study 3 was used – see Chapters 3 and 4. 
8.2.3.3. Amount and Accessibility of Knowledge Measure 
A seventy-two-item timed sentence verification task was created to assess amount and 
accessibility of knowledge. Thirty-six items required a true response and were directly 
associated with the knowledge-base used in the Image Selection Task. Table 8.1 provides 
examples – see Appendix 8.1 for a list of stimuli. The remaining thirty-six items were 
lexically and syntactically similar fillers however, a false response was required. These 
items were related to the knowledge-base used in the IST but were not based on this 
knowledge-base (e.g. plants give birth to baby plants). Each sentence was seven syllables 
long and recorded by the researcher. Each sentence was presented orally once (to account 
for differences in reading skill) and visually in the middle of the screen until participants 
verified the sentence. Participants were instructed to press the tick button if they felt the 
sentence was true and the cross button if they felt the sentence was false, immediately 
after hearing the sentence. A button press was not accepted until the entire sentence had 
been presented orally. Sentences were presented in a random order for each participant. 
Accessibility of knowledge was indexed by response time in milliseconds. Amount of 
knowledge was indexed by accuracy. To familiarise the participant with the response 
method and ensure appropriate volume, the task began with five practice trials in which 
participants heard a sentence, which was syntactically and lexically similar to the 
experimental sentences, and had to respond true or false. If participants responded 
incorrectly, the researcher first ensured the participant could hear the sentences and then 
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explained the instructions again. The researcher was confident all participants understood 
the task and response method before the task, proper, began. A HP ProBook Laptop using 
E-Prime software was used to present stimuli and record response times (milliseconds) 
and accuracy. 
Table 8.1. Example of Knowledge Stimuli  
 
8.2.3.4. Belief Bias Measure 
A twenty-item reasoning from true and false premises task was used to assess belief biases. 
To successfully overcome a belief bias, the participant must reason based on logic not 
beliefs. Experimental items required participants to reason from a false premise where 
the conclusion was true based on the premise presented, but not beliefs. Control items 
were used to ensure participants had basic reasoning abilities – i.e. could reason from true 
premises. Fillers presented both true and false premises, but the conclusion was always 
false based on the premise presented. Five items presented a true premise and true 
conclusion (control), five items presented a true premise and false conclusion (filler a), 
five items presented a false premise and true conclusion (experimental), and five items 
presented a false premise and false conclusion (filler b) – see Table 8.2. for example 
stimuli. See Appendix 8.2 for a full list of stimuli. The premise was presented in the top 
half of the screen in a white box with a blue outline. The conclusion was presented in a 
white box with a green outline in the bottom half of the screen. Participants were 
instructed to decide if the conclusion was true or false based on the preceding premise. 
Participants were asked to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible. Items were 
presented in a random order for each participant. Strength of belief bias was indexed by 
a response time difference score for correct items, to control for differences in motor 
control (experimental – control). To familiarise the participant with the response method, 
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the task began with four practice trials, one trial representing each condition. If a 
participant answered incorrectly, the researcher explained the task and instructions to 
participants and what the correct answer should have been. The researcher was confident 
all participants understood the task before the experiment, proper, began.  A HP ProBook 
Laptop using E-Prime software was used to present stimuli and record response times 
(milliseconds) and accuracy.  
Table 8.2. Example Reasoning from False Premises Stimuli 
 
8.2.3.5. Inhibition Measure 
 
The Rule-Shift-Cards task from the Behavioural Assessment of the Dysexecutive 
Syndrome (BADS; Wilson et al., 2003) was used to assess inhibition. Participants saw a 
series of cards. As each card was presented participants were instructed to respond ‘true’ 
or ‘false’ depending on the rule given –say true if the card is black, false if the card is not 
black. Participants then saw the cards again, but were instructed to respond according 
new a new rule –say true if the card is even, false if the card is not even. Errors were 
recorded by the researcher. Inhibition skill is indexed by the number of errors made. 
8.2.4. Procedure 
All of the tasks used in this study were administered as part of a larger test battery used 
to obtain data for Studies 3, 4, and 5. The procedure is the same as Study 3 – see 
Chapter 6. 
8.3. Results 
This study sought to explore the role of amount of knowledge, accessibility of knowledge, 
inhibitory control, and strength of belief biases in inference generation skill in Year 5, 
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Year 7, Year 9 and adults. First, age-related changes in each predictor variable were 
explored using ANOVAs. Then the role of these four predictors in inference generation 
skill was analysed using multiple hierarchical regression analyses. The order of variables 
was selected a priori. Composite IQ scores, single-word-reading scores and working 
memory capacity scores were entered in Step 1 to account for relationships between 
inference generation, IQ, word-reading skill and working memory capacity. Individual 
contributions made by each control component are not reported as this was not the aim of 
the study, however, they can be found in Appendix 8.3. To determine if a predictor made 
an independent contribution to inference generation skill, above and beyond the other 
predictors, three of the four predictors were entered in Step 2 and then the remaining 
predictor was entered in Step 3. 
To explore potential age-related changes in the contribution of the four key predictors to 
inference generation skill, separate regression analyses were conducted for each age 
group, as opposed to controlling for age. 
8.3.1. Preliminary Analysis 
 
For strength of belief bias and accessibility of knowledge task data, all incorrect responses 
were removed as the dependent variable was response time. Consistent with previous 
research, a data trim was also conducted with all scores 2 standard deviations above or 
below each participant’s grand mean being removed and all scores 2 standard deviations 
above or below each item’s grand mean being removed (e.g. Calvo & Castillo, 2001a). 
In sum, for belief biases, 20% of Year 5 data, 16.80% of Year 7 data, 10% of Year 9 data, 
and 3.90% of adult data were lost due to errors and the trim conducted. These loss rates 
are in line with previous research (e.g. Moutier et al., 2006). Similarly, for accessibility 
of knowledge 10.57% of Year 5 data, 8.22% of Year 7, 6.00% of Year 9 data, and 8.13% 
of adult data were lost due to errors and the trim conducted. These loss rates are in line 
with previous research (e.g. Nelson & Kosslyn, 1975). After this trim all participants still 
had more than 50% of their data remaining.  
8.3.2. Age-Related Changes in Accessibility of Knowledge, Amount of Knowledge, 
Strength of Belief Bias, and Inhibitory Control 
8.3.2.1. Data Screening 
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Inspection of the data revealed that whilst the assumption of homogeneity of variance 
was met for most datasets, it was violated for the amount of knowledge dataset with the 
largest standard deviation being more than four times greater than the smallest standard 
deviation. The amount of knowledge data set was transformed using a log transformation, 
with the transformed data set used in all analyses. The data were skewed for all tasks. 
Moreover, whilst outliers were transformed for the accessibility of knowledge and 
strength of belief bias datasets, such that they were replaced with the highest or lowest 
data point within normal ranges, outliers were left in for all other measures as they were 
thought to reflect true scores. Across all age groups, this led to one outlier being included 
in IQ, vocabulary and amount of knowledge, and two outliers being included in single-
word-reading. Consequently, non-parametric tests were conducted for all comparisons. 
In Table 8.3., the means and standard deviations for IQ score (including vocabulary 
subscale and matrix reasoning subscale), single-word-reading skill, working memory 
capacity, inference generation skill (number of errors), amount of knowledge (total 
correct), accessibility of knowledge (response time), strength of belief bias (response 
time), and inhibitory control (number of errors) are presented as a function of year group. 
Table 8.3. shows that for all tasks performance appears to improve with age. A series of 
independent non-parametric ANOVAs were conducted to explore these differences 
further. 
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Table 8.3. Descriptive Statistics (Means and Standard Deviations) for Vocabulary, Matrix Reasoning, IQ, Single-Word-Reading, 
Accessibility of Knowledge, Amount of Knowledge, Strength of Belief Bias, Inhibition Skill and Working Memory Capacity for All Age 
Groups 
 
Minimum and Maximum scores refer to minimum and maximum possible scores 
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8.3.2.2. Accessibility of Knowledge 
 
A non-parametric independent measures ANOVA was conducted to explore the effect of 
age on accessibility of knowledge. A main effect of age was found (χ2 (3, N = 207) = 
65.204, p < .001). Six independent non-parametric t-tests were conducted to explore 
further. Results suggest that Year 5 access knowledge significantly slower than Year 7 
(U = 403.00, p < .001, N = 101), Year 9 (U = 273.00, p < .001, N = 101), and adults (U = 
333.00, p < .001, N = 107). There was found to be no significant difference between Year 
7 and Year 9 (U = 528.00, p = .030, N = 100) or Year 9 and adults (U = 723.00, p = .088, 
N = 106). Year 7 were found to access knowledge significantly slower than adults (U = 
680.00, p < .001, N = 107). This suggests that after Year 7, development in accessibility 
of knowledge is gradual. 
8.3.2.3. Amount of Knowledge 
 
A non-parametric independent measures ANOVA was conducted to explore the effect of 
age on amount of knowledge. A significant main effect of age was observed (χ2 (3, N = 
207) = 31.38, p < .001). Six independent non-parametric t-tests were conducted to explore 
further. Adults were found to have significantly more knowledge than Year 5 (U = 720.00, 
p < .001, N = 107), Year 7 (U = 559.50, p < .001, N = 106), and Year 9 (U = 497.00, p < 
.001, N = 106). No other comparisons were significant (p > .81 for all remaining 
comparisons). This suggests that amount of knowledge does not vary from Year 5 to Year 
9, however, adults do appear to have more knowledge than all younger groups32. 
8.3.2.4. Strength of Belief Bias 
 
A non-parametric independent measures ANOVA was conducted to explore the effect of 
age on strength of belief bias. A significant main effect of age was found (χ2 (3, N = 207) 
= 25.27, p < .001). Six non-parametric independent t-tests revealed that Year 5 responded 
significantly slower than Year 7 (U = 796.00, p = .009, N = 101), Year 9 (U = 536.00, p 
                                                 
 
32
 It is important to note that amount of knowledge was near ceiling levels for all groups, although gradual 
development was observed. The lack of knowledge acquisition with age is surprising since the 
knowledge-base necessary to generate inferences in the Image Selection Task was based on the Key Stage 
2 and Key Stage 3 science curriculums. Subsequently, Year 5s would not have encountered the Key Stage 
3 curriculum. However, the knowledge-base used was fairly general. For example, rather than focusing 
on the specifics of reproduction explored in Key Stage 3 (e.g. mitosis), the knowledge-base is focused on 
general ideas (e.g. mammals give birth to live young, reptiles lay eggs). 
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= .005, N = 101) and adults (U = 719.00, p < .001, N = 107). Year 7 were found to respond 
significantly slower than adults (U = 799.00, p = .002, N = 106). However, none of the 
remaining comparisons were significant (p > .15 for remaining comparisons). This 
suggests a gradual development in strength of belief biases from Year 7 to adulthood. 
8.3.2.5. Inhibitory Control 
 
A non-parametric independent measures ANOVA was conducted to explore the effect of 
age on inhibitory control. A significant main effect of age was found (χ2 (3, N = 207) = 
46.34, p < .001). There was found to be no significant difference between the number of 
errors made by Year 5 and Year 7 (U = 934.00, p = .113, N = 101). Year 5 were found to 
make significantly more inhibition errors than Year 9 (U = 482.50, p = .001, N = 101) 
and adults though (U = 435.00, p < .001, N = 107). There was found to be no significant 
difference between the number of inhibition errors made by Year 7 and Year 9 (U = 
552.50, p = .052, N = 100). However, Year 7 were found to make significantly more 
inhibition errors than adults (U =  579.50, p <  .001, N =  106). Year 9s were also found to 
make significantly more inhibition errors than adults (U = 612.50, p = .007, N = 106). 
This suggests that whilst inhibitory control develops from Year 5 to adulthood, 
development between Year 5 and Year 7 and Year 7 and Year 9 is minimal. 
8.3.3. The Relationships between Amount of Knowledge, Accessibility of Knowledge, 
Inhibitory Control, Strength of Belief Biases and Inferential Skill 
 
8.3.3.1. Data Screening 
 
Data screening revealed that all correlations were below .8, all VIF values were below 10 
and all Tolerance values were greater than .1. For all analyses the Durbin-Watson statistic 
was between 1 and 3, suggesting the assumption of ‘lack of autocorrelation’ was met. 
Residual statistics were examined for extreme cases. For all analyses, there were never 
more than three cases (out of 50) with standardised residual statistics higher than +/- 2. 
Moreover, there was never more than one standardised residual greater than +/-2.5. 
Therefore, it can be assumed that the regression models were accurate. For most analyses 
residual errors in the model were normally distributed. For some models there was slight 
skew, however, this was never severe. 
For most analyses assumptions of homoscedasticity and linearity were met. However, 
there appears to be slight heteroscedasticity for the following models: 
 Year 7 real-world coherence model 
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 Year 7 counterfactual-world coherence model 
 Adult real-world coherence model 
 Adult counterfactual-world coherence model 
The validity of these models is questionable and caution must be taken when generalising 
these results beyond the current sample. 
Means were calculated for each group for performance on each task. As can be seen from 
Table 8.3., ceiling effects were present for amount of knowledge. No other ceiling or floor 
effects were present. 
8.3.3.2. The Predictive Utility of Amount of Knowledge, Accessibility of Knowledge, 
Inhibitory Control, and Strength of Belief Biases in the Inferential Process 
 
This study aimed to explore the potentially changing unique contribution of each 
component in the inferential process throughout adolescence and into adulthood. 
Therefore, the individual contribution of each component, after controlling for all other 
components is explored below for each inference type and each age group. For all 
analyses composite IQ scores, working memory capacity scores and single-word-reading 
scores were entered in Step 1 to account for relationships between inference generation 
and IQ, working memory capacity and decoding. The results of composite analyses, 
combining all four predictor variables in Step 2, for each dependent variable can be found 
in Appendix 8.433. Beta values for all variables for each regression model can be found 
in Appendix 8.5. 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
33
 Additional analysis was also ran, such that groups were split by reading comprehension age instead of 
chronological age. This was due to the high number of weak comprehenders in Year 9 – see Section 
6.3.3.2. Results of this analysis are not reported as variance was largely explained by the control 
variables, with no clear relationships emerging. This is unsurprising given the relationships reported 
between reading comprehension, single-word-reading ability, working memory and IQ (Carver, 1990; 
Dixon, Lefevre, & Twilley, 1988; Masson & Miller, 1983; Singer, Andrusiak, Reisdorf, & Black, 1992; 
Singer & Richot, 1996; Whitney, Ritchie, & Clark, 1991). 
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8.3.3.2.1. Amount of Knowledge and Inferential Skill 
 
To explore the independent contribution of amount of knowledge, accessibility of 
knowledge, inhibitory control, and strength of belief bias were entered at Step 2 and 
amount of knowledge at Step 3. Results can be found in Table 8.4.-8.7.  
Table 8.4. Summary of Fixed-Order Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses (∆R2) 
With Real-World Coherence Inference Generation Skill as the Dependent Variable and 
Amount of Knowledge as the Predictor Variable, controlling for Word-Reading, IQ, and 
Working Memory Capacity, Accessibility of Knowledge, Inhibitory Control, and 
Strength of Belief Bias 
 
* p <  .05, ** p <  .01, *** p <  .001 
Table 8.5. Summary of Fixed-Order Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses (∆R2) 
With Real-World Elaborative Inference Generation Skill as the Dependent Variable and 
Amount of Knowledge as the Predictor Variable, controlling for Word-Reading, IQ, and 
Working Memory Capacity, Accessibility of Knowledge, Inhibitory Control, and 
Strength of Belief Bias 
 
* p <  .05, ** p <  .01, *** p <  .001 
Table 8.6. Summary of Fixed-Order Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses (∆R2) 
With Counterfactual-World Coherence Inference Generation Skill as the Dependent 
Variable and Amount of Knowledge as the Predictor Variable, controlling for Word-
Reading, IQ, and Working Memory Capacity, Accessibility of Knowledge, Inhibitory 
Control, and Strength of Belief Bias 
 
* p <  .05, ** p <  .01, *** p <  .001 
Table 8.7. Summary of Fixed-Order Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses (∆R2) 
With Counterfactual-World Elaborative Inference Generation Skill as the Dependent 
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Variable and Amount of Knowledge as the Predictor Variable, controlling for Word-
Reading, IQ, and Working Memory Capacity, Accessibility of Knowledge, Inhibitory 
Control, and Strength of Belief Bias 
 
* p <  .05, ** p <  .01, *** p <  .001 
Amount of knowledge appears central to real-world coherence inferential skill, sharing a 
negative relationship, such that as amount of knowledge increases number of real-world 
coherence inferential errors made decreases. Specifically, amount of knowledge was 
found to account for 16.3%, 15.3%, 7.6% and 5% of variance in Year 5, Year 7, Year 9 
and adults, respectively, after controlling for accessibility of knowledge, inhibitory 
control, strength of belief bias, IQ, working memory capacity, and word-reading skill. 
Whilst a significant contribution was not made in Year 9, this was approaching 
significance (p =  .06). Amount of knowledge also accounted for a significant 33.5% 
unique variance in real-world elaborative inferential skill in Year 9. The relationship was 
negative. Amount of knowledge did not make a unique contribution to any of the 
remaining variables (p >  .17). 
8.3.3.2.2. Accessibility of Knowledge and Inferential Skill 
 
To explore the independent contribution of accessibility of knowledge, amount of 
knowledge, inhibitory control, and strength of belief bias were entered at Step 2 and 
accessibility of knowledge at Step 3. Results can be found in Tables 8.8-8.11.  
Table 8.8. Summary of Fixed-Order Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses (∆R2) 
With Real-world Coherence Inference Generation Skill as the Dependent Variable and 
Accessibility of Knowledge as the Predictor Variable, controlling for Word-Reading, 
IQ, Working Memory Capacity, Amount of knowledge, Inhibitory Control, and Strength 
of Belief Bias 
 
* p <  .05, ** p <  .01, *** p <  .001 
Table 8.9. Summary of Fixed-Order Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses (∆R2) 
With Real-world Elaborative Inference Generation Skill as the Dependent Variable and 
Accessibility of Knowledge as the Predictor Variable, controlling for Word-Reading, 
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IQ, Working Memory Capacity, Amount of knowledge, Inhibitory Control, and Strength 
of Belief Bias 
 
* p <  .05, ** p <  .01, *** p <  .001 
Table 8.10. Summary of Fixed-Order Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses (∆R2) 
With Counterfactual-World Coherence Inference Generation Skill as the Dependent 
Variable and Accessibility of Knowledge as the Predictor Variable, controlling for 
Word-Reading, IQ, Working Memory Capacity, Amount of knowledge, Inhibitory 
Control, and Strength of Belief Bias 
 
* p <  .05, ** p <  .01, *** p <  .001 
Table 8.11. Summary of Fixed-Order Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses (∆R2) 
With Counterfactual-World Elaborative Inference Generation Skill as the Dependent 
Variable and Accessibility of Knowledge as the Predictor Variable, controlling for 
Word-Reading, IQ, Working Memory Capacity, Amount of knowledge, Inhibitory 
Control, and Strength of Belief Bias 
 
* p <  .05, ** p <  .01, *** p <  .001 
Accessibility of knowledge was a unique predictor of real-world coherence inferential 
skill in Year 9 and adults, accounting for 18.8% and 29.4% unique variance, respectively, 
after controlling for amount of knowledge, inhibitory control, strength of belief bias, IQ, 
working memory capacity, and word-reading skill. The positive relationships observed 
suggest that as time taken to access knowledge increases number of real-world coherence 
inferential errors made also increases. Accessibility of knowledge also appears central to 
real-world elaborative inferential skill accounting for 26.0%, 11.3% and 12.5% unique 
variance in Year 5, Year 9 and adults, after controlling for amount of knowledge, 
inhibitory control, strength of belief bias, IQ, working memory capacity, and word-
reading skill. Again, the relationship was positive. Accessibility of knowledge did not 
make a unique contribution to any remaining variables (p >  .09).  
8.3.3.2.3. Inhibitory Control and Inferential Skill 
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To explore the independent contribution of inhibitory control, amount of knowledge, 
accessibility of knowledge, and strength of belief bias were entered at Step 2 and 
inhibitory control at Step 3. The results can be found in Tables 8.12.-8.15.  
Table 8.12. Summary of Fixed-Order Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses (∆R2) 
With Real-world Coherence Inference Generation Skill as the Dependent Variable and 
Inhibitory Control as the Predictor Variable, controlling for Word-Reading, IQ, 
Working Memory Capacity, Amount of Knowledge, Accessibility of Knowledge, and 
Strength of Belief Bias 
 
* p <  .05, ** p <  .01, *** p <  .001 
Table 8.13. Summary of Fixed-Order Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses (∆R2) 
With Real-world Elaborative Inference Generation Skill as the Dependent Variable and 
Inhibitory Control as the Predictor Variable, controlling for Word-Reading, IQ, 
Working Memory Capacity, Amount of Knowledge, Accessibility of Knowledge, and 
Strength of Belief Bias 
 
* p <  .05, ** p <  .01, *** p <  .001 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8.14. Summary of Fixed-Order Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses (∆R2) 
With Counterfactual-World Coherence Inference Generation Skill as the Dependent 
Variable and Inhibitory Control as the Predictor Variable, controlling for Word-
Reading, IQ, Working Memory Capacity, Amount of Knowledge, Accessibility of 
Knowledge, and Strength of Belief Bias 
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* p <  .05, ** p <  .01, *** p <  .001 
Table 8.15. Summary of Fixed-Order Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses (∆R2) 
With Counterfactual-World Elaborative Inference Generation Skill as the Dependent 
Variable and Inhibitory Control as the Predictor Variable, controlling for Word-
Reading, IQ, Working Memory Capacity, Amount of Knowledge, Accessibility of 
Knowledge, and Strength of Belief Bias 
 
Inhibitory control appears to play a key role in real-world elaborative inferential skill in 
Year 7 and adulthood. After controlling for reading skill, IQ, working memory capacity, 
amount of knowledge, accessibility of knowledge, and strength of belief bias, inhibitory 
control accounted for 12.1% and 21.0% unique variance in real-world elaborative 
inferential skill for Year 7 and adults, respectively. Similarly, inhibitory control 
accounted for 40.3% and 29.4% unique variance in counterfactual-world elaborative 
inferential skill for Year 7 and Year 9, respectively. In addition, inhibitory control 
accounted for 14.6% unique variance in counterfactual-world coherence inferential skill 
in Year 9. Whilst inhibitory control was a positive predictor of real-world and 
counterfactual-world elaborative inference generation skill in Year 5 and Year 7, such 
that those with weaker inhibitory control made more inferential errors, the relationships 
were negative for Year 9 and adults, such that those with weaker inhibitory control made 
fewer inferential errors. Inhibitory control shared a positive relationship with 
counterfactual-world coherence inferential skill in Year 9. The relationship between 
inhibitory control and inference generation skill appears to be complex. Consequently, 
this relationship is explored further in the additional analysis below34. 
8.3.3.2.4. Belief Biases and Inferential Skill 
 
                                                 
 
34
 Additional analysis was conducted, such that Year 9s with very high error rates were identified and 
removed (n = 2). However, when these participants were removed, patterns did not change. Therefore, 
these results are not reported. 
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To explore the independent contribution of strength of belief bias, amount of knowledge, 
accessibility of knowledge, and inhibitory control were entered at Step 2 and strength of 
belief bias at Step 3. Results can be found in Tables – 8.16.-8.19.  
Table 8.16. Summary of Fixed-Order Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses (∆R2) 
With Real-world Coherence Inference Generation Skill as the Dependent Variable and 
Strength of Belief Bias as the Predictor Variable, controlling for Word-Reading, IQ, 
Working Memory Capacity, Amount of knowledge, Accessibility of Knowledge, and 
Inhibitory Control 
 
* p <  .05, ** p <  .01, *** p <  .001 
Table 8.17. Summary of Fixed-Order Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses (∆R2) 
With Real-world Elaborative Inference Generation Skill as the Dependent Variable and 
Strength of Belief Bias as the Predictor Variable, controlling for Word-Reading, IQ, 
Working Memory Capacity, Amount of knowledge, Accessibility of Knowledge, and 
Inhibitory Control 
 
* p <  .05, ** p <  .01, *** p <  .001 
 
 
 
 
Table 8.18. Summary of Fixed-Order Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses (∆R2) 
With Counterfactual-World Coherence Inference Generation Skill as the Dependent 
Variable and Strength of Belief Bias as the Predictor Variable, controlling for Word-
Reading, IQ, Working Memory Capacity, Amount of knowledge, Accessibility of 
Knowledge, and Inhibitory Control 
 
* p <  .05, ** p <  .01, *** p <  .001 
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Table 8.19. Summary of Fixed-Order Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analyses (∆R2) 
With Counterfactual-world Elaborative Inference Generation Skill as the Dependent 
Variable and Strength of Belief Bias as the Predictor Variable, controlling for Word-
Reading, IQ, Working Memory Capacity, Amount of knowledge, Accessibility of 
Knowledge, and Inhibitory Control 
 
* p <  .05, ** p <  .01, *** p <  .001 
Strength of belief biases appear central to both coherence and elaborative counterfactual-
world inferential skill with positive relationships observed, such that the more time taken 
to respond on the belief bias task the more counterfactual-world errors made. Specifically, 
after controlling for word-reading, IQ, working memory capacity, amount of knowledge, 
accessibility of knowledge, and inhibitory control, strength of belief biases accounted for 
53.4%, 14.0%, and 16.8% of variance in counterfactual-world coherence inference skill 
in Year 5, Year 7 and adults, respectively. Similarly, strength of belief biases accounted 
for 25.0%, 15.7%, 9.2% and 17.2% of variance in counterfactual-world elaborative 
inference skill in Year 5, Year 7, Year 9 and adults, respectively. Strength of belief biases 
therefore appears to play a central role in counterfactual-world inference generation 
processing during adolescence. 
8.3.3.3. Additional Analysis – Exploring the Role of Inhibition 
 
Floyd et al. (2012) highlighted the indirect effects of many skills on comprehension across 
the lifespan using multiple regression. However, as noted by Floyd et al. (2012) most 
multiple regression analyses fail to explore these indirect relationships and the factors that 
may mediate them. Floyd et al. argue that consideration of these relationships is likely to 
lead to a much richer and clearer insight into reading comprehension. Given that the 
direction of the relationship between inhibitory control and inference generation skill 
changed from positive to negative between Year 7 and Year 9, further analyses were 
conducted to explore the role of inhibition in elaborative inference generation in more 
detail. For each group, the median inhibition score was calculated and used to explore 
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individual differences in real-world elaborative inference generation skill and 
counterfactual-world elaborative inference generation skill35. 
8.3.3.3.1. Real-World Elaborative Inference Generation Skill 
 
For Year 5, there is no significant difference in number of real-world elaborative errors 
made by those with good inhibition skills and those with weak inhibition skills (t (49) = 
0.66, p = .51). For Year 7, there appears to be no significant difference in the number of 
real-world elaborative errors made by those with good inhibition skills and those with 
weak inhibition skills (t (48) = 1.91, p = .06). For Year 9, there was found to be no 
significant difference in the number of real-world elaborative errors made by those with 
good inhibition skills and those with weak inhibition skills (t (48) = 0.72, p = .48) 36. For 
adults, significantly more real-world elaborative errors were found to be made by those 
with good inhibitory skills (mean = 1.88, SD = 0.96) compared to those with weak 
inhibitory skills (mean = 0.63, SD = 0.95; t (54) = 4.43, p < .001).  Therefore, inhibitory 
control appears central to real-world elaborative inference generation skill in adults, with 
strong inhibitory skills resulting in weaker inference generation skills. 
8.3.3.3.2. Counterfactual-World Elaborative Inference Generation Skill 
 
For Year 5, there was no significant difference in number of counterfactual-world 
elaborative errors made by those with good inhibition skills and those with weak 
inhibition skills (t (49) = 0.71, p = .49). For Year 7, those with good inhibition skills were 
found to make significantly fewer errors (mean = 1.08, SD = 1.10) than those with weak 
inhibition skills (mean = 2.29, SD = 1.31; t (48) = 3.35, p = .002). For Year 9, those with 
weak inhibition skills were found to make significantly fewer errors (mean = 0.81, SD = 
1.09) than those with good inhibition skills (mean = 2.14, SD = 1.03; t (48) = 3.95, p 
< .001)37 . For adults, there was no significant difference between those with weak 
inhibition and good inhibition skills (t (54) = 0.21, p = .83).  Therefore, inhibitory control 
appears to be central to counterfactual-world elaborative inference generation in Year 7 
                                                 
 
35
 Median split analysis was conducted with those Year 9s making a high number of inhibition errors 
removed (n = 2). These results are not reported as patterns were the same regardless of whether these 
participants were included or excluded.  
 
37
 The same pattern was observed when those Year 9s identified has making a high number of inhibition 
errors were removed (t (46) =  3.76, p =  .001). 
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and Year 9, however, its primary function appears to change during this time. The nature 
of this change is discussed below. 
8.4. Discussion 
This study sought to establish age-related changes in the cognitive underpinnings of real-
world coherence, real-world elaborative, counterfactual-world coherence and 
counterfactual-world elaborative inference generation skill in Year 5 (9-10 years), Year 
7 (11-12 years), Year 9 (13-14 years) and adults (18 years and over). The independent 
predictive utility of four key predictors (amount of knowledge, accessibility of knowledge, 
inhibitory control, and strength of belief bias) was explored. The data presented here 
extend knowledge in several ways. First, the cognitive underpinnings of real-world 
coherence, real-world elaborative, counterfactual-world coherence and counterfactual-
world elaborative inference generation skill differed and changed with age. Specifically, 
knowledge was central to real-world coherence inference, with a shift in importance from 
amount of knowledge to accessibility of knowledge between Year 7 and Year 9. 
Knowledge and inhibitory control were central to real-world elaborative inferential skill, 
with inhibitory control shifting from sharing a positive relationship with elaborative 
inferential skill in Year 7 to a negative relationship in Year 9. Belief biases and inhibitory 
control were central to both counterfactual-world coherence and elaborative inference 
generation skill. The direction of the relationship between inhibitory control and 
counterfactual-world coherence and elaborative inferential skill was found to fluctuate. 
Taken together, findings suggest that coherence and elaborative inferences are distinct 
inference types with unique developmental trajectories. 
8.4.1. The Cognitive Underpinnings of Real-World Coherence Inference Generation 
Skill 
Real-world coherence inference generation skill appears to be underpinned by knowledge. 
Amount of knowledge made a significant unique contribution to real-world coherence 
inference generation skill in Year 5 and Year 7 accounting for 16.3% and 15.3% unique 
variance, respectively. Accessibility of knowledge made a significant unique contribution 
in Year 9 and Adults, accounting for 18.8% and 29.4% unique variance, respectively. 
Subsequently, whilst knowledge remains central to real-world coherence inference 
generation skill in all age groups, there appears to be a developmental shift between Year 
7 and Year 9 in importance from amount of knowledge to accessibility of knowledge. 
These results support those implicating knowledge in the inferential process and build 
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upon previous research by showing how the role of knowledge changes during 
adolescence (Birch & Bloom, 2004; Prat & Just, 2010; Prat et al., 2007; 2011).  
The current findings conflict with Barnes et al. (1996), one of the few studies to explore 
the role of knowledge in inferential processing developmentally, however. Barnes et al. 
(1996) found that the role of accessibility of knowledge in coherence inference generation 
declined with age. Real-world coherence inferences are argued to be drawn whilst reading 
since they are essential to maintaining coherence (see Graesser et al., 1994). Subsequently, 
Barnes et al. suggested that, due to increasing comprehension monitoring skills and 
identification of coherence breaks, accessibility of knowledge becomes less important to 
coherence inference generation skill with age, such that readers will strive to generate the 
inference and maintain coherence even if the necessary knowledge is not readily 
accessible. However, research suggests that in most cases coherence inferences are 
generated with minimal effort, particularly as the reader develops, such that inferential 
speed is found to increase with age (Magliano et al., 1993; Millis & Graesser, 1994). This 
is unsurprising given that research shows that both word-reading skill and reading fluency 
increase with age (Adlof, Catts, & Little, 2006; Carver, 1993; Tilstra, McMaster, van den 
Broek, Kendeou, & Rapp, 2009). For older readers to generate inferences without 
disrupting fluent reading, highly accessible knowledge would facilitate the efficient and 
relatively automatic generation of those inferences needed to maintain coherence whilst 
reading. For participants in Year 5 and Year 7, amount of knowledge was the strongest 
independent predictor of real-world coherence inferential skill. Year 5 and Year 7 may 
thus be more likely to engage in laborious search processes since reading is a slower and 
more demanding process at this age (Adlof et al., 2006; Carver, 1993; Tilstra et al., 2009).  
An alternative explanation may be due to Barnes et al. (1996) priming the necessary 
knowledge to control for the possibility of differing amounts of knowledge across the age 
groups by, first, teaching participants the necessary knowledge-base. As a result, when 
generating coherence inferences in the Barnes et al. study the necessary knowledge, even 
if not readily accessible, may have been weakly activated, thus requiring minimal effort 
to be fully activated. Participants may have engaged in this additional processing, 
knowing that they would find the knowledge they would need. However, when reading 
naturally, knowledge is not primed in such a way, instead, the knowledge necessary for 
coherence inferences is thought to be activated through associative processing, (van den 
Broek et al., 1995; 1999; 2005). Therefore, if the necessary knowledge is not freely 
available, to prevent reading disruption, older readers may not engage in this potentially 
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time-consuming yet possibly fruitless task. Subsequently, accessibility of knowledge 
would be essential to successful real-world coherence inference generation for these older 
groups. The results of the current study may thus be more reflective of inferential 
processing during the natural reading process. However, it is important to note that near 
ceiling effects were observed on the amount of knowledge task. Therefore, the role of 
amount of knowledge may not be adequately represented in the current study, particularly 
in older participants where variance in scores within the groups is minimal. In sum, 
knowledge appears to be key to real-world coherence inferential skill, such that with age 
accessibility of knowledge becomes more important than mere possession of knowledge. 
This may be due to the increasing necessity to generate coherence inferences whilst 
reading, with only minimal effort. 
8.4.2. The Cognitive Underpinnings of Real-World Elaborative Inference Generation 
Skill 
 
For Year 5, accessibility of knowledge was found to make the strongest unique 
contribution to real-world elaborative inferential skill, accounting for 26% independent 
variance, after controlling for all other skills of interest in this thesis. Knowledge 
activation is argued to be associative, such that semantic knowledge is thought to be 
stored in networks, with those knowledge nodes with multiple or strong links to the target 
knowledge node also being activated (Kintsch, 1988; 1998). Therefore, when reading or 
performing a conscious search of long-term memory, improvements in knowledge 
activation could increase the likelihood of the knowledge necessary for elaborative 
inference generation being activated and the target inference being generated. Research 
suggests that knowledge activation increases during adolescence (Barnes et al., 1996). 
This is supported by the findings of the current study, such that accessibility of knowledge 
significantly increased from Year 5 to Year 7. Therefore, it is possible that even when 
given a prompt and time, Year 5 are still unable to retrieve the necessary knowledge. 
Subsequently, when generating real-world elaborative inferences, Year 5 may only do so 
with knowledge that is easily accessible if they are unable to quickly access the target 
knowledge. 
The increase in knowledge accessibility may explain the central role of inhibitory control 
in Year 7. Inhibitory control was the only skill found to make an independent contribution 
to real-world elaborative inference generation skill in Year 7, accounting for 12.10% 
unique variance, such that those Year 7s with stronger inhibitory skills were more 
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successful when generating real-world elaborative inferences. Increasing knowledge 
accessibility means that compared to Year 5, when searching long-term memory, Year 7 
may activate more knowledge automatically. Subsequently, some of the knowledge 
activated may be irrelevant. Inhibitory control would be needed to reduce processing costs 
by ensuring only the most relevant information is processed (e.g. Cain, 2006). This 
reduces the load on working memory, allowing for the execution of those other skills and 
processes necessary for inference generation (e.g. semantic integration). 
There appears to be a shift in the primary function of inhibitory control in the elaborative 
inferential process between Year 7 and Year 9, such that, whilst inhibitory control shares 
a positive relationship with real-world elaborative inferential skill in Year 5 and Year 7, 
in Year 9 and adults a negative relationship is observed. This suggests that for the two 
older groups, those with stronger inhibitory control are less successful when generating 
real-world elaborative inferences. However, inhibitory control only makes a significant 
contribution to real-world elaborative inference generation skill in adults, accounting for 
21% unique variance. There are several possible interpretations. First, inhibitory control 
has been implicated in the suppression of irrelevant information and consequent 
maintenance of a clear workspace whilst generating inferences (e.g. Cain, 2006). 
However, if this process was to become too efficient, with only knowledge with very high 
activation levels being maintained, inhibitory control could hinder elaborative inference 
generation. Research suggests that elaborative inferences are generated offline for a 
variety of reasons, one being the number of possibilities is too numerous to be fully 
explored whilst reading (e.g. Calvo & Castillo, 2001a; 2001b). Given that adults are able 
to access knowledge with more ease than CYP, the number of possibilities available when 
given time to consciously search long-term memory may be very high. Those with strong 
inhibitory control may quickly isolate one idea whereas those with weak inhibitory 
control maintain more possibilities. If, however, the one possibility selected by those with 
good inhibitory control is inconsistent with the target inference then accuracy will not be 
achieved. Alternatively, those with weak inhibitory control are more likely to have the 
target inference activated as a possibility. This is supported by the findings of the current 
study, such that accessibility of knowledge also made a significant independent 
contribution to the real-world elaborative inferential processing of adults, accounting for 
12.5% unique variance. Similarly, inhibitory control was found to improve between Year 
7 and adulthood and Year 9 and adulthood, but not between Year 7 and Year 9. This may 
explain the pattern of results observed, such that Year 9 are beginning to focus on just 
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one possibility, but do not (or only some participants) have the level of inhibitory control 
needed to do this successfully. 
Second, the IST may not be suitable for assessment of inhibition associated with language 
processing (Barnes et al., 2004; Cain, 2006; Gernsbacher, 1993; Harnishfeger, 1995; 
Kintsch, 1988). Inhibition is thought to comprise a ‘family’ of skills (Friedman & Miyake, 
2004). The three functions include: 1) prepotent response inhibition –  the suppression of 
a dominant, often automatic response to the stimuli presented 2) response to distractor 
inhibition – suppression of irrelevant stimuli to focus on relevant stimuli, when both are 
present simultaneously 3) resistance to proactive interference – suppression of 
information that is no longer relevant. Prepotent response inhibition and response to 
distractor inhibition are related to incoming environmental information. Research 
exploring the relationship between prepotent response inhibition and response to 
distractor inhibition finds no difference between good and poor comprehenders 
suggesting these aspects of inhibitory control do not underpin the reading comprehension 
processes (Arrington, Kulesz, Francis, Fletcher & Barnes, 2014; Borella et al., 2014).  
Due to the motor response method, the IST may assess prepotent response inhibition. The 
IST requires participants to select one picture from four. It is possible then that more 
impulsive responders do not consider all four possibilities when making their selection. 
The IST may thus be tapping this aspect of the individual as opposed to the inhibitory 
control associated with accurate inference generation. This may explain the variation in 
results observed.  
Similarly, the rule-shift-cards task is dependent upon deliberate and conscious inhibitory 
processing (Wilson et al., 1996). The method of suppression in the comprehension 
process, however, is thought to be largely unconscious (e.g. Kintsch, 1988). The 
Construction-Integration theory, for example, suggests that the knowledge integrated into 
a situational model and the knowledge lost results from several iteration cycles, with 
knowledge nodes with high activation levels becoming stronger, and knowledge nodes 
with low activation levels becoming weaker and eventually being degraded or pruned. 
The rule-shift-cards task is unlikely to tap this implicit process of suppression. In addition, 
the rule-shift-cards task is not a pure measure of inhibitory control, such that other skills 
such as working memory and long-term memory are required for successful completion. 
Finally, there is little variation in the adult sample’s inhibition scores. As a result, any dip 
in performance could result in a strong relationship being observed due to the regressional 
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nature of this study. It is important to note that all of these possibilities are extremely 
speculative. Further research using several measures of inhibition is needed to unpick the 
relationship between inhibition and inference generation skill. 
For Year 9 amount of knowledge was the strongest independent predictor, accounting for 
33.5% unique variance. It is possible that Year 9 are engaging in a laborious search 
processes to find the knowledge which matches the target inference presented at the time 
of test. Accessibility of knowledge was the second strongest predictor accounting for 
11.3% unique variance. This suggests that whilst Year 9 engage in the laborious search 
processes needed for elaborative inference generation, this process is facilitated by readily 
accessible knowledge. However, these suggestions are made very tentatively. The unique 
pattern of skills underpinning inference generation in Year 9 coincides with a unique 
pattern of inferential skill also occurring in Year 9. This suggests that Year 9 may be a 
unique time in the processing of inference generation. This is discussed further below. 
In sum, elaborative inference generation appears to be underpinned by accessibility of 
knowledge, however, as accessibility of knowledge increases, inhibitory control seems to 
become key. However, it is possible that the primary function of inhibitory control 
changes with age. Whereas in Year 7 it appears that inhibitory control is needed to inhibit 
irrelevant knowledge resulting from increasing accessibility of knowledge, in adults 
inhibitory control appears to constrain the search process, minimising the possibilities 
weakly activated at the time of test and/or the number of possibilities isolated when 
searching long-term memory. Similar to the role of knowledge in coherence inferential 
processing, the shift in function of inhibitory control may also occur between Year 7 and 
Year 9.  
8.4.3. The Cognitive Underpinnings of Counterfactual-World Coherence Inferential 
Processing 
Strength of belief bias was the only predictor to make a unique contribution to 
counterfactual-world coherence inferential skill in Year 5 and Year 7, accounting for 
53.4% and 14.0% unique variance respectively, such that those with stronger belief biases 
made more counterfactual-world coherence errors. This suggests that when processing 
counterfactual-world coherence inferences, belief biases result in the activation of and 
preference for processing real-world knowledge, which serves to limit successful 
counterfactual-world inference generation. This is consistent with previous research 
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implicating belief biases in counterfactual-world processing (Houde & Guichart, 2001; 
Moutier et al., 2006; Richards & Sanderson, 1999). Extant research exploring belief 
biases had focused on counterfactual-world reasoning rather than counterfactual-world 
inference generation. Therefore, these findings extend previous research by highlighting 
the key role of belief biases in counterfactual-world coherence inferential processing. 
These results also extend previous research by showing that even when a counterfactual-
world context is provided, counterfactual-world inferential processing still appears to be 
affected by belief biases. This conflicts with previous research exploring counterfactual-
world literal processing which finds that whilst initially incoming text is compared against 
real-world beliefs, as the text progresses and a counterfactual-world mental model is 
constructed text is compared against the counterfactual-world model instead (e.g. 
Nieuwland, 2015). A tentative explanation is that belief biases may play a stronger role 
in inferential rather than literal processing as inferences are constructed by integrating 
one or more textual premise with existing knowledge. The reader thus creates the 
inference; to be accepted the reader evaluates the validity of the inference generated 
(Byrne, 2007). Belief biases may thus impede validation, a process not necessary when 
processing literal information. 
In Year 9, strength of belief biases was no longer a significant independent predictor of 
counterfactual-world coherence inference skill. Instead, inhibitory control was found to 
be the strongest unique predictor, accounting for 14.6% independent variance, such that 
those Year 9s with stronger inhibitory control made fewer counterfactual-world 
coherence errors. Although not significant, strength of belief biases was the second 
strongest predictor of counterfactual-world coherence inference skill, accounting for 
6.3% unique variance. Previous research suggests that for counterfactual-world 
processing to be successful, the real-world interference experienced must be inhibited 
(e.g. Moutier et al., 2006). This may thus explain the pivotal role of inhibitory control, 
above and beyond strength of belief biases, during Year 9. It is notable, then, that 
inhibitory control does not make a significant independent contribution to counterfactual-
world coherence inference skill in Year 5 and Year 7. It is possible that the central role 
of inhibitory control in Year 9, but not Year 5 and Year 7, is due to a qualitative shift in 
the application of belief biases.  
Mitchell et al. (1996) suggest that when processing a narrative, those aged 9-10 years 
apply a ‘seeing is believing rule’, such that processing is based on a character’s actual 
experience of an event. Conversely, adults are believed to adopt a more complex 
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processing strategy, such that they consider other real-world alternatives that may affect 
the character’s actions. Therefore, CYP may more readily accept the information in the 
text, even when it is contradictory to what they already know, whereas adults will try to 
find a real-world alternative that can explain the text. For example, when reading “Every 
day the boy ate chocolate cake all day long and every day the boy grew skinnier and 
skinner” all readers may activate background knowledge relating to food intake changing 
body size. This may then lead to the inference: eating chocolate cake makes the boy 
skinny. Given that the text provides no additional information, CYP may accept this 
inference because it is based on the character’s experiences. However, adults may 
question the inference generated, and draw upon other knowledge sources to generate an 
alternative real-world inference that is consistent with the text – e.g. the boy has bulimia. 
For the correct counterfactual-world inference to be drawn, the adult must inhibit the real-
world interference. Mitchell et al. (1996) only used a child (9-10 years) and adult group, 
thus the application of belief biases during adolescence was unknown. However, given 
the central role of inhibitory control in Year 9 but not the younger groups, current results 
suggest that Year 9 patterns are consistent with the more complex application of belief 
biases observed by the adults in the Mitchell et al. study. The findings of the current study, 
therefore, extend previous research by suggesting that the qualitative shift in the 
application of belief biases occurs between Year 7 and Year 9.  
By adulthood, inhibitory control no longer makes a unique contribution to counterfactual-
world coherence inference skill, instead strength of belief biases was the only predictor 
to make a significant unique contribution, accounting for 16.8% independent variance. 
The difference in patterns between Year 9 and adults may be due to improvements in 
inhibitory control. For adults, inhibitory control may be sufficient, such that adults can 
effectively inhibit the real-world interference experienced by the more complex 
application of belief biases. In sum, belief biases appear central to counterfactual-world 
coherence inferential skill across the lifespan. However, there appears to be a qualitative 
shift in the way belief biases are applied from Year 7 to Year 9, such that older readers 
apply a more complex strategy.  
8.4.4. The Cognitive Underpinnings of Counterfactual-World Elaborative Inferential 
Processing 
 
Strength of belief biases was the only predictor to make a unique contribution to 
counterfactual-world elaborative inferential skill in Year 5, accounting for 25.0% 
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independent variance, such that stronger belief biases resulted in more errors. This is 
consistent with the patterns observed for counterfactual-world coherence inferential 
processing. For Year 7, strength of belief biases was still a unique predictor of 
counterfactual-world elaborative inferential skill, accounting for 15.7% independent 
variance. However, inhibitory control made the strongest unique contribution, accounting 
for 40.3% unique variance. Those with good inhibitory control were more successful 
when generating counterfactual-world elaborative inferences than those with weak 
inhibitory control. The increasing importance of inhibitory control from Year 5 to Year 7 
is surprising, given that inhibitory control did not increase during this time, and strength 
of belief biases decreased. However, the inhibitory control measure used assessed 
inhibitory skill (number of errors), not inhibitory speed. Research suggests that inhibitory 
speed significantly increases between the ages of nine years and twelve years (Bjorklund 
and Harnishfeger, 1990; Romine & Reynolds, 2005). Therefore, it is possible that those 
Year 7s who were able to inhibit more accurately may also inhibit information more 
efficiently. Subsequently, these Year 7s would be able to more quickly inhibit the real-
world interference caused by belief biases, thus aiding counterfactual-world elaborative 
inference generation. 
In Year 9, inhibitory control remained the strongest unique predictor of counterfactual-
world elaborative inference skill, accounting for 29.4% independent variance. Strength 
of belief biases also continued to make an independent contribution, accounting for 17.2% 
unique variance. However, the direction of relationship between inhibitory control and 
counterfactual-world elaborative inferential skill was negative, such that those with good 
inhibitory control made more counterfactual-world elaborative errors. There are two 
possible interpretations. First, elaborative inferences, are typically found to be generated 
offline, such that the knowledge needed to generate the target inference is typically not 
readily accessible – i.e. minimal activation levels (Graesser et al., 1994; Kintsch, 1988). 
Research suggests that irrelevant and/or contradictory information is suppressed in the 
initial stages of inferential processing to reduce processing costs (e.g. Cain, 2006). Given 
its counterfactual-world nature and low activation levels, the knowledge necessary for the 
generation of counterfactual-world elaborative inferences is thus likely to be suppressed 
in the early stages of inferential processing. Strong inhibitory control would thus hinder 
counterfactual-world elaborative inference generation. Conversely, those with weak 
inhibitory control may maintain the counterfactual-world information, thus aiding later 
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inference generation. However, it is not easy to explain why this would occur in Year 9, 
but not Year 5 and 7. 
Second, given that Chapter 7 suggests counterfactual-world elaborative inferences were 
generated offline, these inferences may have been processed with strategic effort. Year 9 
is a critical period in the development of reasoning and meta-cognitive skills, such that 
adolescents begin to question and evaluate the possibilities of information presented to 
them (Swanson, 1990). Developing meta-cognition may hinder the conscious search of 
long-term memory, such that Year 9 may consciously evaluate the plausibility of the 
information, and due to belief biases, those with stronger inhibitory control may inhibit 
information that is inconsistent with real-world beliefs. This was observed by the 
researcher during the task, such that Year 9s made comments such as “but that can’t be 
right because…” This is consistent with the qualitative shift in the application of belief 
biases discussed above. Given that the negative relationship between inhibitory control 
and counterfactual-world elaborative inferential skill is not observed until Year 9, the 
latter possibility is most likely. However, both suggestions are extremely tentative.  
By adulthood, inhibitory control is still a negative predictor of counterfactual-world 
elaborative inferential skill. However, it does not make a significant independent 
contribution, despite inhibitory control improving from Year 9 to adulthood. For adults, 
strength of belief biases was the only predictor to make an independent contribution to 
counterfactual-world elaborative inferential processing, accounting for 17.2% unique 
variance. The declining role of inhibitory control may be due to adults becoming more 
flexible, such that further developments in abstract thinking allow adults to more readily 
accept counterfactual-world information (Flavell, 1971). However, the continued 
independent contribution of strength of belief biases, suggests that counterfactual-world 
processing continues to be governed by a preference for real-world information. In sum, 
belief biases appear central to counterfactual-world elaborative inferential processing 
from Year 5 to adulthood. Inhibitory control appears to be important also, particularly 
during the Secondary School years. The function of inhibitory control during this time 
appears to change, however. Whilst in Year 7 inhibitory control inhibits real-world 
interference, in Year 9 inhibitory control may inhibit the activation of knowledge deemed 
implausible during a conscious search of long-term memory. Further research is needed, 
given that, due to time constraints, it was only possible to use one measure to explore 
each component of inference generation. For inhibitory control, in particular, it would be 
interesting to explore the relationship between inhibitory control and inference generation 
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using several measures sensitive to both skill and speed and conscious and unconscious 
processing. 
8.4.5. Conclusions 
 
This study highlights the unique developmental trajectories of four inference types during 
adolescence: real-world coherence, real-world elaborative, counterfactual-world 
coherence, and counterfactual-world elaborative. Specifically, knowledge appears central 
to real-world coherence inferences with a shift from mere possession of knowledge to 
accessibility of knowledge as the necessity to generate these inferences automatically 
whilst reading increases. Real-world elaborative inference generation, on the other hand, 
appears to be underpinned by developments in knowledge accessibility and inhibitory 
control, such that as more knowledge is readily accessible stronger inhibitory control is 
executed. However, in some instances, this control may be too strong. Belief biases 
appear central to both coherence and elaborative counterfactual-world inference 
generation across adolescence. However, there may be a conceptual shift in the 
application of belief biases between Year 7 and Year 9. This study also highlights Year 9 
as a special time in inference generation development, with the possibility of qualitative 
shifts, largely driven by inhibitory control, occurring during this time.  
  
254 
 
CHAPTER 9 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
This thesis sought to explore age-related changes in real-world and counterfactual-world 
inference generation abilities during adolescence. To assess this wide age-range, whilst 
also effectively and efficiently assessing both inferential skill and time-course along with 
possible real-world interference when processing counterfactual-world information, a 
new measure of inference generation was created, the Image Selection Task (IST). The 
development and evaluation of the IST is detailed in Chapters 3 and 4. To promote a 
natural reading process, the IST embeds critical sentences into short fantasy stories. 
Participants move through the text at their own speed, with the time taken to read critical 
texts recorded thus providing a measure of the inferential time-course. Each critical text 
is followed by a forced-choice picture-selection task which allows for a measure of skill 
(number of errors) to be obtained. The use of diagnostic fillers also allows for conclusions 
to be drawn regarding the cause of inference generation failure. The IST was found to be 
a valid measure of inference generation abilities. Due to the use of a pictorial response 
method, which minimises additional translational demands, the IST also appears to 
provide a purer measure of CYP’s inference generation abilities than existing measures 
utilising verbal response methods.  
The IST was used with Year 5, Year 7, Year 9 and adults in three studies to investigate: 
1. The role of real-world and counterfactual-world inference generation abilities in 
reading comprehension and text production during adolescence (Chapter 6) 
2. Age-related changes in real-world and counterfactual-world inference generation 
abilities during adolescence (Chapter 7). 
3. The development and potentially changing role of those skills and processes 
underpinning real-world and counterfactual-world inference generation abilities 
during adolescence (Chapter 8). 
This chapter begins by summarising the key findings of this thesis and then relating these 
to previous research. The educational implications of this research are considered. This 
is followed by a discussion of research limitations. Finally, directions for future research 
and conclusions are provided. 
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9.1. Summary of Findings 
9.1.1. How does the role of inference generation in higher-order literacy skills change 
during adolescence? 
 
One aim of this thesis was to explore the role of inference generation skill in reading 
comprehension and text production processes during adolescence. Inference generation 
was implicated in both reading comprehension and text production during adolescence. 
Therefore, this research is unique in nature such that it explicitly establishes a relationship 
between inference generation and text production quality during adolescence. Second, 
whilst not significant, visual inspection of regression coefficients suggests that, during 
adolescence, the predictive utility of overall inference generation skill declines for 
reading comprehension but increases for text production. This research thus highlights 
the unique developmental trajectories of these higher-order literacy skills during 
adolescence. Third, whilst not significant, visual inspection of regression coefficients for 
each inference type suggests that real-world coherence inference skill plays a growing 
role in text production quality during adolescence, such that predictive utility appears to 
increase. Conversely, the role of real-world coherence inference skill in reading 
comprehension appears to decline during adolescence. The opposite pattern is observed 
for real-world elaborative inference generation. The role of specific inference types in the 
reading comprehension and text production process is discussed in more detail below. 
9.1.1.1. Inference Generation and Reading Comprehension 
 
Reading comprehension skill was found to improve throughout adolescence, however, a 
period of limited development was observed between Year 7 and Year 9. A shift in 
importance of inference type to the reading comprehension process was also observed in 
Year 9. Specifically, real-world coherence inference generation skill was found to be a 
unique significant predictor of inference generation in all age groups. This is consistent 
with skilled models of reading comprehension and inference generation that highlight the 
importance of maintaining coherence whilst reading (e.g. Kintsch, 1988; 1998). However, 
elaborative inference generation skill did not make a significant contribution to reading 
comprehension skill until Year 9. This suggests a possible shift in the way coherence 
inferences and elaborative inferences are processed when reading at 13-14 years (Year 9). 
Coherence inferences are essential for basic understanding of a text. However, it appears 
that as the CYP progresses a more enriched mental model is needed for the deep level of 
understanding expected. This is consistent with the researcher’s classroom experience, 
such that texts not only become more challenging with regards to syntactic complexity 
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and vocabulary, but also the depth of understanding expected. Year 9 was also the point 
where inferential processing speed (measured by reading speed) achieved adult-like 
levels. Taken together, results could suggest that as inferential processing becomes more 
efficient the reader is able to elaborate on the text in more detail.  
Reading comprehension progress was not observed between Year 7 and Year 9, however, 
potentially suggesting that the increasing importance of elaborative inference skill may 
be difficult to for Year 9s to manage. However, by adulthood, elaborative inference 
generation was the strongest predictor of reading comprehension skill and reading 
comprehension skill had significantly improved between Year 9 and adults. This suggests 
adults are better able to deal with the demands associated with elaborative inference 
generation as part of the reading process. The findings of Chapter 8, suggest that this may 
be due to increased knowledge accessibility and, as discussed below, the possibility that 
some adults are generating elaborative inferences whilst reading. The research presented 
here thus adds to the current literature by showing that developments in reading 
comprehension during adolescence may be fuelled, at least in part, by the more efficient 
generation of elaborative inferences and specifically the use of more accessible 
knowledge, with this shift occurring around Year 9. These findings also demonstrate the 
distinct role of coherence and elaborative inference generation skills in reading 
comprehension, thus highlighting the need for further research to distinguish between the 
two inference types. 
9.1.1.2. Inference Generation and Text Production 
 
Text production quality was found to improve throughout adolescence, however, a period 
of limited development was observed between Year 7 and Year 9. The results of Chapter 
6 also suggested that there is a shift in importance of inference type during Year 9, such 
that coherence inference generation becomes more important than elaborative inference 
generation. Specifically, the role of real-world coherence inference generation skill in text 
production quality was found to increase with age, with the unique contribution of real-
world coherence skill approaching significance in Year 9 and reaching significance in 
adulthood. Elaborative inference generation skill made a significant contribution in Years 
7, 9 and adults, but, predictive utility was found to decline with age (although this decline 
was not significant). This pattern of results is consistent with the knowledge-telling model 
(Bereiter and Scardamalia, 1987; Hayes 2012) such that whilst the first stage (knowledge-
telling) is characterised by the generation of ideas with developments due to elaboration, 
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the second and third stages are characterised by improvements in coherence and the 
organisation of text. As discussed below, developments in coherence inference generation 
were characterised by a shift in the function of knowledge, such that accessibility of 
knowledge became more important than amount of knowledge. It is possible then, that 
developing writing is constrained at first by amount of knowledge (i.e. the CYP does not 
have the knowledge necessary to make a link between one or more ideas) and then 
accessibility of knowledge (i.e. the CYP only makes links between ideas when the 
knowledge needed to do so is readily available).  
In Year 5 and Year 7 the control variables (working memory capacity, IQ, decoding) 
accounted for substantial amounts of variance in text production quality (45.9% and 
29.1% respectively). However, as the predictive utility of inferential skill increased, the 
predictive utility of the control variables declined. This pattern is consistent with the 
Simple View of Writing (SVW; Juel, 1988). According to the SVW, text production 
quality develops as low-level transcription skills become automatic and working memory 
capacity increases, since this allows for the execution of higher-level ideation skills – i.e. 
mental model construction. The research presented here thus supports the SVW and 
further extends this by explicitly highlighting the growing importance of coherence 
inference generation skill as low-level transcription skills become automatic. To sum, the 
application of coherence inference generation skills to the text production process appears 
to be mediated, at first by transcription skills, then amount of knowledge and then the 
accessibility of this knowledge. 
 
9.1.2. How do inference generation abilities change during adolescence? 
 
A further aim of this thesis was to explore changes in inferential skill (number of errors) 
and the inferential time-course (speed) during adolescence. Inference generation 
development appears to be largely quantitative during adolescence, with proficiency 
achieved between Year 7 and Year 9 for both real-world and counterfactual-world 
information. However, there also appears to be a period of qualitatively different 
processing during Year 9, such that a qualitatively different error pattern was observed 
for this group compared to all other age groups.  
Inference generation skill appears to develop between Year 5 and Year 7, at which point 
adult-like proficiency is achieved for both real-world and counterfactual-world inference 
generation. The lack of development in real-world inference generation skill between 
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Year 7 and adulthood is surprising and whilst consistent with some research (e.g. Casteel, 
1993) conflicts with others (e.g. Barnes et al., 1996). The results of this thesis may be 
explained by use of the IST compared to a text-based assessment tool. A pictorial 
response method was chosen to minimise those verbal demands associated with the 
translational process. It was hoped that this would provide a purer, less confounded 
measure of CYP’s inference generation abilities. It is possible then, that CYP have the 
same inference generation skills as adults by 11-12 years, but these skills are constrained 
by the verbal skills needed to translate text or construct an answer. This interpretation is 
supported by the findings of Chapter 4, such that despite the use of the same methodology, 
CYP performed worse on the sentence verification task (which used a verbal response 
method, thus requiring decoding and translational processes) compared to the IST (which 
used a pictorial response method, thus minimising decoding and translational processes) 
whereas there was no difference for adults. This has implications for the classroom, such 
that the implementation of the most effective intervention is dependent on successful 
identification of the CYP’s difficulty(s). Therefore, the use of measures in which 
inference generation can be isolated from translation and verbal output processes may be 
needed. This finding also provides an avenue for further research, such that it could be 
fruitful to explore the translational and verbal skills that are constraining the successful 
application of the inference generation process between Year 7 and adulthood. 
Previous research suggests counterfactual-world inference generation becomes more 
difficult with age, with a conceptual shift in the processing of counterfactual-world 
inferences occurring between 9-10 years and adulthood (Bowyer-Crane & Snowling, 
2010; Ceci et al., 1981; Dorfman, 1989; Dorfman & Brewer, 1988; Graesser et al., 1998). 
The findings of this thesis thus conflict with previous research. This discrepancy may be 
due to the tasks used. For instance, in the Ceci et al. (1981) study older participants only 
displayed counterfactual-world errors in their recall after a one-week delay. Research 
suggests that as a CYP ages they are more likely to store information by fitting it into pre-
existing knowledge structures (Barnes et al., 1996; Chi, 1978). Typically, these are real-
world knowledge structures. In the current thesis, participants’ inference generation skill 
was assessed after an almost immediate delay (500ms). Therefore, storage and recall was 
not necessary. Real-world interference may thus be higher when storing and recalling 
information than when reading, particularly for older CYP. 
Qualitative developments during adolescence were not observed for the inferential time-
course. All age groups were found to generate coherence inferences online and 
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elaborative inferences offline, regardless of the plausibility of information. This was 
evidenced by significantly longer reading speeds for real-world coherence inference-
evoking critical texts compared to real-world literal critical texts. There was no significant 
difference between reading speeds for real-world elaborative inference-evoking critical 
texts and real-world literal critical texts. This finding is consistent with previous research 
(Calvo et al., 2006; Casteel, 1993; Ford & Milosky, 2008; Graesser et al., 1994; Prat et 
al., 2011; Virtue et al., 2006; 2008). These findings also serve to extend the 
Constructionist Theory by suggesting coherence inferences will be generated online, by 
all age groups, even when reading fantasy texts and generating counterfactual-world 
inferences. This finding conflicts with previous research which suggests a qualitative shift 
in the processing of counterfactual-world information between 9-10 years and adulthood, 
though (Bowyer-Crane & Snowling, 2010; Graesser et al., 1998). The notion of a 
conceptual shift was not based on direct comparison of CYP and adults, however, but 
discrepancies in findings between studies exploring the counterfactual-world inferential 
processing of adults and CYP. Moreover, previous research exploring counterfactual-
world text processing has utilised offline measures of inference generation, explored only 
one age group, and/or not been explicit about inference type (e.g. Bowyer-Crane & 
Snowling, 2010; Ceci et al., 1981; Dorfman, 1989; Dorfman & Brewer, 1988; Graesser 
et al., 1998). The differences between adults and CYP observed in the previous literature 
thus appear to be due to methodological differences, such that this thesis has shown when 
the same methodology is used to assess CYP and adults, all groups display qualitatively 
similar patterns. 
In line with previous research, for all age groups, inference generation was found to be 
more difficult than literal processing, potentially resulting from a different process (e.g. 
Chow et al., 2008; Jin et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2012; Prat et al., 2011; Virtue et al., 2006; 
2008). Qualitative changes in inference generation skill during adolescence were 
observed, such that a unique error pattern was observed in Year 9. Specifically, Years 5 
and 7 and adults found the generation of elaborative inferences no more difficult than the 
generation of coherence inferences. Previous research has found that the generation of 
elaborative inferences is more difficult than the generation of coherence inferences (e.g. 
Bowyer-Crane & Snowling, 2010; Cain & Oakhill, 1999). There are several possible 
explanations for this discrepancy in findings. First, elaborative inferences are typically 
found to be generated offline (e.g. Calvo et al., 2006). However, many of the 
aforementioned studies have used online measures of inference generation, thus only 
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those inferences generated whilst reading are measured. Second, inferences can be either 
text-based or knowledge-based, with knowledge-based inferences more difficult (Kintsch, 
1994). Many of the aforementioned studies have explored text-based coherence 
inferences but knowledge-based elaborative inferences. Consistent with the findings of 
this thesis, those exploring both knowledge-based coherence and knowledge-based 
elaborative inferences find no difference in skill levels (e.g. Cain et al., 2001). Third, the 
use of pictures may have encouraged the construction of a highly enriched multi-modal 
situational model. The static inferences explored in this study often reflected visual 
features – e.g. colour. The construction of highly enriched visual situational models may 
thus facilitate elaborative, specifically static, inference generation. If this is the case, the 
results of this thesis support those theories suggesting that mental models are multi-modal 
as opposed to merely propositional (e.g. Zwaan, 2003).  
Year 9 found coherence inference generation more difficult than elaborative inference 
generation. Although not significant, visual analysis of means suggests that this effect is 
primarily due to Year 9 experiencing more difficulty with coherence inference generation 
compared to elaborative inference generation in the counterfactual-world condition. 
Positioning Year 9 as a unique time in development is supported by the additional analysis 
conducted in Chapter 7 such that when data were analysed according to reading 
comprehension age, and Year 9s were dispersed across groups, all groups made a similar 
amount of coherence and elaborative errors, suggesting the pattern observed is due to 
chronological age not reading age. Year 9 also displayed a different pattern to all other 
age groups when those skills underpinning counterfactual-world inference generation 
were explored (Chapter 8), such that inhibitory control, not strength of belief biases was 
key. Taken together, it is possible that, compared to the other age groups, for some reason 
Year 9 are facing more real-world interference when processing counterfactual-world 
coherence inferences compared to counterfactual-world elaborative inferences. As a 
result, suppression of this conflicting information becomes key to success. Several 
reasons for the possible qualitative shift in counterfactual-world processing during this 
time are discussed in Section 9.1.3.3.  
For the most part patterns were the same for real-world and counterfactual-world 
processing, however, counterfactual-world information was processed significantly 
slower than real-world information by all groups. This finding was predicted, such that 
previous research suggests the processing of counterfactual-world information is more 
taxing than the processing of real-world information for all age groups (e.g. Bowyer-
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Crane & Snowling, 2010; Ferguson, 2012; Graesser et al., 1998). Previous research 
suggests that the additional processing time is spent resolving conflict experienced due to 
real-world interference – the automatic activation of related but contradictory real-world 
knowledge. This is supported by the error analysis conducted in Chapter 7, such that for 
all age groups and both inference types, the primary cause of counterfactual-world 
inference generation failure was attributed to real-world interference. The additional time 
spent processing counterfactual-world information appears to be effective in most cases, 
such that counterfactual-world inference generation was not found to be any more 
difficult than real-world inference generation, except for counterfactual-world coherence 
inferences in Year 9, as discussed above. Both real-world and counterfactual-world 
inference generation development during adolescence, then, is largely quantitative in 
nature. However, some qualitatively different processing may be occurring during Year 
9, such that counterfactual-world coherence processing during this time appears to cause 
some difficulty. 
9.1.3. How do the cognitive underpinnings of successful inference generation change 
during adolescence? 
 
The role of amount of knowledge, accessibility of knowledge, inhibitory control and 
strength of belief biases in inference generation skill during adolescence was also 
explored in this thesis. This research builds upon the findings of existing studies by 
showing that, during adolescence, each inference type appears to be underpinned by 
different skills at different times. Specifically, real-world coherence inference generation 
appears to be underpinned by knowledge throughout adolescence, with a shift in 
importance from amount of knowledge to accessibility of knowledge around Year 9. 
Knowledge and inhibitory control appear central to elaborative inference generation 
whereas strength of belief biases appear to underpin counterfactual-world inference 
generation. Each inference type is discussed in more detail below. 
 
9.1.3.1. Real-World Coherence Inference Generation 
 
The IST was carefully designed for this thesis such that fillers were designed to reflect 
common reasons for inference generation failure, allowing for a meaningful analysis of 
errors to be conducted. For all groups, real-world coherence errors were primarily 
attributed to literal processing (Chapter 7) – i.e. the participant not integrating the ideas 
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within the critical text using their background knowledge. This is supported by the results 
of Chapter 8, which implicate the integration of background knowledge in the successful 
generation of real-world coherence inferences, although there appears to be a shift in the 
role of knowledge processes. Whereas amount of knowledge was found to be the 
strongest unique predictor of real-world coherence inference generation skill in Years 5 
and 7, accessibility of knowledge was found to be the strongest unique predictor of real-
world coherence inference generation skill in Year 9 and adults. This shift may be due to 
when in the reading process coherence inferences are generated by different age groups. 
The Simple View of Reading (SVR) suggests that the application of inferential processes 
(and other higher-order skills falling under the umbrella of linguistic comprehension) is 
constrained by decoding skills in children, such that it is not until decoding is automatic 
that inferential processes can operate whilst reading. The results of this research and 
previous studies, however, suggest that even young children are able to generate 
coherence inferences whilst reading, despite decoding skills not being automatic 
(Omanson et al., 1978; Paris et al., 1977). It is possible then that whilst not automatic, 
decoding skills are proficient enough by 9-10 years for the simultaneous execution of 
inferential skills whilst reading. Alternatively, online comprehension may be slowed by 
limited decoding skills, but not constrained completely. Instead, a two-stage more 
conscious reading comprehension process may take place where text is decoded and then 
higher-order processes are executed. Years 5 and 7 may engage in a conscious search for 
the necessary knowledge, once the text has been decoded, explaining why possession not 
accessibility of knowledge is key. This is also consistent with the researcher’s data 
collection observations and classroom observations. Children will often appear to pause 
and consider what they have read once they have successfully decoded.  
For Year 9, on the other hand, decoding skills may be automatic. This cannot be 
determined by the current study as the single-word-reading task employed assessed word-
reading skill not speed. Proficient models of reading comprehension, that assume 
decoding proficiency, suggest that, due to associative mechanisms, knowledge is 
automatically activated whilst reading (Kintsch, 1988; van den Broek et al., 1995; 1999; 
2005; Zwaan, 2003). Barnes et al. (1996) suggest that the amount of knowledge that is 
readily accessible via associative mechanisms improves with age as knowledge networks 
become better organised. This is supported by the findings of the current thesis such that 
accessibility of knowledge was found to increase with age. Working memory resources 
are thus no longer primarily attributed to conscious decoding and large amounts of 
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associated knowledge are also readily available. Inferential processes may be executed 
whilst reading, as opposed to the two-step process discussed above. A conscious search 
of long-term memory would disrupt the fluid reading process, explaining the increasing 
importance of accessibility of knowledge over amount of knowledge. The reading speed 
measure used in the current research does not distinguish between pauses and reading. 
Therefore, it remains unclear when Year 5 and Year 7 are engaging in inferential 
processing. An eye tracking study, which could map pauses, fixations and regressions to 
determine reading processes, would be needed to explore this further. 
9.1.3.2. Real-World Elaborative Inference Generation 
 
For Year 5, accessibility of knowledge was the strongest predictor of elaborative 
inference generation. The Constructionist Theory suggests that elaborative inferences are 
generated offline, when prompted, after a conscious search of long-term memory, as the 
knowledge needed for the generation of these inferences is neither readily accessible nor 
strongly activated whilst reading (Graesser et al., 1994). Knowledge is thought to be 
stored in networks (Kintsch, 1988; 1998). Developments in knowledge networks are 
thought to reflect not only the addition of new knowledge, but the reorganisation of 
knowledge, resulting in more efficient knowledge activation via associative and 
conscious search mechanisms (Barnes et al., 1996). Year 5 were slower to activate 
knowledge than all other groups, suggesting their knowledge networks may not be as well 
organised as the other groups. Therefore, even when given a prompt and time to search 
long-term memory, Year 5 may still experience difficulty efficiently activating the 
necessary knowledge. Year 5s may thus only generate elaborative inferences with 
information that is easily accessible. This is consistent with the results of Barnes et al. 
(1996) who found that knowledge that was readily accessible was twice as likely to be 
used when generating an inference than knowledge that was more difficult to access.  
Typically, knowledge inhibited is that with low activation levels due to weak or minimal 
connections with other nodes in the currently activated mental model of the text (Kintsch, 
1988). When reading, knowledge necessary for coherence inferences is likely to have 
strong and numerous connections with currently activated nodes, but this is not the case 
for elaborative inferences. Consequently, for coherence inference generation there is 
likely to be one strong overriding inference, with multiple connections. Conversely, for 
elaborative inferences, several competing possibilities, with similar activation levels may 
be accessed when the reader performs a conscious search of long-term memory. 
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Maintenance and integration of all possibilities would be cognitively demanding and 
possibly overwhelm the reader’s limited working memory capacity and result in inference 
generation failure (Cain & Oakhill, 2006a; De Beni et al., 1998; Kershaw & 
Schatschneider, 2012). The reader must thus select one possibility, inhibiting all others. 
The number of competing possibilities will be determined by how readily accessible the 
reader’s knowledge is. Knowledge accessibility improved from Year 5 to Year 7, Year 7 
may thus access more representations than Year 5, explaining the central role of inhibitory 
control in the elaborative inferential process of Year 7s. This also explains the increase in 
inference generation skill and inference generation speed observed between Year 5 and 
Year 7 – i.e. developments in inference generation abilities during this time are driven by 
developments and interactions between accessibility of knowledge and inhibitory control. 
In opposition to the positive relationship observed in Year 7, a negative relationship was 
observed between elaborative inference skill and inhibitory control in adults. This 
suggests that for adults those with stronger inhibitory control make more elaborative 
inference errors. There are several possible, highly speculative, reasons for this 
relationship. Although not detectable in the current findings, some adults may have been 
generating some elaborative inferences online38. A function of inhibitory control in online 
inference generation is to suppress the automatic activation of irrelevant and/or 
contradictory knowledge, thus creating a clear workspace (e.g. Cain, 2006; Harnishfeger, 
1995). Elaborative inferences are argued to be generated offline as there are often multiple 
plausible possibilities (e.g. Albrecht et al., 1995). Whilst adults may be able to maintain 
some of these possibilities whilst reading, maintenance of all possibilities could still 
overload working memory and thus result in comprehension failure. Adults with strong 
inhibitory control may thus strongly inhibit all possibilities, except the one (or two) that 
is most strongly activated. However, if this does not match the target picture, the IST will 
suggest an error has been made. Those adults with weak inhibitory control, however, may 
also be those with a more limited working memory capacity (the rule-shift-cards task is 
not a pure measure of inhibition, such that success is dependent on other skills, including 
working memory capacity) and thus this group may generate elaborative inferences 
                                                 
 
38
 Data in the current study may have been skewed by those adults not generating elaborative inference 
online. This was the case in the Long et al. (1994) study. Their findings suggested that elaborative 
inferences were generated offline, until they split their sample by working memory capacity. The high 
working memory capacity group were found to generate elaborative errors whilst reading, whereas the 
low working memory capacity group were not. 
265 
 
offline, allowing for more conscious control and consideration of several possibilities. 
This interpretation fits with the developmental patterns of inference skill and speed 
observed between Year 7 and adulthood, such that whilst skill did not improve, speed did. 
Alternatively, the negative relationship observed may be attributable to the inference 
generation measure used in the current research. Inhibition is thought to comprise a 
‘family’ of skills (Friedman & Miyake, 2004). The three functions include: 1) prepotent 
response inhibition –  the suppression of a dominant, often automatic response to the 
stimuli presented 2) response to distractor inhibition – suppression of irrelevant stimuli 
to focus on relevant stimuli, when both are present simultaneously 3) resistance to 
proactive interference – suppression of information that is no longer relevant. Resistance 
to proactive interference is the type of inhibitory control most often implicated in the 
reading comprehension process (e.g. Borella et al., 2014). However, due to the motor 
response method used, success on the IST may not be dependent on this type of inhibitory 
control. Similarly, it is possible that the rule-shift-cards task is not tapping the type on 
inhibitory control associated with reading comprehension. The rule-shift-cards task is 
dependent upon deliberate and conscious inhibitory processing (Wilson et al., 1996). The 
inhibitory control likely to operate during reading comprehension is largely unconscious 
(Cain, 2006; Harnishfeger, 1995; Kintsch, 1988). This interpretation is consistent with 
the lack of relationship observed between inhibitory control and coherence inference 
generation skill in the current research, such that coherence inference generation is 
thought to be automatic and largely unconscious. All of the possibilities discussed above 
are highly speculative, research exploring the role of inhibitory control using several 
measures would be needed to further clarify results. 
For Year 9, amount of knowledge was the strongest predictor of elaborative inference 
generation skill. Year 9 were also found to display a different error pattern to all other 
groups, such that they made significantly fewer elaborative errors than coherence errors. 
The superior performance and strong role of amount of knowledge, followed by 
accessibility of knowledge, suggests that some Year 9s may be engaging in a laborious 
search process to find the necessary knowledge, even when this knowledge is not readily 
accessible. Year 9 may be the only group to engage in this additional processing due to 
their point in cognitive development. Whilst Year 7 are just entering Piaget’s Formal 
Operational Stage, Year 9 are deep within it (Dulit, 1972). Those within this stage are 
more likely to engage in speculation and possibility (e.g. consideration of multiple 
alternatives and hypotheses) and to search for additional information that will confirm 
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their new way of thinking. Unlike Years 5 and 7, Year 9 may thus have considered several 
plausible real-world elaborative possibilities, judging these against the four pictures, 
before selecting the target. Whilst adults are also thought to be in the Formal Operational 
Stage, research shows that whilst conflict and questioning (e.g. challenging of ideas 
people and perspectives) is frequent during adolescence, by adulthood these behaviours 
begin to reduce (e.g. Steinberg & Morris, 2001). Unlike Year 9, adults, then, may select 
a possibility and stick with it, instead of considering all possibilities. This suggests that 
Year 9 may be a unique stage in development, such that qualitatively different processes 
are engaged.  
9.1.3.3. Counterfactual-World Inference Generation 
For Year 5, Year 7 and adults, for both coherence and elaborative inference skill, strength 
of belief biases was the strongest predictor, such that those more efficient at overcoming 
belief biases made fewer counterfactual-world errors. When text is read, proficient 
models of reading comprehension suggest that related knowledge from long-term 
memory is automatically activated via memory-based processes (e.g. Kintsch, 1988; 
1998). For counterfactual-world critical texts, the real-world knowledge is consistent with 
beliefs but not the text. The reader must thus suppress their belief biases to generate the 
correct inference. The results of this thesis suggest that whilst belief biases may operate 
whilst reading the additional time spent resolving the conflict experienced is effective, 
such that no significant difference was observed between real-world and counterfactual-
world skill. Additionally, all age groups were able to generate counterfactual-world 
inferences whilst reading when they were necessary for coherence. For all age groups, 
constructionist processes must thus operate, potentially reducing plausibility constraints, 
resulting in the inhibition of real-world knowledge and successful generation of the 
counterfactual-world inference. 
Inhibitory control was also found to play a role in counterfactual-world inference 
generation. Inhibitory control was the second strongest predictor of counterfactual-world 
elaborative inference generation in Year 7, after belief biases, such that those Year 7s 
with stronger inhibitory control generated counterfactual-world elaborative inferences 
with more success. Given the discussion above, it is likely that inhibitory control plays a 
role in inhibiting the real-world interference caused by belief biases. Whilst inhibitory 
control was also a significant predictor in Year 9, the relationship was negative. A 
negative relationship was also observed between inhibitory control and real-world 
elaborative inference generation skill. As discussed above, the negative role of inhibitory 
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control in elaborative inference generation could be due to difficulty weighing up several 
options if all but one possibility is quickly suppressed. Alternatively, as discussed above, 
the pattern of results observed could be an artefact of the measures used. 
It is also possible that the shift in the function of inhibitory control reflects a genuine shift 
in the role of inhibitory control in counterfactual-world processing. Previous research 
suggests a shift in counterfactual-world processing around the ages of 12-14 years, 
underpinned by developments in inhibitory control (Raefetseder et al., 2010; 2013). It is 
suggested that older CYP and adults apply a more complex counterfactual-world 
processing strategy, such that they consider two worlds. Younger CYP are thought to 
apply a simpler basic processing strategy, such that only one world is created and 
considered. When reading, the construction of only one model – a counterfactual-world 
model – would be beneficial such that real-world interference would be minimal. In 
conflict with previous research, the results of Chapter 7 suggest that inhibitory control 
does not improve from Year 7 to Year 9 (Bjorklund and Harnishfeger, 1990; Romine & 
Reynolds, 2005). However, previous research suggests that improvements in inhibitory 
control are largely due to increasing efficiency during adolescence. The inhibitory control 
measure used in the current research tapped accuracy not speed. It is possible then that 
those Year 9s with superior inhibitory accuracy in the current research are also those Year 
9s who are able to more quickly inhibit information. If the shift in processing strategy is 
attributable to increasing inhibitory efficiency then Year 9 may be facing more 
interference than the other age groups, explaining the negative relationship observed. This 
interpretation is highly speculative. Further research would be needed to explore the role 
of inhibitory control, using several measures, in real-world and counterfactual-world 
inference generation skills during adolescence.  
Finally, it is important to note that critical texts were presented within a fantasy world 
which provided a plausible context for the counterfactual-world critical texts. Previous 
research exploring counterfactual-world text processing within a counterfactual-world 
context finds accommodation after an initial delay which is associated with the setting up 
of a counterfactual-world mental model (e.g. Ferguson, 2012; Ferguson & Sanford, 2008, 
Hald et al., 2007). Real-world critical texts were also presented within a fantasy context, 
yet real-world information was processed faster than counterfactual-world information. 
Unlike previous research in which the counterfactual-world critical text is primed by the 
counterfactual-world context, the fantasy contexts used in the IST were designed to reflect 
the natural reading process such that the critical texts in the current thesis were not primed 
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by the story context. Consistent with Warren et al. (2008) the results of this thesis suggest 
that, for all age groups, likelihood predicts processing difficulty in counterfactual-world 
contexts, not plausibility per se.  Real-world information would be more likely given that 
even counterfactual-world mental models are grounded by real-world knowledge. It is 
argued that readers create counterfactual-worlds by applying the nearest possible world 
constraint – i.e. only minimal changes are made to real-world beliefs (Rafetseder et al., 
2010). Taken together, it is likely that readers experience less interference when 
processing counterfactual-world information in counterfactual-world contexts once the 
counterfactual-world context is familiar, constraints are set and counterfactual-world 
information is no longer unexpected. This would explain how readers are able to engage 
so fully with fantasy and fiction texts, becoming lost in the fantasy world. Further research 
would be needed to explore how these worlds are built over time. 
 
9.2. Educational Applications 
Through the researcher’s work in schools she became aware of the vast use of strategies 
to promote comprehension in the classroom and small groups. However, many of these 
strategies appeared to be things teachers thought would work, rather than the result of 
evidenced-based practice or the design of an individualised intervention following a 
specific assessment. As discussed below, the findings of this thesis can be used to support 
the limited evidence-base exploring comprehension and text composition programmes 
and strategies for struggling adolescents and the design of assessments which could lead 
to individualised intervention for those most in need of support. 
9.2.1. General Classroom and Small-Group Strategies 
 
Gregg Brooks provides an overview of the literacy one-to-one, small group s and whole 
class strategies and programmes available to schools in the UK in his fifth edition of 
‘What works for children and young people with literacy difficulties?’  (Brooks, 2016). 
However, whilst government statistics highlight the literacy needs of secondary school 
CYP (Department for Education, 2015a), compared to the number of interventions 
targeting word reading and spelling in primary and secondary school CYP, the number 
of interventions targeting comprehension and text composition are limited. Moreover, a 
review of the interventions reported by Brooks suggests that of those interventions 
claiming to support the development of comprehension, for many this is ‘achieved’ 
through a quiz at the end of each passage. However, in line with the systematic review 
conducted by Paul and Clarke (2016), those interventions found effective at improving 
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comprehension explicitly teach comprehension strategies. For example, Brooks 
highlights inference training as an intervention for secondary school CYP. Similarly, 
Brooks highlights ‘Self Regulated Strategy Development’ (SRSD) as an intervention to 
improve writing skill in CYP in Years 6 and 7. The programme promotes planning, 
monitoring and evaluation, with planning supported by real-world visits to different areas. 
Further support for this intervention comes from Torgerson, Torgerson, Ainsworth, 
Buckley, Heaps, Hewitt, and Mitchell (2014) who, using a randomised control trial, found 
SRSD had a positive effective on the writing skill of the intervention group, in comparison 
to the control group, after 20 weeks. Furthermore, Brooks highlights the efficacy of 
reciprocal reading, an intervention that can be used at the small group level to teach and 
promote skills in the following comprehension strategies: predicting, clarifying, 
questioning and summarising. Although Brooks presents this as an intervention for Years 
5 to 6, through practical work in schools, the researcher is aware of this intervention being 
used more widely across the primary school years and in some secondary schools. It 
appears, then, that to promote comprehension abilities, one must directly target and teach 
comprehension strategies, with the teaching of inference generation one such skill to 
target. The results of the current thesis thus support this body of research and the 
classroom practice the researcher has observed. However, in line with previous research 
as discussed below, this thesis may be able to extend and elaborate on the specific 
teaching of inference generation to small groups and whole classes. 
Given that coherence inferences were found to be generated online, regardless of 
plausibility, strategies should be used to promote the generation of these inferences whilst 
reading. The findings of the current thesis suggest that possession of and, particularly 
during the Secondary School years, ready access to the necessary knowledge-base is 
essential to the successful generation of a coherence inference. This is in line with 
research finding that training students to activate their background knowledge when 
reading can improve their comprehension (e.g. Berkley, Mastropieri, & Scruggs, 2011). 
Educational practitioners should thus encourage the activation of the knowledge 
necessary for these inferences before and whilst reading. This will be particularly 
important for those groups who may not possess the necessary knowledge themselves – 
e.g. EAL learners, pupils from deprived socio-economic areas who may have limited 
experiences. Before reading activities could include speaking and listening activities such 
as brain-storming ideas across the class, small group or paired discussion, and multimedia 
stimuli to prompt discussion and encourage learning of ideas and vocabulary. During 
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reading activities could include think-aloud modelling by an adult highlighting how 
background knowledge is activated and used to link two or more ideas (e.g. “this bit of 
the text reminds me of…”), questioning of texts whilst reading, or marked up texts with 
different symbols to encourage the activation of specific knowledge. 
Elaborative inferences were found to be generated offline. Therefore, elaborative 
inference generation questions and activities should be reserved for after reading. The 
successful generation of these inferences is dependent on a solid mental model for use in 
later comprehension tasks. A solid mental model can be encouraged using the techniques 
and activities discussed above. Elaborative inference generation was found to be 
dependent on both accessibility of knowledge and inhibitory control during Secondary 
School. Therefore, tasks to promote activation and consideration of elaborative 
knowledge should be promoted. Activities could include drawing or writing about a 
setting or character (e.g. wanted posters), role-play and hot seating (e.g. based on what 
you know about X what would he say if…), comparative questions. This is supported by 
Tarchi (2015) who found that an intervention designed to promote knowledge activation 
during reading improved not only inference generation abilities but also reading 
comprehension skill in CYP aged 12-13 years. The findings of the current research 
suggest that the ability to consider multiple options becomes difficult for CYP in 
Secondary School, such that in Year 9 a negative relationship is observed between 
inhibitory control and elaborative inference generation skill. It is possible that adults 
inhibit knowledge too strongly, restricting their ability to weigh up and consider multiple 
possibilities. The use of debate activities may thus be beneficial in encouraging CYP to 
consider several options. Given that the role of elaborative inference generation in reading 
comprehension increased with age, the promotion of elaborative inferences is likely to be 
particularly key in the Secondary School years. This is supported by Vaughn, Klingner, 
Swanson, Boardman, Roberts, Mohammed, et al. (2011) who also suggests that for older 
adolescents support should focus on developing an enriched elaborated mental model. 
Many of the activities described above would fit within Reciprical Reading. For example, 
role play and hot-seating activities fit within predicting, questioning and clarifying 
strategies. 
For counterfactual-world texts, belief biases were found to be key. It is suggested that the 
anomaly effects observed for counterfactual-world critical texts compared to real-world 
critical texts can be attributed to expectancy as both were presented in counterfactual-
world contexts. Therefore, to minimise interference and associated cognitive demands it 
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may be beneficial to aid CYP in creating an initial counterfactual-world mental model 
using other sources in which constraints of impossibility are set. This is supported by the 
work of Filik & Colleagues who found that counterfactual-world models can be added to 
the reader’s knowledge-base (Filik, 2008; Filik & Leuthold, 2008; 2013). Fantasy and 
fiction texts are commonly chosen for pleasure (Clark & Foster, 2005; Clark & Rumbold, 
2006). Given the correlation between reading for pleasure and reading comprehension 
skill (Mahiri, 2003) and academic achievement (Moje, Overby, Tysvaer, & Morris, K. 
2008) supporting engagement with fantasy and fiction texts may particularly aid those 
who have disengaged with reading. This may encourage these CYP to read for pleasure 
and ultimately improve their reading comprehension skill. 
Developments in text production were underpinned by increasing coherence, with the role 
of coherence inferences increasing with age (although this increase was not significant). 
CYP’s writing may thus be improved by providing scaffolds and prompts that help the 
CYP to maintain coherence – e.g. planning sheets, writing models, and vocabulary mats 
with connectives. This thus fits with the SRSD writing intervention discussed above. CYP 
may be encouraged to retell stories and sequence events throughout the school day to 
develop their oral organisation skills. Given that amount and accessibility of knowledge 
are the key predictors of coherence inference generation skill during adolescence, helping 
CYP to develop and discuss their content and ideas before writing may also be useful. 
This could take the form a pre-learning sessions, vocabulary mats, and pictorial or textual 
writing stimuli. 
Finally, throughout the school day and across the curriculum in both Primary and 
Secondary Schools learning activities often require some form of reading and writing – 
e.g. worksheets, books, the internet, written questions, essays, posters. For those with 
literacy difficulties it is important that: a) reading comprehension and text production are 
promoted through explicit instruction and intervention when necessary; and b) 
opportunities for learning from alternate sources are provided. Tovani (2001) suggests 
that some CYP with reading comprehension difficulties may be ‘fake reading’ such that 
they gather information from the teacher and class discussion. Making use of these 
strengths is key to ensuring these CYP have opportunities to learn in a way that they are 
good at, maintaining their self-esteem and motivation to learn. This is supported by 
research finding that improving CYP’s views of reading alongside a comprehension 
intervention leads to additional gains in comprehension skill, above any beyond those 
observed for a comprehension intervention alone (Berkley et al., 2011). 
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9.2.2. Identification of Literacy Difficulties and the Design of Specific Interventions 
 
In a review of reading comprehension interventions for Secondary School CYP, Paul and 
Clarke (2016) found that those interventions targeting phonics through computer-based 
programmes were of limited effectiveness. However, interventions which focused 
specifically on comprehension strategies were found to be more effective. Designing 
interventions to target inference generation may thus result in effective interventions. The 
results of Chapter 6 suggested no progress in reading comprehension or text production 
between Year 7 and Year 9. Additionally, the Year 9 sample comprised higher percentage 
of poor comprehenders39 (57%) than Year 5 (27%) and Year 7 (14%)40. These differences 
could be due to the cross-sectional design employed. It is possible that when in Year 7, 
the current Year 9 cohort had weaker skills than the current Year 7 cohort. However, as 
discussed in Chapter 5, the Year 7 and Year 9 cohorts were recruited from the same 
schools using the same selection criteria. It is possible then that findings of the current 
research reflect a genuine period of limited progress. This is supported by UK government 
statistics which suggest around one third of CYP do not make the literacy progress 
expected during the Secondary School years (Department for Education, 2015a). In the 
current thesis, word-reading skill was found to increase between Year 7 and Year 9, 
although due to the correction applied the difference between the two groups failed to 
reach significance. Reading comprehension text was determined by single-word-reading 
score. Therefore, typically, Year 9s read a higher-level comprehension passage than Year 
7s. As discussed above, it is possible that whilst basic inference generation skills are 
achieved by Year 7, ability to apply these skills is mediated by complexity of text. 
Therefore, whilst Year 9 have basic inferential skills, they may be unable to apply these 
effectively when text demands increase. Alternatively, given that reading comprehension 
measures are largely dependent on literal understanding until Secondary School it is 
possible that the texts read by Year 7 tapped primarily literal understanding, whereas the 
texts read by Year 9 taxed more implicit understanding (Cain & Oakhill, 2006b). 
Therefore, some Year 9s may have a literacy difficulty, related to inference generation 
abilities, that has not been identified, thus limiting the progress they can make. Further, 
longitudinal, research is needed. What is clear, at present, however, is that more in-depth 
                                                 
 
39
 defined in this research as those with a reading comprehension age 12 months or less than their 
chronological age 
40
 Due to YARC only providing reading ages up to 16 years the percentage of adults who may be 
classified as poor comprehenders could not be determined. 
273 
 
and accurate assessments of inference generation abilities are needed if specific 
intervention in Year 9 is to be put in place.  
Based on the findings of the current research, to inform effective identification and 
intervention an inference generation measure must be able to: 
 Assess both coherence and elaborative inference types. The two inference types 
were found to be distinct, underpinned by different processes and play different 
roles in reading comprehension and text production.   Assess both the inference generation time-course and skill. Coherence 
inferences were found to be generated online. Research suggests that the ability 
to generate these inferences spontaneously whilst reading improves with age (e.g. 
Barnes, et al., 1996; Casteel, 1993; Oakhill et al., 2003). Therefore, some with 
limited comprehension skills may be capable of generating coherence inferences 
when given a prompt but not whilst reading. The intervention would need to target 
inferential efficiency.  Assess inference generation skills independent of expressive language skills. 
The development of inference generation abilities observed in this study was 
consistent with Casteel and colleagues (Casteel, 1993; Casteel & Simpson, 1991), 
such that adult-like inferential skill was observed around 11-12 years and adult-
like inferential efficiency around 13-14years. Barnes et al., (1996) found that 
inference generation abilities continued to develop until at least 16 years. Barnes 
et al. used a question-answer assessment method whereas Casteel and colleagues 
and the current study used measures of inference generation that were not 
dependent on expressive language skills. The discrepancy between the studies 
suggests that whilst CYP may be able to generate inferences at an adult-like level 
by 11-12 years, their ability to articulate the inference may continue to develop 
until adulthood. To determine if inference generation and mental model 
construction skills or articulation of ideas should be the target of the intervention 
the assessment tool used needs to explore these skills independently.  Provide diagnostic information. The error analyses conducted in this thesis 
suggests that for all ages inference failure can result from several different faulty 
process. It is important to know not just which inference types the CYP struggles 
with, but also why. This will allow for specific and targeted intervention to be 
created. 
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A measure similar to the IST with passages varying in complexity may be beneficial in 
the classroom. In addition, educational practitioners may want to consider assessing 
knowledge and inhibitory control given that these cognitive components were found to 
be central to inference generation skill in the current study. 
9.3. Limitations 
9.3.1. Sample Age 
 
Four age groups were recruited for this thesis: 9-10 year olds, 11-12 year olds, 13-14 year 
olds and adults. There is a large gap between 14 years and 18 years. Recruiting a group 
of 15-16 year olds was considered. However, in the researcher’s experience schools can 
be reluctant to release Year 11 pupils due to coursework, revision and exam pressures. 
Research exploring adolescent development shows that many of the key changes take 
place between 11-14years, with development in many executive functions plateauing 
after 14 years (see Romine & Reynolds, 2005 for a meta-analysis). Therefore, it is 
possible that development between 14 years and 18 years would be minimal. However, 
further research would be needed to explore this. 
9.3.2. Sampling Strategy 
 
Primary and secondary school participants were recruited from several schools in the 
South Yorkshire and Derby area. Participants were recruited from several schools to 
obtain a representative sample. However, whilst recruiting participants from a range of 
schools may mean participants received a range of teaching styles and strategies, this 
method also has several limitations. First, there may have been selection bias on the parts 
of the schools, such that the responsibility of pupil selection was given to the schools. 
Therefore, despite being given a list of criteria asking for participants who ranged in 
reading abilities, schools may have selected pupils with good reading abilities to present 
themselves in a positive light. Alternatively, schools may have selected participants who 
presented challenges in the classroom to allow some respite for the child and/or teacher. 
To gain a more representative sample, it may thus have been more appropriate to work 
with just one or two schools, randomly selecting participants or working with a particular 
class. However, the researcher was aware of the pressures placed on schools and did not 
want to place additional strains on schools which could have possibly resulted in school 
drop-out. Second, the list of criteria schools were provided with asked for participants 
who did not have a known learning difficulty and/or did not have exceptional abilities. 
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The full range of abilities in the current UK schooling system is thus not fully represented 
by this research. Further research, then, should aim to seek a truly representative sample 
by recruiting participants from a small number of schools and then randomly selecting 
participants from this pool, regardless of learning needs. 
9.3.3. Design 
 
A cross-sectional design was used in this thesis. Differences observed between the age 
groups may be due to differences in group characteristics rather than developmental 
changes. Every effort was made to ensure similar group characteristics, such that all 
schools were given the same selection criteria. As highlighted above, the unique pattern 
observed in Year 9 may be due to sample characteristics rather than age-related changes. 
Due to time constraints, a longitudinal study was not possible, but should be considered 
in future research. 
9.3.4. The Measures 
 
Development between Year 7 and Year 9 was limited. This could reflect the measures 
used, such that they were not robust enough to detect the subtle changes during this time. 
Some of the issues related to robustness will be discussed below. However, it is important 
to note that development was limited on both researcher-designed and standardised tasks. 
The limited progress observed may thus reflect the sample rather than the measures used. 
9.3.3.1. The IST 
 
The IST explored the processing of coherence and elaborative inferences. However, for 
many items, generation of the inference was more complex than the label suggests, such 
that processing was dependent on more than just successful coherence or elaborative 
inference generation. For instance, many coherence inferences also required referential 
processing due to the need for pronoun resolution. For example, for a coherence inference 
to be generated when reading the critical text below the participant must first infer that 
‘it’ refers to the penguin. 
One penguin jumped into the cold ocean. A few seconds later it was at their feet. 
However, research shows that these inferences are often mastered by young children (e.g. 
Ackerman, 1986). However, has highlighted in Chapter 4, for some children pronoun 
resolution was still an area of difficulty, such that they experienced difficulty when 
processing literal items that required pronoun resolution. It is possible then, that some of 
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the processing difficulty and errors made when processing coherence inferences can be 
attributed to difficulties with other types of inference. The need to generate two inferences 
to comprehend a text is not uncommon in real texts, however, and was often necessary to 
prevent the creation of contrived and stilted target texts and stories.  
A successful elaborative inference on the IST could be defined as the enrichment of the 
text by adding knowledge about the character’s or object’s traits, knowledge or beliefs. 
Therefore, when reading the text “the boy was eating grapes,” one reader could infer that 
the grapes are green the other could infer the grapes are black. In both cases, the readers 
have successfully generated an elaborative inference – i.e. they have added knowledge 
about the object’s traits. However, if the target item is a picture of green grapes, only the 
first reader would be scored as successfully generating the inference. Therefore, whilst 
precautions were taken to avoid a correct inference being scored as incorrect (e.g., 
including grapes of three colours you would not typically see – light blue, orange, and 
pink), it is possible that some participants generated an elaborative inference whist 
reading, but not one that matched the target item, thus performing ‘incorrectly’ on the 
IST. This thus highlights the value of open-ended tasks when exploring elaborative 
inference generation.  
Error rates in all groups were low. This may be due to the simplicity of the texts used – 
stories were designed to be readable by CYP aged 9 years or less. Inference generation 
skill may thus continue to develop after 11-12 years. Due to discrepancies in previous 
research it was important that the same methodology was used for all age groups in the 
current thesis to allow for direct comparison. Future research exploring inference 
generation skills using texts of varying complexity would greatly build upon the inference 
generation development literature, highlighting possible constraining factors. 
Previous research shows that the ability to generate coherence inferences spontaneously 
whilst reading improves with age (e.g. Barnes et al., 1996; Casteel, 1993; Oakhill et al., 
2003). Reading speeds in this thesis suggest that Year 5 were able to generate coherence 
inferences whilst reading. However, the researcher’s observation of the Year 5 
participants and Year 5s when reading naturally in the classroom suggests that Year 5 
may not generate inferences whilst reading. Year 5s will often read a sentence(s) pause 
and then continue. It may be that the inference is generated during the pause not whilst 
reading. When reading naturally Year 5s may not generate all coherence inferences whilst 
reading, therefore, full understanding of text may not be gained. This would explain the 
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significantly lower reading comprehension skill observed in Year 5, compared to all other 
age groups. Research utilising eye-tracking methods would shed further light onto the 
online process of inference generation, such that fixations and pauses can be detected.  
Errors were explored using error analysis. However, errors were excluded from reading 
speed data. Consequently, it is unclear if those coherence inferences generated incorrectly 
were still drawn whilst reading. Further research exploring the process underpinning 
inference generation failure is needed. 
Care was taken to design pictures that reflected the idea intended by the researcher – see 
Chapter 3 – however, the validation of the images could have been improved. Each 
picture was piloted in isolation, however, in the image selection task four pictures were 
presented simultaneously. Therefore, the processing associated with viewing an image in 
isolation during the validation task may not have reflected the processing of viewing four 
images simultaneously during the image selection task. For instance, processing the four 
pictures simultaneously may have been more difficult than processing the pictures in 
isolation, such that interference or overload occurred. Alternatively, processing the four 
pictures simultaneously may have been easier than processing the pictures in isolation, 
such that comparison allowed for clearer distinction of differences between pictures. For 
example, in the piloting phase, participants were able to correctly label thermometers 
displaying extremes (e.g., boiling hot, freezing cold). However, there was more variation 
when labelling thermometers displaying temperatures in between these extremes, such 
that cooler temperatures were typically labelled as cold and warmer temperatures as hot. 
However, if all four pictures were presented simultaneously it may have been possible 
for the participants to more easily distinguish between hot and cold.  
A mixed methods approach could also have been used, such that ratings could have been 
accompanied by an interview in which participants’ explanations for their decisions were 
given. This would have allowed a further insight into which elements of the picture 
supported interpretation and alternatively, which elements of the picture were difficult to 
interpret or ambiguous. This would have guided picture development and may have led 
to clearer pictures being created that were representative of the participants’ views not 
just the researcher’s. This may have resulted in the need for fewer amendments to the 
pictures once in the image selection task. Similarly, some of the children viewed plausible 
pictures as implausible as they would be unlikely to witness the events depicted. This 
information was gathered through the children’s vocalisations. Asking all participants to 
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talk through their plausibility ratings may thus have been useful in determining whether 
all participants viewed the images this way, and any other possible factors which 
influence interpretations of plausibility. This information could have then guided or added 
to future interpretations of performance patterns on the IST, providing insight into the 
processing that occurs when presented with images varying in plausibility.  
This thesis was unique in nature such that it sought to explicitly explore the role of 
inference generation in text production quality. Inference generation was assessed during 
the reading comprehension process. Due to time constraints and an already large test 
battery, the inclusion of another measure of inference generation whilst writing was not 
feasible. This means, however, the role of inference generation in the writing process may 
differ to the one suggested. It is clear from the current research, that inference generation 
skills during reading are in some way borne out when writing. Further research would be 
needed to explore inference generation when writing. To this researcher’s knowledge, 
there is not a measure of inference generation whilst writing, although the use of think-
aloud methodologies may be useful a starting point. 
9.3.3.2. Inhibitory Control 
 
As discussed above, the varying role of inhibitory control in the real-world and 
counterfactual-world elaborative inference generation processes could be due to 
developmental shifts or the measure used (rule-shift-cards task) – i.e. not tapping the 
implicit inhibitory control associated with language comprehension (e.g. Kintsch, 1988). 
Similarly, research shows that improvements in inhibitory control are primarily attributed 
to improvements in efficiency (Romine & Reynolds, 2005), however, developments in 
inhibitory efficiency were not tapped by the current measure. Future research utilising 
several measures of inhibitory control is needed. 
9.3.3.3. Knowledge 
 
Amount of knowledge possessed by all groups was high. This was unexpected given that 
the knowledge-base used to create the critical texts was taken from the Key Stage 3 
science curriculum. However, to ensure all critical texts were readable by CYP aged 9 
years or less, the concepts were relatively simple. For instance, for reproduction the Key 
Stage 3 curriculum explores topics such as mitosis whereas the critical texts were based 
on simple concepts of life cycles – e.g. eggs hatching and seeds growing. Further research 
using texts based on more complex knowledge-bases is needed. 
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9.4. Future Research 
 
This thesis has explored typical development, exploration of this area was necessary 
given the few studies exploring inference generation during adolescence and 
inconsistencies between these studies. Future research is now needed to explore poor 
comprehenders to determine how the developmental trajectory of poor comprehenders 
differs to that mapped out in this thesis. Specifically, research exploring poor 
comprehender profiles around Year 7 and Year 9 could prove fruitful in supporting those 
CYP who do not make the expected literacy progress during Secondary School. The use 
of a longitudinal methodology to explore the profiles of those CYP who appear to be 
developing typically during Primary School but then do not make expected progress 
during Secondary School could be fruitful and provide a useful insight into the cause of 
the limited progress made by some CYP during the Secondary School years – i.e. do these 
CYP have weak inference generation abilities that remain unidentified until Secondary 
School or do these CYP have difficulty applying their inference generation skills as text 
demands increase? 
Previous research exploring counterfactual-world inference generation was inconsistent 
with regards to methodology, stimuli and findings. This thesis took steps in answering 
some of the questions surrounding counterfactual-world inference generation, 
particularly during adolescence. For instance, counterfactual-world processing was found 
to be more taxing than real-world processing due to the need to resolve the conflict 
associated with the real-world interference caused by belief biases. All groups appear to 
be able to generate counterfactual-world coherence inferences whilst reading, around 
Year 9. However, there is a possible qualitative shift in the process underpinning 
counterfactual-world inference generation, with inhibitory control potentially playing a 
key role in this.  Counterfactual-world errors were primarily attributable to real-world 
interference. However, what is not clear from the current research is why participants 
were successful in some instances but not others. Exploration of why some participants 
were unable to successfully inhibit the real-world interference for some items but not 
others is needed. It is possible that success is due to strength of belief biases associated 
with particular concepts. To this researcher’s knowledge this is the first piece of research 
to explicitly implicate belief biases in the counterfactual-world inferential process. 
Further research exploring belief biases in inference generation, its specific function and 
how this process is both similar and dissimilar to the role of belief biases in 
counterfactual-world reasoning is thus warranted.  
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Whilst in the current study all age groups were found to generate counterfactual-world 
inferences online, Graesser et al. (1998) suggested adults generate counterfactual-world 
inferences offline. However, there are a number of methodological differences, between 
their research and the current thesis. It may be that when both adults and children are 
presented with more complex and implausible texts counterfactual-world inferences are 
generated offline. Further research, using texts varying in complexity and plausibility 
would be needed to explore this. 
Finally, since beginning this thesis there have been changes in the National Curriculum 
and assessment tools and procedures (Department for Education, 2014). Exploration of 
how these changes may impact upon teaching and necessity of inference generation at 
different levels is warranted. Specifically, the Primary School reading curriculum and 
assessments now place more emphasis on inferential understanding. Given that almost 
50% of CYP did not achieve age-related expectations in the 2016 reading SATs, a drop 
of almost 30% from 2015, it appears that those CYP previously achieving age-related 
expectations in Primary School but then struggling to make expected progress in 
Secondary School had inferential difficulties throughout their school careers, but 
assessment tools did not assess this (Department of Education, 2016). The high 
percentage of CYP failing to achieve age-related expectations in their reading SATs thus 
highlights the need for much more research into the role of inference generation abilities 
in reading comprehension. Moreover, a ‘world without levels’ has freed schools up to use 
more informative and in-depth measures of reading comprehension (Department for 
Education, 2015c). Further research exploring the design of reading comprehension 
measures, consistent with the criteria laid out in the new National Curriculum and the 
findings of previous research is needed.  
9.5. Conclusions 
Government statistics suggest that around one third of CYP in the UK are not making the 
expected literacy progress during Secondary School, despite less than one fifth of CYP 
entering Secondary School with the reading and writing skills expected (Department for 
Education, 2015). Given the central role of inference generation to skilled models of 
reading comprehension, this thesis sought to explore the development of inference 
generation abilities during adolescence, with the goal of informing effective educational 
practice. Findings show that there is both quantitative and qualitative change in inference 
generation skill (measured by number of errors) and time-course (measured by reading 
speed). All age groups appear to generate coherence inferences online and elaborative 
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inferences offline, regardless of the plausibility of the information, although skill in doing 
so improves until Year 7 and speed in doing so improves until Year 9. Several qualitative 
differences were also observed in Year 9, such that Year 9 found the generation of 
coherence inferences more difficult than the generation of elaborative inferences, in 
contrast to all other age groups, inhibitory control, not belief biases, was also the strongest 
predictor of counterfactual-world coherence inference generation skill, and Year 9 
displayed a negative relationship between inhibitory control and elaborative inference 
generation skill. In addition, shifts in the importance of inference types to the reading 
comprehension and text production processes also emerged around Year 9. Year 9, also 
comprised higher percentage of weak comprehenders than all other groups. Year 9, then, 
appears to be a distinct time in inference generation development. With regards to 
supporting literacy development in the classroom, this thesis has highlighted the role of 
inference generation abilities in both reading comprehension and text production during 
adolescence. The need to isolate basic inference generation skills from translational and 
expressive language skills to identify the specific area of need(s) is also promoted by the 
findings of this thesis. Similarly, the findings of this thesis highlight the distinctiveness 
of coherence and elaborative inference types, calling for assessments and interventions to 
recognise this difference, particularly in the Secondary School years when elaborative 
inference generation may be more important to the reading comprehension process than 
coherence inference generation. Some of those factors (knowledge and inhibitory control) 
that may constrain the successful application of basic inference generation abilities 
(achieved around Year 7) during the Secondary School years have also been identified by 
this thesis, with this thesis providing recommendations to aid teachers in supporting CYP 
overcoming these barriers. Year 9 has been highlighted as a period of special development 
that requires much further research, the role of inhibitory control during this time should 
be a specific focus. This thesis has also extended the Constructionist Theory by showing 
that, for all age groups, regardless of plausibility and information those inferences 
necessary for coherence are generated whilst reading. However, due to belief biases, real-
world interference is still likely, meaning if teachers want to engage learners with fantasy 
and fiction texts they may first need to support the CYP in creating a counterfactual-world 
model. 
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Appendix 3.1 – Readability levels for all stories 
Story Readability Rating 
Counterfactual-
World 
 
Story 1 – Version 1 8.732 
Story 1 – Version 2 8.409 
Story 2 – Version 1 8.951 
Story 2 – Version 2 8.977 
Story 3 – Version 1 8.732 
Story 3 – Version 2 8.758 
Story 4 – Version 1 8.732 
Story 4 – Version 2 8.706 
Story 5 – Version 1 8.758 
Story 5 – Version 2 8.732 
Story 6 – Version 1 8.706 
Story 6 – Version 2 8.68 
Real-World  
Story 7 – Version 1 8.435 
Story 7 – Version 2 8.977 
Story 8 – Version 1 8.435 
Story 8 – Version 2 8.977 
Story 9 – Version 1 8.487 
Story 9 – Version 2 8.732 
Story 10 – Version 1 8.977 
Story 10 – Version 2 8.977 
Story 11 – Version 1 8.951 
Story 11 – Version 2 8.68 
Story 12 – Version 1 8.706 
Story 12 – Version 2 8.977 
Literal  
Story 13 – Version 1 8.977 
Story 13 – Version 2 8.977 
Story 14 – Version 1 8.977 
Story 14 – Version 2 8.977 
Story 15 – Version 1 8.706 
Story 15 – Version 2 8.977 
Story 16 – Version 1 8.977 
Story 16 – Version 2 8.732 
Story 17 – Version 1 8.977 
Story 17 – Version 2 8.977 
Story 18 – Version 1 8.977 
Story 18 – Version 2 8.732 
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Appendix 3.2 – Table of Key Stage 2 and 3 Science Topics and Associated 
Critical Texts 
 
Theme Real-World Stimuli 
Counterfactual-
World Stimuli Literal Stimuli 
Coherence Inferences 
Reproduction Holly planted a 
tiny seed. A 
century later an 
oak tree stood in 
its place. 
The seed grew 
into a tree 
The giant egg began 
to crack loudly. 
Soon, instead of the 
egg there was a 
small bear cub. 
The bear hatched 
from the egg 
The men were 
clones. They all 
looked the same 
because the men 
had been grown 
in giant test 
tubes. 
The men had 
been grown in 
giant test tubes 
Transport One penguin 
jumped into the 
cold ocean. A few 
seconds later it 
was at their feet. 
The penguin 
swam to the 
children 
Arms spread wide he 
jumped off the ledge. 
A few seconds later 
he was on the other 
side. 
The man flew 
across the hole 
The large fish ran 
across the green 
grass. He left a 
trail of gunky 
slime as he went. 
The fish ran 
across the grass 
Communication Ben heard a long 
deep sound. Ben 
turned around to 
see a whale 
swimming next to 
him. 
The whale made 
the sound. 
 
“Hello,” came a 
voice from below. 
They looked down to 
see a cat looking at 
them. 
The cat talked to 
them 
Holly did not 
want to wake the 
huge fish up. So 
when Holly 
spoke to Ben she 
whispered. 
Holly spoke to 
Ben 
Structure Ben fell to the 
ground. He 
landed on his leg. 
There was a crack 
and Ben cried out 
in pain. 
Ben's leg broke 
The tree was ten feet 
away. They span 
around again. The 
same tree was now 
two feet away. 
The tree moved 
closer to Holly and 
Ben 
These plants did 
not suck up water 
from their roots. 
The plants 
sucked up water 
from a huge 
straw. 
Plants suck up 
water through a 
straw 
Animal Attacks However, a shark 
was approaching. 
It attacked. Blood 
began to spill out 
of Holly’s arm. 
The hungry tiger 
pounced.  Almost 
instantly Ben's face 
was covered in warm 
sticky spit. 
“ARGH!!!” 
Holly cried out in 
pain. A snake had 
bitten her ankle. 
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The shark bit 
Holly's arm 
The tiger licked 
Ben's face 
The venom was 
very toxic. 
The snake bit 
Holly 
Density They cautiously 
crept on to the 
thin ice. Crack! 
Crack! Ice cold 
water swept all 
over them. 
The children fell 
through the ice 
They slowly stepped 
onto the murky lake. 
They crossed the 
lake without so much 
as wet feet. 
The children 
walked on water 
They ran back to 
the spaceship 
along the hard 
road. They made 
it back in no time 
at all. 
The children 
ran on the road 
 
Elaborative Inferences 
 
Colour The gigantic clay 
statue shone in 
the sun light. It 
must have been at 
least ten feet high. 
The statue was a 
burnt  orange 
colour 
The tiny bear cub 
was quite odd. He 
was not covered in 
fur. He was covered 
in cheese. 
The bear is yellow 
Every blade of 
grass was exactly 
the same. Every 
blade of grass 
was quite short 
and green. 
Grass is green 
Texture Luckily a snake 
skin floated past 
Holly. She took it 
and made a bag 
out of it. 
The bag is scaly 
They were shaped 
like human hands. 
But, they were like a 
large bird's wing in 
every other way. 
The man's hand is 
covered in feathers 
Surprisingly the 
fish was huge. 
The fish was also 
covered in pink 
and purple fur. 
The fish is 
covered in fur 
Temperature Holly and Ben 
spotted a little 
white house. The 
tiny round house 
was made out of 
snow. 
The house is 
cold. 
The fluid in the 
stream was brown 
and steaming. 
“Watch out Holly, it 
is coffee!” said Ben. 
The river is hot 
Holly licked the 
ice-lolly. She 
screamed. The 
ice-lolly was so 
hot it had burnt 
her tongue. 
Ice is hot 
Weight The hippo looked 
at Holly and Ben. 
As the hippo 
walked it's giant 
feet cracked the 
ground. 
Hippos are 
heavy 
Holly and Ben 
looked up. The giant 
grey leaves above 
their heads were 
made of solid stone. 
The leaves are 
heavy 
The rhino was 
very very big. It 
had huge feet and 
was very very 
heavy. 
The rhino is 
heavy 
Rigidity Ben grabbed the 
steel shield. He 
used it to protect 
them from the 
huge rocks. 
The trees were odd. 
The tree trunks were 
not made of wood. 
They were made out 
The people in 
this place wore 
tops made from 
elastic. Elastic is 
quite stretchy. 
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The shield was 
hard and 
inflexible 
of huge pipe 
cleaners. 
Tree trunks are 
bendy 
Elastic is 
stretchy 
Colour The caring Blibs 
gave Ben a 
special medicine. 
It was made from 
mashed up 
bananas. 
The medicine 
was yellow. 
The trees were odd. 
The leaves were 
covered in tiny 
rubies that glinted in 
the sunlight. 
The leaves were red 
There was a large 
herd of very odd 
zebras. The 
zebras were 
covered in huge 
pink stripes. 
The zebra had 
pink stripes 
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Appendix 3.3 – Critical Texts and Test Sentences used in Critical Text 
Validation Booklet 
Critical Text Test Sentence 
Although it glided through the water the 
humongous hippo was extremely heavy. 
Hippos on this planet are very light.  
He dove off the cliff. Arms spread wide 
he soared through the air and soon landed 
on the other cliff. 
The friendly man had flown across the 
large gap.   
They stepped onto the lake. Soon they 
were on the other side, without so much 
as wet feet. 
The children had walked across the 
water. 
The creature's gigantic hairy paw had 
been cut by the sharp metal spikes 
beneath it. 
The sharp metal tickled the creatures 
paw.   
Surprisingly the gigantic fish was covered 
in soft orange and violet fur. 
Fish on this planet are covered in fur. 
The hideous creature had toxic green 
blood leaking from a cut in its huge left 
paw. 
The enormous creature had red thick 
blood. 
Ben and Holly were trapped in a tiny 
cage. The cold bars were made of solid 
steel. 
Steel is very soft.    
The bear cub was odd. It wasn't covered 
in fur. It was covered in banana skins. 
The bears on this planet are yellow.   
Quietly Holly spoke to Ben, careful not to 
wake the sleeping creature behind them. 
Quietly Holly spoke to Ben.   
The beautiful granite statue towered 
above all of the other buildings. 
The statue was black.   
However, the shark was approaching. It 
pounced. Blood began to spill out of 
Holly’s arm. 
The evil shark had bitten Holly's arm. 
The hairy brown elephant stood in front 
of them, using its trunk to suck up the 
snow. 
Elephants are heavy. 
The monkeys had very odd looking faces; 
in the place of their nose was a green 
snake. 
The small monkey's nose was covered in 
fur. 
Ben fell to the ground. He landed on his 
leg. There was a crack and Ben cried out 
in pain. 
The bone in Ben's leg had broken.   
Luckily unlike those on Earth the rocks 
on this planet were very soft and spongy. 
The rocks on this planet are very hard. 
Instead of sucking water up through their 
roots, these plants sucked up water 
through a straw. 
The flowers suck up water through a 
straw.   
The egg began to crack loudly. Soon, 
instead of the egg there was a small furry 
bear cub. 
The tiny bear cub had hatched from the 
egg. 
All of the inhabitants of this planet were 
exactly the same. They were all clones. 
The inhabitants were all the same.   
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The whale made a low deep groan. 
Suddenly many more whales appeared 
around him. 
The whale called to the other whales. 
  
The tiny animal had been shot. A bright 
orange substance was oozing from the 
wound. 
The gigantic creature had bright red 
blood.   
Instead of sparkling blue water, a thick 
stream of coffee was flowing through the 
river. 
The rivers on this planet are hot.   
The large tree was on their right. They 
turned around again, and saw the same 
tree on their left! 
The trees had moved.   
A great magnificent eagle soared high 
above their heads full of both grace and 
power. 
The large eagle was covered in scales. 
The fish ran across the green grass, 
leaving a trail of pink sticky slime as he 
went. 
The wet fish ran across the grass. 
A snake skin washed up on one of the 
islands. Holly quickly turned it into a hat. 
The hat was scaly.   
"Don't worry, it will grow back," said 
Cain. "Part of the plant lives on under the 
soil." 
Plants do not have roots below the soil. 
Instead of leaves all of the trees seemed to 
be growing tiny cans of coca cola. 
Leaves on the trees on this planet are 
mostly red.   
His tail had been cut off, but instead of a 
wound, there was a new smaller tail. 
The dog's tail had grown back.   
Enormous leaves were rustling above 
their heads, enormous leaves made of 
solid lead. 
The leaves on this planet are very light. 
They cautiously tiptoed across the thin 
ice. Crack! Ice cold water engulfed their 
bodies. 
The children had fallen through the thin 
ice. 
Very slowly Holly and Ben looked up. 
The grey leaves high above them were 
made of rock. 
The leaves on this planet are heavy.   
Splash. The heavy marble rocks quickly 
sank to the bottom of the very murky 
lake. 
The rocks on this planet sink in water. 
The giraffe had a huge neck which it was 
using to get leaves from the top of the 
trees. 
The giraffes on this planet have short 
necks. 
“Hello,” came a voice from behind. They 
turned around to see a cat looking at 
them. 
The cats on this planet can talk. 
Holly took a bite of the pear. Instantly she 
fell to the ground clutching her belly. 
The pears on this planet are good for 
you.   
There was no way out. Just like 
everything else, their small cage was 
made of solid concrete. 
Concrete is hard and inflexible.   
Holly planted a tiny seed. A century later 
an oak tree stood in its place. 
The seed had grown into a huge oak tree. 
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One penguin jumped into the ice cold 
ocean. Moments later it appeared at their 
feet. 
The penguin had swum to the children. 
“ARGH!!!” Holly cried out. A snake had 
bit her ankle. The venom was extremely 
deadly. 
The evil snake bit Holly's pale ankle. 
  
Whilst shaped like a human hand, it was 
like a bird's wing in every other way 
possible. 
The mans hands were covered in 
feathers.    
Holly fell forward and landed in 
something warm sticky and red. She 
screamed loudly. 
She had landed in a pool of ketchup. 
The zebras trotting ahead of them had 
bright yellow stripes all over their bodies. 
All of the zebras had bright yellow 
stripes.   
Instantly she screamed in pain. The ice-
lolly was so hot it burnt her tongue when 
she licked it. 
The ice lollies on this planet are hot.   
Even every tree trunk was exactly the 
same. They were all perfect cylinders. 
The tree trunks are all rectangular 
shaped.   
Surprisingly, instead of wood, the tree 
trunks seemed to be made out of plastic 
rulers. 
Trees trunks on this planet are flexible. 
The enormous field ahead of them was 
filled to the brim with beautiful poppies. 
Poppies are red.   
However, they were trapped. There was 
no way out. The thick walls of rock were 
completely solid. 
The rocks on this planet were really soft. 
The whole planet was covered in thick 
white snow. Snow so deep it came up to 
their elbows. 
Snow is very cold. 
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Appendix 3.4 – Critical Text ratings for each item 
Critical Sentence Accuracy Ratings (%) - Children 
Item Percentage of time item 
was rated correctly 
1a 90% 
1b 90% 
2a 90% 
2b 80% 
3a 100% 
3b 80% 
4a 80% 
4b 100% 
5a 90% 
5b 90% 
6a 100% 
6b 80% 
7a 90% 
7b 90% 
8a 80% 
8b 80% 
9a 90% 
9b 80% 
10a 90% 
10b 90% 
11a 100% 
11b 80% 
12a 100% 
12b 80% 
13a 80% 
13b 50% 
14a 80% 
14b 80% 
15a 80% 
15b 40% 
16a 90% 
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16b 80% 
17a 80% 
17b 90% 
18a 80% 
18b 100% 
 
Critical Sentence Accuracy Ratings - Adults 
Item Percentage of time item 
was rated correctly 
1a 80% 
1b 80% 
2a 90% 
2b 90% 
3a 80% 
3b 90% 
4a 100% 
4b 80% 
5a 100% 
5b 90% 
6a 80% 
6b 90% 
7a 80% 
7b 80% 
8a 90% 
8b 80% 
9a 100% 
9b 100% 
10a 90% 
10b 100% 
11a 100% 
11b 90% 
12a 90% 
12b 90% 
13a 80% 
13b 80% 
14a 90% 
14b 80% 
15a 100% 
15b 90% 
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16a 90% 
16b 100% 
17a 80% 
17b 80% 
18a 90% 
18b 100% 
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Appendix 3.5 – Table of Picture Accuracy Percentages for each Item 
Pictorial Items Correctly identified (%) by children 
Item Target Picture Filler 1 Filler 2 Filler 3 
1a 100% 100% 100% 100% 
1b 100% 100% 100% 100% 
2a 100% 100% 100% 80% 
2b 100% 80% 100% 100% 
3a 100% 100% 100% 100% 
3b 80% 100% 100% 100% 
4a 40% 100% 100% 100% 
4b 100% 100% 100% 100% 
5a 100% 100% 100% 100% 
5b 100% 100% 100% 100% 
6a 100% 100% 100% 100% 
6b 80% 80% 100% 80% 
7a 80% 100% 80% 100% 
7b 100% 100% 100% 100% 
8a 100% 100% 100% 80% 
8b 100% 100% 100% 100% 
9a 100% 100% 100% 100% 
9b 100% 100% 100% 100% 
10a 100% 100% 80% 100% 
10b 60% 60% 20% 0% 
11a 100% 100% 100% 100% 
11b 100% 100% 100% 100% 
12a 80% 100% 100% 80% 
12b 100% 80% 100% 80% 
13a 100% 100% 100% 100% 
13b 100% 100% 100% 100% 
14a 20% 80% 0% 60% 
14b 80% 100% 80% 100% 
15a 100% 100% 100% 100% 
15b 100% 100% 100% 100% 
16a 100% 100% 100% 80% 
16b 100% 100% 100% 100% 
17a 100% 100% 100% 100% 
17b 100% 100% 100% 100% 
18a 100% 100% 80% 80% 
18b 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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Pictorial Items Correctly identified (%) by adults 
Item Target Picture Filler 1 Filler 2 Filler 3 
1a 100% 100% 100% 100% 
1b 100% 80% 100% 100% 
2a 100% 100% 100% 100% 
2b 100% 100% 100% 100% 
3a 80% 80% 80% 80% 
3b 80% 100% 100% 100% 
4a 80% 100% 100% 100% 
4b 100% 100% 100% 100% 
5a 80% 100% 100% 100% 
5b 100% 100% 100% 100% 
6a 100% 100% 100% 80% 
6b 80% 80% 80% 100% 
7a 100% 100% 100% 100% 
7b 100% 100% 100% 100% 
8a 100% 100% 100% 80% 
8b 80% 80% 100% 100% 
9a 100% 100% 100% 80% 
9b 100% 100% 100% 100% 
10a 100% 100% 100% 100% 
10b 80% 60% 60% 20% 
11a 100% 100% 100% 100% 
11b 100% 100% 100% 100% 
12a 100% 100% 80% 100% 
12b 100% 100% 80% 100% 
13a 100% 100% 100% 100% 
13b 80% 100% 100% 100% 
14a 20% 20% 80% 60% 
14b 80% 100% 100% 100% 
15a 100% 100% 100% 100% 
15b 100% 100% 100% 100% 
16a 100% 100% 100% 80% 
16b 100% 100% 100% 100% 
17a 100% 100% 80% 100% 
17b 100% 100% 100% 100% 
18a 100% 100% 100% 80% 
18b 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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Appendix 3.6 – Table of Mean Difficulty Ratings for Each Picture 
Mean difficulty rating for each item for children 
Item Target Picture Filler 1 Filler 2 Filler 3 
1a 1.2 (0.45) 1.2 (0.45) 1.2 (0.45) 1.2 (0.45) 
1b 1.2 (0.45) 1.2 (0.45) 1.4 (0.55) 1.4 (0.55) 
2a 1.2 (0.5) 2 (0.82) 1.4 (0.50) 1.75 (0.96) 
2b 1.6 (0.57) 1.25 (0.50) 2 (0.82) 2 (0.82) 
3a 1.6 (0.55) 1.4 (0.55) 1.4 (0.55) 1.4 (0.55) 
3b 1.5 (0.58) 1.4 (1.00) 1.4 (0.58) 1.2 (0.50) 
4a 2 (1.41) 1.6 (0.71) 1.8 (1.41) 1.4 (0.55) 
4b 1.2 (0.45) 1.2 (0.45) 1.4 (0.55) 1.4 (0.55) 
5a 2 (0.71) 1.2 (0.45) 1.8 (0.45) 1.4 (0.55) 
5b 1.4 (0.55) 1.4 (0.55) 1.6 (0.89) 1.6 (0.55) 
6a 1.2 (0.45) 1.2 (0.45) 1.4 (0.55) 1.2 (0.45) 
6b 1.5 (0.71) 1.25 (0.71) 1.4 (0.71) 1.5 (0.71) 
7a 1.75 (0.5) 1.2 (0.45) 1 (0.00) 1.4 (0.55) 
7b 1.4 (0.55) 1.2 (0.45) 1.4 (0.55) 1.4 (0.55) 
8a 1.4 (0.55) 1.2 (0.45) 1.4 (0.55) 1.4 (0.55) 
8b 1.6 (0.55) 1.6 (0.55) 2 (1.25) 2 (1.25) 
9a 1.6 (0.55) 1.2 (0.45) 1.4 (0.55) 1.6 (0.55) 
9b 1.6 (0.89) 1.4 (0.55) 1.4 (0.55) 1.6 (0.55) 
10a 1.2 (0.50) 1.2 (0.50) 1.5 (0.58) 1.4 (0.50) 
10b 1.67 (0.58) 1.67 (0.58) 2 (0.00) 1.5 (0.58) 
11a 1.6 (0.55) 1.6 (0.89) 1.4 (0.55) 1.4 (0.55) 
11b 1.4 (0.55) 1.4 (0.55) 1.6 (0.89) 1.6 (0.55) 
12a 1.5 (0.58) 1.4 (0.71) 1.25 (0.71) 1.25 (0.71) 
12b 1.2 (0.58) 1.5 (0.58) 1.8 (1.53) 1.67 (1.15) 
13a 1.2 (0.45) 1.2 (0.45) 1.2 (0.45) 1.4 (0.55) 
13b 1.4 (0.55) 1.2 (0.45) 1.2 (0.45) 1.4 (0.55) 
14a 2 (1.26) 1.2 (0.50) 2 (0.82) 1.4 (0.50) 
14b 2 (1.00) 1.5 (0.58) 1.6 (1.00) 1.75 (1.15) 
15a 1.2 (0.45) 1.4 (0.55) 1.4 (0.55) 1.4 (0.55) 
15b 1.4 (0.55) 1.2 (0.45) 1.6 (0.55) 1.4 (0.55) 
16a 1.4 (0.58) 1.2 (0.58) 1.4 (0.58) 1 (0.00) 
16b 1.6 (0.55) 1.2 (0.45) 1.4 (0.55) 1.2 (0.45) 
17a 1 (0.00) 1.2 (0.50) 1.2 (0.50) 1.2 (0.50) 
17b 1.6 (0.55) 1.4 (0.55) 1.6 (0.55) 1.2 (0.45) 
18a 1.4 (0.50) 1.2 (0.45) 1.6 (0.50) 1.25 (0.50) 
18b 1.2 (0.50) 1.2 (0.50) 1.25 (0.50) 1.25 (0.50) 
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Mean difficulty rating for each item for adults 
Item Target Picture Filler 1 Filler 2 Filler 3 
1a 1.00 (0.00) 1.40 (0.55) 1.20 (0.45) 1.00 (0.00) 
1b 1.20 (0.45) 1.25 (0.50) 1.40 (0.55) 1.60 (0.55) 
2a 1.20 (0.45) 1.80 (1.79) 1.40 (0.55) 1.60 (0.55) 
2b 1.20 (0.45) 1.20 (0.45) 1.60 (0.55) 1.80 (0.84) 
3a 2.33 (1.53) 1.75 (0.96) 1.75 (0.5) 1.75 (0.96) 
3b 2.00 (1.00) 1.40 (0.55) 1.80 (0.84) 1.00 (0.00) 
4a 2.00 (0.82) 1.20 (0.45) 1.60 (0.55) 1.80 (0.96) 
4b 1.20 (0.45) 1.20 (0.45) 1.40 (0.55) 1.40 (0.55) 
5a 1.50 (0.58) 1.00 (0.00) 2.00 (1.23) 1.20 (0.45) 
5b 1.40 (0.55) 1.60 (0.89) 1.60 (0.89) 1.80 (0.84) 
6a 1.20 (0.45) 1.00 (0.00) 1.40 (0.55) 1.00 (0.00) 
6b 1.50 (0.58) 2.00 (1.41) 1.50 (0.58) 2.00 (1.25) 
7a 1.60 (0.50) 1.60 (0.55) 1.40 (0.58) 1.80 (0.84) 
7b 1.60 (0.55) 1.40 (0.55) 1.60 (0.55) 1.20 (0.45) 
8a 1.20 (0.45) 1.60 (0.89) 1.40 (0.55) 2.00 (0.82) 
8b 1.25 (0.50) 1.75 (0.96) 2.00 (1.25) 1.80 (0.84) 
9a 2.00 (0.71) 1.80 (0.84) 1.40 (0.55) 1.20 (0.45) 
9b 1.20 (0.45) 1.60 (0.55) 1.40 (0.55) 1.60 (0.89) 
10a 1.40 (0.55) 1.00 (0.00) 1.60 (0.55) 1.20 (0.45) 
10b 1.75 (1.16) 1.67 (1.16) 1.33 (0.00) 2.00 (1.00) 
11a 1.40 (0.55) 1.80 (0.84) 1.40 (0.55) 1.40 (0.55) 
11b 1.40 (0.55) 1.80 (1.30) 1.80 (0.84) 1.80 (0.84) 
12a 1.20 (0.45) 1.80 (1.30) 1.50 (0.58) 1.80 (0.45) 
12b 2.00 (1.73) 1.40 (1.52) 1.40 (0.55) 1.40 (0.55) 
13a 1.20 (0.45) 1.20 (0.45) 1.20 (0.45) 1.20 (0.45) 
13b 1.75 (0.50) 1.60 (0.89) 1.80 (0.84) 1.40 (0.55) 
14a 1.67 (0.58) 1.50 (2.12) 1.75 (0.96) 1.75 (0.96) 
14b 2.20 (1.30) 1.60 (0.89) 1.60 (0.55) 1.20 (0.45) 
15a 1.20 (0.45) 1.00 (0.00) 1.40 (0.55) 1.60 (0.55) 
15b 2.00 (1.23) 1.20 (0.45) 1.20 (0.45) 1.60 (0.89) 
16a 1.60 (0.55) 1.80 (1.10) 1.80 (0.84) 2.00 (1.41) 
16b 1.60 (0.55) 1.60 (0.89) 1.20 (0.45) 1.20 (0.45) 
17a 1.00 (0.00) 1.40 (0.55) 1.50 (0.58) 1.40 (0.55) 
17b 1.60 (0.55) 1.60 (0.89) 1.60 (0.89) 1.20 (0.45) 
18a 1.00 (0.00) 1.20 (0.45) 1.60 (0.55) 1.25 (0.50) 
18b 1.80 (0.84) 1.00 (0.00) 1.20 (0.45) 1.20 (0.45) 
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Appendix 3.7 – Table of Mean Plausibility Ratings for Each Picture 
Mean plausibility rating for each item - Children 
Item Target Picture 
1a 1 (0) 
1b 2 (0) 
2a 1 (0) 
2b 1.6 (0.55) 
3a 1.8 (0.45) 
3b 1.67 (0.58) 
4a 1.4 (0.55) 
4b 1.6 (0.55) 
5a 1.8 (0.45) 
5b 1.2 (0.45) 
6a 1.2 (0.45) 
6b 1.33 (0.58) 
7a 3.75 (0.50) 
7b 3.6 (0.89) 
8a 2.8 (0.45) 
8b 3 (0.71) 
9a 3 (0.71) 
9b 3.4 (0.55) 
10a 3.6 (0.55) 
10b 3.4 (0.55) 
11a 2.8 (1.10) 
11b 3.4 (0.55) 
12a 3.4 (0.89) 
12b 3 (0.71) 
13a 3.8 (0.45) 
13b 1.25 (0.43) 
14a 3.6 (0.55) 
14b 1.25 (0.50) 
15a 3.4 (0.55) 
15b 1 (0.00) 
16a 2.8 (0.45) 
16b 1.8 (0.45) 
17a 3.8 (0.45) 
17b 1.4 (0.55) 
18a 2.8 (0.45) 
18b 2 (0.00) 
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Mean plausibility rating for each item - Adults 
  Item Target Picture 
1a 1.20 (0.00) 
1b 1.80 (0.00) 
2a 1.20 (0.00) 
2b 1.80 (0.84) 
3a 1.67 (0.58) 
3b 1.25 (0.50) 
4a 1.50 (1.00) 
4b 1.20 (0.45) 
5a 1.25 (0.50) 
5b 1.20 (0.45) 
6a 1.00 (0.00) 
6b 2.00 (1.16) 
7a 3.80 (0.45) 
7b 3.20 (1.10) 
8a 3.40 (0.89) 
8b 3.75 (0.50) 
9a 3.40 (0.89) 
9b 3.80 (0.45) 
10a 3.60 (0.55) 
10b 3.00 (0.82) 
11a 3.40 (0.55) 
11b 3.00 (1.25) 
12a 3.40 (1.34) 
12b 3.40 (0.89) 
13a 3.80 (0.45) 
13b 1.25 (0.43) 
14a 3.25 (0.96) 
14b 1.00 (0.00) 
15a 3.80 (0.45) 
15b 1.00 (0.00) 
16a 3.20 (0.84) 
16b 1.40 (0.55) 
17a 3.80 (0.45) 
17b 1.60 (0.55) 
18a 3.40 (0.55) 
18b 1.20 (0.45) 
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Appendix 4.1 – Readability Levels for All Stories 
Story Readability Rating 
Counterfactual-
World 
 
Story 1 – Version 1 8.19 
Story 1 – Version 2 8.164 
Story 2 – Version 1 7.57 
Story 2 – Version 2 7.815 
Story 3 – Version 1 6.98 
Story 3 – Version 2 8.513 
Story 4 – Version 1 8.435 
Story 4 – Version 2 7.919 
Story 5 – Version 1 8.732 
Story 5 – Version 2 8.216 
Story 6 – Version 1 7.893 
Story 6 – Version 2 7.57 
Real-World  
Story 7 – Version 1 7.57 
Story 7 – Version 2 7.893 
Story 8 – Version 1 8.383 
Story 8 – Version 2 7.596 
Story 9 – Version 1 7.028 
Story 9 – Version 2 7.325 
Story 10 – Version 1 7.351 
Story 10 – Version 2 7.839 
Story 11 – Version 1 7.325 
Story 11 – Version 2 7.325 
Story 12 – Version 1 7.893 
Story 12 – Version 2 7.054 
Literal  
Story 13 – Version 1 8.164 
Story 13 – Version 2 8.138 
Story 14 – Version 1 8.435 
Story 14 – Version 2 8.435 
Story 15 – Version 1 7.596 
Story 15 – Version 2 7.622 
Story 16 – Version 1 8.164 
Story 16 – Version 2 7.841 
Story 17 – Version 1 7.325 
Story 17 – Version 2 6.434 
Story 18 – Version 1 6.976 
Story 18 – Version 2 7.596 
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Appendix 4.2 – Interactions for IST Reading Speed (Stage 1) 
Plausibility * Age: F  (1, 28) = .56, p = .46, ηp² = .02 
Inference * Age: F  (2, 56) = .32, p = .73, ηp² = .02 
Plausibility * Inference Type: F (2, 56) = .56, p = .57, ηp² = .02 
Plausibility * Inference Type * Age: F  (2, 56) = 1.24, p = .30, ηp² = .05 
Appendix 4.3 – Interactions for Accuracy (Stage 1) 
 
Plausibility * Age: F  (1, 56) =3.04, p = .09, ηp² = .05 
Plausibility * Task: F  (1, 56) = 0.02, p = .88, ηp² < .001 
Plausibility * Age * Task: F (1, 56) = 0.30, p = .59, ηp² = .01 
Inference Type * Age: F  (2, 112) = 0.76, p = .47, ηp² = .01 
Inference Type * Task: F  (2, 112) = 0.56, p = .57, ηp² = .01 
Inference Type * Age * Task: F  (2, 112) = 0.41, p = .66, ηp² = .01 
Plausibility * Inference Type: F  (2, 112) = 0.87, p = .42, ηp² = .02 
Plausibility * Inference Type * Age: F  (2, 112) = 2.36, p = .10, ηp² = .04 
Plausibility * Inference Type * Task: F (2, 112) = 0.03, p = .97, ηp² < .001 
Plausibility * Inference Type * Age * Task: F  (2, 112) = 0.04, p = .96, ηp² = .001 
Age * Task: F (1, 56) = 0.41, p = .53, ηp² = .01 
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Appendix 4.4 – Final Stories, Critical Texts and Pictorial Stimuli Used 
 
Counterfactual-World Stories 
 
There are six counterfactual-world stories, these stories contain one 
counterfactual-world causal inference evoking critical sentence and one 
counterfactual-world elaborative inference evoking critical sentence. Causal 
evoking inference items can be identified by a '(c)' at the end of the sentence 
and elaborative evoking inference items can be identified be an '(e).' 
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Item 1: Version 1 
Lily and Joe’s spaceship landed at the bottom of a cliff. Suddenly the ground shook. 
 The weight of the spaceship had made the cliff fall down. Huge rocks were crashing down all around Lily 
and Joe.  
Eventually, the giant rocks stopped falling. Lily and Joe climbed out of their ship. They looked around. 
 A massive egg had fallen to the ground with the rocks! Slowly Lily and Joe made their way over to the 
egg.  
The giant egg began to crack loudly. Soon, instead of the egg there was a small bear cub. (c) RED 
The tiny bear cub had hatched from the egg 
 
Lily ran over to the tiny bear cub. He was very upset.  
“He must have fallen from the cliff. We have to take him back to his mum,” said Joe. So Lilly and Joe 
started to climb the cliff.  
The cliff was very steep. Climbing it was hard work. To make it worse it was quite a cold dark day.  
When the sun came out Lily and Joe noticed something weird. 
The tiny bear cub was quite odd. He was not covered in fur. He was covered in cheese. (e) RED 
The bear cub was a yellowish colour 
 
After a few hours Lily and Joe came to a huge nest. They put bear cub into the nest. Lily and Joe then 
rushed back to their spaceship. 
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Item 1: Version 2 
Lily and Joe’s spaceship landed at the bottom of a cliff. Suddenly the ground shook.  
The weight of the spaceship had made the cliff fall down. Huge rocks were crashing down all around them. 
Eventually, the rocks stopped falling.  
Lily and Joe climbed out of their spaceship. They looked around.  
They spotted a small rock that was still shaking. There was a tiny animal hiding under the rock. It was a 
bear cub. 
The tiny bear cub was quite odd. He was not covered in fur. He was covered in cheese. (c) RED 
 
Lily ran over to the tiny bear cub. He was very upset.  
“He must have fallen from the cliff. We have to take him back to his mum,” said Joe. So Lily and Joe set off 
up the cliff.  
The cliff was very steep. Climbing it was hard work.  
After a few hours Lily and Joe came to a massive nest. There was a big green egg in the nest. 
The giant egg began to crack loudly. Soon, instead of the egg there was a small bear cub. (e) RED 
 
"This must be where our cub came from!" said Lily. They put their bear cub in to the big nest. Lily and Joe 
then rushed back to their spaceship. 
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Item 1: Comprehension Questions 
 
The spaceship had caused the cliff to fall down (ex) 
Lily and Joe were very tired after climbing the cliff (inf) 
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Item 2: Version 1 
 
Lily and Joe landed on a planet covered in trees.  
They began to explore the planet, but as they went deeper into the forest it began to get dark and scary. 
“Let’s go back,” begged Lily. “We can't, we're lost!” said Joe sadly. 
Lily saw a stream. They could swim down it and out of the forest.  
“This way!” Lily shouted. Lily was very thirsty. She bent down to get a quick drink. 
The fluid in the stream was brown and steaming. “Watch out Lily, its coffee!” said Joe. (e) RED 
The large wet stream was very hot 
  
Lily and Joe would have to keep walking through the forests. However, as they went on they began to feel 
like they were being followed.  
They heard a thud. They turned back to look. All they could see was trees.  
THUD!!! They looked back again. There was still no one in sight, just trees. "This is very weird," said Lily.  
Then they heard a huge clunk. They turned round and saw a large tree.  
The tree was ten feet away. They turned around again. The same tree was now two feet away. (c) 
YELLOW 
The large tree was moving closer to them 
 
Lily and Joe were lost and now the trees were chasing them. Suddenly they heard a whizzing sound. 
Crashing through the trees came their spaceship! They were saved! 
338 
 
Item 2: Version 2 
 
Lily and Joe landed on a planet covered in trees. They began to explore. They went deeper and deeper 
into the forest.  
However, Lily and Joe soon began to feel like they were being followed.  
They heard a thud. They span back to look. All they could see was trees. THUD!!! THUD!!! They looked 
back again. There was still no one in sight, just trees.  
CLUNK!!! They turned around and saw a large tree.  
The tree was ten feet away. They turned around again. The same tree was now two feet away. (c) 
YELLOW 
 
The tree was following them!!! In fact the tree was chasing them!  
“Let's go back,” begged Lily. “I wish we could, but we're lost!” said Joe sadly.  
Lily spotted a large stream. They were saved. They could swim down it and out of the woods.  
“Quick, this way!” she shouted. Lily ran over to the water as fast as she could. Lily was very thirsty. She 
bent down to get a quick drink. 
The fluid in the stream was brown and steaming. “Watch out Lily, its coffee!” said Joe. (e) RED 
 
Lily and Joe were stuck. There was no way out. Suddenly they heard a whizzing sound. Crashing through 
the trees came their spaceship! They were saved! 
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Item 2: Comprehension Questions 
 
Lily and Joe were lost (ex) 
The woods scared Lily and Joe (inf) 
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Item 3: Version 1 
Joe and Lily had just landed. They had just climbed out of their spaceship when Kaprunk! Kaprang! BANG! 
The spaceship vanished!!!  
A few seconds later it reappeared miles away. Luckily a kind man was passing. He agreed to guide Lily 
and Joe to their spaceship.  
They reached the spaceship quickly. But there was a problem.  
The ship was on the other side of a deep hole. The hole was too wide to jump over. The man was not 
worried. 
Arms spread wide he jumped off the ledge. A few seconds later he was on the other side. (c) BLUE 
The kind man had flown across the large hole 
 
“Hurry up you two. Come on over” called the man.  
“Could you just fly the ship back over to us?” asked Lily. He did.   
They spent the rest of the day with the man. He told them fantastic story after fantastic story. He even told 
them what it is like to fly!  
The day sped by. When it was time to leave Lily and Joe shook the man's hand. The man's hands were 
very odd.  
They were shaped like human hands. But, they were like a large bird's wing in every other way. (e) 
RED 
The man's hand was covered in feathers. 
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Lily and Joe thanked the kind man for his help. They then flew off on a new adventure. 
Item 3: Version 2 
 
Joe and Lily had just landed on an extremely rocky planet.  
They had just climbed out of their spaceship when Kaprunk! Kaprang! BANG! The spaceship vanished!!! A 
few seconds later it reappeared many miles away.  
The path to the ship didn't look easy though. Luckily a kind man was passing by. He agreed to guide Lily 
and Joe to their ship.  
The man was just about the same as the men on Earth. However, his hands were very different. 
They were shaped like human hands. But, they were like a large bird's wing in every other way. (e) 
RED 
 
The kind man was very funny. He told Lily and Joe fantastic story after story. He had led a very good life.  
The long journey to the ship flew by. In no time they were very close to the ship. But there was a big 
problem. A very big problem.  
The ship was on the other side of a deep hole. The hole was far too wide to jump over.  
The man was not worried. 
Arms spread wide he jumped off the ledge. A few seconds later he was on the other side. (c) BLUE 
 
Lily and Joe thanked the kind man for his help. They then flew off on a new adventure. 
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Item 3: Comprehension Questions 
 
The man told Lily and Joe stories (ex) 
Lily and Joe enjoyed their time on the planet (inf) 
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Item 4: Version 1 
Lily and Joe landed on a really sandy planet. The strong wind kept blowing sand into their faces.  
Out of the blue an old piece of paper was blown into Joe's face.  
Eventually the wind dropped. Joe looked at the piece of paper that had hit him. "It's a treasure map!" he 
shouted out.  
First, the map took them into a forest. The forest was unlike any forest they had ever seen.  
The trees were odd. The leaves were covered in tiny rubies that glinted in the sunlight. (e) BLUE 
The leaves on the trees were red in colour 
 
Once out of the woods Lily and Joe came to a lake. On the other side of the lake was a chest.  
The lake was huge. The chest was too far away to swim to. Plus, there was no boat. There was no way for 
Lily and Joe to reach the chest.  
They were just about to give up. But then Joe spotted a note on the map. 'Cross the lake like a jesus 
lizard.'  
"Come with me," said Joe. 
Lily and Joe slowly stepped onto the murky lake. They crossed the lake within no time. (c) GREEN 
Lily and Joe had walked on the water 
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They reached the treasure chest. Shockingly, it was full of eggs. Lily and Joe laughed all the way back to 
the spaceship. 
Item 4: Version 2 
Lily and Joe landed on a windy planet. An old piece of paper blew into Joe's face. "It's a treasure map!" 
Joe cried out.  
First the map took them to a lake. However, the lake was too large to swim across. Plus, there was no 
boat.  
They were about to give up. But then Joe saw a note on the map. 'Cross the lake like a jesus lizard.'  
"Come with me," said Joe. 
Lily and Joe slowly stepped onto the murky lake. They crossed the lake within no time. (c) GREEN 
 
 
The old map then took Lily and Joe all over. They went over huge cliffs and harsh dry sands.  
It was very hard work. They felt like they had been walking for days and days.  
However, Lily and Joe knew it would be worth it. The chest would be full of huge gems and money. 
Eventually, the map took them into a huge forest. It was not like any they had ever seen. 
The trees were odd. The leaves were covered in tiny rubies that glinted in the sunlight. (e) BLUE 
 
In the middle of the forest was the treasure chest. It was full of eggs! Lily and Joe laughed all the way back 
to the spaceship. 
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Item 4: Comprehension Questions 
 
An old newspaper blew into Joe's face (ex) 
Lily and Joe followed the map for hours (inf) 
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Item 5: Version 1 
 
Lily and Joe landed on a planet full of huge mountains and big fluffy dogs.  
One of the dogs ran up to them. Wag wag wag, went his big fluffy tail.  
Lily and Joe spent most of the morning playing with the dog. They called him Chip. But, their fun soon 
came to a halt.  
THUMP! THUMP! THUMP! The floor began to shake. Even the tall trees shook.  
Lily and Joe looked up. The giant grey leaves above their heads were made of solid stone. (e) 
YELLOW 
The giant grey leaves were very heavy 
 
THUMP! THUMP! The noise began to get closer. There was a massive roar. Suddenly a tiger jumped out 
of the trees.  
The tiger was huge. It had giant white teeth and huge claws. Lily, Joe and Chip ran as fast as they could.  
Sadly, they had no idea where they were going. They ran straight into a dead end.  
There was no way out. They were stuck! 
The hungry tiger pounced.  Almost instantly Joe's face was covered in warm sticky spit. (c) GREEN 
The large hungry tiger had licked Joe's face 
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The tiger was not dangerous. He just wanted to play! Lily, Joe and Chip played with the lonely tiger all day. 
Lily and Joe were sad to leave the planet and their new friends. 
Item 5: Version 2 
Lilly and Joe landed on a planet full of huge mountains and big fluffy dogs.  
One of the dogs ran up to them. Wag, wag, wag, went his big fluffy tail.  
Lilly and Joe spent most of the morning playing with the dog. They called him Chip. However, their fun 
soon came to a halt.  
There was a giant roar. Suddenly, a tiger leapt out of the trees.  
The hungry tiger pounced.  Almost instantly Joe's face was covered in warm sticky spit. (c) GREEN 
 
The giant tiger was not scary after all. Lilly, Joe and Chip played with the tiger all day. At first they chose to 
play hide and seek.  
Sadly, the tiger was awful at hide and seek. He was far too big and heavy.  
Every time he made a move the whole place shook.  
THUMP! THUMP! THUMP! THUMP! The floor began to shake. Even the tall trees shook.  
Lily and Joe looked up. The giant grey leaves above their heads were made of solid stone. (e) 
YELLOW 
 
Lily, Joe and Chip decided that hide and seek was too dangerous! They played chess with the clever tiger 
instead. Lily and Joe were sad to leave the fun planet and their new friends. 
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Item 5: Comprehension Questions 
 
Chip was a small cat (ex) 
The tiger wanted to eat Lily and Joe (inf) 
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Item 6: Version 1 
Lily and Joe landed on a planet covered in fish, milk, and grass. "Wow! This planet would be perfect for 
cats," said Lily.  
After a while Lily and Joe came to a huge brick wall with lots of guards in front of it. 
 "Would you like to see 'Cat-World'?" asked a guard. "Sure," said Lily.  
'Cat-World' was not what they had expected. It was full of lots of very sad cats.  
“Hello,” came a voice from below. They looked down to see a cat looking at them. (c) BLUE 
The cat had spoken to Lily and Joe. 
 
"Hi, are you OK?" asked Lily.  
The sad cat shook his head. "Years ago only cats lived here. One day nasty men came. They caged all of 
us and put us in here."  
"But there are so many trees," said Joe. "You could use them to get out."  
"The trees are too soft for that," said that cat. Joe was quite puzzled. He reached out and touched one of 
the trees.  
The trees were odd. The tree trunks were not made of wood. They were made out of huge pipe 
cleaners. (e) GREEN 
The tree trunks in CatWorld were quite bendy 
 
Joe had an idea. They could use the trees to make a catapult to fire the cats over the wall. One by one Joe 
and Lily set the cats free. 
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Item 6: Version 2 
Lily and Joe landed on a planet covered in fish, milk, and grass. "This planet would be perfect for cats," 
said Lily.  
After a while Lily and Joe came to a huge brick wall with lots of guards in front of it. 
 "Would you like to see 'Cat-World'?" asked a guard. "Sure," said Lily.  
'Cat-World' was dark and bare. There were just a few trees. Joe touched one of the trees. 
The trees were odd. The tree trunks were not made of wood. They were made out of huge pipe 
cleaners. (e) GREEN 
 
'Cat-World' was also full of sad cats.  
Joe and Lily saw a sign… 'Many years ago only cats lived here. Then men came to this place. We tried to 
find a use for the cats. But, cats are of no use to us. So we put them in this giant cage. Then we took over.'  
Lily and Joe were very upset by this.  
"We have to help the cats," sobbed Lily. 
“Hello,” came a voice from below. They looked down to see a cat looking at them. (c) BLUE 
 
Joe had an idea. They could use the trees to make a catapult to fire the cats over the wall. One by one Joe 
and Lily set the cats free. 
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Item 6: Comprehension Questions 
 
The cats in 'Cat-World' were happy (ex) 
The cats wanted to escape (inf) 
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Real-World Stories 
 
There are six real-world stories, these stories contain one real-world causal 
inference evoking critical sentence and one real-world elaborative inference 
evoking critical sentence. Causal evoking inference items can be identified by a 
'(c)' at the end of the sentence and elaborative evoking inference items can be 
identified be an '(e).' 
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Item 7: Version 1 
Lily and Joe landed on a planet covered in big green fields.  
The planet was home to lots of animals. There were ducks and pigs. There were sheep and geese. The 
animals did not look happy though. The animals looked scared. 
Lily and Joe tried to get close to the animals but the animals ran away from them. Lily and Joe looked 
around. They found an eye patch on the floor. 
Joe heard a long deep sound. Joe turned around to see a big cow walking towards him. (c) BLUE 
The large cow had made the mooing sound. 
 
The cow walked past Joe, then he looked back and mooed. “I think he wants us to follow him,” Lily said. 
Lily and Joe followed the cow to a large lake. In the middle of the lake was a pirate ship!  
The pirates were throwing stones at any animal trying to drink from the lake. “I know what to do!” said Joe, 
“but I need a bag.” 
Luckily a snake skin floated past Joe. He took it and made a bag out of it. (e) YELLOW 
The bag Joe made was covered in scales 
 
Joe set his transporter to ‘pirate planet,’ popped it into the bag and threw it at the pirate ship. 
The pirates disappeared and the animals could drink from the lake again. 
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Item 7: Version 2 
Lily and Joe landed on a planet covered in deep blue lakes. There were only a few small islands dotted 
here and there.  
The ocean was crystal clear. It was also full of amazing fish, dolphins, and crabs. 
The sea was also full of beautiful rocks and shells. "Let's take a rock home with us," said Joe.  
"We can't," said Lily sadly. "Our swimming costumes don’t have any pockets!" 
Luckily a snake skin floated past Joe. He took it and made a bag out of it. (e) YELLOW 
 
Lily put her favourite stone into the bag.  
Lily and Joe hopped onto an island. The animals on the island looked scared. It did not take Lily long to 
work out why. In the middle of the island there was a huge pirate ship.  
“We want the girl’s gem!” shouted the pirates. Lily wanted to give the gem to them but she was too scared 
to go near them. 
Joe heard a long deep sound. Joe turned around to see a cow walking towards in him. (c) BLUE 
 
The brave cow took the gem from Lily to the pirates. There was a big bang and a whiz. Then the huge 
pirate ship shot into the air and disappeared. 
 
  
355 
 
Item 7: Comprehension Questions 
 
The tiny black spot was actually a pirate ship (ex) 
The whale liked Lily and Joe (inf) 
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Item 8: Version 1 
 
Lily and Joe had flown straight into an asteroid storm. Giant rocks were crashing into the spaceship. It was 
going to get damaged.  
Lily and Joe had to make a quick landing. They were able to land on a sandy beach next to a huge ocean. 
The ocean was crystal clear. The best thing was the beach was empty.  
But, there was a reason for that. The ocean was full of sharks! Lily dived into the sea.  
However, a shark was approaching. It attacked. Blood began to spill out of Lily’s arm. (c) YELLOW 
The evil shark had bitten Lily's arm 
 
Lily cried out! Joe swam out to save her. But many more sharks began to pop up. Lily and Joe were stuck!  
They began to panic. Out of the blue came a small boat.  
There was a pink man in the boat. "Climb in," said the pink man. Lily and Joe were saved!  
The man took Lily and Joe back to his town. In the middle of the town was a large statue.  
The gigantic clay statue shone in the sun light. It must have been at least ten feet high. (e) BLUE 
The statue was a burnt orange colour 
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After a day in the town Lily and Joe went back to their spaceship. Joe fixed up Lily's arm and then they left 
the planet. 
Item 8: Version 2 
 
Lily and Joe had flown into an asteroid storm. Giant rocks were crashing into the spaceship. It was going 
to get damaged.  
CRASH!! WHACK!!! A rock hit the wing. The wing fell off and landed in the ocean below.  
The ship was out of control. Lily and Joe had to make an emergency landing.  
They were able to land on a beach next to the huge ocean. There was a boat tied up next to a statue. 
The gigantic clay statue shone in the sun light. It must have been at least ten feet high. (e) BLUE 
 
Lily and Joe could see the wing in the ocean. However, they could also see some very evil sharks.  
Lily and Joe climbed into the boat. They made it to the wing in no time.  
Sadly, the heavy wing had started to sink. Lily and Joe could not reach the wing from the boat.  
One of them would have to jump in for it. Lily dove into the sea. She grabbed the wing.  
However, a shark was approaching. It attacked. Blood began to spill out of Lily’s arm. (c) YELLOW 
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Joe pulled Lily and the wing into the boat. Joe put the wing back on the spaceship. They then flew away 
from the awful planet. 
Item 8: Comprehension Questions 
 
The statue was tiny (ex) 
The sharks were hungry (inf) 
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Item 9: Version 1 
Lily and Joe landed on a planet covered in ice.  
The only animals around were large hippos. However, legend said a lost tribe of humans also lived on the 
planet.  
A photo of this tribe would be worth millions. Lily and Joe decided to look for the tribe.  
They came to a very thin piece of ice.  Did they dare to cross it? On the other side of this thin ice was a 
hairy hippo.  
The hippo looked at Lily and Joe. As the hippo walked its giant feet cracked the ground. (e) RED 
The hippo was very, very heavy 
 
Joe and Lily saw something where the hippo had been stood. What was it? It was pink and blue. Was it a 
teddy bear?  
"Do you think it is from the lost tribe?" asked Joe. "It must be!" cried Lily.  
"We could go and take a look," said Joe. "But the ice is so thin," said Lily. 
 "I think we'll be able to make it," said Joe.    
They cautiously crept on to the thin ice. Crack! Crack! Ice cold water swept all over them. (c) BLUE 
Lily and Joe had fallen through the ice 
 
Lily and Joe began to drown. Suddenly they were pulled out of the water.  They looked around. However, 
they never found out who pulled them out of the water. 
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Item 9: Version 2 
 
Lily and Joe landed on a planet covered in ice.  
The only animals around were hairy hippos. However, legend said a lost tribe of humans also lived on the 
planet.  
A photo of this tribe would be worth millions. Lily and Joe decided to look for the tribe.  
Joe and Lily saw a small pink teddy bear. It must have been from the tribe. It was on the other side of 
some very thin ice. 
They cautiously crept on to the thin ice. Crack! Crack! Ice cold water swept all over them. (c) BLUE 
 
Lily and Joe began to drown. Suddenly, they were pulled out of the water.  They quickly looked round. 
However, there was no one about.  
Lily and Joe tried to find the lost tribe all day. After hours of searching they gave up.  
They headed back to the ship. They went by the patch of ice they had fallen into. 
 A hairy hippo was stood on the other side of the ice. 
The hippo looked at Lily and Joe. As the hippo walked its giant feet cracked the ground. (e) RED 
 
Could the hippo have saved them? Lily and Joe would never find out who saved them. They would always 
be very, very thankful though.  
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Item 9: Comprehension Questions 
 
The hippo fell through the ice (ex) 
Lily and Joe were glad that they had been saved from drowning (inf) 
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Item 10: Version 1 
Joe and Lily landed on a lovely planet. Some friendly aliens called Blibs lived on the planet.  
The Blibs were about as tall as a desk chair. They were like big shaky blobs of green jelly. They didn't 
have arms or legs.  
The Blibs loved to grow stuff. The Blibs used their plants to make magical medicines. 
 The Blibs noticed that Joe looked ill.  
The caring Blibs gave Joe a special medicine. It was made from mashed up bananas. (e) GREEN 
The medicine was yellow in colour 
 
Joe was starting to feel better when whole place went pitch black. The sun was a giant light bulb and it had 
just blown out.  
Sadly, it was too high for the Blibs to reach. An engineer put a new light bulb in every year. Sadly, he was 
not due for weeks.  
“The plants will die!” cried the Blibs. “Calm down!” said Joe. “I will put a new bulb in for you.”  
Joe put in the new bulb. But the bright light dazzled him and he slipped.  
Joe fell to the ground. He landed on his leg. There was a crack and Joe cried out in pain. (c) BLUE 
One of the bones in Joe's leg had broken 
 
Luckily the Blibs had a special medicine to mend broken bones. So within a week or two Joe’s leg was all 
better. 
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Item 10: Version 2 
Joe and Lily landed on a planet in darkness. Friendly aliens called Blibs lived on the planet. Their sun was 
a giant light bulb and it had just blown out.  
An engineer changed the bulb every year. Sadly he was not due for weeks.  
The Blibs were all very upset. “Calm down!” said Joe. “I will change the bulb for you.” 
Joe put in the new bulb. But the light dazzled him and he fell.  
Joe fell to the ground. He landed on his leg. There was a crack and Joe cried out in pain. (c) BLUE 
 
"OUCH!!! OUCH!!! OUCH!!! OUCH!!!" Joe cried out in pain. The fall had broken Joe's leg.  
He was in an awful lot of pain! The pain was so bad Joe felt like he was going to pass out.  
Luckily, the smart Blibs very, very good at growing things. The whole planet was covered in weird yet 
wonderful plants.  
The Blibs used their plants to make magical medicines. 
The caring Blibs gave Joe a special medicine. It was made from mashed up bananas. (e) GREEN 
 
Joe took the medicine. It was really yummy. The best thing was it was a special medicine that could heal 
broken bones. Within no time at all Joe's leg was all better.  
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Item 10: Comprehension Questions 
 
The Blibs were not good at growing plants (ex) 
The Blibs do not like the dark (inf) 
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Item 11: Version 1 
Lily and Joe landed on a very, very snowy planet. First Lily and Joe wrapped up warm.  
They put on five coats and seven pairs of socks. Then they got out of their nice and warm spaceship. The 
planet was ice cold.  
"Wow it's freezing!!" said Lily. "How could anyone live here? It's far too cold!"  
It seemed as though someone did live on the ice cold planet though. 
Lily and Joe spotted a little white house. The tiny round house was made out of snow. (e) YELLOW 
The tiny white round house was very cold. 
 
Lily and Joe ran up to the tiny house. They knocked on the snowy door.  
A gruff old man answered. As soon as he saw Lily and Joe he smiled. The man told Lily and Joe that he 
was the only human left on the planet.  
"Aren't you lonely?" asked Joe. "No, I have many friends," said the man. "Let me show you."  
They all went outside. The old man whistled at a group of penguins.  
One penguin jumped into the cold ocean. A few seconds later it was at their feet. (c) YELLOW 
The penguin had swum to Lily and Joe. 
 
"You see the penguins are my friends," said the man happily. Lily and Joe spent the afternoon with the 
man and his penguins. They then flew off on another adventure. 
366 
 
Item 11: Version 2 
Lily and Joe landed on a snowy planet. First Lily and Joe wrapped up warm. Then they got out of their 
spaceship.  
The planet was ice cold. The first thing they saw was a family of penguins. 
The penguins were on an iceberg in the sea. The penguins looked at Lily and Joe.  
There were two large penguins and two baby ones. They all squawked at Lily and Joe. 
One penguin jumped into the cold ocean. A few seconds later it was at their feet. (c) YELLOW 
 
The penguins let Lily and Joe stroke them for a while. They then jumped back into the ocean and swam 
away.  
Lily and Joe decided to explore the rest of the planet. There wasn't much to see. 
 Every now and then Lily and Joe came across a penguin.  That was all though. 
Lily and Joe were just about to head back when they saw something.   
Lily and Joe spotted a little white house. The tiny round house was made out of snow. (e) YELLOW 
 
An old man was in the house. He had been stuck on the planet all alone for years! He missed his family. 
He asked Lily and Joe to take him back to his own planet. Lily and Joe did. 
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Item 11: Comprehension Questions 
 
The planet was freezing cold (ex) 
Lily and Joe liked the planet (inf) 
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Item 12: Version 1 
 
Joe and Lily had just landed on a planet covered in concrete.  
They came to a large sign which said: 'Welcome to Concretia. We are working hard. We want to cover 
every inch of this place in concrete.'  
Lily and Joe did find some very dry soil though. "At last," said Joe. "Soil!!!"  
"We need to plant some seeds" said Lily. "This place needs to come back to life." 
Lily planted a tiny seed. A century later an oak tree stood in its place. (c) RED 
The tiny seed had grown into an oak tree 
 
The evil robots that lived on Concretia were not happy about this though. In fact they were very, very mad 
at Lily and Joe.  
Within seconds a large army of robots were stood in front of Lily and Joe.  
"KILL THEM BOTH!!!" ordered one of the huge robots.  
All of the huge metal robots began to throw big blocks of concrete at Lily and Joe. Luckily Joe spotted a 
large shield.  
Joe grabbed the steel shield. He used it to protect him and Lily from the huge rocks. (e) GREEN 
The shield was hard and inflexible 
 
Lily and Joe ran back to the spaceship as fast as they could. As they flew away Lily threw some seeds out 
of the window. She hoped they would find a way to grow.  
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Item 12: Version 2 
 
Joe and Lily had just landed on a planet covered in concrete.  
"This place is awful," said Joe. "Where are all of the plants?"  
Suddenly Lily and Joe were attacked by an army of huge robots.  
The robots were throwing big blocks of concrete at Lily and Joe. Luckily Joe spotted a shield.   
Joe grabbed the steel shield. He used it to protect him and Lily from the huge rocks. (e) GREEN 
 
Lily and Joe ran away from the robots as fast as they could. They out ran the robots. However, Lily and 
Joe realised that they were lost.  
Lily began to cry. "Don't cry," said a tiny mouse. "I'll take you back to your ship."  Lily and Joe followed the 
mouse back to their ship.  
"Is there anything we can do for you," asked Joe. "Some grass and plants would be nice," said the mouse. 
"But nothing grows in concrete."  
Lily smiled. She gave the mouse a bag of seeds. "These seeds will grow, even in concrete." 
Lily planted a tiny seed. A century later an oak tree stood in its place. (c) RED 
 
The mouse promised them that he would plant all of the seeds and bring the planet back to life. Lily and 
Joe then left the awful planet. 
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Item 12: Comprehension Questions 
 
The planet was covered in grass (ex) 
The robots were glad that Lily and Joe had come to their planet (inf) 
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Literal Stories 
 
There are six literal stories, these stories contain one real-world critical 
sentence and one counterfactual-world critical sentence. Real-world critical 
sentence items can be identified by a '(rw)' at the end of the sentence and 
counterfactual-world sentence items can be identified be a '(cfw).' 
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Item 13: Version 1 
 
Lily and Joe landed on a planet full of caves. They decided to go caving.  
Caving was fun, but really hard work. Soon, Lily and Joe were hungry and tired. They decided to head 
back.  
However, there was a problem. One of the holes they’d carefully crossed earlier was now full of water.  
To make it worse a fish was in the hole! A fish with razor sharp teeth and huge claws.  
Surprisingly the fish was massive. The fish was also covered in pink and green fur. (cfw) RED 
The fish was covered in pink and green fur 
 
Lily and Joe froze. The fish was scary.  
"We can wait here until the fish swims back out of the hole," said Joe.  
But the cave was filling with water too. "We can't! If we stay in the cave we'll drown," said Lily.  
Suddenly, the fish made a sound. The sound was a low deep growl. Lily gazed at it.  
Lily did not want to wake the huge fish up. So when Lily spoke to Joe she whispered. (rw) BLUE 
When Lily spoke to Joe she had whispered 
 
"The fish is snoring!" said Lily. "It's asleep." There was a thin ledge next to the hole the fish was in. Lily and 
Joe tiptoed around the ledge. They ran out of the cave and back to the spaceship. 
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Item 13: Version 2 
 
Lily and Joe landed on a planet full of caves. They decided to go caving.  
Soon, Lily and Joe were hungry and tired. They decided to turn back.  
However, there was a problem. One of the holes they had crossed earlier was now full of water. To make it 
worse a huge fish was in the hole!   
Suddenly, the fish made a sound. It was a low deep growl. Lily gazed at it.  
Lily did not want to wake the huge fish up. So when Lily spoke to Joe she whispered. (rw) BLUE 
 
“I think the fish is asleep,” Lily said. “It's snoring!”  
Luckily, there was a thin ledge next to the hole. Lily and Joe were almost out of the cave when the ledge 
behind them broke.  
A rock fell into the water. The fish moved. But it didn't wake up.  
As Lily and Joe passed the fish they realised that it was a very odd fish. 
Surprisingly the fish was massive. The fish was also covered in pink and green fur. (cfw) RED 
 
Lily and Joe ran out of the caves as fast as they could. They were safe at last. "That was a close one!" said 
Lily.  "I know!" said Joe. They both began to laugh at the sleeping fish. 
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Item 13: Comprehension Questions 
 
The fish was asleep (ex) 
A fish was blocking Lily and Joe's exit (inf) 
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Item 14: Version 1 
 
Lily and Joe landed on a dusty planet. Everyone was holding plant pots.  
The people were all walking through a tunnel. Lily and Joe followed them. On the other side of the tunnel 
was a lake.  
CRASH!!! Suddenly rocks began to fall down all over the place. Lily and Joe hid under a tree.  
Eventually, the rocks stopped falling. But huge rocks were now in front of the tunnel. They were all stuck!!! 
The people in this place wore tops made from elastic. Elastic is quite stretchy. (rw) GREEN 
The elastic was quite stretchy 
 
This gave Lily an idea. They could use the tops to make a trampoline. Everyone could then jump over the 
tunnel.  
Lily told the men and women her idea. They all began to help her. They all gave Lily their tops.  
Since there was now a way out of the tunnel they began to relax. They put their plant pots down next to 
the lake.  
Every plant then did quite a strange thing.  
These plants did not suck up water from their roots. The plants sucked up water from a huge straw. 
(cfw) YELLOW 
The plants sucked up water from a huge straw 
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Lily and Joe watched the plants drink for the rest of the day. It was an amazing sight. They then bounced 
over the tunnel and back to their spaceship. 
Item 14: Version 2 
 
Lily and Joe landed on a dusty planet. Everyone was holding plant pots. The people were walking through 
a tunnel.  
"Where are you going?" asked Lilly. "It hasn't rained for weeks. So we're taking the plants to the lake." said 
a man.  
Lily and Joe followed him. On the other side of the tunnel was a lake.  
All of the plants were put down next to the lake. The plants then did quite an odd thing. 
These plants did not suck up water from their roots. The plants sucked up water from a huge straw. 
(cfw) YELLOW 
 
Lily and Joe watched the plants drink. It was a very cool sight. Each plant drank for about an hour.  
Lily and Joe were just about to head back to their spaceship when… CRASH!!! Huge rocks were falling 
from the sky.  
Lily and Joe hid under a large tree. Eventually, the falling came to a stop.  
Sadly, two huge rocks were now in front the tunnel. They were all stuck!! 
The people in this place wore tops made from elastic. Elastic is quite stretchy. (rw) GREEN 
 
This gave Lily an idea. They could use the tops to make a trampoline. They could then jump over the 
tunnel.  Everyone was free in no time at all. 
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Item 14: Comprehension Questions 
 
The people gave Lily their trousers (ex) 
The people were happy that the tunnel was blocked (inf) 
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Item 15: Version 1 
Lily and Joe landed on a planet in chaos. There had been a murder.  
The kind old bear that lived on a small island just outside of the city had been found dead. 
 The island was surrounded by a fast flowing river. There was no bridge and no boats. The only way to 
reach the island was to swim.  
A slimy fish had been seen at the scene. But he had not been seen since. Lily saw the fish. 
The large fish ran across the green grass. He left a trail of gunky slime as he went. (cfw) YELLOW 
The large fish had run across the green grass 
 
"I didn't do it!" cried the fish, "I can't swim." So the fish couldn't have killed the bear. But if he didn't do it 
who did?  
Joe had an idea. Lily, Joe and the fish went to the bear's house.  
Joe shook the bear. It began to move. “He's not dead!” said Joe, “he was hibernating."  
"Well I could have told you that," said a large rhino that lived with the bear.  
The rhino was huge. It had huge feet. The rhino was also very, very heavy. (rw) GREEN 
The rhino was very, very heavy 
 
Lily, Joe, the fish, and the bear all returned to the city. Once there they told the police what had really 
happened. 
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Item 15: Version 2 
Lily and Joe landed on a planet in chaos. There had been a murder. The old bear that lived on a small 
island just outside of the city had been found dead.  
The island was surrounded by a fast flowing river. There was no bridge and no boats. The only way to 
reach the island was to swim.  
A slimy fish had been seen at the scene. But he had not been seen since. 
Suddenly, a rhino spotted the fish. 
The rhino was huge. It had huge feet. The rhino was also very, very heavy. (rw) GREEN 
 
"Over there!" shouted the Rhino. "I didn't do it!" cried the fish, "I can't swim." So who had killed the bear?  
Joe had an idea. Lily, Joe and the fish went to the bear's house.  
Joe shook the bear. It began to move. “He's not dead!” said Joe, “he was hibernating!"  
Lily, Joe and the fish went back to the city. But the police still thought the fish was guilty. They began to 
chase after him. 
The large fish ran across the green grass. He left a trail of gunky slime as he went. (cfw) YELLOW 
 
Lily and Joe told the police that the fish didn't kill the bear. The fish was then freed. 
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Item 15: comprehension Questions 
 
The fish could swim (ex) 
The fish was scared of the police (inf) 
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Item 16: Version 1 
Lily and Joe landed on a cold frosty planet. They were greeted by a man. “Welcome,” he beamed. “Here, 
every city is made of ice-cream.”  
“Do you have a strawberry ice-lolly city?” asked Lily.  “Yep, I’ll take you there” smiled the man.  
The strawberry ice-lolly city was surrounded by thick walls of rock.  "The walls keep the ice-cream cold," 
said the man.  
"Mmm they look tasty," said Lily. She had to have one.  
Lily licked the ice-lolly. She screamed. The ice-lolly was so hot it had burnt her tongue. (cfw) BLUE 
The ice lolly was very, very hot 
 
The man began to laugh. "I am Evil-tron!!" he said. "I tried to take over the universe. So the space police 
trapped me here. But, now I can steal your spaceship and escape."  
The man laughed then ran off. He shut the door on his way out. Lily and Joe were stuck!  
Joe had an idea. They could use an ice lolly to melt the walls.  
Lily and Joe were free.  
Lily and Joe ran back to the spaceship along the hard road. They quickly made it back. (rw) RED 
Lily and Joe ran along the hard road 
 
The man was trying to open the spaceship but it wouldn't open. As soon as Lily and Joe appeared it flew to 
them. They jumped in and flew off. 
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Item 16: Version 2 
Lily and Joe landed on a frosty planet. They were greeted by a man. “Welcome,” he beamed. “Every city is 
made of ice-cream.”  
“Do you have a strawberry ice-lolly city?” asked Lily.  “Yep, let's go” smiled the man. 
 Once there the man began to laugh. "I am Evil-tron!!" he said. "I tried to take over the universe. So the 
space police trapped me here. But, now I can steal your spaceship."  
"Quick!" cried Joe. 
Lily and Joe ran back to the spaceship along the hard road. They quickly made it back. (rw) RED 
 
Evil-tron had got back to the ship before them. He had laid a trap. Giant walls rose out of the road around 
Lily and Joe. They were trapped!  
"That evil man is going escape and it's all our fault," cried Lily.  
"He won't, the spaceship only opens for us," said Joe.  
This made Lily feel much better. "Since we're stuck I might as well have an ice-lolly," said Lily. 
Lily licked the ice-lolly. She screamed. The ice-lolly was so hot it had burnt her tongue. (cfw) BLUE 
 
Joe had an idea. They could use an ice lolly to melt the walls. Lily and Joe were free. The spaceship flew 
over to them and they flew off. 
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Item 16: Comprehension Questions 
 
The planet was made of ice-cream (ex) 
Evil-tron was a nice guy (inf) 
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Item 17: Version 1 
Lily and Joe landed in a small town. The town was a little bit spooky.  
"This place is odd," said Joe. Every house was the exact same shade of blue.  
Every lawn had the same tree in it. Every tree was the exact same shape. And every leaf was the same 
size.  
It got worse. Lily and Joe were very surprised. The whole town was perfect. 
Every blade of grass was exactly the same. Every blade of grass was quite short and green. (rw) 
BLUE 
Every blade of grass was quite short and green 
 
Lily and Joe went into a café. A man came over. He looked just like the man sat in front of them. More men 
came into the café.  
These men were all very alike too. They all made their way over to Lily and Joe. Lily and Joe were stuck.  
“Must be the same. Must be the same,” the men chanted.  
Lily and Joe realised the truth… 
The men were clones. They all looked the same because the men had been grown in giant test 
tubes. (cfw) GREEN 
The men had been grown in giant test tubes 
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Lily had an idea. “We are the same. You are different,” she chanted. The clones looked at each other and 
then began to fight. Luckily, this meant Lily and Joe were able to sneak out and back to their spaceship. 
Item 17: Version 2 
 
Lily and Joe landed in a small town. They went into a café.  
A man came over. He looked just like the man sat ahead of them.  
More very alike men came into the café. They made their way over to Lily and Joe. Lily and Joe were 
trapped.  
“Must be the same. Must be the same,” the men chanted. Lily and Joe realised the truth… 
The men were clones. They all looked the same because the men had been grown in giant test 
tubes. (cfw) GREEN 
 
Lily had an idea. “We are the same. You are different,” she chanted.  
The odd men faced each other. Then they began to fight. This meant Lily and Joe were able to sneak 
away.  
They ran back to their ship. They saw that the whole town was just as weird as the men.  
The whole town was the same. Every house was the exact same shade of pale blue.  
Every blade of grass was exactly the same. Every blade of grass was quite short and green. (rw) 
BLUE 
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They got back to the spaceship in no time. "What a lucky escape," said Joe. "Must be the same, must be 
the same," chanted Lily. Joe froze. "Only joking! You should have seen your face though" laughed Lily.  
Item 17: Comprehension Questions 
 
Everything on the planet was the same (ex) 
The clones did not want to hurt Lily and Joe (inf) 
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Item 18: Version 1 
 
Lily and Joe landed on a planet covered in deserts. There were also lots of cool purple rocks.  
Lily and Joe decided to look for a rock as a gift for their friend Newt. Eventually they spotted a rock shaped 
like an N.  
However, it was on the other side of a large crack in the ground. The crack was full of snakes.  
Lily leapt, but the gap was too wide. She fell right into the crack.  
“ARGH!!! ARGH!!! ARGH!!!” Lily cried out in pain. The large evil snake had bitten Lily's ankle.  (rw) 
YELLOW 
The large snake had bitten Lily's ankle. 
 
Bravely Joe went into the pit and got Lily out. Lily was as pale as a ghost and very shaky.  
Joe had some pills that would save Lily. Sadly, they were back in the spaceship.  
It would take him hours to carry Lily back. Lily didn’t have a few hours.  
Joe would have to find a faster way back. Luckily, the answer right in front of him. 
There was a large herd of very odd zebras. The zebras were covered in huge pink stripes. (cfw) 
RED 
The zebras were covered in huge pink stripes. 
 
Joe approached the zebras. One of them bowed down so Joe and Lily could ride on its back. Within no 
time they were back at the spaceship. Lily got better very fast. 
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Item 18: Version 2 
Lily and Joe landed on a planet covered in deserts and beautiful purple rocks.  
Lily and Joe decided to look for the perfect rock as a present for their friend Newt. Newt collected weird 
rocks.  
Lily and Joe searched all day. They saw many wonderful things. But they just couldn't find the right rock.  
They saw giant pink trees, huge birds, and tiny cats. In front of them was a sight just as weird. 
There was a large herd of very odd zebras. The zebras were covered in huge pink stripes. (cfw) 
RED 
 
After a while they found the right rock.   
It was on the other side of a giant hole. The hole was full of snake after snake.  
"Can you jump that far?" asked Joe. "If you fall in the snake pills are in the ship. It will take hours to get 
back to them."  
Lily leapt, but the gap was too wide. She fell straight into the crack.  
“ARGH!!! ARGH!!! ARGH!!!” Lily cried out in pain. The large evil snake had bitten Lily's ankle. (rw) 
YELLOW 
 
Joe pulled Lily out of the pit. He approached the zebras. One of them bowed down so they could ride on its 
back. Within no time they were back at the spaceship. 
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Item 18: Comprehension Questions 
 
The planet was covered in deserts (ex) 
The zebras would fit in on Earth (inf) 
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Appendix 4.5 – Reading Grades 
 
 Version 1 Version 2 
Story 1 1.66381 1.546566 
Story 2 1.389934 1.034305 
Story 3 1.319643 1.882885 
Story 4 1.833403 1.605384 
Story 5 1.263378 1.757986 
Story 6 1.383646 1.315577 
Story 7 2.558578 2.357026 
Story 8 1.82406 2.113874 
Story 9 2.047927 2.82226 
Story 10 1.724031 1.693808 
Story 11 2.595006 2.684251 
Story 12 2.743687 2.823654 
Story 13 2.22301 2.050983 
Story 14 2.504829 2.050983 
Story 15 1.705825 1.599674 
Story 16 2.015049 2.072054 
Story 17 1.580346 1.446664 
Story 18 2.937035 1.890408 
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Appendix 4.6 – Practice Story 
 
Lily and Joe landed on a new planet. They climbed out of their rocket to look around. Lily felt 
unsure. She turned around to head back, but it was too late. Their rocket was rising into the 
sky. ͞“oŵeoŶe has stoleŶ our roĐket!͟ Đried Joe. The thieǀes did Ŷot get far though. Suddenly, 
there was a loud bang. The rocket crashed. The ďaŶg ǁas so loud it kŶoĐked Lily’s hat off her 
head. 
Lily ďeŶt dowŶ aŶd piĐked up her ďig hat. Lily’s large hat was yellow aŶd ŵade froŵ straw. 
(rw) GREEN 
Lily’s hat was ŵade froŵ straw. 
 
Lily Đliŵďed a tree to see if she Đould see ǁhere the roĐket had laŶded. ͞It’s that ǁay!͟ she 
shouted. ͞We just Ŷeed to fiŶd the riǀer aŶd folloǁ it.͟ Lily and Joe jumped into the river and 
swam down it. They saw green fish, red ducks, and purple eels. They Finally, Lily and Joe could 
see their rocket. 
The rocket was surrounded by hundreds of sheep. The sheep were quite odd. The sheep 
were green. (CFW) YELLOW 
The sheep were green. 
 
Lily and Joe jumped out of the river. They ran to their rocket. It was empty. The thieves had 
run away. Lily and Joe jumped into their rocket and flew away. 
Comprehension Questions 
Lily was feeling happy at the start of the story? (inf) 
Lily climbed a tree to find the rocket? (exp) 
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Appendix 4.7 – Remaining Interactions for SVT Response Time (Stage 2) 
 
Plausibility * Age: F (1,28) = 1.20, p = .28, ηp² = .04 
Inference * Age: F  (2,56) = 2.26, p = .11, ηp² = .01 
Plausibility * Inference Type: F (2, 56) = .35, p = .71, ηp² = .01 
Plausibility * Inference Type * Age: F (2,56) = 1.21, p = .31, ηp² = .04 
Appendix 4.8 – Remaining Interactions for IST Reading Speeds (Stage 2) 
 
Plausibility * Age: F  (1, 28) = 0.95, p = .34, ηp² = .03 
Inference Type * Age: F  (2, 56) = 0.76, p = .47, ηp² =  .03 
Plausibility * Inference Type: F  (2, 56) = 0.80, p = .46, ηp² = .03 
Plausibility * Inference Type * Age: F  (2, 56) = 2.42, p = .10, ηp² = .08 
Appendix 4.9 – Remaining Accuracy Interactions (Stage 2) 
 
Plausibility * Age: F  (1, 56) = 0.19, p = .66, ηp² < .01 
Plausibility * Task: F  (1, 56) = 1.06, p = .31, ηp² = .02 
Plausibility * Age * Task: F  (1, 56) = 0.19, p = .66, ηp² < .01 
Plausibility * Inference Type * Age: F (2, 112) = 1.35, p = .27, ηp² = .05 
Plausibility * Inference Type * Task: F (2, 112) = 1.69, p = .19, ηp² = .06 
Plausibility * Inference Type * Age * Task: F (2, 112) = 1.64, p = .20, ηp² = .06 
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Appendix 5.1 - Ethical Approval 
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Appendix 5.2 – Information Sheets, Consent Forms, and Debriefs 
 
Email to Schools/Sports Groups 
Dear Head Teacher, 
I'm Rebecca Hancock. I'm a PhD student at Sheffield Hallam University. My PhD project will be 
exploring the development of reading comprehension and text production skills during 
adolescence.  
I was wondering if you would be willing to let me work with around 5 students from year. 
What Would the School Receive for Taking Part? 
Once the study is completed I would provide you with feedback. This feedback would offer 
suggestions to improve reading comprehension and text production skills. 
I would also be happy to run a class/assembly on 'what it is like to go to university' or 
'Psychology as a subject.'  
Your school would also receive a certificate from Sheffield Hallam University stating that you've 
been involved in a project that aims to promote literacy skills in young people. 
What Would Your Students Receive for Taking Part? 
All students that take part will receive a small goody bag, typically filled with small items of 
stationary. 
We also find that young people generally enjoy the types of tasks I would like them to 
complete. 
Each student would also receive a certificate. 
What Would Your Students Have to Do? 
I have developed a variety of computer and paper based tasks to assess reading 
comprehension, text production, and related skills. 
Students would complete the task in two sessions. The first session is a one-to-one session 
which should take no longer than an hour. The second session is a group session, where all 5 
students complete the tasks at the same time. Again this session should take no longer than an 
hour. 
Of course, when these sessions take place would be decided through discussion with the 
students' class teachers. 
If you think your school would be interested in my project or if you would like any further 
details please do not hesitate to contact me. 
With Best Wishes, 
Rebecca 
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Tier 1 – Organisation Consent 
Dear Head teacher, 
Thank you for taking the time to find out more about my research project. This letter will 
provide you with more information about the project. 
The project is looking at how the ability to generate inferences from fantasy and fiction texts 
may change with age. Therefore, this project is looking for changes across time, and so the 
young people will need to complete the tasks both now and then again 18months later. I 
would be looking to work with children from year 5, year 7, and year 9. You can chose which 
age group(s) you would like me to work with and within these age groups the groups of 
children (i.e., which tutor group) you would like me to work with.  
The tasks and activities will be assessing: 
 intelligence  reading comprehension abilities  text production skill  counterfactual-world and real-world inference generation abilities  ability to access real-world knowledge  inhibition skill   working memory capacity  strength of belief-bias 
All tasks are suitable for children and should not differ too much from the tasks they complete 
in class. Some tasks will be completed on a laptop and some tasks will be paper based. The 
laptop will be provided by the researcher. 
Parental consent will be gained from the parents and both verbal and written consent will be 
gained from the children before they take part in the study.  
The young people would be seen individually during school time in a quiet area of your school. 
Several sessions may be needed but each session will last no longer than 40minutes and all 
sessions will be arranged through discussion with the class teacher.  This should minimise any 
disruption to learning. It is thought approximately 2-3 sessions will be needed, however, this 
ŵay ǀary depeŶdiŶg oŶ eaĐh Đhild’s age aŶd aďilities.  
All data collected will be treated with the strictest confidence. All data will be anonymised, by 
giving each child a unique but random code. This, instead of their name, will be recorded on all 
tasks. Any data stored on a computer will be password protected and any paper based data 
will be stored in a locked cupboard.  
Of course all young people would be able to withdraw from the study at any time during data 
collection.  The young people will be told if at any point they want to stop then they can. 
Furthermore, children will be told that the tasks are voluntary and so if they do not wish to 
complete a task they do not have to. 
ChildreŶ’s data ĐaŶ also ďe ǁithdraǁŶ ďy yourself or parents/guardians up until 31st December 
2012 by contacting me directly by e-mail (dsrh9@exchange.shu.ac.uk).  Data collected in 
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18months will also be able to be withdrawn up to 2 weeks after data collection. A more 
specific time will be given closer to the time. 
If you have any further queries about the study please do not hesitate to contact me by e-mail.  
You can also contact my supervisor Dr Claudine Bowyer-Crane by e-mail or telephone 
(claudine.bowyer-crane@york.ac.uk; 01904 434398).  If you are happy for the pupils in your 
school to take part in this research please fill in the form below. 
Kind regards 
 
Rebecca Hancock 
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Project exploring the development of inference generation abilities:  OPT-IN form 
I have read and understood the information given to me about this study. I give permission for 
the pupils in my school to take part in the research project looking at the development of 
inference generation abilities. I understand that participation in this study involves: 
 Assessment at time 1 and then again 18months later at time 2 
  Distribution and collection of parental consent forms on behalf of the researcher 
  Children completing several individual test sessions which will last no longer than 
40minutes a session 
  Children completing a variety of computer and paper based activities 
I also understand that: 
 All data will be anonymised 
  All data will be securely stored, either in a locked cupboard or when on a computer, 
password protected 
  The children can withdraw from their data from the study up until 31st December 2012  
  The children do not have to take part if they do not wish 
  The children can refuse to complete any tasks 
  Data ĐaŶ also ďe ǁithdraǁŶ ďy either the sĐhool or the Đhild’s pareŶts/guardiaŶs 
  I can contact the researcher or her supervisor at any point during this study if I have 
any questions of queries 
Name of School:………………………………………………………… 
 
Head teacher:………………………………………………………….. 
 
 
Signed:…………………….;Head TeaĐherͿ  Date:……………………… 
 
 
  
398 
 
Tier 2 – Parental Consent
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Tier 3 – Child Consent 
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Child Debrief  
 
  
402 
 
Undergraduate Consent 
 
Thank you for taking the time to find out more about my research project. This sheet will 
provide you with more information about the project. 
The project is looking at how the ability to generate inferences from fantasy and fiction texts 
may change with age and genre. The tasks and activities you will complete will be assessing: 
 intelligence  reading comprehension abilities  writing skills  counterfactual-world and real-world inference generation abilities  ability to access real-world knowledge  inhibition skill   working memory capacity  strength of belief-bias 
 
Some tasks will be completed on a laptop and some tasks will be paper based.  
 You will be seen individually at times convenient for yourself. Several sessions may be needed 
but each session will last no longer than 40minutes. You will receive psycredits for your 
participation. These will be awarded after all sessions have been completed. 
All data collected will be treated with the strictest confidence. All data will be anonymised, by 
giving you a unique but random code. This, instead of your name, will be recorded on all tasks. 
Any data stored on a computer will be password protected and any paper based data will be 
stored in a locked cupboard.  
Of course you have the right to withdraw from the study at any time during data collection up 
until 2 weeks after taking part by contacting me directly by e-mail 
(dsrh9@exchange.shu.ac.uk).  If at any point you wish to stop then you can. Furthermore, all 
tasks are voluntary and so if you do not wish to complete a task you do not have to. 
If you have any further queries about the study please do not hesitate to contact me by e-mail.  
You can also contact my supervisor Dr Lisa Reidy by e-mail or telephone 
(ssllr@exchange.shu.ac.uk |0114 2255813).  If you are happy to take part in this research 
please fill in the form on the next page. 
Kind regards 
 
Rebecca Hancock 
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Project exploring the development of inference generation abilities:  OPT-IN form 
I have read and understood the information given to me about this study. I understand that 
participation in this study involves: 
 Completing a variety of computer and paper based activities over several sessions 
I also understand that: 
 All data will be anonymised 
  All data will be securely stored, either in a locked cupboard or when on a computer, 
password protected 
  I can withdraw my data from the study up until 2 weeks after taking part 
  I do not have to take part if I do not wish to do so 
  I can refuse to complete any tasks 
  I can contact the researcher or her supervisor at any point during this study if I have 
any questions of queries 
 
Name:………………………………………………………….. 
 
 
Signed:…………………................................….                              Date:……………………… 
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Undergraduate Debrief 
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Appendix 5.3 - Order of Tasks 
Session 1 Session 2 
forced-choice picture-selection task written language task 
vocabulary task Knowledge task 
inhibition task belief bias task 
reading comprehension task 
 
working memory task  
matrix reasoning task  
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Appendix 6.1. – Individual Analysis for Vocabulary and Matrix Reasoning 
Raw Scores 
There was found to be a significant main effect of age for vocabulary score (χ2 (3, N = 
200) = 116.31, p < .001). Six non-parametric independent t-tests were conducted to 
explore further. Year 5 were found to have weaker vocabulary skills than Year 7 (U = 
360.00, p < .001, N = 100), Year 9 (U = 79.50, p < .001, N = 100), and adults (U = 43.00, 
p < .001, N = 100). Year 7 were found to have weaker vocabulary skills than Year 9 (U 
= 324.00, p < .001, N = 100) and adults (U = 262.50, p < .001, N = 100). Year 9 were also 
found to have weaker vocabulary skills than adults (U = 551.00, p = .002, N = 100).  
A main effect of age was found for matrix reasoning scores (χ2 (3, N = 200) = 46.01, p < 
.001). Six non-parametric independent t-tests were conducted to explore further. Year 5 
were found to have weaker matrix reasoning skills than Year 7 (U = 605.50, p < .001, N 
= 100), Year 9 (U = 542.00, p = .006, N = 100), and adults (U = 426.00, p < .001, N = 
100). There was found to be no difference between the matrix reasoning abilities of Year 
7 and Year 9 (U = 687.50, p = .576, N = 100). However, Year 7 (U = 757.00, p = .001, N 
= 100) and Year 9 (U = 538.00, p = .001, N = 100) were found to have weaker matrix 
reasoning skills than adults. 
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Appendix 6.2 – Individual Contributions of Controls 
Beta values for Text Quality Regression Models 
 Year 5 Year 7 Year 9 Adults 
Working 
Memory 
Capacity 
.359* .159 .019 .014 
IQ Raw Score .312 .233 .347 .070 
Single Word 
Reading 
Score 
.267 .297 .112 .174 
*p <  .05 
Beta values for Reading Comprehension Regression Models 
 Year 5 Year 7 Year 9 Adults 
Working 
Memory 
Capacity 
.024 .096 .007 .093 
IQ Raw Score .238 .009 .087 .235 
Single Word 
Reading 
Score 
.246 .523* .381 .073 
*p <  .05 
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Appendix 7.1 – Comparisons for Main Effect of Age (Accuracy) 
 
Year 5 vs Year 7: t (99) = 2.44, p = .02 
Year 5 vs Year 9: t (99) = 2.95, p = .004 
Year 5 vs Adults: t (105) = 4.93, p < .001 
Year 7 vs Year 9: t (98) = 0.72, p = .48 
Year 7 vs Adults: t (104) = 2.03, p = .04 
Year 9 vs Adults: t (104) = 1.03, p = .30 
Appendix 7.2 – Remaining Interactions for Accuracy Data 
Plausibility * Age: F (1, 203) = .12, p = .95, ηp² < .01 
Plausibility * Inference Type * Age: F (1.85, 383.70) = .63, p = .70, ηp² = .01 
Appendix 7.3 – Additional Analysis Comparisons for Main Effect of 
Reading Comprehension Age (Accuracy) 
 
7-9;12 years vs 10-13;12 years: t (98) = 2.82, p = .006 
7-9;12 years vs 14-15;12 years: t (95) = 2.72, p = .008 
7-9;12 years vs 16 years and over: t (106) = 2.78, p = .006 
10-13;12 years vs 14-15;12 years: t (97) = 0.37, p = .71 
10-13;12 years vs 16 years and over: t (108) 0.15, p = .88 
14-15;12 years vs 16 years and over: t (105) = .022, p = .82 
Appendix 7.4 – Remaining Interactions for Additional Analysis Accuracy 
Data 
Plausibility * Reading Comprehension Age: F  (1, 206) = .99, p = .40, ηp² = .03 
Inference Type * Reading Comprehension Age: F  (1.65, 352.56) = 1.01, p = .41, ηp² 
= .03 
Plausibility * Inference Type * Reading Comprehension Age: F  (1.65, 352.56) = 1.46, p 
= .20, ηp² = .04 
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Appendix 7.5 – Comparisons for Main Effect of Age (Reading Speed) 
 
Year 5 vs Year 7: t (99) = 4.28, p < .001 
Year 5 vs Year 9: t (99) = 8.81, p < .001 
Year 5 vs Adults: t (105) = 10.58, p < .001 
Year 7 vs Year 9: t (98) = 4.47, p < .001 
Year 7 vs Adults: t (104) = 6.01, p < .001 
Year 9 vs Adults: t (104) = 1.31, p = .19 
Appendix 7.6 – Remaining Interactions for Reading Speed Data 
 
Plausibility * Age: F (1, 180) = 1.15, p = .33, ηp² = .02 
Inference Type * Age: F (1.92, 346.25) = .014, p = .99, ηp² = .003 
Plausibility * Inference Type: F (1.92, 346.25) = .03, p = .97, ηp² <  .001 
Plausibility * Inference Type * Age: F  (1.92, 346.25) = .09, p = .99, ηp² = .001 
  
410 
 
Appendix 7.7 – Additional Analysis 
Additional analysis was conducted when exploring accuracy patterns as Year 9 displayed 
a qualitatively different pattern to the other three groups. This was not the case for reading 
speed, such a main effect of age was not observed. The Year 9 sample comprises a high 
number of young people with reading comprehension levels below age-related 
expectations. Therefore, it is possible that reading speed patterns were skewed by the mix 
of reading abilities in each age group. Therefore, reading speeds were explored using the 
four new reading comprehension age groups created previously: 7-9;11 years (n = 49), 
10-13;11 years (n = 51), 14-15;11 years (n = 48), and 16 years and over (n=59). See Table 
7.8 for a summary of reading speed means for each condition. A mixed factorial ANOVA, 
with reading speed of critical text as the dependent variable was conducted. 
Data was inspected prior to analysis. Since two versions of each story were created, 
analysis was conducted to determine if one version of the stories was more difficult than 
the other. There was found to be no difference between the number of errors made on 
Version 1 and Version 2 for those with a reading age of 7-9;11 years (t (47) = 1.81, p 
= .08), 10-13;11years (t (49) = 1.04, p = .31), 14-15;11 years (t (46) = 1.39, p = .17) or 
16 years and over (t (57) = 0.83, p = .42). Data was therefore collapsed across both 
versions. Inspection of the skewness and kurtosis statistics revealed that for all conditions 
the data was normally distributed (z-scores for skewness and kurtosis were less than 1.96, 
the level suggested by Field (2005) for sample sizes less than 200). Homogeneity of 
variance was violated such that the largest standard deviation was more than four times 
larger than the smallest standard deviation (Howell, 1987). However, Field suggests 
ANOVA is robust enough to deal with this violation. Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity was 
significant for inference type. Girden (1992) suggest that Huynh-Feldt, not the 
Greenhouse-Geisser correction, should be used when the estimates of sphericity are 
greater than 0.75, as in these cases the Greenhouse-Geisser correction is likely to be too 
conservative. Consequently, a parametric ANOVA was conducted to explore the effects 
of age, plausibility and inference type on reading speeds, with Huynh-Feldt statistics 
reported for those analyses including inference type. 
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Mean number of errors (and Standard Deviations) for real-world literal, real-world coherence-inference-evoking, real-world elaborative-
inference evoking, counterfactual-world literal, counterfactual-world coherence-inference evoking, counterfactual-world elaborative-
inference evoking conditions for all Reading-Age groups 
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A 2 (Plausibility: real-world, counterfactual-world) * 2 (Inference Type: literal, 
coherence, elaborative) * 4 (Reading Comprehension Age: 7-9:11 years, 9-13:11 years, 
14-15:11 years, 16 years) mixed factorial ANOVA was conducted. A main effect of 
plausibility was observed, with counterfactual-world critical sentences being read 
significantly slower than real-world critical sentences (F (1, 206) = 10.01, p = .002, ηp² 
= .08). A main effect of inference type was also observed (F (1.89, 351.69) = 4.19, p = .02, 
ηp² = .03). Three post hoc pairwise comparisons were conducted. There was a trend for 
coherence critical sentences to be read slower than literal critical sentences (t (206) = 2.51, 
p = .01) and elaborative critical sentences (t (206) = 2.16, p = .03), however, these 
differences did not reach significance due to the correction applied. There was no 
significant difference between reading speeds for literal critical sentences and elaborative 
critical sentences (t (206) = 0.37, p = .57). An interaction was observed between inference 
type and age (report). Six post hoc pairwise comparisons revealed that 7-9 year olds read 
critical texts significantly slower than 10 -13 year olds (t (98) = 4.81, p < .001), 14-15 
year olds (t (95) = 5.88, p < .001), and 16 years and over (t (106) = 5.42, p < .001). None 
of the remaining comparisons were significant (p >  .42 for all remaining comparisons). 
None of the interactions were significant (p >  .39 for all interactions). 
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Appendix 8.1 – Example Stimuli – Knowledge 
Experimental Items  
1. mammals give birth to live young 
2. most men look quite different 
3. most trees grow from tiny seeds 
4. without help humans can't fly 
5. penguins can't fly but can swim 
6. fish can't walk but they can swim 
7. cats can't talk but can meow 
8. (human speech) 
9. (whale song) 
10. trees are rooted to the ground  
11. tigers could bite a human 
12. some sharks could bite a human 
13. some snakes could bite a human 
14. the bones in humans can break 
15. thin ice can crack if walked on 
16. humans can't walk on water 
17. solid rocks can be walked on 
18. plants soak up water through roots 
19. a lot of bears have brown fur 
20. humans are covered in skin 
21. snakes skin is covered in scales 
22. fish are covered in scales 
23. coffee is often quite hot 
24. snow is usually cold 
25. ice lollies are very cold 
26. mostly, leaves on trees are green 
27. usually grass is green 
28. zebras have black and white stripes 
29. Most bananas are yellow 
30. most clay is brownish 
31. hippos are very heavy 
32. rhinos are very heavy 
33. leaves are not very heavy 
34. most tree trunks are very hard 
35. solid steel doesn’t bend 
36. concrete walls are quite solid 
 
Fillers (7syllables) 
1. Birds are covered in scales 
2. Nearly all pink pigs can fly 
3. Dolphins can't walk but can fly 
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4. Lions can't talk but can woof 
5. Hippos can't swim but can fly 
6. Many dogs have bright green fur 
7. Pigs are covered in feathers 
8. Most snakes are covered in fur 
9. Lava is often quite cold 
10. Bumble bees have purple stripes 
11. Mud is often bright yellow 
12. Water is often bright pink 
13. Milk is usually green 
14. Feathers are very heavy 
15. Elephants are very light 
16. Many insects are heavy 
17. Iron bars bend easily 
18. The human skull is bendy 
19. Humans can walk on cold milk 
20. Plants use their leaves to make cakes 
21. Almost all chickens can speak 
22. Whales bark at each other 
23. Trees jump around to find food 
24. Worms often attack humans 
25. Squirrels often attack men 
26. Goldfish often attack men 
27. Humans can walk on thin air 
28. Most humans can't walk on grass 
29. Rain is usually hot 
30. Orange juice is very hot 
31. Foxes are often purple 
32. Thick wood is easy to bend 
33. Rubber is quite hard to bend 
34. A lot of dogs hatch from eggs 
35. All girls are identical 
36. Plants give birth to baby plants 
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Appendix 8.2 – Example Stimuli – Belief Biases 
 
Premise Conclusion 
All dogs have feathers. A dalmatian is a dog Dalmatians have feathers 
All dogs are bigger than donkeys. All donkeys 
are bigger than elephants 
Dogs are smaller than elephants 
All wood sinks in water. Oak is a type of 
wood 
Oak floats on water 
Snow makes driving conditions safer. It 
always snows in the winter 
It is safer to drive in the winter 
All apples are blue or pink. Tim's apple is not 
pink 
Tim's apple is blue 
All fish live in trees. A trout is a fish Fish live in water 
All footballs are the same shape as tennis 
balls. All tennis balls are the same shape as 
rugby balls 
A football is the same shape as a rugby ball 
All plants make carbon dioxide. A sunflower 
is a plant 
A sunflower makes carbon dioxide 
All elephants are hayeaters. All hayeaters 
are light 
Elephants are not light 
All fruit is unhealthy. A banana is a fruit Bananas are healthy 
All birds have wings. A canary is a bird A canary has wings 
All snakes use their tongues to smell with. A 
cobra is a snake 
Cobras use their tongues to smell with 
All buses have more wheels than cars. All 
cars have more wheels than motorbikes 
Motorbikes have more wheels than buses 
Rain causes the water in rivers to rise. It 
rains a lot in Autumn 
In Autumn the water levels in rivers drop 
All squirrels are red or grey. Jack's squirrel is 
not red 
Jack's squirrel is grey 
All Summers are warmer than Autumns. All 
Autumns are warmer than Winters 
Winters are warmer than Summers 
All vegetables are healthy. A carrot is a 
vegetable 
A carrot is unhealthy 
All humans produce carbon dioxide. Sally is a 
human 
Sally produces carbon dioxide 
All igneous rocks are formed by magma. 
Granite is an igneous rock 
Granite is formed by magma 
All quadrilaterals have four sides. A square is 
quadrilateral 
A square has three sides 
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Appendix 8.3 – Contributions of Controls 
Contribution of Controls to Real-World Coherence Inference Generation Skill 
 Year 5 Year 7 Year 9 Adults 
IQ Raw Score -.23 -.20 -.31 -.38* 
Working 
Memory 
Capacity 
-.22 -.34 -.13 <-.01 
Single Word 
Reading Score 
-.41*** -.08 -.06 -.13 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
Contribution of Controls to Real-World Elaborative Inference Generation Skill 
 Year 5 Year 7 Year 9 Adults 
IQ Raw Score -.23 -.35 -.15 -.22 
Working 
Memory 
Capacity 
-.15 -.21 -.12 -.03 
Single Word 
Reading Score 
-.17 >-.01 -.06 -.18 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
 
Contribution of Controls to Counterfactual-World Coherence Inference Generation 
Skill 
 Year 5 Year 7 Year 9 Adults 
IQ Raw Score .04 .01 .17 .08 
Working 
Memory 
Capacity 
.02 .13 .10 .15 
Single Word 
Reading Score 
.24 .21 .30 .14 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
 
Contribution of Controls to Counterfactual-World Elaborative Inference Generation 
Skill 
 Year 5 Year 7 Year 9 Adults 
IQ Raw Score .20 .17 .25 .24 
Working 
Memory 
Capacity 
.21 .07 .14 .01 
Single Word 
Reading Score 
.11 .08 .08 .06 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
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Appendix 8.4 – Composite Analysis 
Beta Values for Step 2 Variables when Exploring Accessibility of Knowledge in Step 3 
and Real-World Coherence Inference Generation Skill as Dependent Variable 
 Year 5 Year 7 Year 9 Adults 
Strength of 
Belief Bias 
.04 .20 .19 .11 
Inhibitory 
Control 
.02 .16 .17 .02 
Amount of 
Knowledge 
-.53*** -.56*** -.38* -.36** 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
 
Beta Values for Step 2 Variables when Exploring Accessibility of Knowledge in Step 3 
and Real-World Elaborative Inference Generation Skill as Dependent Variable 
 Year 5 Year 7 Year 9 Adults 
Strength of 
Belief Bias 
.11 .21 .12 >.01 
Inhibitory 
Control 
.13 .42* -.10 -.54*** 
Amount of 
Knowledge 
.01 -.23 -.70 -.19 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
 
 
Beta Values for Step 2 Variables when Exploring Accessibility of Knowledge in Step 3 
and Counterfactual-World Coherence Inference Generation Skill as Dependent 
Variable 
 Year 5 Year 7 Year 9 Adults 
Strength of 
Belief Bias 
.75*** .37* .33* .42** 
Inhibitory 
Control 
.05 >.01 .40* .24 
Amount of 
Knowledge 
.13 .26 .05 .12 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
 
Beta Values for Step 2 Variables when Exploring Accessibility of Knowledge in Step 3 
and Counterfactual-World Elaborative Inference Generation Skill as Dependent 
Variable 
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 Year 5 Year 7 Year 9 Adults 
Strength of 
Belief Bias 
.54*** .46*** .32 .42* 
Inhibitory 
Control 
.07 .77** -.59** -.02 
Amount of 
Knowledge 
.01 .10 .08 .09 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
 
 
Beta Values for Step 2 Variables when Exploring Amount of Knowledge in Step 3 and 
Real-World Coherence Inference Generation Skill as Dependent Variable 
 Year 5 Year 7 Year 9 Adults 
Accessibility of 
Knowledge 
.29 .43** .51** .63*** 
Strength of Belief 
Bias 
.01 .02 .18 .17 
Inhibitory 
Control 
.15 .16 .01 .04 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
Beta Values for Step 2 Variables when Exploring Amount of Knowledge in Step 3 and 
Real-World Elaborative Inference Generation Skill as Dependent Variable 
 Year 5 Year 7 Year 9 Adults 
Accessibility of 
Knowledge 
.53* .11 .45* .40*** 
Strength of Belief 
Bias 
.01 .15 .03 .04 
Inhibitory 
Control 
.12 .42* -.13 -.50*** 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
 
 
Beta Values for Step 2 Variables when Exploring Amount of Knowledge in Step 3 and 
Counterfactual-World Coherence Inference Generation Skill as Dependent Variable 
 Year 5 Year 7 Year 9 Adults 
Accessibility of 
Knowledge 
.21 .28 .18 .13 
Strength of Belief 
Bias 
.80*** .47** .27 .44** 
Inhibitory 
Control 
.08 >.01 .41* .25 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
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Beta Values for Step 2 Variables when Exploring Amount of Knowledge in Step 3 and 
Counterfactual-World Elaborative Inference Generation Skill as Dependent Variable 
 Year 5 Year 7 Year 9 Adults 
Accessibility of 
Knowledge 
.10 .09 .16 .09 
Strength of 
Belief Bias 
.57** .43** .34* .41** 
Inhibitory 
Control 
.05 .77*** -.63*** -.05 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
 
Beta Values for Step 2 Variables when Exploring Inhibitory Control in Step 3 and Real-
World Coherence Inference Generation Skill as Dependent Variable 
 Year 5 Year 7 Year 9 Adults 
Strength of Belief 
Bias 
.02 .10 .09 .14 
Amount of 
Knowledge 
-.48** -.47** -.29 -.23* 
Accessibility of 
Knowledge 
.18 .19 .48** .57*** 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
 
Beta Values for Step 2 Variables when Exploring Inhibitory Control in Step 3 and Real-
World Elaborative Inference Generation Skill as Dependent Variable 
 Year 5 Year 7 Year 9 Adults 
Strength of 
Belief Bias 
>.01 .11 .20 .05 
Amount of 
Knowledge 
-.11 -.22 -.64*** -.15 
Accessibility of 
Knowledge 
.56*** .01 .37** .44** 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
 
Beta Values for Step 2 Variables when Exploring Inhibitory Control in Step 3 and 
Counterfactual-World Coherence Inference Generation Skill as Dependent Variable 
 Year 5 Year 7 Year 9 Adults 
Strength of Belief 
Bias 
.79*** .43** .32 .46** 
Amount of 
Knowledge 
.08 .17 .03 .08 
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Accessibility of 
Knowledge 
.19 .19 .13 .08 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
 
Beta Values for Step 2 Variables when Exploring Inhibitory Control in Step 3 and 
Counterfactual-World Elaborative Inference Generation Skill as Dependent Variable 
 Year 5 Year 7 Year 9 Adults 
Strength of Belief 
Bias 
.57** .27 .32 .43** 
Amount of 
Knowledge 
>.01 .06 .22 .12 
Accessibility of 
Knowledge 
.11 .04 .06 .11 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
 
Beta Values for Step 2 Variables when Exploring Strength of Belief Bias in Step 3 and 
Real-World Coherence Inference Generation Skill as Dependent Variable 
 Year 5 Year 7 Year 9 Adults 
Amount of 
Knowledge 
-.48** -.43** -.33* -.26* 
Accessibility of 
Knowledge 
.17 .24 .48** .57*** 
Inhibitory 
Control 
.01 .13 .09 .08 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
 
Beta Values for Step 2 Variables when Exploring Strength of Belief Bias in Step 3 and 
Real-World Elaborative Inference Generation Skill as Dependent Variable 
 Year 5 Year 7 Year 9 Adults 
Amount of 
Knowledge 
-.17 -.16 -.60** -.11 
Accessibility of 
Knowledge 
.57*** .07 .33* .38** 
Inhibitory 
Control 
.02 .12 -.45* -.33 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
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Beta Values for Step 2 Variables when Exploring Strength of Belief Bias in Step 3 and 
Counterfactual-World Coherence Inference Generation Skill as Dependent Variable 
 Year 5 Year 7 Year 9 Adults 
Amount of 
Knowledge 
.08 .30 .01 .17 
Accessibility of 
Knowledge 
.02 .05 .24 .09 
Inhibitory 
Control 
.02 .12 .45* .33 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
 
Beta Values for Step 2 Variables when Exploring Strength of Belief Bias in Step 3 and 
Counterfactual-World Elaborative Inference Generation Skill as Dependent Variable 
 Year 5 Year 7 Year 9 Adults 
Amount of 
Knowledge 
.03 .06 .02 .05 
Accessibility of 
Knowledge 
.08 .20 .09 .09 
Inhibitory 
Control 
.02 .64*** -.59** -.11 
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Appendix 8.5 – Beta Values for Regression Analysis 
Beta Values for Real-World Coherence Regression Models 
 Year 5 Year 7 Year 9 Adults 
Strength of Belief 
Bias 
.02 .14 .10 .14 
Inhibitory 
Control 
.01 .17 .09 .06 
Accessibility of 
Knowledge 
.18 .19 .47*** .58** 
Amount of 
Knowledge 
-.48** -.47** -.31 -.24* 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
 
Beta Values for Real-World Elaborative Regression Models 
 Year 5 Year 7 Year 9 Adults 
Strength of 
Belief Bias 
.01 .21 .20 .02 
Inhibitory 
Control 
.17 .42* -.04 -.49*** 
Accessibility of 
Knowledge 
.57*** >.01 .36* .38** 
Amount of 
Knowledge 
-.17 -.23 -.65*** -.11 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
Beta Values for Counterfactual-World Coherence Regression Models 
 Year 5 Year 7 Year 9 Adults 
Strength of Belief 
Bias 
.79** .42** .29 .42** 
Inhibitory 
Control 
.06 >.01 .43 .26 
Accessibility of 
Knowledge 
.20 .19 .19 .11 
Amount of 
Knowledge 
.06 .17 .08 .10 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
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Beta Values for Counterfactual-World Elaborative Regression Models 
 Year 5 Year 7 Year 9 Adults 
Strength of Belief 
Bias 
.57** .45** .35* .43** 
Inhibitory 
Control 
.06 .77*** -.61** -.04 
Accessibility of 
Knowledge 
<.01 .05 .15 .11 
Amount of 
Knowledge 
.02 .07 .06 .12 
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 
 
 
 
